Heartland Co-Op v. Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Company

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0156
Filed June 5, 2024

HEARTLAND CO-OP,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

NATIONWIDE AGRIBUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeffrey D. Bert, Judge.

Heartland Co-op appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Company. AFFIRMED.

John F. Lorentzen of Nyemaster Goode, PC, Des Moines, for appellant.

Sean M. O’Brien of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des

Moines, for appellee.

Heard by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Langholz, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.

Heartland Co-op (Heartland) is an agricultural cooperative with many

business locations throughout Iowa and other states. In 2020, a derecho damaged

several of Heartland’s properties in Iowa. As Heartland was insured under a policy

issued by Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Company (Nationwide), Heartland

made a claim under the policy. Among other coverages, the policy provided

earnings-and-extra-expense coverage. In simplified terms, this coverage pays for

loss of net income resulting from damage to insured properties from a covered

peril and extra expenses that would not have been incurred but for the damage

caused by the peril, such as relocation costs and costs to outfit and operate at a

replacement or temporary location. The insurance policy limited the amount

Nationwide would pay for this coverage to $3,000,000 for “any one loss.”

After submitting its claim for the lost earnings and extra expenses caused

by the derecho, Heartland received a total of $3,000,000 from Nationwide.1

Heartland suffered lost earnings and extra expenses at multiple locations that, in

total, exceeded $3,000,000, but Nationwide limited payment to $3,000,000

because it determined that the lost income and extra expenses suffered across all

properties combined constituted a single loss to which the $3,000,000 limit applied.

Heartland filed suit alleging breach of contract. Both parties moved for summary

judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Nationwide after finding

1 Nationwide also paid Heartland $131,418,384.58 under other coverages for
losses Heartland sustained from the derecho. Payment under those other
coverages is not in dispute in this case. The dispute in this appeal is confined to
how much Nationwide owes under the earnings-and-extra-expense coverage.
3

that the words “any one loss” mean the combined loss at all locations for one

event.2 Heartland appeals.

We review summary judgment rulings for correction of errors at law.

Lennette v. State, 975 N.W.2d 380, 388 (Iowa 2022). A party is entitled to

summary judgment when the record “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). Material facts are those that affect the outcome of

the suit, and a fact issue “is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” In re Est. of Franken, 944 N.W.2d

853, 858 (Iowa 2020) (cleaned up) (citation omitted). The movant bears the

burden of proving the “undisputed facts entitle[] it to summary judgment.” Behm v.

City of Cedar Rapids, 922 N.W.2d 524, 542 (Iowa 2019). We review the record in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and make on their behalf all

“legitimate inference[s] that can be reasonably deduced from the record.”

Homeland Energy Sols., LLC v. Retterath, 938 N.W.2d 664, 683 (Iowa 2020)

(quoting Phillips v. Covenant Clinic, 625 N.W.2d 714, 717‒18 (Iowa 2001)).

2 Heartland also argued to the district court that it should have the chance to prove

at trial that the derecho was not a single storm. The district court found that the
evidence did not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
derecho was a single weather event. The court found that the derecho was a
single weather event for purposes of the insurance policy and granted summary
judgment to Nationwide. Heartland appeals this issue but barely mentions it in its
brief. The brief cites no parts of the record generating a factual dispute on this
issue and cites no pertinent authority. Therefore, we find the issue waived. Iowa
R. Civ. P. 6.903; Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 691
(Iowa 1994) (“[R]andom mention of [an] issue, without elaboration or supportive
authority, is insufficient to raise the issue for our consideration.”).
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We start by highlighting some of the key provisions pertaining to the

earnings-and-extra-expense coverage, beginning with the one under the heading

“HOW MUCH WE PAY” that reads, “‘We’ pay no more than the Income Coverage

‘limit’ indicated on the ‘schedule of coverages’ for any one loss.” The pages that

follow contain the schedule of coverages. Under the “Income Coverage Part” of

the schedules, there is a list of potential coverages under the heading

“COVERAGE (check one)” with a box to check next to each coverage listed. Only

the box for “Earnings and Extra Expense” is checked. Thus, the parties do not

dispute that the policy provides earnings-and-extra-expense coverage.

Following the list of coverages is the heading “LIMIT (check one)” followed

by two options with a corresponding box to check beside each option. The first

option states “Income Coverage Limit—The most ‘we’ pay for loss at any one

‘covered location’ is:.” This option is unchecked, and no limit was filled in. The

second option reads: “Refer to Scheduled Locations (check if applicable).” This

option is checked, requiring the parties and us to look to the location schedules to

determine the applicable limit of coverage.

The location schedules that follow start with a schedule that describes the

covered location as location number “087 ALL ‘COVERED LOCATIONS.’” This

page lists five types of coverage, including earnings-and-extra-expense coverage

with a limit of $3,000,000—the coverage at issue here. Here is the pertinent part

of that schedule:
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Following this schedule listing earnings-and-extra-expense coverage for “ALL

‘COVERED LOCATIONS’” is a separate page for each of Heartland’s eighty-six

business locations in Iowa and other states (consecutively numbered as location

numbers 001 through 086), with each of those eighty-six schedules listing

coverages for that location and a corresponding limit amount for each coverage.

None of the individual-location schedules lists any earnings-and-extra-expense

coverage.

The dispute here comes down to whether the policy provides $3,000,000 of

coverage for each location that sustained an earnings-and-extra-expense loss or

whether it provides $3,000,000 of coverage for all earnings-and-extra-expense

loss Heartland sustained across all eighty-six locations (or as many of them as

sustained damage from the derecho). This requires us to interpret and construe

the policy. When we interpret an insurance policy, we determine the meaning of

the words it contains. Boelman v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 826 N.W.2d 494, 501–

02 (Iowa 2013). When we construe the policy, we give those words legal effect.

Id. Both interpretation and construction are matters for the court. Id. (noting that

interpretation is a matter for the court unless extrinsic evidence comes into play
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and that construction is always a matter for the court). If a policy term is undefined,

we give the term its ordinary meaning, rather than a technical or specialized

meaning. Wakonda Club v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 973 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Iowa

2022). If the language has more than one reasonable interpretation, it is

ambiguous and will be interpreted in favor of the insured. Id. A term is not

ambiguous simply because the parties disagree on its meaning. Id.

Pared down to its essence, this case hinges on what is meant by “any one

loss” in the context of the earnings-and-extra-expense coverage. The district court

concluded that the terms of the insurance contract created a $3,000,000 limit for

the lost earnings and extra expenses suffered across all Heartland business

locations, so Heartland experienced only one loss. Heartland claims this

conclusion was erroneous because “any one loss” means the limit applies

individually to the losses suffered at each location or at least is ambiguous and

should therefore be interpreted in Heartland’s favor. See id. (“We interpret

ambiguous policy provisions in favor of the insured . . . .”).

The Iowa Supreme Court has already determined the word “any” means “all

or every.” Thomas v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d 678, 683 (Iowa 2008).

Merriam-Webster defines “loss” as “destruction, ruin,” and more relevant to the

coverage at issue here, “failure to gain, win, obtain, or utilize.” Loss, Merriam-

Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/loss (last visited May 30,

2024) (giving “loss of income/revenue” as an example use of loss under the fourth

definition). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “loss” as “[a]n undesirable outcome of

a risk; the disappearance or diminution of value.” Loss, Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th ed. 2019). And it defines “loss” in the insurance context as “[t]he amount of
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financial detriment caused by . . . an insured property’s damage, for which the

insurer becomes liable.” Id.

Giving the words in the policy their ordinary meaning does not clarify

whether an individual loss is considered in terms of the company as a whole or in

terms of the individual locations. Reading this language in the context of the rest

of the policy provides more clarity. See Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Westlake Inv., LLC, 880

N.W.2d 724, 734 (Iowa 2016) (“[W]e determine whether an ambiguity exists not by

examining clauses seriatim, but by interpreting the policy in its entirety, including

all endorsements, declarations, or riders attached.”). Heartland does not have per-

location coverage because the box for per-location coverage was not checked.

Instead, the other box was checked, referring to the location schedules to find the

limit. This alone suggests that loss is not determined per location. That suggestion

becomes stronger when we look at the location schedules that follow. The limit for

earnings-and-extra-expense coverage is found on the schedule for “all covered

locations” and not on any of the individual-location schedules. “All covered

locations” is not the same as “each covered location.” Because “all covered

locations” cannot reasonably mean the coverage applies to “each location”

(because Heartland does not have per-location coverage), it must mean it applies

to the locations in the aggregate. Therefore, in the context of the policy as a whole,

we read “any one loss” to mean the aggregate loss experienced by Heartland as

a whole across “all covered locations.”

Heartland tries to get around the fact that a per-location limit was not part

of the policy by pointing to other parts of the policy. It points out that the policy

provides coverage “during the ‘restoration period’ when ‘your’ ‘business’ is
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necessarily wholly or partially interrupted by direct physical loss of or damage to

property at a ‘covered location.’” Heartland argues this policy language ties the

restoration period and its loss calculation methods to the definition of “any one

loss.” The policy defines the restoration period as:

1. The time it should reasonably take to resume “your”
“business” to a similar level of service beginning:
a. for earnings, after the first 72 hours (unless otherwise
indicated on the “schedule of coverages”) following the direct
physical loss of or damage to property at a “covered location” that is
caused by a covered peril; and
b. for extra expenses, immediately following the direct
physical loss of or damage to property at a “covered location” that is
caused by a covered peril.
The “restoration period” ends on the date the property should
be rebuilt, repaired, or replaced or the date business is resumed at
a new permanent location.

Heartland claims the words “a covered location” is in line with covering a loss at

“any covered location.” (Emphasis added.) Heartland also points out that the

policy includes a “Valuation” section, describing how an earnings loss is calculated.

This section notes that “pertinent sources of information” include “‘your’ accounting

procedures.” Heartland contends these two policy provisions demonstrate that

“any one loss” allows it to recover for each loss with a $3,000,000 limit at each

location.

We are not persuaded by Heartland’s argument. The reference to “a

covered location” in defining the restoration period simply confirms that the

coverage only applies to those locations that were damaged by a covered peril.

No one disputes that Heartland has coverage during the restoration period at each

covered location that incurred lost earnings and extra expenses caused by the

derecho. The dispute is whether those amounts of lost earnings and extra
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expenses are all part of one loss at “all covered locations,” as opposed to being

separate losses with separate limits. The reference to “a covered location” in the

definition of restoration period sheds no helpful light on resolving the dispute at

hand.

We are also not persuaded by Heartland’s argument that, because the

policy says the parties look to Heartland’s accounting procedures to determine the

value of Heartland’s loss and Heartland has separate accounting for each location,

the policy requires the loss suffered by each location to be a separate loss under

the policy. The policy’s reference to Heartland’s accounting practices is in the

valuation section of the policy. By its plain terms, this section says the accounting

practices are a pertinent source of information in calculating the amount of the loss.

It sheds no meaningful light on determining whether a loss occurred and whether

that loss is a separate loss for each location.3

Heartland tries to weave together the language in the “restoration period”

and “valuation” parts of the policy to argue separate locations suffered separate

losses because the restoration periods for each location are different, as are the

accounting procedures for determining profit and loss. Presumably, Heartland

does this weaving because it has to differentiate between a “per location loss” and

a “per location limit” due to the fact that the “per location limit” option was not a part

of the policy. But we are not persuaded by Heartland’s efforts. While we partly

3 For example, whether Heartland uses a cash-basis or accrual accounting method

or uses a LIFO (last-in, first-out) or FIFO (first-in, first-out) method for valuing
inventory may be pertinent information in determining how to calculate lost
earnings. But those accounting procedures have no bearing on determining
whether “any one loss” refers to individual locations or “all covered locations.”
10

understand the distinction Heartland is trying to make between a limit based on the

definition of loss versus a per-location limit, we are unclear where the threshold for

separate losses would be. Let’s say the derecho had managed to shut down all

affected locations at the same time, causing each location to pause its operations.

The shutdowns happened at the same time, so assuming each location was

restored at the same time, under Heartland’s logic we could easily conclude

Heartland suffered one all-encompassing loss. But if the shutdowns occurred

minutes apart, and the restorations also happened minutes apart, would it still be

considered one loss, even if the effect was the same? Heartland wants us to say

the time differences between when its various locations were shut down as the

derecho swept across Iowa was enough to cause separate losses. But we don’t

see a clear place to draw the line, and we see nowhere in the policy suggesting

that such line must be drawn. And letting different accounting methods determine

whether a loss occurred—in contrast to using different accounting methods to

determine the amount of a loss—would create a loophole through which insureds

could effectively turn their coverage limits into per-location limits without

purchasing that option. The policy does not support such a conclusion.

To sum up, we don’t find Heartland’s reading of the policy to be a natural

reading. See Boelman, 826 N.W.2d at 501 (“We will not strain the words or

phrases of the policy in order to find liability that the policy did not intend and the

insured did not purchase.”). The only reasonable interpretation of the policy is that

the limit applies to the loss suffered in the aggregate by the company as a whole—

at “all covered locations”—so we conclude the policy language is not ambiguous.

See Nat’l Sur. Corp., 880 N.W.2d at 734 (“Policy language is ambiguous when,
11

considered in the context of the policy as a whole, it is susceptible to two plausible

interpretations.”). Because the language is not ambiguous and the district court

correctly interpreted and construed the terms of the insurance contract to conclude

there is a single loss with a single limit of coverage, Nationwide established it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

Schumacher, P.J., concurs; Langholz, J., dissents.
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LANGHOLZ, Judge (dissenting).

What is “one loss” under a business interruption insurance policy that

covers a business with eighty-six locations across the country? This term was put

to the test when a historic derecho swept across Iowa, damaging at least forty-

eight of Heartland Co-op’s locations in the state—from Woodbine to Marengo.

Because the insurance policy caps Heartland’s coverage at $3 million “for any one

loss,” Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Company argues—and the majority

agrees—that Heartland is only entitled to $3 million for all its business-interruption

losses caused by the property damage at these forty-eight locations.

But I respectfully part ways with the thoughtful majority opinion based on

my interpretation of the text of the policy as a whole. Under the policy’s text, a

business-interruption loss is tied to physical loss or damage at a specific

location. Thus, when more than one location has physical losses, the business

interruption at each of those locations is multiple losses too. And because the

$3 million limit is per loss—not per occurrence or per peril or capped by the

catastrophe limit that the parties chose not to set—Heartland can claim up to

$3 million for each of the business interruption losses arising from each of the

physical losses at Heartland’s locations.

I would hold that this interpretation is the unambiguous meaning of the

policy. But at the very least, it shows that the policy “is fairly susceptible to two

interpretations,” and thus this interpretation “favoring the insured” must be

adopted. A.Y. McDonald Indus., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 619

(Iowa 1991). I would thus reverse the district court’s contrary summary judgment

rulings and remand for further proceedings.
13

Under Heartland’s insurance policy, Nationwide will “pay no more than”

$3 million “for any one loss” that is payable under its business interruption

coverage—which the policy refers to as “Earnings and Extra Expense” coverage.

I agree with the majority that the meaning of “one loss” is the fighting issue. But to

best understand its meaning, rather than going to precedent or the dictionary, I

would start with the policy’s definition of its coverage for an earnings-and-extra-

expense loss. See Wakonda Club v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 973 N.W.2d 545,

553 (Iowa 2022) (looking to text of “policy as a whole” to find support for

interpretation of disputed provision (cleaned up)); cf. State v. McCollaugh,

5 N.W.3d 620, 623 (Iowa 2024) (explaining in the related context of statutory

interpretation, that when a drafter “chooses to act as its own lexicographer, we are

normally bound by its definitions, even if they do not coincide with dictionary or

common law definitions”).

So under the policy, a covered earnings-and-extra-expense loss is the

“actual loss of net income” and certain “extra expenses” when Heartland’s

“business is necessarily wholly or partially interrupted by direct physical loss of or

damage to property at a covered location . . . as a result of a covered peril.”

(Emphasis added).4 And Heartland’s business is defined as “the usual business

operations occurring at a covered location.” (Emphasis added). Both the definition

of the covered loss and of the business are tied to “a”—in other words, a single—

“covered location.” These provisions don’t say at “any locations” or “all locations”

4 For readability, I have omitted internal quotation marks used in the policy to

identify defined terms and removed the capitalization of phrases that appear in all
capitalized text without noting those omissions or at alterations.
14

or “across the entire business operations,” as one would need to if intending to

define “one loss” more broadly than just the interruption at a single location. Thus,

because the scope of “any one loss” is the interruption from damage at a single

covered location, the $3 million limit applies to that loss. And damage that

interrupts business at another location triggers another loss that again has another

$3 million limit.5

Other parts of the policy also suggest that the scope of one earning-and-

extra-expense loss is only the loss caused by the physical loss at a single location.

The policy’s proof-of-loss provision requires the insured to provide “the time, place,

and circumstances of the loss”—not the “places”—when making a claim. And the

policy’s definition of restoration period—which sets the time period for calculating

the extent of earnings-and-extra-expense loss—is tied to “a physical loss of or

damage to property at a covered location.” The restoration period starts on “the

date of a physical loss of or damage to property at a covered location.” And it ends

on the date that “property should be rebuilt, repaired, or replaced” or when

“business is resumed at a new permanent location.”

This definition of restoration period only makes sense in the context of “one

loss” being the business interruption at a single location. For starters, it again

speaks of a single covered location. It also does not include any text describing

how the time period is calculated when there is physical damage at multiple

locations, such as text specifying that it continues until every location is repaired

5 Even Nationwide agrees that under the policy’s terms, the $3 million limit applies

only to “one loss,” so payment for one earnings-and-extra-expense loss—however
that term is properly interpreted—“does not reduce the limits applying to a later
loss.”
15

or only until the first location is repaired. But that additional explanation is

unnecessary if each location with physical loss or damage is considered “one loss,”

each with its own restoration period easily calculated as described by the text of

the policy’s definition. This lack of any additional explanation in the definition thus

further supports the narrow scope of “one loss” tied to the interruption caused by

the physical loss or damage at a single location.

To be clear, I derive the scope of a single location from the policy’s listing

of eighty-six scheduled locations—not the accounting practices of Heartland. I

agree with the majority that Heartland pushes its argument too far in suggesting

that the policy left it to Heartland to decide the scope of “one loss” by how it

chooses to structure its business or separately account for its net income. There

is no support in the text of the policy for such an expansive discretionary power for

Heartland to adjust the extent of its coverage unilaterally. But Heartland and

Nationwide agreed to include the scheduled-location endorsement and specified

eighty-six individual locations that are insured by the various coverages, including

the earnings-and-extra-expense coverage. And so, relying on the policy’s

definition of a single location—which despite Heartland’s broader theoretical

arguments is all it actually seeks to do here—does not pose the line-drawing or

loophole-creating problems the majority seeks to avoid.

Continuing to look at the policy as a whole, it also shows that its drafters

knew how to set a coverage limit tied to something other than “any one loss.” That

includes setting limits for “any one occurrence” or “any one occurrence or at any

one location,” which it did for its supplemental utility-service-interruption and

pollutant-cleanup-interruption coverage, respectively. And we can see the policy
16

setting a twelve-month, per-location limit for all “expenses arising out of a covered

peril,” as it did in its pollutant-cleanup-and-removal coverage. Indeed, the policy

had a possible provision for a catastrophe limit that would have provided a total

cap for all losses caused by the derecho—“for any combination of or total losses

arising under one or more coverages in any one occurrence”—that the parties

decided not to set in its schedule of coverages for the policy. If the earnings-and-

extra-expense coverage had been limited in any of these ways, this would be a

different case. But it was not so limited. Its $3 million limit was for “any one loss.”

And best interpreting the text actually chosen by the parties means that each

location that had its business interrupted by physical loss or damage from the

derecho suffered one loss, each separately subject to the $3 million limit.

I reach this result based on the text of the policy—not the precedent of other

courts interpreting other policies. See Wakonda Club, 973 N.W.2d at 554. Indeed,

the parties have not directed us to any cases deciding the precise issue here—

and I am unaware of any. But interpreting “one loss” to be tied to a location of the

property loss is consistent with the focus in other cases on the required connection

between the business-interruption loss and a physical loss at the insured location.

See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of State of Pa., 385 F. Supp. 2d 343,

350–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting argument that destruction of airline’s ticket

counter in the World Trade Center triggered coverage for business-interruption

losses at all airline’s locations as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks), aff’d by 439

F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2006); Ramada Inn Ramogreen, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,

835 F.2d 812, 814 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that business-interruption policy did

not cover losses for hotel as a result of physical damage to adjacent restaurant
17

because restaurant building was “listed separately in the insurance policy,

evidencing the intent of the parties to treat it as a separate entity”); Wakonda Club,

973 N.W.2d at 552–53 (requiring “physical element” to loss of the covered

premises to trigger business-interruption coverage). And it’s consistent with our

supreme court’s observation that business-interruption coverage is fundamentally

“tied to the insured premises.” Steel Prods. Co. v. Miller’s Nat’l Ins. Co., 209

N.W.2d 32, 38 (Iowa 1973).

To support its contrary interpretation, the majority relies on the parties’

choice to set the $3 million limit in the location schedule rather than checking the

box on the schedule of coverage to set a limit “for loss at any one covered location.”

While I understand the intuitive appeal of the negative implication that the majority

reads into this, I don't give much weight to this drafting choice. Because whatever

the effect would have been of checking the box, the absence of the provision does

not change any of the policy’s substantive text already discussed—all of which

leads to the conclusion that “one loss” means the business interruption at one

covered location. The only term left unaddressed in that substantive text is the

dollar amount of the “limit indicated on the schedule of coverages for any one loss.”

And with the choice to set that limit in the location schedule instead, we look there

to find the applicable limit: $3 million.

The majority also gives weight to the $3 million limit being listed on the

location schedule under location number eight-seven, which is described as “all

covered locations” rather than separately listed on the schedules for each of the

eighty-six other locations that describe individual covered locations. According to

the majority, the use of the word “all” in the description of the location means that
18

the limit set there is an aggregate limit for all locations. And I concede that this is

the closest call in the proper interpretation of the policy. But I still respectfully

disagree.

To properly interpret the meaning of this page, we first need to again

remember that we’ve been sent on this cross-referencing hunt only to find the

maximum amount to be paid “for any one loss.” Nothing on this schedule page

purports to change the limit from a per-loss limit to some other aggregate limit. Nor

does it amend or conflict with any of the other text of the policy shaping what “one

loss” means. It simply lists as a “coverage provided” the “earnings and extra

expense” coverage with a “Limit” of “$3,000,000.”

And the “all” that the majority finds significant merely appears in the

description of the “Covered Locations,” for the coverages listed. According to the

text of the location schedule, the policy’s coverage “only applies to the covered

locations described below.” So the purpose of the location description is to specify

what locations are covered by the listed coverage provided—not to modify the

coverage or limits listed.6 By describing the location as “all covered locations,” the

schedule in turn cross-references the eighty-six specifically described locations.

We thus know that all of those eighty-six locations have the earnings-and-extra-

expense coverage in addition to the personal-property and building-property

6 By choosing to include the location schedule and the related scheduled-location

endorsement in the policy, the parties deviated from the default provision in the
policy that coverage would be provided at “any location or premises where
[Heartland has] buildings, structures, or business personal property covered under
this coverage” rather than just at “a location that is described on the Location
Schedule.”
19

coverage listed on their individual schedules. That’s all the work that I interpret the

term “all” to do.

In isolation, the correct meaning of the schedule page might appear murkier.

But we do not consider ambiguities “seriatim by clauses”—we must “read the policy

as a whole.” Boelman v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 826 N.W.2d 494, 501 (Iowa

2013). And doing so, the best interpretation of the schedule page is that “all

covered locations” just means that the $3 million limit is the limit that applies for

“any one loss” at any of the locations (or as the policy says, at “all” of them) rather

than implicitly adding a new aggregate business-wide limit not described anywhere

in the policy.

Bottom line, Heartland is not limited to $3 million of business interruption

coverage for all its losses because that limit is for “any one loss,” and each location

that had its business interrupted by physical loss or damage from the derecho

suffered one loss. While I recognize that the majority has offered a thoughtful

contrary interpretation, I would still hold that this interpretation favoring Heartland

is the unambiguous meaning of the policy when read “as a whole.” Boelman, 826

N.W.2d at 501. But even if the policy is “fairly susceptible to” the majority’s

interpretation too, then the interpretation “favoring the insured” must be adopted.

A.Y. McDonald Indus., 475 N.W.2d at 619. Either way, we should not affirm the

district court’s grant of summary judgment to Nationwide. And so, I respectfully

dissent.