Paternity: Lauren Fryar v. Miles Ostergren

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JP-1025 | October 16, 2026 Page 1 of 8
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any
action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
In Re the Paternity of J.J.O., Minor Child
L.F.,
Appellant-Respondent
v.
M.O.,
Appellee-Petitioner
October 16, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-JP-1025
Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit Court
The Honorable Pamela S. Munsey, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
46D02-2104-JP-56
Memorandum Decision by Judge Bradford

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Judges Bailey and Altice concur.
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] L.F. (“Mother”) and M.O. (“Father”) are the biological parents of J.J.O.
(“Child”), who was born on May 26, 2020. After a hearing on a modification
of Father’s parenting time, Mother sought and submitted itemized statements
for $2335.50 in attorney’s fees. On February 5, 2026, the trial court instead
awarded Mother attorney’s fees in the amount of $1973.00. Mother contends
that the trial court abused its discretion in finding both that she had only sought
$2225.50 in attorney’s fees and that the amount sought was not supported by
the itemized statements. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On September 30, 2025, Mother petitioned for an emergency modification of
parenting time, requesting that Father be allowed only supervised visitation
with Child, in line with the parenting coordinator’s recommendations. The
trial court held a hearing on December 15, 2025, and issued its order on
January 16, 2026.
[3] Although the trial court did not modify Father’s parenting time, it did order
him to obtain a psychological evaluation and acknowledged that he “continues
to repeat behaviors that negatively effect [(sic)] his parenting time and keep him

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involved in the legal process.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 22–23. Because
Father continues “inviting this adversary process into his life” and failing to
follow court orders, Mother requested attorney’s fees. Appellant’s App. Vol. II
p. 23. In the emergency order, the trial court noted that Mother had requested
attorney’s fees in the amount of $2335.50 but would later rule on the request
once she had submitted an itemized statement to support her affidavit.
[4] On January 27, 2026, Mother submitted four invoices for services rendered
from September through December of 2025. The invoiced amounts were as
follows:
Invoice Funds Applied From
Retainer New Charges
October 1 $607.50 $0.00
November 3 $121.50 $0.00
December 2 $94.50 $0.00
January 2 $1149.50 $1172.50
Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 25–28. The January invoice included an entry in
the amount of $810.00 for services rendered at the December 15, 2025 hearing,
which Mother had intentionally excluded from her calculation of attorney’s
fees.

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[5] In its order on attorney’s fees, the trial court stated that Mother had requested
attorney’s fees in the amount of $2225.50, not $2335.50, as was listed in its
emergency order. The trial court then determined that Mother’s “itemized
statement does not appear to match the amount previously requested[,] total[ed]
all ‘funds applied from retainer[,]’ and reach[ed] the sum of $1,973.00.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19.
[6] The next day, Mother moved to correct error, in which she requested that the
trial court add together both the “Funds Applied from Retainer” and “New
Charges” to reach a subtotal of $3145.50. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 29.
Mother also requested that the trial court subtract $810.00, the fees incurred
from the hearing, from $3145.50, leaving $2335.50 in fees for services rendered
up to the hearing. Mother also requested that the trial court award her the
remaining $810.00.1 On March 12, 2026, Mother filed an amended motion to
correct error, this time adding requests to correct the order on attorney’s fees to
protect her counsel’s professional reputation. The trial court denied both
motions on April 1, 2026.
Discussion and Decision
[7] As an initial matter, we note that Father proceeds pro se. A pro se litigant is not
given special consideration “by virtue of being self-represented[,]” Cingel v.
1 On appeal, Mother requests only $2335.50, not $3145.50, which would include the $810.00 for services
rendered at the December 15, 2025 hearing.

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Ferreri, 269 N.E.3d 857, 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (internal quotation omitted),
and “[w]e will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on
his behalf[.]” Wilcox v. Gingrich, 274 N.E.3d 1269, 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026)
(internal quotation omitted). Father argues that attorney’s fees are
“unreasonable” and “unnecessary” because the trial court “mildly admonished
[Mother] for bringing the claim of an overnight visit at paternal grandmother as
a vacation.” Appellee’s Br. pp. 5, 4. However, because Father cites no legal
authority to show how this would alter the trial court’s decision to award
attorney’s fees, he has waived the issue for appellate review. See Berger v. Berger,
648 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that a party’s failure to “cite
to any cases or relevant authority in support of” their argument constitutes
waiver).
[8] Moving to the merits of Mother’s claim, we recognize at the outset that the trial
court’s statement that Mother had requested attorney fees in the amount of
$2225.50, not $2335.50, appears to have been a scrivener’s error. The trial
court had previously stated in its emergency order that “Mother is requesting
attorney fees in this matter in the amount of $2335.50.” Appellant’s App. Vol.
II p. 24. Mother’s affidavit also clearly states that she had “accumulated fees
and charges in the amount of $2335.50[.]” Ex. Vol. I p. 17. Mother also
testified that she had wished for the trial court to order Father to reimburse her
for $2335.50. Tr. Vol. II p. 58. We are confident that Mother sought $2335.50,
not $2225.50, in attorney’s fees.

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[9] That said, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding
her $1973.00 rather than the $2335.50 that she had requested. Indiana Code
section 31-14-18-2(a) provides that a trial court in a paternity action “may order
a party to pay: … (2) a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees, including
amounts for legal services provided and costs incurred, before the
commencement of the proceedings or after entry of judgment.” We review a
trial court’s award of attorney’s fees, and the amount of any such award, for an
abuse of discretion. Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Franklin, 814 N.E.2d 281, 286 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004) (citing Malachowski v. Bank One, Indpls., N.A., 682 N.E.2d 530,
533 (Ind. 1997)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s award is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court.” Id. at 286–87.
[10] Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by miscalculating her
attorney’s fees because her request for $2335.50 was supported by itemized
statements. In support, Mother cites our decision in Kinder v. Kinder, 265
N.E.3d 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), in which we stated that a trial court’s
mathematical errors in dividing the marital estate constituted an abuse of
discretion. There, the trial court had listed different amounts for certain assets
in the body of the order than the amounts listed on the final spreadsheet, which
had caused an erroneous division of the marital estate. Id. at 558–59. Unlike
marital assets with defined values, however, “[w]hat constitutes a reasonable
attorney fee is a matter largely within the trial court’s discretion.” Franklin Coll.
v. Turner, 844 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

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[11] Mother submitted four invoices as proof of her request for $2335.50. The
October, November, December, and January invoices included “Funds Applied
From Retainer” of $607.50, $121.50, $94.50, and $1149.50 respectively, the
sum of which is $1973.00, i.e., the amount the trial court awarded Mother.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 25–28. Unlike the other invoices, the January
invoice also listed “New Charges” of $1172.50. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 28.
The sum of all funds applied from retainer and new charges is $3145.50. In her
affidavit, Mother had noted that her request of $2335.50 excluded “anticipated
time for the December 15, 2025 contested court hearing[.]” Ex. Vol. I p. 17.
The January invoice includes an entry in the amount of $810.00 for “Hearing
on restriction of parenting time” on December 15, 2025. Appellant’s App. Vol.
II p. 28. Subtracting $810.00 from $3145.50, we reach a total of $2335.50, i.e.,
the amount requested by Mother.
[12] While it seems that the evidence could have supported an award of $2335.50,
the trial court was under no obligation to award Mother the full amount she
requested. See Franklin Coll., 844 N.E.2d at 105 (“[P]roof that Franklin paid its
counsel $4375 in attorney’s fees does not mean that such an amount is
reasonable.”). The trial court considered the documentation submitted by
Mother and awarded her a portion of the fees she had requested. It was within
the trial court’s discretion to determine what amount of attorney’s fees, if any,
were reasonable under the circumstances. Moreover, in doing so, “[t]he trial
court … need not cite the reasons for its determination.” Whited v. Whited, 859
N.E.2d 657, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing a trial court’s award of

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attorney’s fees under the child support article). The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that Mother was only entitled to a portion of the fees
that she requested.
[13] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Bethany J. Beckman
Beckman Law, LLC
Michigan City, Indiana
APPELLEE PRO SE
M.O.
Niles, Michigan