Kristy M Reisinger v. State of Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CR-3026 | October 20, 2026 	Page 1 of 17
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Kristy M. Reisinger,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
October 20, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-3026
Appeal from the Boone Superior Court
The Honorable Matthew C. Kincaid, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
06D01-2404-F5-588
Memorandum Decision by Chief Judge Tavitas
Judges Bradford and Felix concur.

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Tavitas, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] 	Following a jury trial, Kristy Reisinger was convicted of battery resulting in
bodily injury to a public safety official, a Level 5 felony; disarming a law
enforcement officer, a Level 5 felony; and resisting law enforcement, a Class A
misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Reisinger to a total of twelve years of
incarceration. Reisinger appeals and challenges her sentence. We affirm.
Issues
[2] 	Reisinger presents two issues, which we expand and restate as:
I. 	Whether the trial court failed to provide a sentencing
statement.
II. 	Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
Reisinger.
III. 	Whether Reisinger’s sentence is inappropriate.
Facts
[3] 	On March 19, 2024, Reisinger was an inmate in the Boone County Jail. Boone
County Sheriff’s Department Corrections Officers Joshua Boyd, Caleb
Ehrstine, and Angel Jackson were on duty at the jail that evening. Reisinger
was making loud noises that night by slamming her fists and screaming loudly,
disturbing the other inmates. The Corrections Officers decided to move
Reisinger to a different cell block. They went to Reisinger’s cell and informed

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her of their decision to move her and instructed her to pack up her belongings.
An agitated Reisinger told Officer Jackson, “no b***h, I am not going to
move.” Tr. Vol. II p. 36. Reisinger also called the officers “b*****d[s],” and
again indicated her refusal to move. Id. Despite repeated commands to pack
up her belongings and leave the cell, Reisinger refused.
[4] 	After Reisinger repeatedly refused the officers’ demands, Officer Boyd removed
his taser, but Officer Jackson instructed Officer Boyd to not yet use the taser at
that point. The officers then entered the cell to forcibly remove Reisinger. As
they attempted to handcuff her, Reisinger resisted. Reisinger bit Officer
Jackson on Jackson’s left arm, scratched Officer Ehrstine, and reached for
Officer Boyd’s taser, which discharged during the struggle and struck Officer
Boyd’s leg.1 The officers then dry stunned Reisinger’s arm with the taser, at
which point Reisinger stopped resisting and began to comply with the officers’
commands. Reisinger was then moved to a different cell block.
[5] 	As a result of her actions, the State charged Reisinger on April 3, 2024, as
follows: Count I—battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official, a
Level 5 felony; Count II—disarming a law enforcement officer, a Level 5
felony; and Count III—resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor.
The trial court scheduled a competency hearing for March 11, 2025. Before this
hearing occurred, the Boone Circuit Court held a hearing on Reisinger’s
competency in another cause. In that cause, a report from one medical
1 Because both prongs of the taser did not make contact with Officer Boyd, he was not electrically stunned.

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professional indicated that Reisinger was not competent to stand trial, and on
January 28, 2025, the Boone Circuit Court found Reisinger incompetent to
stand trial.
[6] 	Two days later, Reisinger’s counsel in the present case asked the trial court to
take judicial notice of the order from the Boone Circuit Court finding Reisinger
to be incompetent to stand trial. The trial court did so and vacated the
scheduled competency hearing and instead set the cause for a status hearing to
be held on June 23, 2025. At the status hearing, the parties agreed to set the
matter for a jury trial.
[7] 	After Reisinger had been restored to competency, a jury trial was held on
October 6, 2025. The jury found Reisinger guilty as charged. At sentencing on
November 5, 2025, the trial court sentenced Reisinger to six years on Count I,
six years on Count II, and one year on Count III. The trial court ordered the
sentences on Counts II and III to be served concurrently, but consecutive to the
sentence in Count I, for an aggregate sentence of twelve years. Reisinger now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. The trial court did not fail to provide a sentencing statement.
[8] 	Reisinger first argues that the trial court failed to provide a sentencing statement
at the time it sentenced her. Trial courts must enter a sentencing statement
when imposing a sentence for a felony offense. Carranza v. State, 184 N.E.3d
712, 717 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490

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(Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). A sentencing
statement must include a “‘reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court’s
reasons for the sentence imposed,’” and, if the trial court finds aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, “‘the statement must identify all significant mitigating
and aggravating circumstances and explain why each circumstance has been
determined to be mitigating or aggravating.’” Belcher v. State, 138 N.E.3d 318,
327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 484-85, 490), trans.
denied. The purpose behind this requirement is to: (1) guard against arbitrary
and capricious sentencing and (2) provide an adequate basis for appellate
review. Baker v. State, 255 N.E.3d 1199, 1204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing
Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 489).
[9] 	Reisinger claims that the trial court here failed to enter a sentencing statement
at all. We acknowledge that the trial court’s written sentencing order does not
contain the trial court’s reasoning for imposing the sentence it did, nor does it
identify significant aggravating and mitigating circumstances. When
considering the adequacy of a sentencing statement, however, “we consider
both the written and oral sentencing statements.” Id. (citing McElroy v. State,
865 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind. 2007)); see also Gleason v. State, 965 N.E.2d 702, 711
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (concluding that trial court’s oral sentencing statement was
sufficiently detailed to support the sentence imposed).
[10] 	Here, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court made the following statements
from the bench:

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Taken together the aggravators outweigh the mitigating
circumstances. First, Ms. Reisinger has a prior conviction for the
same sort of behavior for which she now stands convicted. That
is an aggravating circumstance. The Defense proffers the
expectation that the balance of—that this behavior rather is
unlikely to recur, it is plainly false and respectfully I find that it is
not a mitigating circumstance. In fact, the opposite is true. Ms.
Reisinger is likely to reoffend and that is an aggravating
circumstance. The Defense proffers that Ms. Reisinger has been
a victim of prior abuse. Respectfully that is not a—not a
mitigating factor. The factor is being informed of prior abuse is
simply irrelevant in determining whether to pronounce a
sentence of—of less or more as the case may be. So, taken
together, the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.
Tr. Vol. II pp. 117-18. Although this statement is brief, in it, the trial court does
identify the aggravating factors on which it relied and rejected Reisinger’s
proffered mitigator. This is sufficient to provide a basis for our appellate
review.2 We, therefore, reject Reisinger’s claim that the trial court did not enter
a sentencing statement.
2 Even if the trial court failed to enter a sentencing statement at all, this does not necessarily require that we
remand. Our Supreme Court has “long held that where the trial court erred in sentencing a defendant, there
are several options for the appellate court.” Windhorst v. State, 868 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ind. 2007). “[W]e have
the option to remand to the trial court for a clarification or new sentencing determination[,]” or we may
exercise our authority under Appellate Rule 7(B) to review and, potentially, revise a sentence. Id. In
Windhorst, our Supreme Court noted that this Court had exercised this option and declined to revise the
defendant’s sentence—a determination that our Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Id. As discussed
below, we review Reisinger’s sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B) and do not find it to be inappropriate.

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II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to find
Reisinger’s mental health issues to be a significant mitigating factor.
[11] 	Reisinger also challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court. Although
Reisinger cites Appellate Rule 7(B) and claims that her sentence is
inappropriate, she also claims that the trial court failed to consider her mental
health as a mitigating factor. We note that “a claim on appeal that a
defendant’s sentence is inappropriate given the nature of the offense and the
defendant’s character is separate and distinct from a claim the trial court abused
its discretion at sentencing, and the two issues should be analyzed separately.”
Richardson v. State, 189 N.E.3d 629, 637 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing King v.
State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). Accordingly, we first address
whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Reisinger and, then,
whether her sentence is inappropriate.
[12] 	Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are
reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d
1190, 1197 (Ind. 2018) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490); “An abuse occurs
only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual
deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903, 904 (Ind.
2019).
[13] 	A trial court can abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including:
(1) “failing to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) entering a
sentencing statement in which the aggravating and mitigating

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factors are not supported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing
statement that does not include reasons that are clearly supported
by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) entering a
sentencing statement in which the reasons provided in the
statement are “improper as a matter of law.”
Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 193 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Anglemyer, 868
N.E.2d at 490-91). On appeal, we presume that a trial court renders its
sentencing decision solely on the basis of relevant and probative evidence.
Schuler, 132 N.E.3d at 905.
[14] 	The finding of mitigating circumstances lies within the trial court’s sentencing
discretion. Kedrowitz v. State, 199 N.E.3d 386, 406 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans.
denied. The trial court is not obligated to find a circumstance to be mitigating
merely because it is advanced as such by the defendant, nor is it required to
explain why it does not find a proffered circumstance to be mitigating. Id.
(citing Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind. 2000)). The trial court is not
required to give the same weight to mitigating circumstances as does the
defendant. Id. On appeal, the defendant must show that the proffered
mitigating circumstance is both significant and clearly supported by the record.
Id.
[15] 	Here, Reisinger claims that the trial court failed to consider her mental health as
a mitigating factor.3 Reisinger argues that there is evidence in the record that
3 To the extent that this is an attack on the weight given to Reisinger’s mental health, this claim is no longer
cognizable. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (holding that a trial court can no longer be said to have abused

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supports a finding that she suffers from mental illness. Reisinger refers to her
behavior in the present case; letters she sent to the trial court; the psychologist’s
report in the Boone Circuit Court case; the determination that Reisinger was
not initially competent to stand trial; the psychologist’s report in the present
case stating that Reisinger did not appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct;4
and trial counsel’s dealings with Reisinger. Thus, Reisinger concludes that the
trial court “was well aware that Ms. Reisinger had mental health issues and that
those issues had contributed to, if not caused, the alleged crimes in this case.”
Appellant’s Br. p. 10. Reisinger claims that, despite this, the trial court failed to
mention her mental health at all during sentencing. But a trial court is not
required to explain why it does not find a proffered circumstance to be
mitigating. Kedrowitz, 199 N.E.3d at 406.
[16] 	We recognize that the record clearly indicates that Reisinger suffers from
mental illness. Indeed, she was initially determined to be incompetent to stand
trial and had to be restored to competence before she could be tried. But mental
its discretion by failing to “properly weigh” aggravating and mitigating factors). Thus, we take Reisinger’s
claim to be that the trial court failed to consider her mental health at all.
4 We note that another report, from psychologist Dr. Don Olive, stated that Reisinger appreciated the
wrongfulness of her conduct but could not control her “aggressive impulses” due to generalized character
pathology, including “severe agitation, impulsivity, hostility, combativeness, and paranoia.” Appellant’s
App. Vol. II p. 52. Dr. Olive, however, did not perceive any evidence of psychotic or manic symptomology
that “militated against Ms. Reisinger’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct.” Id.
Reisinger makes no argument on appeal as to how this report fits within the factors set forth in Covington, see
Appellant’s Br. pp. 9-10, and we will not make this argument for her. See Applegate v. State, 230 N.E.3d 944,
952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (noting that “it is not appropriate for this Court to make that argument on [a
defendant’s] behalf.”), trans. denied; see also Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. 1990) (observing that a
court runs the risk of being an advocate rather than an adjudicator when it searches the record and makes up
its own arguments because a party presented them in a perfunctory manner).

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illness is not, by itself, a significant mitigating factor. Instead, our Supreme
Court has held that mental illness at the time of the crime may be considered a
significant mitigating factor. Castor v. State, 754 N.E.2d 506, 509 (Ind. 2001).
“[E]valuating the validity of a claim that mental illness deserves mitigating
weight requires the exercise of ‘a high level of discernment.’” Higginson v. State,
209 N.E.3d 15, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Covington v. State, 842 N.E.2d
345, 349 (Ind. 2006)). When a trial court determines the significance of a
defendant’s mental illness, the following considerations are relevant: “(1) the
extent of the defendant’s inability to control his or her behavior due to the
disorder or impairment; (2) overall limitations on functioning; (3) the duration
of the mental illness; and (4) the extent of any nexus between the disorder or
impairment and the commission of the crime.” Id. (citing Covington, 842
N.E.2d at 349).
[17] 	Reisinger does not address any of these factors. Thus, it is not clear to us the
extent to which her mental illness impacted her ability to control her behavior
or the overall limitations her mental illness placed on her functioning. Nor
does Reisinger explain the duration or extent of her mental illness. Most
importantly, although Reisinger notes that there must be a nexus between a
defendant’s mental illness and the commission of the crime, she does not
explain the extent of any such nexus between her mental illness and her present
offenses. We will not search the record to find a basis for a party’s argument.
Shelby v. State, 986 N.E.2d 345, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

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[18] 	This failure to establish a nexus between Reisinger’s mental illness and her
commission of her instant offenses is fatal to her claim. See Howard v. State, 266
N.E.3d 304, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (holding that trial court did not abuse its
discretion by failing to consider defendant’s PTSD diagnosis as a mitigating
factor where defendant failed to establish a nexus between his diagnosis and his
crime); Steinberg v. State, 941 N.E.2d 515, 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that
trial court did not abuse its discretion by not finding defendant’s mental health
to be a mitigating factor where defendant demonstrated no nexus between his
mental health and his crime and merely stated that his mental illness was an
“explanation” for his crime), trans. denied.
[19] 	Nor do we accept Reisinger’s claim that the trial court “completely ignored”
her mental health issues. Appellant’s Br. p. 10. The trial court, at Reisinger’s
request, specifically took judicial notice of all of Reisinger’s mental health
records. Reisinger’s counsel then referred to Reisinger’s mental health during
his argument at the sentencing hearing and noted that Reisinger had a “mental
health disorder,” referred to her prior psychological evaluations and her history
of involuntary medication to treat her mental health, and argued that “trauma”
was “at play” in explaining Reisinger’s conduct. Tr. Vol. II pp. 115-16. Thus,
the trial court was well aware of Reisinger’s mental health issues; indeed, the
trial in this case was postponed until Reisinger was restored to competence.
The trial court simply chose not to find that Reisinger’s mental health issues as
a mitigator.

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[20] 	If we were in the trial court’s position, we might have reached a different result.
But our review is confined to a cold record, and unlike the trial court, we had
no opportunity to observe Reisinger’s demeanor or conduct in person. Because
the trial court was uniquely positioned to make such an assessment, we defer to
its judgment. See Hollins v. State, 145 N.E.3d 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (noting
that trial court, who observes defendant first hand, is in the better position to
assess the defendant’s demeanor), trans. denied. We cannot say that the trial
court abused its discretion by not considering Reisinger’s mental illness to be a
significant aggravating factor.5 See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494 (concluding
trial court did not overlook defendant’s mental illness but instead determined
that it was not a significant mitigating factor and that such determination was
within trial court’s discretion).
III. Reisinger’s twelve-year aggregate sentence is not inappropriate.
[21] 	Reisinger also claims that her sentence is inappropriate. The Indiana
Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences
imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing
Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, which is implemented through
Appellate Rule 7(B), enables a court on appeal to “revise a sentence authorized
by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the court finds
5 Even if the trial court did abuse its discretion by failing to consider Reisinger’s mental illness as a significant
mitigating factor, this does not necessarily require remand for resentencing. See Chappell v. State, 966 N.E.2d
124, 134 n.10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that error in sentencing is harmless if the sentence imposed is not
inappropriate), trans. denied; see also Windhorst, 868 N.E.2d at 507. As explained below, Reisinger’s sentence
is not inappropriate.

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that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.”6 Deference to the trial court’s sentence should
prevail unless “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light
the nature of the offense and the defendant’s character.” Oberhansley v. State,
208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[22] 	In considering whether a sentence is inappropriate, “‘we focus on the forest—
the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent,
number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.’” Jones v.
State, 218 N.E.3d 3, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d
1, 8 (Ind. 2014)), trans. denied. Our review is not limited to the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances found by the trial court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at
1271. “Our role is primarily to leaven the outliers and identify guiding
principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the perceived correct result in
each case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the
relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the
defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad
other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
6 A defendant, however, need not show that both the nature of the offense and his or her character warrant
revision; “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong
must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127 (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 220
(Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

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A. Nature of the Offenses
[23] 	We first consider the nature of Reisinger’s offenses, recognizing that the
advisory sentence is the “starting point” our General Assembly has selected as
appropriate for the crime committed. Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 805 (Ind.
2025). Reisinger was convicted of two Level 5 felonies and a Class A
misdemeanor. The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is one to six years,
with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). And a
person convicted of a Class A misdemeanor “shall be imprisoned for a fixed
term of not more than one (1) year[.]” Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2. Thus, Reisinger
faced a maximum sentence of thirteen years, and the trial court sentenced her to
the near-maximum term of twelve years.
[24] 	Our analysis of the “nature of the offense” requires us to look at the extent,
brutality, and heinousness of the offense. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668
(Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 5). We consider whether there
is “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense
(such as [being] accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality).” Konkle
v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025).
[25] 	Here, Reisinger created the situation that led to her offenses by making loud
noises in the jail, prompting the officers to move her to another cell block where
she would not be so disruptive. Instead of cooperating, Reisinger refused the
officers’ commands and cursed at them. When the officers entered Reisinger’s
cell, she physically fought and resisted them—she bit Officer Jackson and
scratched Officer Ehrstine. More seriously, she grabbed Officer Boyd’s taser,

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and the taser discharged and struck Officer Boyd. Thus, Reisinger’s offenses
involved multiple victims and multiple harms. See Gibbs v. State, 214 N.E.3d
351, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (noting that when a defendant commits the
offenses against multiple victims, enhanced and consecutive sentences are
appropriate to “‘vindicate the fact that there were separate harms and separate
acts against more than one person’”) (quoting Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852,
857 (Ind. 2003)). Only after the officers used the taser to dry stun Reisinger did
she stop resisting. We perceive nothing in Reisinger’s actions that constitutes
compelling evidence that portrays her offenses in a positive light.
B. Character of the Offender
[26] 	Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a
defendant’s qualities, including the defendant’s age, criminal history,
background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. Jones v. State, 218 N.E.3d
3, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021);
McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)), trans. denied. The
significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant’s character and an
appropriate sentence varies based on the “gravity, nature and number of prior
offenses as they relate to the current offense.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103,
112 (Ind. 2016). “Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a
defendant’s character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App.
2020).
[27] 	At the age of forty-seven at the time of sentencing, Reisinger has a non-trivial
criminal history. In 2022, she was convicted of battery resulting in bodily

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injury, a Class A misdemeanor. While on pre-trial release in that case, she
violated the terms of her release and was ordered to report to community
corrections. She later violated the terms of her release again. Then, in 2024,
Reisinger was convicted of intimidation by drawing or using a deadly weapon,
a Level 5 felony. In that case too, Reisinger violated the terms of her pre-trial
release and was eventually held with a $10,000 cash bond.
[28] 	Both Reisinger’s prior offenses and the instant offenses involve either inflicting
personal injury or threatening to do so, and they occurred only shortly before
the instant offenses. As to remorse, instead of accepting responsibility for her
actions, Reisinger instead stated that she was trying to be peaceful but that
Boone County was “at war” with her. Tr. Vol. II p. 107. She even asked the
trial court to find that the victims here had “induced or facilitated” her offenses.
Id. Although we recognize that Reisinger suffers from mental illness, none of
this reflects well on Reisinger’s character.
[29] 	We recognize that the trial court’s sentence was harsh—just one year shy of the
maximum sentence. And again, had we been in the trial court’s position, we
might have imposed a lesser sentence. But the question before us is not whether
a lesser sentence would be more appropriate, but whether the sentence imposed
by the trial court was inappropriate. Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1173 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2020) (citing Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015)). Having
considered the nature of Reisinger’s offenses and her character, we cannot say
that Reisinger’s twelve-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate.

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Conclusion
[30] 	The trial court’s oral sentencing statement is adequate to permit appellate
review of Reisinger’s sentence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
failing to consider Reisinger’s mental illness as a significant mitigating factor,
and Reisinger’s twelve-year aggregate sentence is not inappropriate.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
[31] 	Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Thomas K. Reynolds
Lebanon, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana