In the Interest of E.G. and W.G., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1446
Filed January 10, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF E.G. and W.G.,
Minor Children,

W.D., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Brent Pattison, District

Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Lori M. Holm, Des Moines, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

ConGarry D. Williams of Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney

and guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

At the termination-of-parental-rights hearing for her two children, born in

2018 and 2021, a newly sober mother testified that she wanted “another chance”

to “be a better mom to my boys.” When asked why she was absent for most of the

juvenile court proceedings, the mother answered, “My drug use got really, really

bad. I was in a dark place, and—and I just couldn’t find my way out.”

Though the court praised the mother for her recent sobriety, it concluded

her attempt at a “fourth-quarter comeback”—which happened only after the

permanency goal was changed to termination—was not enough to move the

goalposts. So the court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(f) and (h) (2023).1 The mother appeals, claiming the juvenile

court erred in finding sufficient evidence that the children could not be returned to

her custody, determining termination was in the children’s best interests, and

denying her request for more time to work toward reunification.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

When the oldest child was three years old—in May 2022—a neighbor found

him in her backyard. He had a large bruise on his head and said that “his mom

had hit him.” The neighbor called the police, who helped the child find his way

back home. Along the way, they ran into the child’s aunt. She was out looking for

the child and told the officers that she suspected the mother was using

methamphetamine because she was “easily agitated, lost her teeth, and was

looking skinny.” A child protective worker from the Iowa Department of Health and

1 The father’s parental rights were also terminated. He does not appeal.
3

Human Services met the officers at the child’s home, where they found his parents

and younger brother.2 The mother, who was in a domestically violent relationship

with the father, also had a bruise on her face. The children were placed with

relatives under a safety plan pending drug testing of the parents. After the parents

failed to complete that testing, the State obtained an order for temporary removal

and filed child-in-need-of-assistance petitions. The older child later tested positive

for methamphetamine. The children were adjudicated as in need of assistance in

June.3 That same month, the father was arrested for domestic abuse assault

against the mother.

By the dispositional hearing in August, the mother had not participated in

services outside of visits, which she attended inconsistently. Around then, the

mother admitted to the department that she regularly consumed alcohol and used

methamphetamine “on occasion.” During some of the mother’s visits in

September, she displayed signs of drug use, including paranoia and talking to

herself. The mother was easily frustrated with the children and needed frequent

redirection to ensure their safety. She stopped attending visits altogether in

October.

In January 2023, the father was arrested for assaulting the mother again.

At the permanency hearing in mid-April, the court learned the mother had not

contacted the department or had a visit with the children in more than six months.

2 This was not the first time the family was involved with the department.The
mother tested positive for methamphetamine when the older child was born in
2018. She completed outpatient substance-abuse treatment the next year, and
the child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding was closed.
3 The mother did not appear for the adjudication hearing, the November review

hearing, or the April 2023 permanency hearing.
4

While the father made a moving plea for more time, the juvenile court agreed with

the department that the case should proceed to termination of parental rights.

The State petitioned to terminate the parents’ rights a few days after that

hearing. At the end of April, the mother was involuntarily committed for treatment.

She stayed at a hospital for a couple of weeks before being transferred to House

of Mercy for residential substance-abuse and mental-health treatment. When she

was at the hospital, the mother contacted the department, seeking visits with the

children. The department denied her request at the recommendation of the oldest

child’s therapist. The mother then filed a motion for services and reasonable

efforts. Following a hearing, the court denied the motion but directed the mother

to reach out to the therapist. In mid-June, the mother renewed her motion for

services and reasonable efforts after talking to the therapist, who was still against

visits. The court denied the motion.

The termination hearing was held in late July. The mother testified that she

was still in inpatient treatment at House of Mercy. She was pregnant again by the

father and unsure whether they would stay together, noting “[r]ight now I’m

focusing on my treatment and myself.” The mother agreed that she did not

voluntarily go to treatment, testifying: “I was court-ordered . . . because of

methamphetamine use and my mental health.” She said that before her

involuntary commitment, she was using methamphetamine “[w]henever [she]

could. Basically 24/7.”

A progress report from House of Mercy stated the mother “needs

improvement” with program attendance and was only “moving towards

engagement” in recovery participation and other areas. Despite being diagnosed
5

with severe anxiety and depression, the mother testified that she had not yet

participated in any individual therapy. But she was committed to staying at House

of Mercy for the full length of the program—“around two years.” The mother

explained the children could be placed with her there “in a relatively short period

of time” and attend the on-site daycare.

The department caseworker testified the older child’s therapist was not on

board with resuming visitation while the termination petitions were pending

because it would cause more harm than good. If visits were to begin, the therapist

told the caseworker “it needed to happen very slowly,” with the mother first

addressing her own mental health before proceeding toward supervised visits.

When asked for her opinion on the mother’s request for an extension of time, the

caseworker testified: “I would really like to see the boys reach a permanency goal.

They’re comfortable where they are. I think it would cause more trauma and

potentially go through this process again.”

In its ruling, the juvenile court concluded the children could not be returned

to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. While the court

commended the mother for being in treatment, the court noted her sobriety “was

relatively new” and “there is still significant work to do for her to resume custody.”

The court explained that “given her lengthy history of methamphetamine use, prior

child welfare involvement, and the parents’ related struggles with domestic

violence, physical abuse, and supervision in the past, [she] would need to

demonstrate more progress in residential treatment, as well as some success in

the community before reunification could occur.” For many of the same reasons,
6

the court found termination was in the children’s best interest and an extension of

time was unwarranted. The mother appeals.

II. Analysis

We apply a three-step analysis in conducting our de novo review of

terminations of parental rights, asking whether (1) a statutory ground for

termination is satisfied, (2) the children’s best interests are served by termination,

and (3) a statutory exception applies and should be exercised to preclude

termination. See In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022); see also Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)–(3). We confine our review to the steps raised by the parent on

appeal. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). Here, those are the first

two. If those steps support termination, we then consider any ancillary issues

raised by the parent, such as whether additional time should be granted. See Iowa

Code § 232.117(5); see also id. § 232.104(2)(b).

A. Grounds for Termination

The mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

termination under section 232.116(1)(f) and (h), which apply separately to the

children given their ages. She only challenges the final common element of each

provision—that the children could not be returned to her custody at the time of the

termination hearing.4 See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4); In re D.W., 791

N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting the statutory language “at the present

time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”).

4 See In re B.W., No. 23-0518, 2023 WL 4759462, at *3 n.5 (Iowa Ct. App. July 26,

2023) (discussing the two different interpretations in our case law for finding that
children “cannot be returned” to parental custody). Our conclusion is the same
under either interpretation.
7

The mother seemed to acknowledge at the hearing that the children could

not immediately be placed with her at residential treatment, agreeing with her

attorney that there would need to be a “reunification process with the boys.” But

she overlooked ongoing barriers to that reunification process. Although she was

in a controlled environment that would ensure the children’s safety, the mother had

no contact with them for nearly ten months. During that time, the children became

integrated into their foster home, where they were thriving. One of the foster

mothers told the court at the end of the hearing that both children “were doing

fantastic,” especially the oldest child, who had struggled the most. According to

that child’s therapist, any reintegration of the mother into the children’s lives would

need to happen “very slowly.”

While the mother had commendably achieved more than ninety days of

sobriety, a progress report from the inpatient facility stated that she was not yet

fully engaged in recovery. The mother had only attended four out of the ten

parenting classes that she had been offered and had not yet started individual

therapy, even though it was available. Notably, the mother has been down this

road before. In the past juvenile court case with the oldest child, she successfully

completed substance-abuse treatment for her methamphetamine addiction only to

end up back where she started. See In re H.L., No. 14-0708, 2014 WL 3513262,

at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 16, 2014) (stating “[w]hat’s past is prologue” and citing

cases in which a parent’s past performance is viewed as evidence of the parent’s

future); see also In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012) (noting a parent’s

past conduct helps determine future behavior). Given the mother’s history, we

agree with the juvenile court that she “would need to demonstrate more progress
8

in residential treatment, as well as some success in the community before

reunification could occur.” See In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App.

1998) (“Where the parent has been unable to rise above the addiction and

experience sustained sobriety in a noncustodial setting, and establish the essential

support system to maintain sobriety, there is little hope of success in parenting.”).

For these reasons, we find the evidence was sufficient to support

termination under section 232.116(1)(f) and (h).

B. Best Interests

Next, the mother claims termination is contrary to the children’s best

interests. In assessing whether termination is in a child’s best interests, we “give

primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the

long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and

emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2).

The mother argues the children would be safe with her at inpatient

treatment. Yet, we have already concluded the children cannot be returned to the

mother’s custody at present. The mother also argues that termination is not in the

children’s best interests because it would sever their relationship with their yet-to-

be-born sibling. While sibling ties are important, the overall question is what is in

the children’s best interests. See In re T.J.O., 527 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa Ct.

App. 1994).

From a best-interests standpoint, there is a big difference between severing

established sibling ties versus ties between siblings who have never met, as here.

See id. (affirming separation of siblings where they “never resided together” or

knew each other and one of the children was “strongly bonded to the foster parents
9

with whom he has spent almost his entire life”). All else considered, we find

termination to be in the children’s best interests. It will satisfy the children’s long-

deserved needs for safety and a permanent home—the defining elements of a

child’s best interests. See In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011). It will

also provide them with an opportunity to be adopted by their foster placement,

where the children have become integrated, their behavioral issues have

stabilized, and they have flourished. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b).

C. Additional Time

Finally, the mother claims the court should have granted her request for

more time for reunification. Additional time is appropriate only if we can conclude

“the need for removal . . . will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month

period.” Id. § 232.104(2)(b). As noted, we agree with the juvenile court that the

mother would need to participate in and complete treatment, with an extended

period of sobriety and stability in the community, before the children could be

returned to her care. With her history, she needs more than six months to

accomplish those goals. “The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended

while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems.” In re

A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987). Because we cannot conclude the need

for removal will no longer exist after six months, we find additional time is not

warranted or in the children’s best interests. See In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323

(Iowa 2021).

We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.