Pierce v. Shane

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50252

MARY PIERCE, )
) Filed: April 18, 2024
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JODY MARIE SHANE and THOMAS ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
EDWARD SHANE, husband and wife, ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Defendants-Appellants. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bonneville County. Hon. Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge.

Judgment awarding damages in action seeking title to real property, affirmed.

Swafford Law, P.C.; Ronald L. Swafford, Idaho Falls, for appellants.

Holden Kidwell Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.; Shan B. Perry, Idaho Falls, for
respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Jody Marie Shane and Thomas Edward Shane, husband and wife, appeal from the judgment
awarding damages in an action seeking title to real property. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case involves a dispute between Mary Pierce and her daughter and son-in-law, Jody
and Thomas Shane, regarding their respective ownership interests in real property. In 2016, the
Shanes moved to Idaho. That same year, Pierce and her husband visited the Shanes and decided
to relocate to Idaho. Pierce and her husband purchased a home in Idaho Falls. Shortly thereafter,
Pierce’s husband passed away, which prompted her son to move in with Pierce in her Idaho Falls
home.

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In early 2017, Pierce and the Shanes began looking for property where they could live
together. Pierce and the Shanes enlisted the help of a local realtor who had helped both Pierce and
the Shanes purchase property in the past. The parties instructed the realtor that they wished to
purchase a property with two residences and acreage for horses. Unable to find a property with
two residences, the parties settled on property near Ririe. Because the Ririe property only had one
residence, Pierce and the Shanes agreed to remodel the basement into a “mother-in-law
apartment.”
In April 2017, the Shanes executed a purchase and sale agreement for the Ririe property.
The Shanes were the only individuals named in the real estate contract and were the only parties
present at the closing. Additionally, while the parties discussed including all of their names on the
title to the Ririe property, only the Shanes appeared on the title. Prior to the sale, Pierce and Jody
signed a letter (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5) providing the seller of the Ririe property proof of $30,000 in
funds available in Pierce’s account to be used for the purchase of the property. The letter indicated
in part that, “the name of the giftor is Mary Pierce.” Soon after, Pierce issued a cashier’s check
for $429,759.73 for the purchase of the Ririe property. The Shanes did not provide any of the
funds used for the purchase. The same day Pierce withdrew the funds for the purchase, she also
gifted her son nearly $30,000 for the purchase of a new motorcycle.
The Shanes closed on the Ririe property in May 2017. Once the Shanes moved in, they
began remodeling the basement so Pierce could move in. By September 2017, both Pierce and the
Shanes lived on the Ririe property. Almost a year following the closing, Pierce filed a complaint
against the Shanes seeking an ownership interest in the Ririe property. After being served with
the complaint, the Shanes provided Pierce with a notice of eviction, as well as a notice of rent
change informing her that she would be charged $1500 a month in rent until she moved out.
Thereafter, law enforcement was called to the Ririe property, and Pierce was removed from the
residence.
In July 2020, while Pierce’s complaint was pending, the Shanes sold the Ririe property for
$565,000 and left Idaho. A court trial was held on Pierce’s complaint. The district court heard
testimony from Pierce, Jody, Pierce’s son, Jody’s daughter, and the parties’ realtor. Following
trial, the district court concluded that a constructive trust had been created between Pierce and the
Shanes which granted Pierce a beneficial interest in one-half of the Ririe property. The district

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court awarded Pierce a judgment for $282,500 as compensation for her one-half interest. The
Shanes filed a motion for reconsideration and/or amendment of findings of fact, which the district
court denied in part and granted in part.1 The Shanes appeal.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where a trial court sits as a finder of fact without a jury the court is required to enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Estate of Hull v. Williams, 126 Idaho 437,
440, 885 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Ct. App. 1994). Our review of the trial court’s decision is limited to
ascertaining whether substantial, competent evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether
the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts as found. Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73,
77, 205 P.3d 1209, 1213 (2009); Cummings v. Cummings, 115 Idaho 186, 188, 765 P.2d 697, 699
(Ct. App. 1988). Thus, we defer to findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous, but we freely
review the trial court’s conclusions of law reached by applying the facts found to the applicable
law. Staggie v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps., 110 Idaho 349, 351, 715 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Ct. App.
1986). Where there is conflicting evidence, it is the trial court’s task to evaluate the credibility of
witnesses and to weigh the evidence presented. Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 354, 357, 815
P.2d 1094, 1097 (Ct. App. 1991). We will not set aside the trial court’s factual findings as clearly
erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent, even if conflicting, evidence.
Kennedy v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 440, 442, 259 P.3d 586, 588 (2011). Evidence is substantial and
competent if a reasonable trier of fact would accept that evidence and rely on it to determine
whether a disputed point of fact was proven. Hull v. Giesler, 156 Idaho 765, 772, 331 P.3d 507,
514 (2014); Hutchison v. Anderson, 130 Idaho 936, 940, 950 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Ct. App. 1997).

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Following argument on the Shanes’ motion, the district court struck its finding that Pierce
“was in reasonably good health at this time and the plan for her to live in the Ririe Property’s
basement was not based on any need to care for her.” Additionally, the district court amended its
finding that Pierce delayed selling her Idaho Falls home to avoid paying capital gains taxes as
follows: “In accordance with her own understanding of the requirements of [her husband’s] trust,
[Pierce] delayed selling her [Idaho Falls] house.” The district court denied the rest of the Shanes’
motion.

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III.
ANALYSIS
The Shanes argue the district court erred in awarding Pierce a judgment for a one-half
interest in the Ririe property. Specifically, the Shanes contend the district court erred in concluding
Pierce intended to gift only half of the Ririe property. The Shanes further assert the district court
erred in concluding a constructive trust had been established between the parties. Pierce responds
that the record and applicable law supports the decision of the district court. We hold that the
district court’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial and competent evidence and
that the Shanes have failed to show the district court erred in awarding Pierce a judgment for a
one-half interest in the Ririe property.
A. Pierce’s Gift
Under Idaho law, a “gift” is a voluntary transfer of property by one to another without
consideration or compensation therefor. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable
Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 126, 206 P.3d 481, 490 (2009); Stanger v. Stanger, 98 Idaho 725, 728, 571
P.2d 1126, 1129 (1977). To effectuate a gift, a donor must deliver property to a donee, or to
someone on his or her behalf, with a manifested intent to make a gift of the property. See In re
Estate of Lewis, 97 Idaho 299, 302, 543 P.2d 852, 855 (1975); Boston Ins. Co. v. Beckett, 91 Idaho
220, 222, 419 P.2d 475, 477 (1966). Delivery is accomplished when the grantor relinquishes all
present and future dominion over the property. Banner Life Ins. Co., 147 Idaho at 126, 206 P.3d
at 490; see also Boston Ins. Co., 91 Idaho at 222, 419 P.2d at 477. Donative intent may be proven
by direct evidence, including statements of donative intent or inferences drawn from the
surrounding circumstances, such as the relationship between the donor and donee. Banner Life
Ins. Co., 147 Idaho at 126, 206 P.3d at 490; Estate of Hull, 126 Idaho at 443-44, 885 P.2d at
1159-60. The existence of donative intent is a factual finding to be made by the trial court. See
Nielson v. Davis, 96 Idaho 314, 315, 528 P.2d 196, 197 (1974).
Inter vivos gifts are not presumed, even in familial relationships, and the burden is on the
beneficiary to establish every element of the gift, including donative intent. See Claunch v. Whyte,
73 Idaho 243, 248, 249 P.2d 915, 917-18 (1952). While the relationship shared by donor and
donee may be a factor in determining donative intent, a familial relationship alone is insufficient
to establish a conveyance was a gift and may impose a higher burden of proof. Id. Where the

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donee stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship to the donor, the burden is increased to the
extent of requiring the beneficiary to establish the gift by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at
248, 249 P.2d at 918. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that indicates the thing to be
proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2016-17), 161
Idaho 398, 403, 387 P.3d 66, 71 (2016).
In this case, the district court determined that, because Pierce’s purchase of the Ririe
property occurred shortly after the death of her husband and because Pierce trusted the Shanes to
negotiate the terms of the purchase, a fiduciary relationship between the parties was established.
Accordingly, the Shanes were required to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
funds used to purchase the Ririe property were offered to them as a gift. While the district court
determined the evidence was “reasonably certain and highly probable that [Pierce] intended to gift
half of the Ririe property to the Shanes,” it was “not reasonably certain or highly probable that
[Pierce] intended to gift the entire property.” To the contrary, the district court determined that
the funds Pierce provided “were intended to purchase real property to be shared between [her] and
the Shanes.” The district court noted five reasons justifying its conclusion.
First, the district court cited the parties’ initial efforts to find a property with two
residences--one for Pierce and one for the Shanes. Second, when the parties were unable to locate
property with two residences, they decided to remodel the Ririe property’s basement into a
“mother-in-law apartment” to provide Pierce a living space. Third, the district found that Pierce
intended to equalize her gifts to Jody and Pierce’s son. Given Pierce’s intention, the district court
determined that “gifting the entire $430,000 property to Jody alone would be far from equal.”
Fourth, as evidenced by the testimony of Jody’s daughter, Pierce made clear that she did not want
her name on the Ririe property’s title because she “wished to avoid any of the property going to
[her late-husband’s] heirs.” As such, the district court found that Pierce “was not foregoing having
her name on the title for the sake of a gift, but for estate planning purposes.” Finally, the district
court found the Shanes also had an interest in keeping Pierce’s name off the title because of
previous property disputes Jody had with her mother. Based on this evidence, the district court
could not conclude it was reasonably certain or highly probable that Pierce intended to gift the
Shanes 100 percent interest in the Ririe property. Accordingly, the district court found the

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evidence presented demonstrated, “clearly and convincingly, that [Pierce] intended to gift half of
the Ririe property to the Shanes.”2
On appeal, the Shanes contend the district court erred in concluding Pierce intended to gift
half of the Ririe property because “the weight of the evidence clearly establishes, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the funds” were a gift. The Shanes do not challenge the district court’s
conclusions regarding Pierce’s gift. Moreover, the Shanes fail to provide any authority or cogent
argument. Instead, they provide a litany of factual assertions which they argue prove that Pierce’s
donative intent was to gift the total funds used to purchase the Ririe property. The Shanes also
highlight instances of conflicting testimony presented at trial. The factual assertions raised by the
Shanes were argued to and evaluated by the district court. The Shanes essentially ask this Court
to reweigh the evidence presented at trial. It is well established that appellate courts in Idaho do
not reweigh evidence. Neustadt v. Colafranceschi, 167 Idaho 214, 227, 469 P.3d 1, 14 (2020).
The district court weighed the evidence presented at trial and, despite conflicting testimony,
determined that Pierce intended to gift the Shanes only half of the Ririe property. Absent clear
error, we will not disturb those findings on appeal. See Woods v. Woods, 163 Idaho 904, 907, 422
P.3d 1110, 1113 (2018) (explaining that findings of fact that are supported by substantial and
competent evidence are not clearly erroneous--even in the face of conflicting evidence in the
record). The Shanes have failed to show either factual or legal error underlying the district court’s
conclusion that Pierce intended to gift only half of the Ririe property to the Shanes.
B. Constructive Trust
A constructive trust arises when legal title to property has been obtained through actual
fraud, misrepresentations, concealments, taking advantage of one’s necessities, or under
circumstances otherwise rendering it unconscionable for the holder of legal title to retain beneficial
interest in property. Snider v. Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 643, 289 P.3d 43, 45 (2012); Hettinga v.
Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 470, 886 P.2d 772, 775 (1994); Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 168, 722
P.2d 474, 477 (1986). Imposition of a constructive trust is an equitable remedy and does not
require that the holder of legal title intend to create a trust interest in another. Snider, 153 Idaho

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With regard to the letter signed by Pierce providing the seller of the Ririe property proof
of funds in her account to be used for the purchase of the property, the district court found Pierce’s
“giftor” designation applied only to the $30,000 referenced in that letter.

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at 643-44, 289 P.3d at 45-46. Indeed, a constructive trust arises from the legal title holder’s
wrongful actions and not from any intent to create a trust. Id. at 644, 289 P.3d at 46. A party
seeking to impose a constructive trust must prove the facts alleged to give rise to the trust by clear
and convincing evidence. Id. Whether a party presented sufficient evidence to meet the clear and
convincing standard is a finding of fact that this Court will uphold if substantial and competent
evidence supports it. Id.
Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has established that a constructive trust can arise
when a person who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on
the ground that he or she would be unjustly enriched if permitted to retain it. Rowe v. Burrup, 95
Idaho 747, 750, 518 P.2d 1386, 1390 (1974); Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 599, 608, 167 P. 481,
483 (1917). To establish a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must prove: (1) there was a
benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such
benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof. Turcott v.
Estate of Bates, 165 Idaho 183, 190, 443 P.3d 197, 204 (2019); Lincoln Land Co., LLC v. LP
Broadband, Inc., 163 Idaho 105, 109, 408 P.3d 465, 469 (2017). Thus, to recover damages for
unjust enrichment, the complaining party must establish that the equities of the case would
otherwise make it unfair for the recipient of the enrichment to receive a benefit without making
compensation for the value of that benefit. Turcott, 165 Idaho at 190, 443 P.3d at 204.
In this case, the district court determined there were two bases establishing a constructive
trust between Pierce and the Shanes--the fifth Snider basis (that it would be unconscionable for
the holder of legal title to retain beneficial interest in property) and Rowe’s “unjust enrichment”
basis. Because Pierce had a one-half interest in the Ririe property, held in trust, the district court
concluded she was entitled to recover half the money obtained upon the Shanes’ sale of the
property. Accordingly, the district court awarded Pierce $282,500. With regard to the fifth Snider
basis, the district court determined that, while the evidence showed Pierce intended to gift half of
the Ririe property’s purchase price, “it would be inequitable and unconscionable for the Shanes to
retain the benefit of the second half of the purchase price without any payment for the value
thereof.” On appeal, the Shanes argue the district court erred when it found a constructive trust
was established due to unconscionability because there were no findings that the title to the Ririe

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property was obtained “through actual fraud, misrepresentations, concealments, taking advantage
of one’s necessities, or under circumstances otherwise rendering it unconscionable for the holder
of legal title to retain beneficial interest in the property.” The Shanes appear to argue that all five
elements articulated in Snider must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order to
establish a constructive trust. We disagree.
Contrary to the Shanes’ argument, Snider does not list five elements required to establish
a constructive trust. Instead, as evidenced by use of the word “or,” Snider lists five alternative
bases for establishing the existence of a constructive trust. Snider, 153 Idaho at 643, 289 P.3d at
45; See Markel Int’l Ins. Co., Ltd v. Erekson, 153 Idaho 107, 110, 279 P.3d 93, 96 (2012) (holding
the word “or” is a disjunctive particle used to express an alternative or to give a choice of one
among two or more things); Fraiser v. Fraiser, 87 Idaho 510, 514, 394 P.2d 294, 297 (1964)
(stating the word “or” may be used to mark off and separate alternative ideas, and it may indicate
one or the other of two or several persons, things, or situations, and not a combination of them and
often connects a series of words or propositions, presenting a choice of either). Thus, Idaho law
does not require the district court to find all five Snider bases in order to establish a constructive
trust. Accordingly, the Shanes have failed to show error in the district court’s finding that it would
be unconscionable for them to retain the benefit of the entirety of the proceeds from the sale of the
Ririe property.
The district court also concluded that Pierce established the creation of a constructive trust
through the doctrine of unjust enrichment--that the Shanes were unjustly enriched by Pierce’s
purchase of the property. Specifically, the district court concluded Pierce conferred a benefit upon
the Shanes by paying the entirety of the Ririe property purchase price and that the Shanes
appreciated the benefit of those funds in acquiring title to the entire property. The district court
found “the Shanes also appreciated a benefit from appreciation in the value of the property from
the original approximate $430,000 purchase price to its resale price of $565,000 in 2020.” Because
the Shanes were unjustly enriched by obtaining title to the entire Ririe property while only being
gifted half the purchase amount, the district court concluded a constructive trust arose with Pierce
as the beneficiary to half of the Ririe property.
On appeal, the Shanes argue the district court erred when it found a constructive trust was
established due to unjust enrichment because there were no findings of fact to show the Shanes

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“would be unjustly enriched if allowed to retain 100% beneficial interest in the Ririe property.”
However, the Shanes do not challenge the district court’s conclusions as to each basis of unjust
enrichment. Moreover, the Shanes fail to support their argument on appeal with any authority or
cogent argument. A party waives an issue on appeal if either argument or authority is lacking.
Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 128, 937 P.2d 434, 440 (Ct. App. 1997). Accordingly, the Shanes
have failed to show either factual or legal error in the district court’s conclusion that Pierce
established the creation of a constructive trust through the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
C. Attorney Fees on Appeal
An award of attorney fees may be granted under I.C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 to the
prevailing party and such an award is appropriate when the court is left with the abiding belief that
the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Rendon
v. Paskett, 126 Idaho 944, 945, 894 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct. App. 1995). On appeal, both parties request
an award of attorney fees. We address each request in turn.
1. The Shanes’ request for attorney fees
The Shanes request an award of attorney fees contending Pierce “knew and had knowledge
at all times what she was doing when she made the gift and most apparently when she decided to
file this lawsuit.” Because of the district court’s findings regarding Pierce’s business acumen and
experience, the Shanes argue “this case is a prime example” of a civil action where justice requires
the prevailing litigant be made whole by awarding attorney fees and costs. The Shanes’ argument
fails for two reasons.
First, the Shanes are not the prevailing party in this civil action. Moreover, the Shanes cite
and apply the wrong standard for determining whether an award of attorney fees is warranted.
While the Shanes assert they are “entitled to attorney fees and costs in this matter pursuant to
I.C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 40(a) and 41(a),” they do not apply the standards set out in those sections.
Instead, the Shanes cite a portion of the Idaho Session laws from 1987 for the following
proposition: “It is the intent of the legislature of the state of Idaho that this act grant prevailing
litigants in civil actions the right to be made whole for attorney’s fees and costs when justice so
requires.” 1987 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 263. This is not the appropriate standard for determining
whether an award of attorney fees is proper. The Shanes are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

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2. Pierce’s request for attorney fees
Pierce argues she is entitled to attorney fees on appeal because the Shanes’ appeal “was
not brought reasonably or in good faith” and is nothing more than an invitation for this Court to
reweigh the evidence presented at trial.
An award of attorney fees is appropriate if the appellant only invites this Court to
second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence or if the law is well settled and the appellant
has made no substantial showing that the lower court misapplied the law, or no cogent challenge
is presented with regard to the trial court’s exercise of discretion. Pass v. Kenny, 118 Idaho 445,
449-50, 797 P.2d 153, 157-58 (Ct. App. 1990); McPherson v. McPherson, 112 Idaho 402, 407,
732 P.2d 371, 376 (Ct. App. 1987). That standard for an award of attorney fees is satisfied in this
case. Accordingly, Pierce is awarded attorney fees on appeal.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Substantial and competent evidence supports the district court’s findings and conclusions
that Pierce intended to gift the Shanes half of the Ririe property and that a constructive trust was
established between the parties for one-half of the value of the property. The Shanes have,
therefore, failed to show any error in the district court’s finding that Pierce had an ownership
interest in the Ririe Property. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment awarding Pierce an
ownership interest in the Ririe property is affirmed. Costs and attorney fees on appeal are awarded
to Pierce.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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