Abbey Fry vs. Andrew Blauvelt D/B/A Bluefield Trust Construction

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 10–1336
Filed July 13, 2012
ABBEY FRY,
Appellee,
vs.
ANDREW BLAUVELT d/b/a BLUEFIELD
TRUST CONSTRUCTION,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County,
Joel D. Yates, Judge.
On further review, plaintiff asserts the court of appeals erred in
awarding defendant a new trial. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Michael J. Moreland and Heather M. Simplot of Harrison,
Moreland & Webber, P.C., Ottumwa, for appellant.
Richard S. Bordwell, and Trevaniel J. Temple of Bordwell Law
Office, P.L.C., Washington, and Larry J. Brock (until withdrawal), for
appellee.

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ZAGER, Justice.
In this breach of contract case, we consider whether the district
court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial based on
several rulings by the district court that the defendant claims materially
affected his rights and denied him a fair trial. The district court refused
the defendant’s request to exclude exhibits disclosed by the plaintiff the
day before trial in violation of the district court’s pretrial scheduling
order. Additionally, the district court refused the request to declare a
mistrial when the plaintiff testified to certain matters in violation of the
district court’s stipulated ruling on a motion in limine and denied the
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. The court of appeals reversed
and remanded for a new trial because it concluded the district court
abused its discretion in admitting the exhibits into evidence. On further
review, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the
judgment of the district court.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
Based on the evidence produced at trial, the jury could have found
the following facts. In August 2008, plaintiff, Abbey Fry (Fry), hired the
defendant, Andrew Blauvelt d/b/a Bluefield Trust Construction
(Bluefield), to remodel her home in Ollie, Iowa. After some negotiating,
Fry and Bluefield entered into an oral contract in which Bluefield agreed
to extend Fry’s kitchen, add a master bedroom with a bath and closet,
add a hallway, and add a garage with a basement below. The estimated
cost to complete the project was $101,250. No agreement was reached
as to the time of completion, although Fry wanted the project completed
within six months. Bluefield broke ground on or around September 28,
2008.

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Work initially proceeded at a relatively rapid pace with weekly
payment applications by Bluefield showing work performed and
subsequent payments by Fry. The contractual relationship between the
parties began to sour in late December when the project foreman left for
a month-long vacation. After the foreman left, Fry became increasingly
dissatisfied with the progress of the project and eventually ordered
Bluefield off the job in January 2009.
After firing Bluefield, Fry hired S.R.S. Construction to complete the
project. Chad Evans, the owner of S.R.S. Construction, testified that
S.R.S. Construction did some electrical work, put a doorway in, installed
a window, worked on the flooring, and performed other work on the
addition. Aside from the work it did perform, S.R.S. Construction
submitted a bid in the amount of $24,650 which was its estimated cost
to complete the addition. It also submitted another bid in the amount of
$32,480 to repair the roof of the garage that was, according to Evans,
defectively constructed.
Fry filed a breach of contract claim against Bluefield in April 2009.
Fry claimed Bluefield failed to perform under the contract, and as a
result of this failure to perform, she incurred expenses and suffered
damages. Specifically, Fry sought damages for the cost to complete the
project according to the original oral contract between the parties. She
also sought damages as a result of construction delays she claimed were
caused by Bluefield.
Prior to trial, Bluefield filed a motion in limine. The motion sought
to prohibit Fry from “mentioning, discussing, or asking any witness”
about an allegation of repair fraud involving one of Bluefield’s projects in
Mississippi. The motion also sought to exclude any evidence or
testimony relating to one of Bluefield’s projects located in Wellman, Iowa

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involving an allegedly unhappy customer. By stipulation of the parties,
the district court granted the motion.
By pretrial order, trial in this matter was set for June 29, 2010.
The pretrial order also required the parties to exchange complete exhibit
and witness lists no later than seven days before trial. On June 22, Fry
faxed her initial exhibit list to Bluefield which listed sixteen items, many
of which were designated simply as “photographs.” The day before trial,
Fry filed an amended exhibit list that included one hundred and eighty-
three exhibits. The last eight exhibits contained fifteen photographs,
none of which were previously disclosed to Bluefield. The fifteen
photographs allegedly depicted a “water leak on June 1 [and 2], 2010,”
and a “millipede invasion on June 18, 2010,” that occurred in Fry’s
home.
On the morning of trial, Bluefield requested the district court
exclude the eight exhibits from evidence. Bluefield argued the exhibits
should be excluded from evidence because Fry failed to disclose the
photographs in accordance with the pretrial order. Bluefield further
argued that the photographs would inflame the jury and that it needed
time to consult an expert to investigate the cause of the leak and
infestation. Fry’s counsel responded that the photographs were not
previously disclosed because the water leak and millipede problem were
recent developments. He also asserted that expert testimony was
unnecessary. The district court reserved judgment, and the trial began.
During Fry’s testimony, the district court denied Bluefield’s motion to
exclude the untimely disclosed exhibits. The district court explained
that, although it agreed that Bluefield’s concerns were “legitimate,” the
court thought the concerns could “adequately be addressed through

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cross-examination of the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s witnesses, and/or
through presentation of [Bluefield’s] evidence.”
During recross-examination of Fry, Bluefield’s attorney attempted
to undermine the probative value of the photographs by calling attention
to the eighteen month gap between the time Bluefield stopped working
on the project and the time the water leak and millipede problems arose.
The following exchange took place:
Q. [W]e’re now 18 months after you fired Andy and
you’re having a problem that you’re relating back to
something that he did 18 months ago; is that right? A.
Because he’s the one that set the wall, yes. The wall that
has a terrible leak, that’s full of foam that I had to put to
keep the mice from coming in in the winter for two years
now. The wall is incorrect. Not just the door.
Q. Any of the problems that you’ve had, you haven’t
fixed those problems? A. I have no money to fix those
problems.
Q. And that’s because Andrew blew all your money?
Is that right? A. He didn’t use it where he was supposed to,
and I’m pretty sure he used it on other jobs because he was
behind on them jobs too. He doesn’t know how to manage
money very well.
Q. What’s the basis of that opinion? A. He’s filed
bankruptcy many times.
Q. Yeah. All right. A. A lawsuit down in Mississippi
on another house. One in Wellman that’s very unhappy with
her job site, too.
Q. Are you going to call those people to testify? A. I
did, but you won’t let them.
(Emphasis added.) Bluefield’s attempt to undermine the value of the
photographs during recross-examination thus led to the introduction of
testimony that was previously held inadmissible by the district court’s
ruling on Bluefield’s motion in limine. On Bluefield’s motion, the district
court struck the improper remarks from the record and directed the jury

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“not to consider those answers.” Bluefield moved for a mistrial, which
the district court denied.
The jury subsequently returned a verdict in Fry’s favor. On July
14, 2010, Bluefield filed a motion for new trial on several grounds.
Bluefield first alleged the admission of the untimely disclosed exhibits—
specifically, the photographs of the water leak and millipede problem—
prevented him from receiving a fair trial and affected his substantial
rights. Bluefield also alleged that the court committed error when it
refused to grant a mistrial after Fry violated the district court ruling on
the motion in limine. Bluefield claims this violation prevented him from
receiving a fair trial and thus warranted a new trial. Bluefield also
argued other errors by the district court warranted a new trial. The
district court denied the motion for new trial on all grounds, and
Bluefield appealed.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The
court of appeals reasoned the district court abused its discretion in
admitting the late-disclosed exhibits because the late disclosure
prejudiced Bluefield’s defense. The court of appeals further noted that
Fry did not seek damages with respect to the water leak or millipede
problem and therefore the photographs were irrelevant to the breach of
contract claim. The court reasoned that the admission of the
photographs prevented Bluefield from receiving a fair trial under Iowa
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1004. Fry requested further review, which we
granted.
II. Scope of Review.
“We review the denial of a motion for new trial based on the
grounds asserted in the motion.” Estate of Long ex rel. Smith v.
Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 656 N.W.2d 71, 88 (Iowa 2002), abrogated on

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other grounds by Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 836 (Iowa
2009); see also Ladeburg v. Ray, 508 N.W.2d 694, 696 (Iowa 1993).
“Ultimately, ‘we are reluctant to interfere with a jury verdict’ or the
district court’s consideration of a motion for new trial made in response
to the verdict.” Estate of Long, 656 N.W.2d at 88 (citation omitted). We
review a district court’s denial of a motion to exclude untimely disclosed
exhibits for abuse of discretion. Cf. Olson v. Nieman’s, Ltd., 579 N.W.2d
299, 305 (Iowa 1998). “If the motion [for a new trial] is based on a
discretionary ground such as misconduct it is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” Loehr v. Mettille, 806 N.W.2d 270, 277 (Iowa 2011). Claims
“of accident and surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against” are also reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Vanden
Berg v. Wolfe, 196 N.W.2d 420, 422 (Iowa 1972). “We review the district
court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on the claim a jury
awarded excessive damages for an abuse of discretion.” WSH Props.,
L.L.C. v. Daniels, 761 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Iowa 2008) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). A district court abuses its discretion if it rests
its ruling on “clearly untenable or unreasonable grounds.” Lawson v.
Kurtzhals, 792 N.W.2d 251, 258 (Iowa 2010).
Bluefield claims that a new trial was appropriate because the
verdict was “not sustained by sufficient evidence” and the district court
committed errors of law. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1004(6), (8). “Because the
sufficiency of the evidence presents a legal question, we review the trial
court’s ruling on this ground for the correction of errors of law.” Estate
of Hagedorn ex rel. Hagedorn v. Peterson, 690 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Iowa 2004).
In a related claim, Bluefield argues the district court committed legal
error in not granting its motion for a directed verdict, a decision we

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review for a correction of errors at law. Hasselman v. Hasselman, 596
N.W.2d 541, 545 (Iowa 1999).
III. Issues Presented on Appeal.
Bluefield raised eight issues on direct appeal. Bluefield first
argued a new trial was warranted under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure
1.1004(1). Under rule 1.1004(1), a new trial may be granted for an
“abuse of discretion which prevented the movant from having a fair trial.”
Bluefield asserts a new trial was appropriate under this rule because the
district court abused its discretion in admitting the untimely disclosed
photographs and refusing to grant Bluefield’s motion for a mistrial
during Fry’s testimony.
Second, Bluefield argued the district court should have granted a
new trial under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1004(2), which permits a
new trial for “[m]isconduct of the jury or prevailing party.” Bluefield
asserts Fry engaged in misconduct by referencing Bluefield’s projects in
Mississippi and Wellman, Iowa in violation of the district court’s order
granting the motion in limine.
Third, Bluefield stated that a new trial should have been granted
pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1004(3), which allows a new
trial for an “[a]ccident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against.” Bluefield argued that the untimely disclosed
exhibits, and Fry’s testimony regarding the Mississippi and Wellman,
Iowa projects, constituted a “surprise” that “ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1004(3).
Bluefield’s fourth, fifth, and sixth arguments alleged the jury
verdict was excessive and reflected an award based on passion or
prejudice. Bluefield relied on Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 1.1004(4), (5)
and (6) in support of this argument.

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Seventh, Bluefield argued the district court made errors of law
during trial, which called for a new trial under rule 1.1004(8). Bluefield
asserted the district court’s failure to order a mistrial, to exclude the
untimely disclosed exhibits, and to exclude testimony regarding damages
to the roof of Fry’s garage were errors of law warranting a new trial.
Finally, Bluefield asserted the district court erred in failing to grant
his motion for directed verdict at the close of Fry’s case-in-chief.
Bluefield asserted the jury’s verdict finding Bluefield breached the
contract was unsupported by the evidence. Bluefield’s final argument
relies on Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1003(2) and 1.1004(9).
IV. Merits.
A. Photographs. Bluefield claims the district court’s decision to
admit the photographs of the water leak and millipede problem prevented
Bluefield from receiving a fair trial. See id. r. 1.1004(1). Although
Bluefield is not entirely clear about how the district court abused its
discretion and prevented it from having a fair trial, the crux of Bluefield’s
argument is it was deprived of a fair trial because the district court
admitted exhibits that were untimely disclosed in violation of the pretrial
order. As noted above, the pretrial order required Fry to provide
Bluefield with a complete exhibit list “no later than seven (7) days prior to
trial.” Fry failed to comply with the pretrial order by filing an amended
exhibit list, which included the previously undisclosed photographs in
question, the day before trial. Bluefield’s request for the exclusion of the
untimely disclosed photographs was, in substance, a motion to enforce
the pretrial order by appropriate sanctions under Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.602(5). See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.602(5) (stating a court “may
make such orders . . . as are just” for a party’s failure to obey a
scheduling or pretrial order, including an order prohibiting introduction

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of certain matters in evidence as provided in rule 1.517(2)(b)(2)). We
therefore turn to the question of whether the district court’s failure to
enforce the pretrial order deprived Bluefield of a fair trial.
Pretrial scheduling orders serve an important function in our civil
justice system. A scheduling order encourages pretrial management and
assists the trial court in controlling the direction of the litigation. See
Caruso v. Pearce, 678 S.E.2d 50, 55 (W. Va. 2009); see also Stevenson v.
Felco Indus., Inc., 216 P.3d 763, 769 (Mont. 2009). It has been said that
the purpose of a pretrial scheduling order is to “permit orderly discovery
and pretrial preparation.” In re Estate of Fahnlander, 913 P.2d 426, 429
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996). By fixing time deadlines, a scheduling order
stimulates litigants to focus on the most germane issues in the case. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendments (citing
Report of the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and
Procedures 28 (1979)); 3 James W. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 16.02, at 16–19 to 16–20 (3d ed. 2012). Time limits thus promote
efficiency and reduce the amount of resources required to be invested in
the litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes to 1983
amendments. “[T]he absence of a scheduling order,” observes one
commentator, “can result in lack of focus, inefficiency, and delays in
disposition.” 3 James W. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 16.10[2], at
16-39.
The cooperation of parties during pretrial stages of litigation is
essential. Judge McIllvaine observed fifty years ago that “[w]ithout the
active cooperation of the trial attorneys, and their diligent preparation of
the cases for pretrial, the whole purpose of pretrial will fail.” John W.
McIllvaine, A District Judge’s Views as to the Means of Insuring
Compliance by Counsel with the Pretrial Procedures, 29 F.R.D. 191, 408

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(1961). The failure of a party to meet pretrial deadlines not only
undermines the goals of the schedule, but also prejudices the other
party, who is subject to the deadlines as well. See Perry v. Sera, 623
A.2d 1210, 1220 (D.C. 1993); see also Barrow v. Abramowicz, 931 A.2d
424, 431 (Del. 2007) (stating “the pretrial order is tantamount to a
contract between the parties for conducting pretrial preparation”). A
party’s failure to comply with pretrial procedure divests the trial court’s
control over the administration of justice in the case and places it in the
hands of recalcitrant or otherwise dilatory counsel. See Link v. Wabash
R.R., 291 F.2d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1961).
To ensure our district courts have the tools to effectively manage
pretrial conduct and control the conduct of the trial, we have recognized
the inherent power of the district court to enforce pretrial orders by
imposing sanctions. See Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa, 282
N.W.2d 639, 646 (Iowa 1979). Our rules of civil procedure reflect this
inherent power by vesting the district court with discretion to fashion
appropriate sanctions for violations of pretrial orders. See Iowa Rs. Civ.
P. 1.517(2)(b)(2)–(4), .602(5); Olson, 579 N.W.2d at 305. Although district
courts have discretion in deciding whether to enforce pretrial orders, “it
is incumbent upon a reviewing court to scrutinize the exercise of that
discretion and to confine the exercise to reasonable limits.” Fox v.
Stanley J. How & Assocs., Inc., 309 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Iowa Ct. App.
1981).
We conclude the district court properly denied Bluefield’s motion
for a new trial based on the admission of the exhibits in question. Under
rule 1.1004, a district court should only grant a new trial if one of the
grounds listed in the rule applies and the movant’s substantial rights
were materially affected. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1004. When the asserted

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ground for a new trial is that the district court abused its discretion, the
movant must show the error “prevented the movant from having a fair
trial.” Id. r. 1.1004(1). Thus, in order to reverse the district court and
grant Bluefield’s motion for a new trial, we must not only be convinced
that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the
photographs, we must also be convinced that the error materially
affected Bluefield’s substantial rights.
Bluefield argues that the district court abused its discretion when
it admitted evidence that was not turned over in accordance with the
pretrial order and that this abuse of discretion prevented Bluefield from
receiving a fair trial. We disagree with both claims. The district court
found that Bluefield’s concerns regarding the late disclosure of the
evidence, and his resulting inability to investigate the photos, could
“adequately be addressed through cross examination of the plaintiff or
the plaintiff’s witnesses, and/or through presentation of [Bluefield’s] own
evidence.” As discussed below, this point is well-taken. The court of
appeals correctly noted that Fry had time to alert Bluefield of her
intention to admit evidence of a water leak and millipede infestation.
However, the record does not support the conclusion that Bluefield was
prejudiced by Fry’s failure to include the exhibits in the first exhibit list.
Bluefield argued the exclusion of the exhibits in the exhibit list impaired
his ability to investigate the cause of the water leak. However, Bluefield
presented testimony that Bluefield did not install the window that was
shown in the controverted photographs. Bluefield clearly was able to
investigate and refute this evidence of a water leak and effectively did so
at trial.
Bluefield also was not prejudiced in its ability to investigate and
refute the millipede infestation which occurred shortly before trial.

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Bluefield presented testimony at trial that Fry was instructed not to cut
any holes in the cement wall between the old and the new basement
other than the small opening needed for the heating duct. This was due
to the time of year and because the scheduling of the project did not call
for it at that time. Because Fry could have this done at no charge, she
not only had a hole cut for the heating duct but also went ahead and
opened up a significant hole leading into her existing basement.
Therefore, the hole leading into Fry’s existing basement could not
reasonably be attributed to any direct action by Bluefield. Bluefield also
emphasized the significant time gap between when it was removed from
the project and when these problems occurred. As the district court
pointed out, while Bluefield’s ability to refute evidence of the water leak
and millipede problem may have been impaired, the district court also
reasonably concluded the surprise suffered by Bluefield was not
substantial nor did it otherwise prevent it from developing a means of
impeachment. See State v. Thompkins, 318 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Iowa 1982)
(noting ability to prepare for or investigate untimely disclosed evidence a
factor to be considered in determining prejudice caused by late
disclosure); see also City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309, 1315
(Alaska 1985) (stating the district court is in the best position to
determine credibility and reasonableness of attorney’s claim of surprise
by undisclosed evidence).
Even if Bluefield was surprised by the additional exhibits, it is
unlikely this had any impact on the ultimate outcome of the proceedings.
Fry’s testimony on the water leak and millipede infestation consisted of
five pages of a trial transcript which exceeded five hundred and eighty
pages. In contrast, in excess of twenty-eight pages of the transcript were
consumed discussing timesheets. One of the principal arguments Fry

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advanced with respect to her breach of contract claim involved the
assertion that Bluefield breached an implied warranty to construct the
garage in a good and workmanlike manner. Fry submitted several
exhibits, aside from the photographs in question, and offered the
testimony of an expert in support of her assertion that Bluefield
breached the implied warranty of workmanlike quality. The photographs
of the water leak and millipede problem were therefore cumulative and
had marginal probative value.
Under these facts, we cannot say that by admitting the
photographs that were turned over the day of trial, the district court
exercised its discretion on grounds or reasons clearly untenable or to an
extent clearly unreasonable. The introduction of the disputed exhibits
did not significantly alter Bluefield’s defense strategy, nor was Bluefield
unable to effectively respond to the exhibits through cross-examination
and its direct evidence. We note Bluefield has also claimed the
photographs were not relevant to a breach of contract case and should
have been excluded on that basis. See Estate of Long, 656 N.W.2d at 90
(“[T]he photographs were not relevant to any issue properly before the
jury and there was no ‘just reason for their admission.’ Thus, the district
court’s admission of the photos . . . amounted to an abuse of discretion.”
(citation omitted)). However valid this argument may be, Bluefield has
failed to demonstrate how his substantial rights have been affected by
the introduction of the untimely disclosed exhibits. While we certainly
do not condone the last minute disclosure of exhibits in this case,
Bluefield has failed to establish substantial prejudice resulted due to the
introduction of the untimely exhibits. We therefore reject Bluefield’s
argument that a new trial is warranted under Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.1004(1), (3), or (8).

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B. Improper Remarks by Fry. Bluefield asserts that the district
court’s failure to grant a mistrial following Fry’s statements in violation of
the motion in limine deprived it of a fair trial, amounted to misconduct
by the prevailing party, constituted a surprise which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against, and constituted an error of law in the
proceeding. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1004(1), (2), (3), (8).
The district court found that Fry’s improper remarks were not
made in bad faith and were “to a large extent, if not wholly,” made in
response to questions posed by Bluefield’s counsel. Immediately
following the improper remarks, the district court sustained Bluefield’s
objection, struck the remarks from the record, and directed the jury not
to consider them. “Generally, an admonition to the jury to disregard
inadmissible testimony is sufficient to cure any prejudice.” State v.
Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Iowa 1986); State v. Brown, 397
N.W.2d 689, 699 (Iowa 1986) (“[A] trial court’s quick action in striking
the improper response and cautioning the jury to disregard it, coupled,
when necessary, with some type of general cautionary instruction, will
prevent any prejudice.”). “We . . . allow trial courts broad discretion in
determining whether to grant a mistrial. Such discretion is a recognition
of the trial court’s better position to appraise the situation in the context
of the full trial.” Eldridge v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., 533 N.W.2d 569,
571 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted).
Bluefield has not shown that the district court’s admonishment
failed to cure any prejudice caused by the violation of the motion in
limine. These facts do not present an “extreme instance” in which
“manifest” prejudice provides sufficient grounds for a new trial. See
State v. Jackson, 587 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Iowa 1998). We find neither
abuse of discretion nor error of law in the denial of the request for a

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mistrial or the denial of a new trial based on the grounds asserted by
Bluefield in its appeal asserting a new trial is warranted in light of Fry’s
statements in violation of the motion in limine.
C. Jury Award. Bluefield also asserts the jury verdict is excessive
due to passion or prejudice. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1004(4). We review
claims alleging excessive damages influenced by passion or prejudice for
abuse of discretion. WSH Props., L.L.C., 761 N.W.2d at 49. A
presumption of passion or prejudice arises when a jury verdict is
“flagrantly excessive.” Id. at 50. Once the presumption of passion or
prejudice is dispelled, we look to other indications in the record to
support a finding of passion or prejudice. Id. at 51. In considering
whether a verdict is so excessive as to show it is the result of passion or
prejudice, “ ‘we must take the evidence in the aspect most favorable to
plaintiff which it will reasonably bear.’ ” Townsend v. Mid-Am. Pipeline
Co., 168 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Iowa 1969) (citation omitted).
We conclude that the presumption of passion or prejudice is
dispelled in this case because the jury verdict is supported by
substantial evidence. The jury awarded $42,000 for the cost to complete
the project. The contract price of the project was $101,250. Fry stated
she paid Bluefield a total of $79,309. Fry acknowledged that $1295.74 of
the total was for a “dog run” that was not included in the original budget.
Fry also spent $5326.54 on cabinets, though the original bid only
budgeted $3000 for cabinets.1 Thus, Fry incurred a total of $81,013.26
on the project as originally contemplated by the parties before Bluefield’s
departure. At the time Bluefield stopped working on the project, a
balance of $20,236.74 remained on the original contract.
1Fry conceded she was responsible for the amount in excess of the budgeted
sum for the cabinets.

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Following Bluefield’s departure, Fry spent over $20,000 on
materials and labor to continue work on the addition. An estimate from
S.R.S. Construction stated it would cost another $24,650 to complete the
addition. In addition to the cost to complete, S.R.S. Construction
submitted a bid in the amount of $32,480 for the cost to repair the roof
constructed by Bluefield which Fry and her expert claimed was defective.
Moreover, Fry and Anthony Williams testified the original contract
included a geothermal unit, which would cost $18,000 to install.
Whether this was included in the original proposal was highly disputed
at trial. There were also significant cost overruns on other items that
were part of the original proposal. The record reveals substantial
disputes as to the amount of these additional costs and the responsible
party. After sorting through all of the contested evidence and testimony,
it is clear the jury award of $42,000 as the cost to Fry to complete the
project due to Bluefield’s breach is supported by substantial evidence
and is not flagrantly excessive.
The jury also awarded Fry $9662.76 for the cost of delay caused by
Bluefield. Fry testified that she financed the addition to her home
through a home equity line of credit of $100,000. Fry explained the line
of credit may be turned into a mortgage once the addition is completed.
Fry testified the delay in finishing the project prevented her from
converting her home equity line of credit into a thirty-year conventional
mortgage. She testified that between December 28, 2008, and July 1,
2010, she paid $18,749.88 in interest on her loan. Had she been able to
convert her home equity line of credit into a thirty-year mortgage,
however, she would have paid $7421.67 in interest. Therefore, the cost
of delay awarded by the jury is supported by substantial evidence and
not flagrantly excessive.

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We also find no indication in the record that the jurors acted out of
passion or prejudice in such a way as to punish Bluefield. As discussed
above, the jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Further,
the record is devoid of any other objective evidence affirmatively
establishing the jury acted out of passion or prejudice. See Allen v.
Lindeman, 259 Iowa 1384, 1398, 148 N.W.2d 610, 619 (1967) (stating “it
must affirmatively be shown prejudice and passion existed before this
court should interfere with a verdict”). Therefore, based on the
evidentiary support of the verdict and the lack of evidence showing
passion or prejudice, we conclude the damages awarded by the jury in
this case are not excessive or influenced by passion or prejudice.
Further, because we conclude the verdict was supported by substantial
evidence, we reject Bluefield’s claim under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure
1.1004(6).
D. Directed Verdict. Following the close of Fry’s case-in-chief,
Bluefield made a motion for directed verdict claiming Fry failed to
introduce sufficient evidence on the element of breach. In response to
Bluefield’s motion, Fry’s counsel argued sufficient evidence supported
the breach element in three ways: First, Bluefield breached the contract
by exceeding the agreed upon price of the project; second, Bluefield’s
dilatory progress on completion of the contract amounted to a breach;
and third, Bluefield’s shoddy workmanship breached the implied
warranty of workmanlike quality. The district court denied Bluefield’s
motion for directed verdict.
We review a denial of a motion for directed verdict for correction of
errors at law. Hasselman, 596 N.W.2d at 545. On a motion for directed
verdict, the trial court is required to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, even if contradictory evidence exists. Bellville v.

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Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 702 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Iowa 2005). A motion
for directed verdict must be overruled if substantial evidence supports
each element of each claim. Easton v. Howard, 751 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa
2008). Evidence is substantial “[w]hen reasonable minds would accept
the evidence as adequate to reach the same findings.” Id. Our task is to
determine whether the district court “correctly determined there was
sufficient evidence to submit the issue to the jury.” Id.
We conclude substantial evidence supports Fry’s breach of
contract claim. In construction contracts, “it is implied, unless there is
express contrary agreement, that ‘the building will be erected in a
reasonably good and workmanlike manner.’ ”2 Busker v. Sokolowski,
203 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Iowa 1972) (quoting Markman v. Hoefer, 252 Iowa
118, 123, 106 N.W.2d 59, 62 (1960)). In this case, Fry testified that
problems with the roof of the garage were a factor in her decision to ask
Bluefield to discontinue the project. Chad Evans opined that, overall,
Bluefield’s work was subpar. Evans stated the roof on the garage
installed by Bluefield fell below industry standards and would cost
$32,480 to repair. There were also numerous claims of other deficiencies
in the work performed by Bluefield.
There was also substantial evidence presented by Fry that
numerous individual bid items were well over budget at the time
Bluefield was removed from the project. Bluefield acknowledged that it
did not discuss this with Fry or have any written documentation as to
change orders. Lastly, there was substantial evidence in the record that
2Bluefield briefly argues the admission of evidence related to the cost to repair
Bluefield’s shoddy workmanship was an error of law warranting a new trial. See Iowa
R. Civ. P. 1.1004(8). Because the evidence was directly related to Fry’s claim based on
the implied warranty of workmanlike construction, the district court did not err in
admitting evidence of cost of repair.

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little or no work was being performed on Fry’s addition in the weeks
leading up to Bluefield’s removal from the project. Therefore, there was
substantial evidence in the record to support a claim of breach so that it
was not error for the district court to deny the motion for directed verdict
and allow the matter to proceed to the jury. On these facts, we also
conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict. We therefore
reject Bluefield’s arguments under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1004(6)
and rule 1.1004(9).
V. Conclusion.
For the reasons stated above, Bluefield has not shown the district
court committed any error in its decisions during the trial that
substantially prejudiced Bluefield’s rights to a fair trial. Therefore,
Bluefield is not entitled to a new trial. We vacate the decision of the
court of appeals, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

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