State of Iowa v. Preston Odell Martin

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0454
Filed June 5, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

PRESTON ODELL MARTIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Gregory Milani,

Judge.

A defendant appeals the district court’s rejection of his insanity defense.

AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Heard by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
2

TABOR, Presiding Judge.

The district court found Preston Martin guilty of murder, burglary, and

robbery, each in the first degree. He appeals, arguing the district court should

have found by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of

the offenses. We find substantial evidence supporting the court’s decision that

Martin failed to prove his insanity defense, so we affirm the court’s verdicts.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

One morning in late May 2019, Tommy Foster called Ottumwa police to

report a suspicious person who approached his house. In the call just before noon,

Foster described the person but did not ask for officers to respond. Earlier that

day, neighbors saw Martin walking near Foster’s house wearing a dark shirt and

dark jeans. Meanwhile, Foster’s father came to his son’s house to mow the lawn.

He knocked on his son’s door and received no answer. Around 2:45 that

afternoon, he returned to his son’s house and found a side door ajar. After

entering, he found his son’s body on the floor. Tommy had been stabbed to death.

The father called his wife, who called 911.

Responding to that call, police found blood spatter all over the kitchen. A

bloody butcher knife was in the sink, partially hidden under a colander. Foster’s

body was on the kitchen floor, surrounded by towels, clothing, and blankets,

soaking up the blood. There was no sign of forced entry into the house. A plastic

food storage container where Foster kept his loose change was missing, along

with his car keys. But other valuables, such as a video game system, were left

behind.
3

Foster’s washing machine supplied clues to the investigators. It was filled

with water, but not running. Inside was a dark green shirt and a pair of dark jeans,

later identified as belonging to Martin. And Martin’s fingerprints were on the lid.

A few blocks from Foster’s house, surveillance cameras captured a shirtless

Martin entering a convenience store around 2:00 p.m. and buying a drink. About

half an hour later, Martin entered another convenience store, where he hung

around for about fifteen minutes. Video from the second store showed Martin

holding the container of change from Foster’s house.

Around 2:50 p.m., while police were at the crime scene, they spotted Martin

walking by the house. He matched the description Foster gave earlier. As he drew

near the house, he crossed the road and then turned in the other direction. Martin

was still shirtless. Police intercepted Martin as he was walking across the

Jefferson Street bridge and asked why he was not wearing a shirt. Martin said he

gave his shirt to a friend. The officers noticed that Martin’s boots were speckled

with blood—later determined to match Foster’s DNA. The officers recalled that

some of their conversation with Martin did not make sense, especially his repeated

mention of the odd phrase: “ink dot.” The officers arrested Martin and took him to

the police station for questioning. At the time of his arrest, Martin was wearing

Foster’s jeans. And in his pocket, Martin had Foster’s car keys.

During his police interrogation, Martin made no admissions. But in the

officers’ estimation, he did make “a lot of very random” and “weird” statements.

For example, he discussed “voodoo, Wiccan, and Freemasons.” He also claimed

to have put a “hex” on one officer.
4

At trial, an interviewing officer testified that when they pressed him about

the murder, Martin “redirected the conversation.” The officers showed Martin a

photo of Foster’s house and “essentially accused him of murdering the victim,” but

Martin “wanted to have no part in that conversation.” Martin would discuss other

events in the day, such as stopping by the convenience store and talking with a

friend, but “nothing about the murder itself.” He continued to reference “ink dot”

and raised other issues not relevant to the murder. During the investigation,

officers learned Martin had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and had been

committed multiple times. He was on disability insurance for his mental-health

impairments.

The State charged Martin with first-degree murder in May 2019. It added

charges of first-degree burglary and first-degree robbery in July. Trial was delayed

in September 2019, January 2020, and July 2021 when the court found Martin

incompetent and suspended proceedings. The court decided Martin’s competency

was restored in December 2021 and resumed proceedings. The defense waived

a jury trial and notified the State of Martin’s intent to raise diminished capacity and

insanity defenses.

At the bench trial, psychologist Luis Rosell testified for the defense, giving

his expert opinion that Martin was psychotic on the day of the murder. The State

offered rebuttal testimony from psychologist Rosanna Jones-Thurman. She

concluded that Martin was not psychotic and demonstrated malingering. After trial,

the court found sufficient evidence that Martin committed the three offenses,

rejecting his diminished capacity defense, and determined he did not prove his

affirmative defense of insanity. Martin appeals.
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II. Scope and Standards of Review

We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence following a bench trial

for correction of legal errors. State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022).

We affirm if the court’s verdicts are supported by substantial evidence. State v.

Myers, 924 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Iowa 2019). We review all the evidence in the light

most favorable to the district court’s decision. Id. at 826–27.

On the affirmative defense, it was Martin’s burden to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense. See

Iowa Code § 701.4 (2019); State v. Buck, 510 N.W.2d 850, 852 (Iowa 1994).

III. Analysis

Martin’s sole argument on appeal is that he proved his insanity defense.1

That defense is defined in Iowa Code section 701.4. The statute precludes

conviction if at the time of the crime the accused was suffering from “a diseased or

deranged condition of the mind” that rendered them “incapable of knowing the

nature and quality of the act” “or “incapable of distinguishing between right and

wrong in relation to that act.” “Insanity need not exist for any specific length of

time” before or after the crime. Iowa Code § 701.4.

1 As its first matter of business, the district court found the State presented
sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Martin committed all
three offenses, including the intent elements—overcoming Martin’s diminished
responsibility defense. Martin claimed that he was compelled to kill Foster and
could not stop himself. The court disagreed and found that Martin’s admission to
Rosell that “he was cognizant of his action even if experiencing some sort of mental
health condition” meant he “had the capability and capacity” to form the required
intent. The court also pointed to Martin grabbing the knife and taking the car keys
as proof of the intent elements of robbery and burglary. Martin does not contest
the court’s diminished-responsibility findings on appeal.
6

As both sides agree on appeal, an insanity defense often comes down to a

“battle of the experts” wherein the fact finder can rely on the expert it finds the most

credible. See, e.g., State v. Wadsworth, No. 16-1775, 2018 WL 2230666, at *8

(Iowa Ct. App. May 16, 2018). If the experts “conduct substantially equivalent

reviews of the case, it is ‘within a district court’s province to choose one expert’s

opinion over a competing qualified expert’s opinion.’” Id. (quoting United States v.

Ghane, 593 F.3d 775, 781 (8th Cir. 2010)). Although that is not exactly what the

district court did here, we begin our analysis with the conflicting opinions of the

experts.

First, Dr. Luis Rosell testified for the defense, and the court admitted his

report. Rosell examined police records, audio of Martin’s interrogation, pretrial

competency evaluations by state psychiatrists, the minutes of evidence, and

defense motions for competency hearings. He also interviewed Martin. He

detailed Martin’s history of substance use, two commitments to mental-health

facilities, and history of criminal charges and imprisonment. Martin was committed

in 2015 and again in 2016 based on his wife’s concern about his behavior. In

2017, his outpatient mental-health provider noted he was experiencing “self-care

deficits” and looked “disheveled” while demonstrating “bizarre delusions, auditory

hallucinations, and paranoia.”

Martin told Rosell that on the day of the offenses, he was smoking

methamphetamine and his “body decided to go one way and it would not stop

moving.” He recalled:

I was sitting there, and it happened again, my body went to the
opposite direction I wanted to go. I wanted to go over the hill to my
aunt’s house, but I went southbound. I went into a house, but I have
7

no idea why I went in there. It was just what happened. I did not
have a weapon with me. I did not pick the house it was where my
body went. My body kicked the door in. I had no reason to be there.
Nobody I know lives there[.] After I knocked the door in[,] my hand
grabbed a butcher knife with the left hand, but I am right-handed. I
could not speak. There was a guy named Foster. I did not know his
name until I read about it later. He told me to get out and my brain
could not move my body. All I remember after that was stabbing him.

Martin insisted, “I did not have control over my bodily movements. I felt like I was

out of my body. I do not remember how many times I stabbed him. I can’t

remember where I stabbed him. One hit him in the chest.” He added,

When I grabbed the knife, I felt for my safety and his and was hoping
the police would show up. Because of how I was feeling at the time,
and I had no control over what was going to happen. I know what I
did was wrong, and at the time, my body was doing it, and I had no
control on how to stop it.

Rosell noted that Martin was not on medication at the time of the crimes

and, in his opinion, Martin’s statements to police “made no sense.” Rosell believed

that Martin’s speech during the police interview showed common symptoms of a

psychotic disorder: auditory hallucinations and delusions, and disorganized and

nonsensical or tangential speaking. In contrast, during his interview with Martin

several years later when Martin was being treated, Rosell found that he “was back

to being a normal person, could answer questions, could follow direction,

and . . . was able to have a conversation.”

Rosell administered several tests designed to measure psychiatric illness

and malingering. On the Miller Functional Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-

FAST), Martin’s score suggested he was not feigning mental illness. Similarly, the

results of the Structured Inventory of Reported Symptoms-2 Test (SIRS-2) showed

he was not trying to exaggerate his psychopathology. And the Rogers Criminal
8

Responsibility Assessment Scales (R-CRAS) revealed that Martin had lost his

“behavioral and cognitive control” at the time of the crimes. According to Rosell,

these results confirmed that Martin did not have “the capacity to know or appreciate

that his conduct was wrong.” But Rosell’s report also acknowledged, “There is no

known psychological instrument that can measure a person’s state of mind at a

specific time in their past,” and the R-CRAS “should not be viewed as a stand-

alone source” but was only “a piece of the evaluation process.”

Beyond the testing, Rosell viewed the interrogation as evidence of Martin’s

incoherent “mindset after the offense occurred.” Rosell also considered that Martin

had no connection with the victim, no profit motive, and did not flee or hide after

the crimes—suggesting that he “may have been experiencing a psychotic episode

that induced the criminal behavior.”

Rosell downplayed the influence of substance use on Martin’s mental state,

noting that even when he was not using marijuana or methamphetamine while

being held pretrial, Martin continued to have symptoms of schizophrenia severe

enough to render him incompetent to stand trial. On cross-examination, Rosell

agreed that Martin explained he was aware of his acts as they happened and did

not “black out” until after the murder. Martin also reported that this episode of

losing control was new for him—he had never experienced such a period, though

he had committed violent crimes before. And Rosell agreed that Martin did not

explain when this period of “possession” ended.

After the defense rested, Dr. Rosana Jones-Thurman offered rebuttal

evidence for the prosecution. She also interviewed Martin and reviewed the past

evaluations and records. She administered the Test of Memory and Malingering
9

(TOMM) and determined Martin was “trying to feign” his symptoms. She also noted

jail staff found Martin to be “‘normal’ in most respects.”

Creating confusion about the purpose of her evaluation, Jones-Thurman

stated several times in her report that Martin was competent to stand trial. But she

added that she did not believe that “he has any diminished responsibility or

capacity, and . . . does not believe that he was insane at the time of the crime.”

She reported he gave consistent information to all examiners, which would not be

possible with a psychotic impairment. She also believed that Martin “deliberately

went to that house and remembered it for numerous years and potentially wanted

to seek revenge on someone, [which] indicates planning and intact executive

functioning.” She noted his “past crimes indicate a level of violence and

impulsiveness but that is not the equivalent of ‘deranged’ or psychotic.” Finally,

she noted he “could have had some psychotic symptoms at times due to his

substance abuse” but declared him “competent for trial.” On cross-examination,

Jones-Thurman admitted that the purpose of her report was to determine Martin’s

competency, not his mental state at the time of the murder.

In her trial testimony, Jones-Thurman recounted reviewing a police

interview of Martin’s aunt, Roberta. Martin was staying with his aunt at the time of

the murder. Roberta reported that Martin had mental-health issues but sometimes

exaggerated their severity. Roberta also reported that Martin pretended to see or

hear things. And Roberta recounted Martin’s long history of violence and

behavioral problems.2

2 Roberta gave substantially the same testimony at trial.
10

In reviewing the police interview, Jones-Thurman noticed that Martin tended

to go “off-topic” when the officers tried to ask him about the murder. She noticed

that Martin was “generally pretty friendly, pretty affable” until the questions focused

on Foster; then “he would not make eye contact. He would drop his head down.

He would not talk. His affect and demeanor would change.” These observations

led Jones-Thurman to conclude Martin was not insane on the day of the murder.

She believed his animation, his body movement, his eye contact, and other

behaviors were inconsistent with psychosis.

Jones-Thurman also found that Martin’s conduct on the day of the murder

showed he “knew what he was doing.” For example, he “targeted” the house,

looking for someone specific, entering through the side door rather than the front

door. He then grabbed the biggest knife from the block on the counter—knives

being his “weapon of choice” in past offenses. Finally, before leaving the house,

he tried to clean up the murder scene and himself and then collected the coins and

car keys. As her bottom line, Jones-Thurman believed that Martin had “an

antisocial personality disorder with psychopathy,” but not a psychosis that

rendered him criminally insane.

In its ruling, the district court provided a thorough recitation of the expert

testimony. But it did not explicitly rely on either expert’s opinion in reaching its

conclusions. The court treated Martin’s statements to Rosell as substantive

evidence but did not credit the defense expert’s conclusion that Martin was insane.

Nor did the court make any finding that Jones-Thurman was credible. True, such

a finding could be implicit. Yet the court did not cite any aspect of her opinion in

reaching its conclusions on diminished capacity or insanity. Indeed, after the
11

court’s verdicts, the defense asked for more explicit credibility findings. But the

court denied that request without analysis. It is possible the court found neither

expert credible nor helpful in determining Martin’s sanity at the time of the offenses.

But the absence of a finding to that effect, explicit credibility determinations, or any

weighing of the experts’ testimony hinders our review. See Connell v. Barker,

No. 22-1791, 2023 WL 4759458, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 26, 2023) (Buller, J.

specially concurring) (explaining “the difficult position the appellate courts are put

in when the district court does not make express credibility findings or explain why

it is rejecting what appears to be credible testimony in favor of other evidence”).

Having aired our grievance, we turn to the substance of the court’s ruling.

First, the court acknowledged that Martin suffered from a mental condition that

affected his behavior and thinking. It found that the “crux of the defendant’s

insanity defense as it pertains to the murder charge is his reported lack of control

of his behavior during the crime.” The court noted that this “irresistible impulse

defense” has been subsumed under the M’Naghten test3 and codified in

section 701.4. But the court rejected Martin’s argument that mental illness

rendered him incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his acts:

To know and understand the nature and quality of one’s acts means
a person is mentally aware of the particular acts being done and the
ordinary and probable consequences of them. The defendant’s own
words to Dr. Rosell show that he was aware of murdering Foster.
The defendant stated that he remembered grabbing the butcher knife
and remembered stabbing Foster. He said he did not remember how
many times he stabbed Foster or when but did know that at least one
stab was to Foster’s chest. While the defendant may assert that he
was not in control of his body at the time, his own admissions clearly
demonstrate knowledge of the nature and quality of his actions.
Further, there is no evidence that his claimed psychosis regarding

3 M’Naghten’s Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng.Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
12

control of his body affected his understanding or comprehension of
the act, just the ability to restrain his actions.

The court also rejected Martin’s argument on the second alternative, finding the

evidence showed he could distinguish between right and wrong in his acts.

As to the burglary and robbery charges, the court acknowledged that

Martin’s behavior was “largely nonproductive,” but reasoned that “the level of

success a defendant has in engaging in criminal behavior does not alone prove

insanity.” Rather, the court found:

The steps taken by the defendant to evade detection, while
ineffective, were not so abnormal to show that the defendant did not
have the capacity to know the nature and quality of his actions or that
he was incapable of distinguishing right and wrong. The same holds
true for the fact that the defendant did not take any other valuables
from the Foster residence despite them being in view and easily
transported. Defendant could have stolen more items of greater
monetary value; however, his failure to do so does not prove a lack
of capacity to know the nature and quality of his actions or the ability
to distinguish right and wrong.

Rather than rely on the psychologists, the court used the circumstantial

evidence surrounding the offenses to determine Martin was sane—though he had

a mental-health impairment. The record supports the conclusion Martin was

suffering from a mental-health condition. Before the murder, Martin had been

diagnosed with schizophrenia and involuntarily committed twice. His behavior and

speech on the day also reflected a diseased or deranged mind. But suffering from

a psychiatric disorder alone does not mean a defendant must be found criminally

insane. See State v. Venzke, 576 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (affirming

trial court’s conclusion that a schizophrenic defendant’s “delusions and

hallucinations were not sufficiently severe as to render him insane” under our

statute).
13

On appeal, Martin contests the district court’s characterization of several

aspects of his behavior, insisting that his conduct did not show he understood the

nature and quality of his acts or could distinguish that they were wrong. For

instance, he argues that leaving clothes in the washer and placing towels around

Foster to mop up his blood were not attempts to conceal evidence. He also notes

that he could have stolen more valuable items from the house. He claims he did

not hide the knife but threw it haphazardly into the sink. Finally, he points out that

he did not flee but circled back toward the house. All in all, Martin faults the district

court for giving “scant analysis” of the evidence showing his deranged mental

state—evidence he believes “reveals a person in a severe state of psychosis.”

Martin has a point; much of the circumstantial evidence can reasonably be

interpreted as variably supporting or refuting the view that he was criminally

insane. In such a case, experts help interpret such evidence. See Iowa R.

Evid. 5.702 (an expert may testify if their “scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a

fact in issue”). But as noted, the district court did not provide an express weighing

of the experts’ credibility. And while it is tempting to second-guess the court’s

reading of the facts given the comparably reasonable interpretation Martin

suggests, sufficiency-of-the-evidence review requires us to take the evidence “in

the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences that may

be fairly drawn from the evidence.” State v. Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d 174, 180 (Iowa

2017) (citation omitted). “Evidence is not rendered insubstantial merely because

it might support a different conclusion; the only question is whether the evidence
14

supports the finding actually made.” State v. Emanuel, 967 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Iowa

Ct. App. 2021).

The district court viewed much of the circumstantial evidence as showing

Martin’s consciousness of guilt, allowing an inference that he understood the

nature and quality of his acts and distinguished that they were wrong. See, e.g.,

State v. Mong, 988 N.W.2d 305, 314 (Iowa 2023) (finding acts showing

consciousness of guilt can be substantial evidence of the defendant’s specific

intent to harm). The court’s view was supported by substantial evidence. It was

reasonable to conclude that Martin tried to clean up the scene by mopping up blood

and putting the knife in the sink. Martin displayed even stronger evidence of his

sanity by trying to wash his bloody clothes before leaving the murder scene. And

when Martin was unsuccessful in doing the laundry, he chose to don Foster’s ill-

fitting jeans rather than walk out with his own bloodstained clothing. Overall,

Martin’s conduct after the stabbing raises the reasonable inference that he was

trying to conceal his involvement, which supports an inference that he was aware

of the nature and wrongfulness of his acts. Martin later lied when police asked him

where his shirt was, further supporting that inference.

Other conduct also bolstered the court’s finding of sanity. Martin

approached the house that morning and then returned, entering through the side

door rather than the front, suggesting his ability to plan a stealthy entry. Martin

reported “kick[ing] the door in,” supporting an inference that he was aware he was

not welcome. After entering, he armed himself with a knife from the kitchen

counter, showing an intent to attack. And Martin left the house with Foster’s coins

and his car keys, showing a motive for the attack of personal gain, even if those
15

gains were small and more valuable items were available. Martin even spent the

stolen change at the convenience store a short time later. Those acts support an

inference that Martin had rational motives.

Finally, the court’s rejection of the insanity defense was supported by

Martin’s statements to Rosell that he had no control of his body, though he

remained aware of what he was doing. A loss of bodily control is not the standard

for proof of insanity. Aside from Rosell’s opinion, Martin presented no evidence

showing he was incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the acts or that he

could not distinguish right from wrong. To the contrary, he explained to Rosell that

when he “grabbed the knife,” he knew that there was reason to fear for Foster’s

“safety” and he “hop[ed] the police would show up.” Those admissions showed

Martin knew the nature of his acts—that he presented a danger to Foster. His

mention of law enforcement signaled that he could distinguish that his acts were

wrong. See State v. Wheeler, 403 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Iowa 1987) (“If the trier of fact

finds the defendant was able to comprehend the nature and consequences of the

act and knew the act was wrong, the defense of insanity falls even though the

defendant may have acted from irresistible impulse.”). Combining Martin’s

admissions and his conduct surrounding the murder—and taking all reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from that evidence—we find substantial evidence

supports the district court’s conclusion that Martin failed to prove his insanity

defense. We thus affirm the court’s verdicts.

AFFIRMED.