State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare v. John Doe (2026-06)

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 53692

In the Matter of: John Doe I, A Child )
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF )
HEALTH AND WELFARE, ) Filed: June 18, 2026
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
JOHN DOE (2026-06), ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Anson L. Call, II, Magistrate.

Judgment and decree terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Merrill and Merrill, Chartered; Mary E. Shea, Pocatello, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Jason R. Chandler, Deputy Attorney
General, Pocatello, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
John Doe appeals from the magistrate court’s judgment and decree terminating his parental
rights to John Doe I (Child). Doe argues the magistrate court erred by terminating his parental
rights without addressing the due process argument that his parental rights were terminated based
on facts never adjudicated or tasks not included in the case plan, and the Idaho Department of
Health and Welfare (Department) did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that: Doe
abused Child; Doe neglected Child; and terminating Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests
of Child. The Department argues there is substantial and competent evidence supporting the
magistrate court’s conclusions regarding the alternate statutory bases upon which Doe’s parental
rights could be terminated and terminating Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of Child.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment and decree terminating Doe’s parental rights.

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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case is one of three cases that were consolidated in the magistrate court but are not
consolidated on appeal. The parties in the consolidated cases in the magistrate court are Doe, his
wife (Stepmother),1 and the mother of Child (Mother). Doe and Mother are the biological parents
of Child. Stepmother is the biological parent of two other minor children (Children), who are not
biologically related to Doe or Mother.2
Child was born in April 2022 and lived with Mother and Mother’s parents. When Child
was approximately five months old, Mother and Doe’s relationship ended, and Mother began
dating another man. Mother and Child moved in with Mother’s boyfriend in December 2022. The
three then moved to Oregon, and Mother and her boyfriend married. In July 2023, the Oregon
Department of Children and Family Services (Oregon DCFS) opened an investigation into Mother
and her husband over allegations that Child had been burned and was given cold showers as a
punishment during potty training. It was also reported to the Oregon DCFS that Child had been
burned on his hand.
Oregon DCFS had ongoing safety concerns for Child, but Mother and her husband became
uncooperative with the Oregon investigation. Because of the safety concerns and lack of
cooperation, Oregon DCFS placed Child with Doe in Idaho. At that time, Doe lived with
Stepmother and Children.
A short time after Child was placed with Doe and Stepmother, Stepmother called Doe and
informed him that Child was limp and not moving correctly. Child was taken to the emergency
room where Doe and Stepmother reported to the medical providers that Child had also been
vomiting and experiencing diarrhea. No brain scans of Child were performed, and he was sent
home with nausea medicine and a diagnosis of respiratory syncytial virus (RSV). The following
day, Child returned to the emergency room after Stepmother reported to Doe that Child was unable
to stand and use the right side of his body. This time, a computed tomography (CT) scan was

1
Doe and Stepmother were in a dating relationship but later married during the Child
Protective Act case. For ease of reference, we will refer to Doe’s wife as Stepmother regardless
of their marital status at any given time.
2
Mother’s parental rights to Child were also terminated; that appeal is pending in
Docket No. 53666. Stepmother’s parental rights to Children were also terminated; that appeal is
pending in Docket No. 53700.
2
performed. The CT scan revealed: bilateral frontal hygromas (fluid in the brain), an enlarged
ventricular system, and an acute 4 to 5 mm subdural hematoma in the left frontal region (a
collection of blood in the brain). Medical providers also noted that Child had bruising on his
cheeks; Doe and Stepmother reported that the bruising was the result of Stepmother’s daughters
throwing toys at Child.
The emergency room doctor who examined Child, Dr. Curtis Sandy, testified that the neuro
deficits associated with a brain bleed most often occur within twenty-four to forty-eight hours of
the onset of the brain bleed. After reviewing the CT scan, Dr. Sandy testified that, in his opinion,
the blood in Child’s brain was less than twenty-four to forty-eight hours old due to the large area
of acute blood present in the brain with a smaller area of mixed density blood. Because the brain
bleed was so large and Child was experiencing neurological symptoms, it was determined that
surgery may be required. There were no pediatric neurologists nearby, so Child was flown to a
hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah. Additional scans were completed at that hospital, including a
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Photographs of Child were taken, which showed bruising on
Child’s cheeks, forehead, and left arm. The Department filed a CPA petition alleging Child was
abused, abandoned, neglected, homeless, or lacked a stabled home environment; Child was
subsequently placed into the temporary custody of the Department. Following an adjudicatory
hearing, the Department was granted continued temporary custody of Child, and a case plan was
approved and adopted for Doe. Thereafter, the Department filed a petition for termination of Doe’s
parental rights and adoption of Child.
Following a termination trial, the magistrate court found that Doe neglected Child on three
alternate bases: (1) Child was without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or
other care or control necessary for his well-being, because of the conduct or omission of Doe
and/or Doe’s neglect or refusal to provide them (I.C. §§ 16-2005(1)(a)(ii), 16-2002(3)(a) and 16-
1602(31)(a));3 (2) Doe was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities and, as a result of such
inability, Child lacks the parental care necessary for his health, safety, or well-being (I.C. §§ 16-
2005(1)(a)(ii), 16-2002(3)(a) and 16-1602(31)(b)); and (3) Doe failed to comply with the
magistrate court’s orders or case plan, Child had been in the temporary custody of the Department

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Although the magistrate court cites to I.C. §§ 16-2005(1)(b) and 16-2002(30)(a), it is clear
it was referring to I.C. §§ 16-2002(3)(a) and 16-1602(31)(a).
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for fifteen4 of the most recent twenty-two months, and reunification had not been accomplished
(I.C. §§ 16-2005(1)(a)(ii) and 16-2002(3)(b)). The magistrate court also found Doe was unable to
discharge his parental responsibilities and such inability will continue for a prolonged
indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, morals, and/or well-being of Child (I.C.
§ 16-2005(1)(a)(iv)) and that termination of Doe’s parental rights is in Child’s best interests. Doe
appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater
quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143
Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe
v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate court’s decision
must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
This Court must conduct an independent review of the record but must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the magistrate court’s judgment, as the magistrate court has the opportunity
to observe witnesses’ demeanor, to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or motive, and to
judge the character of the parties. In Interest of Doe I, 163 Idaho 274, 277, 411 P.3d 1175, 1178
(2018).

4
The statutory time frame under Idaho Code § 16-2002(3)(b) to terminate parental rights
has since been amended to twelve of the most recent twenty-two months. The amendment does
not affect the analysis or outcome of this case.

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III.
ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Basis for Termination
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due
process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383,
386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a parent-
child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental liberty
interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may terminate a
parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of Health &
Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at
652.
Idaho Code § 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the parent-
child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five factors
exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child
and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a
prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the
parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory
ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.
Idaho Code § 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-
1602(31). Section 16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the
child is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control
necessary for his or her well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents,
guardian, or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where
the parent has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in a Child Protective Act
case and the Department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen of the most

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recent twenty-two months and reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the
fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody of the Department.
I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b).
Doe raises four arguments on appeal: (1) the magistrate court erred in terminating his
parental rights without first ruling on his due process argument that his parental rights were
terminated on facts that were never adjudicated or included in the case plan; (2) the Department
did not prove by clear and convincing evidence either that Child was abused or that Doe failed to
protect Child from abuse; (3) the Department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence Doe
neglected Child; and (4) the Department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of Child. The Department argues: (1)
Doe’s brief fails to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 35 and relies on evidence not in the record,
which results in a waiver of Doe’s claims on appeal; (2) the magistrate court did not find abuse as
a statutory basis to terminate Doe’s parental rights; (3) the Department’s efforts at reunification
are irrelevant in a termination proceeding; and (4) the magistrate court’s findings on the statutory
bases for which Doe’s parental rights could be terminated and its finding that termination is in the
best interests of Child are supported by substantial and competent evidence.
1. Failure to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 35
We first address the Department’s claim that Doe has waived consideration of his
arguments on appeal for failing to comply with I.A.R. 35(a)(6). Idaho Appellate Rule 35 sets out
the required contents of an appellant’s brief and provides that the argument section of an
appellant’s brief “shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented
on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript
and record relied upon.” I.A.R. 35(a)(6). The record in this case is 758 pages, and the transcript
is 1,469 pages. The argument section of Doe’s opening brief is eighteen and one-half pages. In
those eighteen plus pages, there are three citations to the record. In subsection I of the argument
section, there is one citation to pages 1,031-1,033 and 1,037 of the transcript, which is Doe’s
argument at the termination trial for a directed verdict. In subsection II, there is one citation to
pages 28-29 of the record, which is the initial petition filed in the CPA case. In subsection IV,
there is one citation to pages 301-302 of the transcript, which is Doe’s testimony regarding his
unwillingness to separate from Stepmother. Subsection III omits any reference to the record.
While Doe cites to the record in support of his argument in his reply brief, that is insufficient to

6
avoid waiver. See Dodd v. Jones, 175 Idaho 382, 395, 566 P.3d 379, 392 (2024) (holding although
the Dodds presented additional argument and authority in support of an issue inadequately
supported in their opening brief, the Court would look only to the initial brief because “those are
the arguments and authority to which the respondent has an opportunity to respond in the
respondent’s brief”). This Court will not search the record on appeal for error. Idaho Dep’t of
Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 113, 244 P.3d 247, 257 (Ct. App. 2010). Even in an
appeal from the termination of parental rights, “we will not consider an issue which is not
supported by cogent argument and authority.” In re Doe (2013-15), 156 Idaho 103, 109, 320 P.3d
1262, 1268 (2014). As a result, Doe has waived consideration of all the claims raised on appeal.
But even if reviewed on the merits, Doe’s claims fail.
2. Due process claim
Doe’s first argument is that the magistrate court erred in terminating his parental rights
without first ruling on his due process argument. Doe’s due process argument is two-fold: (1) the
magistrate court erred by terminating Doe’s parental rights based on facts that were never
adjudicated or included in the case plan; and (2) the magistrate court erred in terminating Doe’s
parental rights because the Department imposed unclear conditions for reunification that were
never made part of the case plan.
The United States Constitution’s Due Process Clause provides that no state shall “deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. This guarantee secures both substantive and procedural due process rights. The substantive
component “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; see also Carver v. Hornish, 171
Idaho 118, 123, 518 P.3d 1175, 1180 (2022). The procedural component, on the other hand,
requires that there be some process to ensure that an individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his
rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions. S. Valley Ground Water Dist. v. Idaho Dep’t
of Water Res., 173 Idaho 762, 794, 548 P.3d 734, 766 (2024). Whether an individual’s due process
rights have been violated requires a reviewing court to engage in a two-step analysis. Id. First,
the court “must decide whether an individual’s threatened interest is a liberty or property interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment.” IDHW v. Jane Doe (2024-04), 174 Idaho 401, 418, 555 P.3d
1091, 1108 (2024). Second, the court must determine what process is due. Id. A parent’s ability
to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of his children is a fundamental right

7
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Carver, 171 Idaho at 123-24, 518
P.3d at 1180-81.
In a termination of parental rights case, the procedural process that is due is defined by
statute and includes notice (I.C. § 16-2008(2)); a hearing before a neutral magistrate court at which
witnesses may appear and be cross-examined (I.C. § 16-2009); and that the magistrate court’s
findings must be established by clear and convincing evidence (I.C. § 16-2009(3)). Doe, 143 Idaho
at 386, 146 P.3d at 652. Where the termination trial complies with these procedural safeguards,
there is no due process violation. See Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe I, 163 Idaho
83, 87-88, 408 P.3d 81, 85-86 (2017) (holding Child failed to establish due process violation where
parental rights were terminated without a trial because hearing was held in compliance with I.C. §
16-2009 and other statutory requirements were met).
i. Facts not adjudicated
Doe argues the Department had an obligation to “convince” Doe through an adjudication
in the CPA case that abuse occurred and Stepmother caused the abuse. Short of that adjudication,
Doe argues the Department violated his due process rights when the Department premised
reunification on Doe’s acknowledgment and acceptance of those facts, required Doe to complete
a task related to those facts, and ultimately terminated Doe’s parental rights based on those facts.
Doe’s argument fails because there is no requirement that any of the allegations of neglect be
“proven” true by clear and convincing evidence in the CPA case.
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that allegations of abuse are sufficient for a
finding of neglect. See In the Interest of the Doe Children v. John Doe and Jane Doe, 163 Idaho
367, 413 P.3d 767 (2018) (mother’s inability to protect her children based on allegations of abuse
was substantial and competent evidence that mother neglected children); Castro v. Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare, 102 Idaho 218, 628 P.2d 1052 (1981) (father’s parental rights
terminated based on allegations of abuse with substantiated injuries); In the Interest of John Doe I
and John Doe II v. State Department of Health and Welfare, 122 Idaho 644, 837 P.2d 319 (Ct.
App. 1992) (rejecting argument that parental rights may only be terminated upon finding, among
other options, affirmative abuse with substantiated physical or emotional harm to child).
Moreover, the statutory bases for termination can be established by circumstantial evidence. Doe
I v. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 900, 71 P.3d 1040, 1047 (2003) (noting abandonment may be proven by
circumstantial evidence)

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Doe argues that because the Department alleged Doe neglected Child by failing to
recognize or admit Stepmother committed the abuse and by failing to protect Child from
Stepmother, the Department “effectively put [Doe] in the position of proving that he reasonably
believed and reasonably believes now that [Stepmother] did not commit the abuse.” This appears
to be an argument that the Department shifted the burden to Doe to prove he was a fit parent. We
disagree.
In IDHW v. Doe (2023-24), 172 Idaho 891, 537 P.3d 1252 (2023), Infant was taken into
protective custody based on allegations that Infant’s older sibling, Toddler, had been taken into
the Department’s custody on allegations of abuse. Id. at 896, 537 P.3d at 1257. At the conclusion
of the Department’s case-in-chief at the adjudicatory hearing, Father and Mother moved for a joint
motion for directed verdict pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 50 and argued the
Department lacked any particularized facts that related to risks to Infant’s safety. Doe (2023-24),
172 Idaho at 896, 537 P.3d at 1257. Parents argued the Department unconstitutionally shifted the
burden of proof to Parents to prove Infant was safe, as opposed to the Department proving Infant
was unsafe in Parents’ care and custody. Id. The magistrate court denied the motion and held
Infant fell within the purview of the CPA. Id. at 897, 537 P.3d at 1258. Parents appealed.
On appeal, Parents argued, among other things, that the magistrate court erred in denying
their I.R.C.P. 50 motion. Doe (2023-24), 172 Idaho at 896, 537 P.3d at 1257. The Supreme Court
noted the evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing included that Toddler had been taken into
protective custody approximately four months before Infant’s birth based on Toddler’s exposure
to methamphetamines and Toddler’s broken femur and other injuries that were indicative of
physical abuse; the goal in Toddler’s CPA case was termination of parental rights; Parents had not
been cooperative with the case plans entered in Toddler’s CPA case; and Parents had not addressed
any of the safety concerns regarding Toddler and all safety concerns that brought Toddler into
protective custody were still concerns. Id. at 901-02, 537 P.3d 1262-63.
The Court noted that the burden of proof during a CPA case was a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. at 901, 537 P.3d at 1262. The Court held the evidence presented at the adjudicatory
hearing constituted substantial evidence sufficient to avoid a motion for direct verdict and “[t]he
‘at risk’ standard under Idaho Code section 16-1603(2) is a lower threshold, not to be confused
with actual abuse, neglect, or abandonment required under section 16-1603(1).” Doe (2023-24),
172 Idaho at 902, 537 P.3d at 1263. The Court further held that although there was no evidence

9
indicating Infant sustained the same injuries as Toddler, there was substantial and competent
evidence that Infant was at risk of being subjected to the same safety concerns that brought Toddler
into the Department’s custody. Id. The Court held there was “substantial and competent evidence
that Infant is at risk of suffering similar abuse or neglect.” Id. The Court further noted that the
law did not require Infant to suffer a broken limb to conclude he was at risk and because specific
safety concerns were associated with Toddler’s abuse and neglect, a reasonable person could
conclude those on-going concerns created a risk that Infant would also be a victim of abuse or
neglect, especially given Parents’ seeming unwillingness to accept the need to change their
behavior. Id. at 902-03, 537 P.3d at 1263-64.
The Court also addressed Parents’ claim that the burden of proof was unconstitutionally
shifted to them to show Infant was not at risk of being abused. Id. at 903, 537 P.3d at 1264. The
Court contrasted the standard that applies for a magistrate court taking jurisdiction over a child
pursuant to I.C. § 16-1603 with the standard for vesting custody with the Department pursuant to
I.C. § 16-1619. Doe (2023-24), 172 Idaho at 904, 537 P.3d at 1265. The Court found there was
sufficient evidence in the case to support the magistrate court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction
over Infant pursuant to I.C. § 16-1603(2). Doe (2023-24), 172 Idaho at 906, 537 P.3d at 1267. In
doing so, the Court relied on its reasoning and holding in Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v.
Doe (2009-21), 151 Idaho 300, 256 P.3d 708 (2011). Doe (2023-24), 172 Idaho at 903-05, 537
P.3d at 1264-66. Mother argued Doe (2009-21) was distinguishable because unlike the facts in
that case, the cause of Toddler’s injuries in Mother’s case were unknown. Doe (2023-24), 172
Idaho at 904, 537 P.3d at 1265. The Court rejected Mother’s characterization that Toddler’s
injuries were unknown, holding:
The cause of Toddler’s injuries is not unknown. The magistrate court found that
the cause of Toddler’s injuries--facial bruising, thigh bruising, and a fractured
femur--was physical abuse. While it is not known who in the home inflicted
Toddler’s injuries, this point is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether
Infant was at risk of abuse or neglect. The CPA does not require a magistrate court
to determine the identity of the first child’s abuser in order to conclude another
child in the same household is at risk of being a victim of abuse or neglect under
subsection 16-1603(2)(b), particularly when the same people in the home have
access to both children and the same parents are obligated to protect both children
from such abuse.

Id. The Court further explained its holding in Doe (2009-21):

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We did not uphold the magistrate court’s determination in Doe [(2009-21)]
that the daughter fell under the jurisdiction of the CPA because the father admitted
his abuse; we upheld it because there was sufficient evidence to support the findings
that daughter was exposed to that abuse and that she was at risk of being a victim
of abuse herself. Either one of these findings would be sufficient to take jurisdiction
of a child under the CPA pursuant to subsection 1603(2)(b); a court need not find
both. Thus, it is irrelevant here that Infant was not exposed to the abuse suffered
by Toddler. The magistrate court was permitted to, and did, take jurisdiction of
Infant based solely on the conclusion that Infant was at risk of being a victim of
abuse, neglect, or abandonment.
Doe (2023-24), 172 Idaho at 905, 537 P.3d at 1266.
Contrary to Doe’s assertion, the Department was not required to “convince” Doe or
“prove” that Child’s injuries were the result of abuse or that Stepmother caused the abuse in the
CPA case. Instead, the magistrate court was required to find by a preponderance of the evidence
that it was contrary to the welfare of Child to remain in the home, and it was in Child’s best
interests for custody to be vested with the Department. This was established by the evidence that
Child was exposed to abuse, and Child was at risk of being further abused.
In its adjudicatory decree, the magistrate court indicated it based its findings on the
information in the verified petition, the affidavits in support of the petition, and the reports of
investigation prepared by the Department and the guardian ad litem. That information included
the opinion of the medical provider who treated Child and indicated Child’s injuries were
consistent with “inflicted trauma (e.g. child abuse)” and Child had a “high risk of further injury or
death if returned to the hands of the caregiver who inflicted the injuries.” That information was
sufficient evidence to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Child had been exposed to
abuse.
Moreover, although it was unknown at the time of the adjudicatory hearing whether it was
Doe or Stepmother who inflicted the injuries, the risk of further abuse was documented in Child’s
medical records and thus is similarly supported in the record. At the time of the injury, there was
no plausible explanation for the injuries Child suffered and both Doe and Stepmother would have
had access to Child if he was returned to the home. Given that there was a high risk of further
injury or death if returned to the caregivers, there was substantial evidence for the magistrate court
to conclude in the CPA case that it was contrary to Child’s welfare to remain in the home and that
it was in Child’s best interests to be placed in the custody of the Department. This was the due
process to which Doe was entitled in the CPA case and that standard was met.

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As it relates to the termination trial, the “adjudication” required was that the Department
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, one of the statutory bases upon which Doe’s parental
rights could be terminated and that terminating Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of
Child.
A similar argument regarding termination on unadjudicated facts was addressed in In re
Child of James R., 182 A.3d 1252 (Me. 2018). There, Child was placed into the Maine Department
of Health and Human Services after being born premature and drug-affected. Id. at 1254. A case
plan was entered and Father made progress on the case plan such that Father was permitted
unsupervised visitation with Child. Id. at 1255. During one of the visits, Child was injured at a
time when Father was the sole caregiver. Id. Medical providers were “very convinced” that
Father’s explanation of the bruises was not accurate, and the bruising was “most consistent with
an inflicted injury.” Id. Father never admitted any wrongdoing and testified at the termination
trial that he was not responsible for Child’s injuries. Id. at 1256. Father’s parental rights to Child
were subsequently terminated and Father appealed. Id. at 1254.
On appeal, Father argued his due process rights were violated because his parental rights
were terminated based largely on the allegation of abuse, which Father asserted was never
adjudicated. Id. at 1258. The Maine Supreme Court disagreed, holding Father had a full
opportunity at the termination trial to challenge the Department’s evidence that he inflicted the
injuries and to present his own evidence on that issue, and he did both. Id. The Court reasoned:
More importantly, however, the basis for a termination determination is not
artificially limited to circumstances, frozen in time, that existed at some earlier date.
As we have stated, the focus of the termination hearing is “not on the original reason
for the children’s removal from the parents’ home, but on the parents’ actions since
that time and their ability, contemporaneous with the termination hearing and into
the future, to provide safe care for [their children].” In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶
15, 775 A.2d 1144. The scope of the Department’s evidence forming the basis for
the judgment and the father’s full participation at the hearing were fully consistent
with the father’s right to due process.
In re Child of James R., 182 A.3d at 1258-59.
Similarly, the issue in this case was whether, at the time of the termination hearing and into
the future, Doe could safely care for Child. Doe had a full, fair, and meaningful opportunity to
challenge all the statutory bases upon which his parental rights could be terminated during the
termination trial. Doe took full advantage of that opportunity and presented evidence to rebut the
Department’s allegations. During the termination trial, it became clear based on Doe’s testimony

12
that Doe refused to believe any of the evidence that Stepmother injured Child. But Doe’s failure
to accept the evidence is not the equivalent of a due process violation. Consequently, Doe has
failed to establish any due process violation related to the level of proof needed to support the
magistrate court’s findings in the CPA case or at the termination trial that Child was abused, and
Stepmother caused the abuse.
ii. Unclear case plan conditions
Doe argues the Department’s “goals for reunification were nebulous, shifting, and without
concrete asks associated with them, making them virtually impossible for the parents and
particularly Father to accomplish.” As part of that argument, Doe asserts, “If the Department had
conditioned reunification on the parents acknowledging the abuse occurred, they would have had
to fashion tasks for the parents that would address reducing or eliminating that future risk for
reunification to occur.” Doe argues that because the case plan did not require separation from
Stepmother, it could not be a basis for termination of Doe’s parental rights.
The case plan order was entered November 27, 2023. The goals for reunification were set
out in the case plan. The case plan was designed to address the safety concern that Doe did not
demonstrate an ability to protect Child, as evidenced by Child’s life-threatening injuries. The goal
related to this safety concern required Doe to demonstrate his ability to protect Child. There were
eight written tasks to address this safety concern and goal. These written tasks required Doe to:
use other methods of discipline as opposed to physical discipline; not allow others to use physical
discipline with Child; demonstrate his ability to use the skills he learned at a Department-approved
parenting class during visitation; submit to random drug testing at the discretion of the Department;
participate in anger management classes; obtain mental health services if requested by the
Department; maintain a home free of any safety hazards; and ensure firearms in the household
were safely stored and out of the reach of Child. There was also a verbal task related to this safety
concern and goal; that task required Doe to separate himself from Stepmother, who at the time the
case plan was adopted, was not yet married to Doe. This was to address the Department’s concern
that Stepmother was responsible for Child’s injuries. This safety concern, and the goal related to
that safety concern, did not change throughout the CPA case.
Additionally, there were conditions for case closure. The first condition for case closure
listed the Department’s safety concern that “[Child] had life threatening injuries that were not
properly explained at the time of injury.” The goal associated with this concern was that Doe

13
would demonstrate the ability to protect Child. The associated task was for Doe to complete a
Department-approved parenting class. For reunification and for case closure, the Department
repeatedly discussed with Doe the importance of protecting Child by separating from Stepmother.
As early as February 2024, Doe was informed about the Department’s expectation
regarding his relationship with Stepmother, who he had not yet married. In a progress report for
review hearing and permanency plan, the caseworker, when describing the efforts by the
Department to finalize permanency goals, noted that in February 2024:
The Department has regular in-person meetings with [Doe] to discuss his case plan.
[Doe] is aware of the tasks the Department needs to see to reunify with [Child],
such as maintaining a home where [Stepmother] is not present. [Doe] reported he
is in the process of separating their homes and finding an appropriate roommate.
This expectation was reiterated in April 2024. Doe was clear about these expectations and
continued to tell the Department he was separated from Stepmother, and they were no longer in a
romantic relationship. For example, as noted by the caseworker in a declaration filed with the
magistrate court:
During a visit on August 2, 2024, [Doe] informed the Department he would end
any relationship with [Stepmother]. The Department reiterated their expectation of
[Doe] not continuing to have a relationship with [Stepmother] due to the allegations
of the severe harm she caused to his child. It has also been reported by the CASA
worker that [Doe] has reported to her that he has ended any relationship with
[Stepmother] months ago but continues to interact with her.
In August 2024, Doe filed a motion for a review hearing and requested a thirty-day home
visit. Therein, Doe stated he had a separate home from Stepmother, was not in a romantic
relationship with her, and “recognizes he must act to protect [Child] from her while there are
questions about her actions or an ongoing criminal case.” At that time, Doe was “agreeable to any
terms of a protective order or limitations on [Stepmother] contacting [Child] while in his care.”
In the Department’s objection, the Department noted that while it was suspected Child’s
injuries were the result of Stepmother’s actions, it could have been Doe who caused the injuries.
The Department was also concerned that Doe would not be protective and keep Stepmother away
from Child, had lied to the Department about his relationship with Stepmother, continued to
associate with Stepmother, and did not understand Stepmother to be a threat to Child. In support
of its objection, the Department attached a declaration from the caseworker. In that declaration,
the Department was clear it had ongoing safety concerns for Child due to Doe’s relationship with
Stepmother; there was evidence Doe and Stepmother had an ongoing relationship; and Doe

14
indicated he believed Stepmother only accidentally injured Child and once Stepmother “is found
not guilty” of the criminal charges, Doe would work to reintegrate Stepmother into his life. The
magistrate court denied the motion on September 19, 2024, for the following reasons: “concerns
about honesty/transparency about harm to [Child],” and “concerns about significant others.”
In December 2024, the progress report filed with the magistrate court details the following:
After the last hearing, [Doe] met with LSW [] to discuss what he would need to do
in order to reunify with [Child]. LSW [] explained to [Doe] he would need to
separate himself from [Stepmother] due to the ongoing concerns. [Doe] reported
he would not build a brick wall between him and [Stepmother] due to her being the
mother of his children. [Doe] reported when his children grew up and asked why
they were unable to maintain contact with their mother, he would explain to them
it was Idaho CPS’ fault.
This report also addressed the fact that on November 25, 2024, it was reported to the Department
that Doe married Stepmother. The Department had conversations with Doe about why he failed
to disclose the information in prior meetings with the Department and Doe’s response was that
Stepmother wanted to wait to tell her family the news.
Doe had actual notice of the case plan task that required he separate himself from
Stepmother and had the ability to comply with or challenge that task. The record makes clear that
the Department was concerned Stepmother was the one who harmed Child. Doe testified that he
knew of Child’s diagnosis of abusive head trauma. Doe further testified he was told by the
Department that his relationship with Stepmother was a “real concern” because of the
Department’s concerns Stepmother caused Child’s injuries. Doe also testified he was told multiple
times that maintaining a relationship with Stepmother would be a significant barrier to
reunification with Child. Doe testified that, for a while, he complied with that requirement but
stayed in contact with Stepmother. He testified that despite the warnings, he reinitiated a romantic
relationship with Stepmother during the CPA case and then married her.
The petition for termination of Doe’s parental rights was filed January 6, 2025. The report
of investigation for termination of parental rights indicated the Department “has continued to
discuss the concerns regarding [Doe’s] relationship with [Stepmother.]” The recommendations
regarding termination of the parent/child relationship reiterated this concern relating to both Doe
and Mother, and yet as late as December 2024, neither Doe nor Mother was willing to put Child’s
needs above their own:
[Child] has sustained significant injuries while in the care of each of his parents that
has been reported to be caused by their respective significant others. Neither parent
15
is willing to acknowledge the seriousness of these injuries and do not believe that
the injuries [Child] sustained were intentionally caused by their significant others.
This causes great concern for either parent’s ability to be a protective caregiver and
demonstrate they can put [Child’s] needs ahead of their own.
Doe appears to argue the notice, opportunity, and evidentiary burden procedural due
process protections were not met in the CPA case. To the extent Doe is arguing the case plan tasks
were unclear and/or he did not have notice of the verbal task to separate himself from Stepmother
during the CPA case in order to demonstrate the capacity to protect Child, his argument is
unavailing because the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly and definitively ruled that an “inquiry
into the Department’s efforts at reunification is irrelevant to the termination of parental rights.”
Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 164 Idaho 883, 888, 436 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2019); see
also State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2019-31), 166 Idaho 357, 361, 458 P.3d 226, 230
(Ct. App. 2020) (“It is well-settled that the Department’s efforts at reunification are not relevant
to the magistrate court’s termination decision under I.C. § 16-2005.”). Moreover, there are several
opportunities for immediate appellate recourse for a magistrate court’s determination of the
Department’s reasonable efforts. As this Court previously ruled in Doe (2019-31), 166 Idaho at
360-61, 458 P.3d at 230-31, “[t]here is a statutory right to appeal at several points during the
pendency of the child protection proceeding.” Idaho Code § 16-1625(1) sets forth this right and
provides, in part, that an aggrieved party may appeal “[a]n adjudicatory decree,” “[a]ny order
subsequent to the adjudicatory decree that vests legal custody of the child in the department,” or
“[a]ny order subsequent to the adjudicatory decree that authorizes or mandates the department to
cease reasonable efforts to make it possible to return the child to his home.” I.C. § 16-1625(1)(a)-
(c).
Although counsel for Doe alleges she objected “numerous times” to the requirement that
Doe separate from Stepmother, there is no citation to the record to support this claim. Nothing in
the record indicates there was any challenge to this task; the record appears to indicate the opposite,
because as noted above, this condition was addressed in a hearing by the magistrate court when
Doe’s request for extended visitation was denied. Moreover, if counsel objected, those objections
establish that Doe had notice of the tasks and it undercuts Doe’s argument that he had no notice of
this task.
The record belies Doe’s claim that he had no notice of the task and that it was not a task
approved by the magistrate court. If Doe had concerns regarding the magistrate court’s findings

16
following the adjudicatory hearing that Child was abused, Doe could have appealed pursuant to
I.C. § 16-1625(a). The failure to challenge the case plan task in the CPA case, however, does not
implicate Doe’s due process rights in the termination proceeding.
Doe next argues that he could not appeal because it was not what was in the case plan, but
rather, what was not in the case plan--the verbal task that he separate from Stepmother--that he
challenged. We disagree. As noted above, Doe had actual notice of this task and could have raised
in the magistrate court whether it was a required case plan task. For example, when Doe filed his
motion for extended visitation, his relationship with Stepmother was one of the bases upon which
the Department objected to the extended visitation. The court minutes from the hearing on the
motion indicate the magistrate court denied the motion in part based on Doe’s relationship with
Stepmother. We note that, neither the transcript of that hearing or any of the CPA hearings is
included in the record on appeal. It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide a sufficient
record to substantiate his or her claims on appeal. Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 127, 937 P.2d
434, 439 (Ct. App. 1997). Regardless, there is no reason Doe could not have challenged the
condition at that hearing and then filed an interlocutory appeal from the denial to modify that
condition of the case plan if he disagreed with the ruling.
It appears part of Doe’s due process argument is that the Department did not comply with
I.C. § 16-1621, which sets forth the requirements for a case plan hearing when there are no
aggravating circumstances. However, in his opening brief, Doe makes no cogent argument related
to the statutory requirements or ties any alleged statutory violations to his due process challenge;
as a result, he has waived this argument. See In re Doe (2013-15), 156 Idaho at 109, 320 P.3d at
1268 (holding even in an appeal from the termination of parental rights, “we will not consider an
issue which is not supported by cogent argument and authority”). However, even when considered
on the merits, the argument fails.
Idaho Code § 16-1621(3)(c) requires that if, following a case plan hearing, the magistrate
court determines the best interests of the child is served by adopting the proposed case plan, the
case plan filed by the Department shall set forth reasonable efforts that will be made so the child
can return home, including a goal of reunification and a plan for achieving that goal:
The reunification plan shall identify all issues that need to be addressed before the
child can safely be returned home without department supervision. The court may
specifically identify issues to be addressed by the plan. The reunification plan shall
specifically identify the tasks to be completed by the department, each parent or

17
others to address each issue, including services to be made available by the
department to the parents and in which the parents are required to participate, and
the deadlines for completion of each task.
The purpose of the written case plan tasks, adopted by the magistrate court and agreed to
by the parents, is to provide notice to the parents what the expectations are for reunification and
case closure. And where a parent has acknowledged those tasks, it is much easier to find a parent
had actual notice of the task and an opportunity to comply or challenge the task. While it could
be the case that a verbal instruction may fail to comport with due process requirements, that is not
the case here. As discussed above, Doe had actual notice of the case plan task, he complied with
the task for a period of time, and it appears the substance of the task was addressed by the
magistrate court at Doe’s request for extended visitation with Child. Doe’s subsequent failure to
separate from Stepmother had nothing to do with his lack of notice, his lack of understanding of
the requirement, or his inability to comply. Instead, Doe simply chose to ignore this requirement
and solidify his relationship with his Child’s abuser.
Doe argues this case is so similar to Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho
752, 250 P.3d 803 (Ct. App. 2011), that the outcome should be the same. In that case, the children
were removed based on allegations of abuse and neglect. Id. at 753, 250 P.3d 804. A case plan
was subsequently approved by the magistrate court; the case plan assigned Father tasks focused
on Father achieving and maintaining sobriety. Id. at 754, 250 P.3d at 805. After a rocky start,
Father began working the case plan and complied with many of the tasks, but not all. Id. The
guardian ad litem noted Father had “made every effort to work his case plan” and was “earnest
and anxious to comply with all that is asked of him.” Id. at 754-55, 250 P.3d at 805-06. The
Department nonetheless filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. Id. at 755, 250 P.3d
at 806. The basis for the petition was that Father neglected his children prior to the children being
taken into the Department’s custody and the neglect continued by Father’s failure to complete the
case plan. Id. Following the termination hearing, Father’s parental rights were terminated and
Father appealed. Id. at 756, 250 P.3d at 807.
This Court concluded that the magistrate court erred in terminating Father’s parental rights.
We reasoned:
The substantive focus of the case plan called for Father to address three
major deficiencies before the children would be returned to him: he was required
to overcome his alcohol abuse, build a healthy relationship with his children and
gain parenting skills, and achieve financial stability so that he could provide a

18
proper home. The magistrate’s findings gave little or no acknowledgement to the
strides that Father had made toward each of these primary goals.
Id. at 758, 250 P.3d at 809. We then analyzed each of the three above-listed goals and ultimately
concluded the magistrate court did not address the uncontroverted evidence that for quite some
time, Father had faithfully worked toward addressing each principal goal of the case plan. Id. at
758-59, 250 P.3d at 809-10. This Court ultimately held the magistrate court erred by focusing on
Father’s behavior prior to the children’s removal “while disregarding or giving minimal attention
to the compelling evidence of Father’s success” in addressing the goals of the case plan. Id. at
763, 250 P.3d at 814.
That case, however, is distinguishable. While it is true this Court noted the magistrate
court in that case found Father failed to comply with case plan tasks that were not written in the
case plan, that was not the focus of the reasoning or ultimate holding in the case. Additionally,
the only basis upon which the Department sought to terminate Father’s parental rights in that case
was neglect by failing to comply with the case plan. That is not the case here, as the Department
alleged three other statutory bases upon which Doe’s parental rights could be terminated. Finally,
in the above case, there was “compelling evidence” that Father substantially complied with the
three substantive goals set forth in the case plan. Here, as discussed above, the substantive goal
of the case plan was to address the safety concern that Doe had not demonstrated the ability to
protect Child “as evidenced by the injury that happened to [Child].” The goal related to this
concern required Doe to demonstrate his ability to protect Child. At the time of the termination
trial, there was no “compelling evidence” that Doe had substantially complied with this goal. His
unwillingness to accept that Child was abused, and Stepmother caused the abuse, created the same
risk to Child that brought Child into the Department’s custody. As such, and unlike in the above
case, the magistrate court did not disregard compelling evidence of Doe’s success in dealing with
the safety concerns related to Child.
Doe also cites to Doe (2009-21), 151 Idaho at 300, 256 P.3d at 708, in support of his
argument. In that case, an infant was taken into protective custody following his admission to the
hospital where he was diagnosed with and treated for a broken femur and two fractured clavicle
bones; x-rays indicated the injuries resulted from at least two separate incidents. Id. at 302, 256
P.3d at 710. Father was arrested and incarcerated as a result of the injuries. Id. The Department
then took protective custody of an older sibling. Id. An adjudicatory hearing was later held, at
which Mother invoked her Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate herself. Id. at 309, 256 P.3d
19
at 717. As a result, the magistrate court concluded that although there were no allegations or
evidence Mother abused the children, for the children to be returned, the magistrate court required
assurance that the children would be safe and “Mother [would] choose the children over the
influence of her husband.” Id. The magistrate court vested custody of the children with the
Department. Mother appealed. Id. at 303, 256 P.3d at 711.
Mother made three arguments on appeal, but as relevant here, Mother argued that because
Father was solely responsible for the infant’s injuries, and Father was incarcerated as a result, it
was not in the best interests of the children to vest custody with the Department when she was able
to care for the children. Id. at 309, 256 P.3d at 717. Mother also argued the magistrate court
impermissibly shifted the burden to her to prove she was a fit parent; the Idaho Supreme Court
agreed. Id. The Court’s reason for so holding is especially relevant:
In this case, there were no allegations that [Mother] abused, neglected or
abandoned her children. The magistrate recognized these facts but felt that there
were not adequate assurances that the children would be safe at home without a
safety plan yet in place and feared that [Mother] would [not] choose the children
over her husband. There was no direct evidence that [Mother] would choose her
husband over her children. . . . There was no evidence of [Mother’s] complicity
in inflicting the injuries on [infant] or that [Mother] was aware of [Father’s] violent
behavior toward [infant] when the injuries were being inflicted, and the evidence
showed she took appropriate, timely action to protect [infant] after he sustained the
injuries.
Id. at 309-310, 256 P.3d 717-18 (emphasis added).
The above case is distinguishable on several grounds. First, it was an appeal from a
decision to vest legal custody of the children with the Department following an adjudicatory
hearing, not a termination hearing, so a different burden of proof applied. Second, the Court’s
opinion was premised on the facts that there was no evidence Mother would choose her husband
over her children and that she protected the infant after he was injured. That is not the case here
because the direct evidence indicates that Doe has chosen Stepmother over Child. Doe’s testimony
at the termination trial made it clear that he does not believe Stepmother injured Child and he will
not separate himself from Stepmother to ensure Child has a home where he will not be left in
Stepmother’s care. As such, the above case does not provide a useful analogy to this case such
that it’s holding would control.

20
Doe has failed to establish any due process violations related to the CPA proceeding or the
termination hearing, to the extent his parental rights were terminated on unadjudicated facts or an
unclear case plan.
iii. Due process requirements in termination proceedings
The statutes addressing termination of parental rights set forth the due process required.
Idaho Code § 16-2006 sets forth the requirements for the content of the petition for termination of
parental rights, which addresses any due process notice claims. The petition here clearly put Doe
on notice that the factual premise for seeking termination of his parental rights was his inability to
protectively parent Child. First, the petition alleged Doe neglected Child because Child “is without
proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for their
well-being, because of the conduct or omission of their parents.” The facts underlying the
allegation were:
While at [Doe’s] home in Idaho, [Child] was again abused and had to be
hospitalized. [Doe’s] girlfriend is charged with abusing the child. [Doe] has
consistently downplayed the injury to the child and defends his girlfriend’s
position. He does not act in a protective manner to prevent further abuse from
occurring. Neither parent has put safety measures in place to ensure that the child
is not exposed to future abuse. Neither parent has developed sufficient skills to
protect their child and provide him with the care and control necessary.
Second, the petition alleged that Doe neglected Child by being unable to discharge his
parental responsibilities. This factual allegation was supported by a report prepared by the
caseworker and attached to the petition as Exhibit A. Therein, the caseworker indicated that Doe
was not able to recognize the severity of Child’s injuries and did not understand how his continued
relationship with Stepmother could impact Child’s safety in the future. The caseworker noted:
[Doe] has continued to demonstrate that he is not able to recognize the seriousness
of his son’s injuries & is unwilling to articulate a plan on how he can ensure
[Child’s] safety in the future. He continues to be involved in a relationship with
the person who injured [Child] & is unable to recognize how this relationship
impacts his child’s safety.
The petition also alleged Doe neglected Child by failing to complete the case plan. Finally,
the petition alleged Doe was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities, and such inability
will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, morals,
and/or well-being of Child. This allegation was supported by the same facts set forth in Exhibit A,
referenced above. In addition to the facts in Exhibit A, the petition also noted

21
the parents have not been able to remove the child’s abusers from his life and have
not otherwise established sufficient safety measures in order to make sure that the
child is not further abused. The parents have not taken the child’s injuries seriously
and have not taken advantage of services meant to mitigate concerns to the child’s
safety.
Doe never challenged the petition as alleging unclear grounds, likely because there is
nothing unclear about the facts alleged in the petition or that those facts formed the basis for the
Department’s petition to terminate Doe’s parental rights. While Doe may have disagreed with
those facts, that does not render the petition unclear. The facts and bases set forth in the petition
constitute actual notice and there is no due process notice violation on this ground.
Next, I.C. § 16-2009 sets forth the due process requirements related to the termination
hearing: a parent is entitled to a hearing, to be represented by counsel if indigent, and all findings
must be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Doe was given a hearing, he was represented
by counsel, and he had the opportunity to present evidence. As discussed below, the magistrate
court’s findings were based on clear and convincing evidence. As a result, Doe has failed to
establish a procedural due process violation in this case.
Moreover, although the magistrate court did not address Doe’s due process argument prior
to finding the statutory bases upon which Doe’s parental rights could be terminated, as discussed
above, Doe suffered no due process violation during the termination proceeding. As a result, we
find no error in the magistrate court’s decision on this issue.
3. Clear and convincing evidence
Doe argues the Department did not prove abuse as a statutory basis for terminating Doe’s
parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. As part of this argument, Doe asserts the
Department failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Child was abused by anyone
because there was conflicting testimony by the medical experts. The Department argues Doe is
asking this Court to reweigh the credibility of the witnesses, which the appellate courts do not do.
We agree with the Department.
First, Doe argues the Department did not prove abuse as a statutory basis for termination.
However, while that was an allegation in the CPA petition, it was neither a basis upon which the
Department sought to terminate Doe’s parental rights in the termination proceeding nor a basis
upon which the magistrate court found Doe’s parental rights could be terminated. As such, we
decline to further address the argument.

22
Second, Doe argues he is not asking this Court to reweigh the evidence, but rather, to assess
the “quantum of proof provided by the [Department].” Doe argues there is no objective evidence
for the magistrate court to find the Department’s expert, Dr. Antoinette Laskey, more credible than
Doe’s medical expert, Dr. Robert Rothfeder. Additionally, Doe argues this Court should find
Dr. Rothfeder’s opinion more credible and adopt his conclusion regarding the causation of Child’s
injuries. This is a clear invitation for this Court to review the evidence presented to the magistrate
court, reweigh the evidence, and reach a different conclusion regarding the credibility of the
experts, the factual findings of those experts, and, subsequently, the factual causation finding of
the magistrate court. We decline to do so.
At the termination trial, the curriculum vitae of Dr. Laskey was admitted as an exhibit.
Dr. Laskey’s curriculum vitae indicated she was board certified in pediatrics with a subspecialty
of child abuse. Dr. Laskey also taught “Pediatrics (Child Protection and Family Health)” at the
University of Utah School of Medicine. Doe stipulated that Dr. Laskey was a pediatric expert with
a subspecialty in child abuse and was qualified to give opinion testimony as to causation of injuries.
Dr. Laskey was the pediatrician who participated in the care, treatment, and diagnosis of Child and
reviewed Child’s CT and MRI scans. Dr. Laskey testified that based on the mix of blood and
spinal fluid in Child’s brain, the brain bleed was an active, new brain bleed. Blood could also be
seen in the back of Child’s eyes, specifically, in all four quadrants of his retinas, which Dr. Laskey
testified was a consistent symptom of “significant trauma, like abusive head trauma.” Child’s
skeletal exam was normal, and no bleeding was noted on his scalp or forehead. Dr. Laskey did
not believe that the bruising present on Child was consistent with the explanation of toys being
thrown at Child, which was offered by Doe and Stepmother. Dr. Laskey concluded that Child had
suffered nonaccidental abusive head trauma that could have been life threatening.
Doe presented expert testimony from Dr. Rothfeder, a retired emergency medicine doctor,
but did not admit Dr. Rothfeder’s curriculum vitae into evidence. Dr. Rothfeder was qualified as
an expert in internal medicine, emergency medicine, and trauma treatment or medicine. His
medical practice was in emergency medicine, but he stopped seeing patients in 2014. Since then,
Dr. Rothfeder has worked as a forensic medical consultant. Dr. Rothfeder disagreed with
Dr. Laskey’s ability to diagnose abusive head trauma without collateral indicators of abuse and
said that he could not decisively determine the acute or chronic nature of Child’s brain bleed
through a CT scan.

23
The magistrate court resolved the conflicting expert testimony in favor of Dr. Laskey. The
magistrate court found:
Dr. Laskey possesses specializations relevant to this matter, above and beyond
those of Dr. Rothfeder. Dr. Laskey’s curriculum vitae demonstrates very current
involvement with the issues surrounding diagnosis and treatment of children who
have suffered abuse. Dr. Rothfeder’s experience is far more removed, but[5] in
subject matter specialization and current involvement in the field. In addition,
Dr. Laskey had access to MRI scans that helped her formulate her opinion on the
cause and age of the bleed.
Having resolved the credibility issue, the magistrate court then made factual findings
regarding the nature and cause of Child’s injuries. The magistrate court found: (1) “[Child]
suffered an abusive head trauma, within the 48 hours prior to his head CT scan at PRMC”;
(2) Dr. Laskey met with Doe and explained the diagnosis of abusive head trauma; (3) Child
exhibited symptoms while in Stepmother’s sole care and Stepmother pleaded guilty to
misdemeanor injury to a child related to Child ’s injuries and served a six-month sentence as a
result of her plea; (4) Stepmother was the cause of the abusive head trauma to Child; and (5) at the
time Child was injured, Doe was informed about the Department’s concerns that Stepmother
caused the injuries and that because of the safety concerns, remaining in a relationship with
Stepmother was a barrier to Doe’s reunification with Child. The magistrate court found
Stepmother’s guilty plea to be compelling, but not controlling, evidence that Stepmother caused
Child’s injuries. The magistrate court also considered Stepmother’s testimony that she pleaded
guilty to the misdemeanor to avoid a felony conviction.
The magistrate court further found that, despite the Department’s advisements and
warnings, Doe supported Stepmother’s version of the cause of Child’s injuries (that her children
threw toys at Child’s face) and, while Doe believed Child was injured in Stepmother’s care, Doe
did not believe Stepmother caused Child’s injuries and Doe wished to “stand by the woman he
loves.” Finally, the magistrate court concluded that Doe and Stepmother deceived the Department
regarding their continued romantic involvement in the time leading up to their marriage.
The magistrate court ultimately concluded Doe neglected Child by refusing to
acknowledge Child was the victim of abuse by Stepmother and that denial made Doe unable to
discharge his parental responsibilities to and for Child. Instead of taking steps to separate Child
from Stepmother, the magistrate court found Doe “increased his involvement in a relationship with

5
It appears this is a typographical error and should be the word “both.”
24
[Stepmother].” The magistrate court found that this inability to discharge parental responsibilities
will be injurious to the health, morals, and/or well-being of Child, and it has already caused Child
harm on “at least two very serious occasions.”
On appeal, this Court will not disturb the magistrate court’s decision to terminate parental
rights if there is substantial, competent evidence in the record to support the decision. Doe v. Doe,
150 Idaho 46, 49, 244 P.3d 190, 193 (2010). As such, findings are competent, so long as they are
supported by substantial, albeit possibly, conflicting, evidence. Doe, 148 Idaho at 246, 220 P.3d
at 1065. Substantial, competent evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Doe, 150 Idaho at 49, 244 P.3d at 193. This Court must conduct
an independent review of the record but must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
magistrate court’s judgment, as the magistrate court has the opportunity to observe witnesses’
demeanor, to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or motive and to judge the character of the
parties. In Interest of Doe I, 163 Idaho at 277, 411 P.3d at 1178.
Doe’s argument that the Department was required to “eliminate [Dr. Rothfeder’s] opinion
as implausible” for the magistrate court to conclude Dr. Laskey was the more credible witness is
not persuasive. Precedent is clear that, “findings are competent, so long as they are supported by
substantial, albeit possibly, conflicting, evidence.” Doe, 148 Idaho at 246, 220 P.3d at 1065
(quoting Doe, 142 Idaho at 177, 125 P.3d at 533). Thus, merely because conflicting evidence was
presented does not mean the magistrate court’s factual findings are not established by clear and
convincing evidence. Although Doe alleges certain medical evidence was inadequately considered
by Dr. Laskey, that argument was made to and rejected by the magistrate court. The magistrate
court considered all the testimony, including the testimony now challenged on appeal, and
nonetheless found Dr. Laskey more credible than Dr. Rothfeder. Doe’s disagreement with that
credibility assessment notwithstanding, the record reflects there is “such evidence a reasonable
mind might accept,” to support the magistrate court’s conclusion that Dr. Laskey was the more
credible witness.
In essence, Doe appears to argue that despite the clear and convincing evidence Stepmother
caused Child’s life-threatening injuries, the Department failed to prove, to Doe’s satisfaction, that
he had reason to believe Stepmother presented any risk of harm to Child. Absent that “proof,”
argues Doe, the magistrate court could not find by clear and convincing evidence that Child was
abused and Stepmother caused the abuse. We disagree. While Doe was free to disregard the

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evidence, that is entirely irrelevant to an analysis of whether the magistrate court’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence. Doe does not dispute that Child was injured while in
Stepmother’s care and that Stepmother pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of injury to a child.
Doe’s argument that Stepmother’s guilty plea was entered pursuant to Alford6, and thus, is
insufficient to establish factually that Stepmother caused Child’s life-threatening head trauma, is
unpersuasive. As a legal matter, an Alford plea is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea and
will be treated as such. See State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543, 547-48, 661 P.2d 328, 332-33 (1983).
As a factual matter, while it is true the Department could not make Doe believe Stepmother caused
Child’s injuries, to the extent Doe chose to ignore all the evidence with which he was presented
simply reinforces the magistrate court’s conclusion that Doe failed to recognize the risk that
existed for Child. Considering all the evidence, the magistrate court concluded, “If [Doe] has not
been convinced yet, his judgment is sufficiently impaired so as to prevent him from properly caring
for [Child].” We agree.
Doe’s challenge to each of the magistrate court’s findings regarding the statutory bases for
terminating Doe’s parental rights rests on his assertion that there was not clear and convincing
evidence that Child was abused and Stepmother caused Child’s injuries. We disagree. In this
case, there was a sufficient factual basis for the magistrate court to find Doe neglected Child.
Doe’s unwillingness to recognize and address those circumstances supports the magistrate court’s
finding of neglect on two, alternate statutory bases: (1) Doe neglected Child by failing to provide
proper parental care and control; and (2) Doe neglected Child based on Doe’s inability to discharge
his parental responsibilities. It similarly supports the magistrate court’s finding that Doe’s parental
rights were subject to termination because he was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities,
and such inability will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period and will be injurious to the
health, morals, or well-being of Child.
Each statutory ground is an independent basis for termination of Doe’s parental rights.
Interest of Doe I, 166 Idaho 57, 454 P.3d 1140 (2019). As a result, we affirm the magistrate court’s
conclusion that Doe neglected Child pursuant to I.C. §§ 16-2005(1)(a)(ii), 16-2002(3)(a), and 16-
1602(31)(3)(a) and (b) because Child was without proper parental care and control, and because
Doe was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities, respectively. We also affirm the

6
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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magistrate court’s finding that Doe was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities pursuant
to I.C. § 16-2005(1)(a)(iv). Consequently, we need not address whether the magistrate court erred
in finding Doe neglected Child by failing to comply with the case plan requirements.
B. Best Interests
Doe makes two arguments regarding the magistrate court’s finding that it is in Child’s best
interests to terminate Doe’s parental rights. First, Doe argues the magistrate court improperly
relied upon Doe’s relationship choice, his alleged dishonesty regarding his on-going relationship
with Stepmother, his housing instability, and speculation about potential future custody disputes.
Second, Doe argues that because the Department failed to prove Child’s injuries were the result of
physical abuse, the Department cannot prove it would be in Child’s best interests to terminate
Doe’s parental rights to protect Child from future harm. The Department argues the magistrate
court did not err because Doe does not have stable housing, has not demonstrated strong parenting
skills, and has denied there is a safety threat to Child.
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When
determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the
parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe
(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
The magistrate court found that terminating Doe’s parental rights is in Child’s best interests
because Doe failed to take steps to protect Child while Child was in Mother’s custody; failed to
protect Child from Stepmother; and has continued to make decisions that would place Child at
future risk if Child was returned to Doe. The magistrate court also found that Doe had not obtained
appropriate housing and had a significant amount of time to address the safety concerns but failed

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to do so. The magistrate court found Child deserved permanency and the foster parents were
willing to provide Child with that permanency.
First, we disagree with Doe’s claim that his parental rights were terminated based on
potential custody disputes, as that does not appear in the relevant section of the magistrate court’s
order, and Doe does not cite to the record for this proposition. Second, we need not address
whether the magistrate court erred in considering the risk to Child while in Mother’s custody or
Doe’s housing situation because even without that evidence, there was substantial and competent
evidence to support the magistrate court’s other conclusions.
Doe testified at the termination trial that he believed Stepmother did not hurt Child. He
further testified that he would not end his relationship with Stepmother unless he was presented
with “undeniable facts or if I feel like our expert’s medical testimony can’t adequately cover the
incident.” Doe further testified that, “Ultimately, nobody is ever going to have definitive proof of
what happened in that apartment. Otherwise, we’d have it by now.” Finally, Doe testified that he
believed Stepmother was innocent and did not believe Stepmother hurt Child.
The report of investigation for terminating Doe’s parental rights, which was considered by
the magistrate court, included information from Child’s medical records from the treating hospital.
The records noted Child’s injuries “cannot plausibly be explained by accidental injury, preexisting
medicines, reasonable discipline, or benign events. Therefore, these injuries should be considered
consistent with inflicted trauma (e.g., child abuse).” The records further opined that Child was “at
high risk of further injury or death if returned to the hands of the caregiver who inflicted these
injuries.” It was also an undisputed fact that Child was in Stepmother’s sole care when the injury
occurred, and Stepmother pleaded guilty to misdemeanor injury to hild and served six months in
jail following her conviction.
Despite those “undeniable facts” regarding the extent and cause of Child’s injuries, Doe
not only maintained a relationship with Stepmother, but solidified that relationship by marrying
her. Doe’s adamant and irrational unwillingness to accept Stepmother was the cause of Child’s
injuries, and the extent of the injuries, means Doe failed to implement any protective parenting as
it related to Stepmother’s access to Child. The risk of Child being left alone with Stepmother--the
same situation that led to Child’s injuries in this case--create a high likelihood of further injury or
death for Child. Doe’s unwillingness to protect Child, and his willingness to return Child to the
same situation that caused Child’s injuries in the first instance, is substantial and competent

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evidence to support the magistrate court’s finding that terminating Doe’s parental rights is in
Child’s best interests.
Additionally, the evidence showed that the foster mother is Child’s biological great-
grandmother, and that Child and Mother lived with her following Child’s birth. The foster mother
testified she hoped to adopt Child if she was permitted to do so, and her husband was also willing
and able to adopt Child.
We hold that there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court’s
finding that termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of Child.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Doe’s failure to comply with I.A.R. 36 results in a waiver of his claims on appeal. But
even reviewed on the merits, Doe failed to establish any due process violation and failed to
establish the magistrate court erred in finding three, alternate statutory bases for terminating Doe’s
parental rights or that terminating Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of Child. The
magistrate court’s judgment and decree terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.
Chief Judge TRIBE and Judge LORELLO CONCUR.

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