BRANDON ENCLARDE vs. versus LATONYA WALKER AND GOAUTO INSURANCE COMPANY

BRANDON ENCLARDE
VERSUS
LATONYA WALKER AND
GOAUTO INSURANCE
COMPANY
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NO. 2026-CA-0309
COURT OF APPEAL
FOURTH CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2023-11715, DIVISION “L-6”
Hon. Kern A. Reese, Judge
* * * * * *
Judge Dale N. Atkins
* * * * * *
(Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge Monique
G. Morial)
LEDET, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT
David C. Jarrell
LAW OFFICE OF DAVID C. JARRELL
9101 W. St. Bernard Highway
Chalmette, LA 70043
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, Brandon Enclarde
Michele Trowbridge Barreca
Kailey M. Goerlitz
Garrett Alline
PORTEOUS HAINKEL & JOHNSON, L.L.P.
704 Carondelet Street
New Orleans, LA 70130
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, GoAuto Insurance Company
REVERSED AND REMANDED
OCTOBER 20, 2026

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This insurance dispute stems from an automobile accident involving
Appellant, Brandon Enclarde (“Mr. Enclarde”), and Latonya Walker (“Ms.
Walker”). Mr. Enclarde seeks review of the trial court’s March 10, 2026 judgment,
which granted the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Appellee, GoAuto
Insurance Company (“GoAuto”), and dismissed his claims against GoAuto with
prejudice. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and
remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petition
On October 17, 2023, Mr. Enclarde filed a Petition for Damages, wherein he
named Ms. Walker and GoAuto as defendants. Mr. Enclarde alleged that on
October 28, 2022, he was driving his vehicle on Downman Road in New Orleans
when a vehicle operated by Ms. Walker collided with the rear of his vehicle.
Further, Mr. Enclarde asserted he suffered personal injuries from the accident
which he alleged was the fault of Ms. Walker. In relevant part, Mr. Enclarde also
alleged that GoAuto insured Ms. Walker on the date of the accident. Pertinent to
DNA
MGM

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understanding aspects of this Opinion, the record reveals that GoAuto eventually
appointed separate counsel to represent Ms. Walker.
Motion for Summary Judgment
On July 30, 2025, GoAuto filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. Therein,
GoAuto did not deny that it insured Ms. Walker on the date of the subject accident.
Instead, GoAuto requested summary judgment on the basis “that there is no
coverage under the GoAuto . . . policy because [Ms.] Walker has failed to comply
with the terms of the GoAuto . . . contract.” More specifically, GoAuto alleged that
Ms. “Walker has failed to cooperate with GoAuto in its investigation of the motor
vehicle accident which forms the basis of [Mr. Enclarde’s] lawsuit, as required by
the GoAuto policy terms, which has materially prejudiced GoAuto’s investigation
of the accident and GoAuto’s defense of this claim.”
In its “Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment” (“Memorandum”),
GoAuto argued “that in the absence of conflict with statutes or with public policy,
insurers have the same rights as individuals to limit their liability and to enforce
whatever conditions they please upon their obligation.” In this regard, GoAuto
pointed to the part of the policy it issued to Ms. Walker that provided, in pertinent
part, that a person insured by the policy must cooperate with GoAuto in its
investigation, settlement, or defense of any claim or suit in the event of an
accident, i.e., the “Cooperation Clause.” GoAuto contended that “[t]he refusal of
an insured to comply with [a] cooperation clause [like the foregoing] suffices to
justify dismissal of the insurer” from the suit.
Additionally, GoAuto alleged Ms. Walker’s failure to cooperate had
prejudiced it. Specifying how Ms. Walker failed to cooperate, GoAuto explained
that she did not report the accident; did not respond to GoAuto reaching out to her

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seventeen times via telephone, email, and written correspondence; and failed to
appear for her deposition and an examination under oath. GoAuto’s Memorandum
laid out this information in a timeline:
1. On 11/4/22, GoAuto claims representative called [Ms.] Walker
at [first telephone number1] and was met with no answer.
GoAuto claims representative then called [Ms.] Walker at
[second telephone number] and was met with a busy signal
each time. GoAuto mailed a Reservation of Rights Cooperation
letter to [Ms.] Walker. GoAuto claims representative sent a text
message to [first telephone number] requesting her to speak
with the claims adjustor as soon as possible.
2. On 11/21/22, GoAuto called [Ms.] Walker at [first telephone
number] and spoke very briefly. Ms. Walker asked the claims
adjustor to hold on while she relocated to somewhere quiet.
After a few minutes, the call ended. GoAuto called back and
received no answer, but, left a voicemail.
3. On 11/30/22, GoAuto mailed a 10-day notice letter to [Ms.]
Walker.
4. On 12/19/22, GoAuto claims representative called [Ms.]
Walker at [first telephone number] and there was no answer.
GoAuto was unable to leave a message as the mailbox was full.
GoAuto followed up with a text message.
5. On 1/23/23 GoAuto noted in the claim file that there has been
no response from [Ms.] Walker.
6. On 10/20/23, GoAuto mailed and emailed an updated
Reservation of Rights for non-cooperation to [Ms.] Walker.
GoAuto provided a copy of the suit in the email and requested
Ms. Walker to contact the claims adjustor as soon as possible.
7. On 10/23/23, GoAuto called [Ms.] Walker at [first telephone
number] and it was not a working number. GoAuto then called
[third telephone number] listed on the policy and was sent to
voicemail and left a message.
8. On 11/1/23, GoAuto received notification from St. Charles
Sheriff’s office that [Ms. Walker] was personally served with
the Petition for Damages.
1 For purposes of privacy, this Opinion will not repeat the telephone numbers listed in
GoAuto’s Memorandum.

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9. On 11/4/23, GoAuto mailed a reservation of rights letter to
[Ms.] Walker.
10. On 11/8/23, GoAuto called [Ms.] Walker at [third telephone
number] and left a voicemail. GoAuto then called [first
telephone number] and it was not in service.
11. On 3/18/24, GoAuto mailed and emailed a letter of notice to
[Ms.] Walker.
12. On 6/6/24, a notice of deposition was sent to [Ms.] Walker
scheduled for 7/9/24.
13. On 7/9/24, [Ms.] Walker did not appear for her deposition.
14. On 9/4/24, an examination under oath was scheduled tentatively
with Ms. Walker’s counsel, Carl Danna, for 9/23/24 as [Ms.]
Walker’s counsel was unable to speak with her or confirm
dates.
15. On 9/18/24, Carl Danna informed that the examination under
oath would not be going forward as he was unable to confirm
the date and time with [Ms.] Walker.
16. On 10/22/24, the examination under oath of [Ms.] Walker was
scheduled for 11/21/24.
17. On 11/21/24, the examination under oath did not go forward as
[Ms.] Walker’s counsel had a conflict. The examination under
oath was rescheduled to 1/27/2[5].
18. On 1/27/2[5], [Ms.] Walker did not appear for her examination
under oath.
(Footnotes omitted.)
Alleging how Ms. Walker’s failure to cooperate prejudiced it, GoAuto
contended it was “unable to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding
the accident and” had “been forced to blindly defend against a claim without any
information and assistance from the insured.” Additionally, Go Auto alleged it
would “incur unnecessary costs and expenses in defending against a lawsuit it
likely should not be involved in.”

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Opposition
On September 3, 2025, Mr. Enclarde filed a “Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (“Opposition”). Therein, Mr.
Enclarde delineated the following timeline in his Opposition (footnotes omitted):
• On June 4, 2024, [Mr. Enclarde’s] counsel noticed the deposition of
[Ms.] Walker to take place on July 9, 2024.
• On June 4, 2024, [Mr. Enclarde’s] counsel served notice upon
counsel for Ms. Walker.
• On July 8, 2024, Ms. Walker was served via domiciliary service.
• On July 9, 2024, Ms. Walker contacted [Mr. Enclarde’s counsel]
stating that she had not been in contact with anyone purporting to
represent her and that she did not have transportation to appear at the
deposition in Chalmette.
• On July 9, 2024, [Mr. Enclarde’s counsel] contacted counsel for Ms.
Walker and provided her phone number and asked that they call Ms.
Walker and ask her to verify the facts of loss.
• On July 9, 2024, [Mr. Enclarde’s counsel] contacted counsel for Ms.
Walker via e-mail and asked that they call Ms. Walker and ask her to
verify the facts of loss.
• On July 10, 2024, [Mr. Enclarde’s counsel] contacted counsel for
Ms. Walker via e-mail and asked that they call Ms. Walker and ask
her to verify the facts of loss.
• At some point on or shortly after July 10, 2024, counsel for Ms.
Walker informed [counsel for Mr. Enclarde] that Ms. Walker had
verified the facts of loss.
• Prior to the filing of the motion for summary judgment, [Mr.
Enclarde’s] counsel made no further requests to depose Ms. Walker in
light of Ms. Walkers [sic] verification of the facts of loss.
• On July 31, 2025, GoAuto filed the instant Motion for Summary
Judgment.
• On July 31, 2025, [Mr. Enclarde’s] counsel contacted counsel for
Ms. Walker to schedule her deposition to oppose GoAuto’s [M]otion
for [S]ummary [J]udgment.

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• On August 29, 2025, [Mr. Enclarde’s] counsel contacted counsel for
Ms. Walker to schedule her deposition to oppose GoAuto’s [M]otion
for [S]ummary [J]udgment.
• In between July 31, 2025 and August 29, 2025, [Mr. Enclarde’s]
counsel made several phone calls to counsel for Ms. Walker.
• As of the close of business on September 2, 2025, counsel for Ms.
Walker has never responded to any of the requests to schedule the
deposition of Ms. Walker.
Insofar as Mr. Enclarde alleged, as quoted above, that Ms. Walker communicated
with her counsel, Mr. Enclarde supported this with an affidavit from his counsel.
Mr. Enclarde also attached his own affidavit in support of his Opposition.
With respect to the above timeline, Mr. Enclarde contended it created a
genuine issue of material fact sufficient to warrant denial of GoAuto’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. Specifically, Mr. Enclarde pointed out that when Ms. Walker
directly received the deposition subpoena, she “was cooperative but lacked the
means to attend the deposition.” Mr. Enclarde alleged that after GoAuto filed its
Motion for Summary Judgment and sought again to depose Ms. Walker and
coordinate a defense with her attorney, it was Ms. Walker’s counsel who was
“utterly unresponsive,” not Ms. Walker.
In addition, Mr. Enclarde argued that GoAuto had failed to allege—let alone
prove—the factual basis for the prejudice it purportedly experienced. In particular,
Mr. Enclarde pointed out that GoAuto did not identify “what additional facts need
to be investigated” for it to defend against Mr. Enclarde’s claim. As Mr. Enclarde
explained, he submitted to a deposition, during which he verified the facts of the
loss and provided a copy of Ms. Walker’s driver’s license and insurance card (with
Ms. Walker being the named insured on same) that he received from her.

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Quoting from Marcantel v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., Mr. Enclarde
argued “a cooperation clause is emphatically not an escape hatch that an insurer
may use to flee from liability” with dismissal on the basis of an insured’s failure to
cooperate being a “‘draconian remedy’ . . . available only where the insurer can
establish actual prejudice.” No. 2:22-01511, 2024 WL 3157598, at *3 (W.D. La.
June 24, 2024) (citations omitted). Mr. Enclarde also cited to Williams v.
USAgencies Casualty Insurance Co. for the principle that the purpose of
Louisiana’s compulsory liability law is “to provide compensation for persons
injured by the operation of insured vehicles” rather than “to protect the vehicle
owner or operator against liability.” 2014-185, p. 7 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/4/14), 140
So.3d 895, 900 (citation omitted). In this vein, Mr. Enclarde argued GoAuto
sought—via its Motion for Summary—“to circumvent the purpose of the
compulsory insurance law and avoid liability under the policy by relying on on
[sic] a failure to cooperate clause to effectively deny coverage to an innocent third
party.” Mr. Enclarde argued that “[s]uch an interpretation imposes an additional
requirement to effectuate the purpose of the compulsory insurance law, namely a
requirement that, in addition to having insurance, an at-fault insured must give his
permission to the third party claim by cooperating with the investigation.”
Reply
On September 25, 2025, GoAuto filed a “Reply to [Mr. Enclarde]’s
Opposition to [Its] Motion for Summary Judgment” (“Reply”). In pertinent part,
GoAuto’s Reply asserted: (1) Mr. Enclarde’s counsel’s affidavit was not
admissible evidence to defeat its Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) Ms. Walker’s
counsel’s unresponsiveness was not relevant to GoAuto’s Motion for Summary
Judgment; (3) Mr. Enclarde’s affidavit was self-serving and not admissible

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evidence to defeat GoAuto’s Motion for Summary Judgment; and (4) Ms.
Walker’s failure to cooperate materially prejudiced GoAuto’s ability to investigate
the alleged accident (this latter topic was essentially a reiteration of the argument
GoAuto made in its Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum).
November 2025 Hearing
On November 21, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on GoAuto’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. Ms. Walker’s new counsel2 was present and explained
Ms. Walker had contacted her office the day before and stated her willingness to
participate in a deposition. Counsel for Ms. Walker also explained, however, that
Ms. Walker did not have transportation or access to the internet to appear for the
deposition in person or virtually via Zoom, respectively. The trial court continued
the matter until January 2026 and told counsel for Ms. Walker to advise Ms.
Walker that her failure to show for her deposition would result in the trial court
assessing attorney fees and costs against her.
Supplemental Opposition
Then, on December 30, 2025, Mr. Enclarde filed a “Supplemental
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment”
(“Supplemental Opposition”). Therein, Mr. Enclarde informed the trial court that
Ms. Walker continued to be insured by GoAuto until at least September 22, 2024
(nearly two years after the subject accident). According to Mr. Enclarde, this
demonstrated the “dis-ingenuousness and absurdity of GoAuto’s failure to
cooperate defense.” That is, Mr. Enclarde argued that GoAuto benefitted
financially by continuing to receive Ms. Walker’s premiums while also benefitting
2 By the time of the hearing, a different GoAuto-appointed attorney represented Ms.
Walker.

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financially by avoiding paying his legitimate claim on the basis of her failure to
cooperate. Thus, Mr. Enclarde argued that GoAuto’s failure to cooperate defense
was “exaggerated at best and completely insincere at worse” because GoAuto did
not find Ms. Walker’s lack of cooperation so egregious as to cancel her policy. In
pertinent part, Mr. Enclarde attached to his Supplemental Opposition the
December 17, 2025 responses GoAuto provided to his supplemental requests for
production, which included Ms. Walker’s insurance policies from the company
through September 22, 2024.
Reply to Supplemental Opposition
On January 30, 2026, in response to Mr. Enclarde’s Supplemental
Opposition, GoAuto filed a “Reply to [Mr. Enclarde]’s Supplemental
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment”
(“Reply to Supplemental Opposition”). Therein, GoAuto argued the trial court
should not consider Mr. Enclarde’s Supplemental Opposition and the exhibit
attached thereto because the facts of GoAuto continuing to insure Ms. Walker and
collect premium payments from her had “no bearing on the issues at hand” in its
Motion for Summary Judgment. Rather, according to GoAuto, this constituted an
effort by Mr. Enclarde “to make an implication of disingenuity on the part of
GoAuto.” As argued by GoAuto, “An insurer can most definitely deny coverage
for a particular claim without canceling the insured’s policy,” and GoAuto also
argued that this was not contrary to public policy. Additionally, GoAuto asserted
that to the extent Mr. Enclarde contended Ms. Walker’s cooperation in paying her
premiums had bearing on her cooperation in his case, this was both irrelevant and
untrue.

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March 2026 Hearing
On March 6, 2026, the trial court held another hearing on GoAuto’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. GoAuto’s counsel confirmed that Ms. Walker’s insurance
policy contained the Cooperation Clause and asserted that her actions had violated
it. Specifying those actions, counsel for GoAuto contended Ms. Walker remained
uncooperative and still had not reported the loss, provided a statement, sat for a
deposition, or sat for an examination under oath. As explained by GoAuto’s
counsel, the only information GoAuto had about the case came from the adverse
party, Mr. Enclarde, such that GoAuto was prejudiced because it had “never been
informed of the facts.” Counsel for Ms. Walker explained that she had made
multiple unsuccessful attempts to reach Ms. Walker.
At the outset, counsel for Mr. Enclarde discussed the fact that GoAuto
continued to insure Ms. Walker despite her failure to cooperate in the subject case.
Mr. Enclarde’s counsel pointed out that GoAuto had issued multiple cancellation
notices to Ms. Walker for her failure to timely pay her premium and then reinstated
her policy upon her doing so. Arguing the import of that, counsel for Mr. Enclarde
asserted this demonstrated that “when [GoAuto] really wanted to get in contact
with [Ms. Walker], [it] did.” As argued by Mr. Enclarde’s counsel, if GoAuto
really cared about Ms. Walker’s failure to cooperate, it would have canceled her
policy.
As to the effect of Ms. Walker’s failure to cooperate, counsel for Mr.
Enclarde explained this was “a simple rear-end auto accident,” such that there was
“very little to investigate.” Mr. Enclarde’s counsel argued that his “client received
a copy from Ms. Walker of her license and her vehicle registration and her
insurance card from GoAuto,” which established it was Ms. Walker driving the

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vehicle during the accident. Then, Mr. Enclarde’s counsel observed there had been
no allegation of fraud or misconduct so as to justify GoAuto attempting to obtain
an examination under oath. Turning to the issue of prejudice, Mr. Enclarde’s
counsel argued GoAuto had not alleged, let alone proven, actual prejudice.
Addressing the public policy aspect of the case, Mr. Enclarde’s counsel asserted
Louisiana’s compulsory liability insurance policy is designed to protect the
innocent party in an accident, i.e., Mr. Enclarde.
The trial court judge ruled that, under La. C.C.P. art. 966 (titled “Motion for
Summary Judgment; procedure”), he could not consider the insurance premiums
paid by Ms. Walker and the insurance policies that covered her subsequent to the
subject accident. In other words, the trial court judge stated he could not and would
not consider Mr. Enclarde’s Supplemental Opposition. The trial court concluded
the hearing by orally granting GoAuto’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Judgment
Thereafter, on March 10, 2026, the trial court issued its written judgment
granting GoAuto’s Motion for Summary Judgment:
This matter was set for hearing on Friday, March 6, 2026 on the
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by defendant [GoAuto] . . . .
. . . .
After a review of the pleadings, evidence, and law, hearing the
argument of counsel, and for the reasons orally assigned at the
hearing, this Honorable Court renders judgment as follow:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by [GoAuto] . . . is
hereby GRANTED and [Mr. Enclarde]’s claims against [GoAuto] . . .
are dismissed, with prejudice, with each party to bear their own costs;
while specifically reserving the rights of [Mr. Enclarde] against any
and all other parties herein.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that this Judgment be and is hereby designated as a
[f]inal [j]udgment in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 1915.
Mr. Enclarde’s timely appeal to this Court followed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Mr. Enclarde asserts two assignments of error in his brief to this Court:
1. The trial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law in granting summary
judgment on the basis of [Ms. Walker]’s failure to cooperate when
[GoAuto] failed to allege, much less prove, actual prejudice.
2. The trial [c]ourt erred in not admitting and not considering
GoAuto’s Responses to Requests for Production that were attached as
Exhibit 5 to the [S]upplement[al] [O]pposition to [GoAuto’s]
[M]otion for [S]ummary [J]udgment.
We begin with Mr. Enclarde’s first assignment of error to address his arguments in
chronological order and, for the following reasons, we find it dispositive of this
appeal.
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment Principles and Standard of Review
We begin our discussion with the principles and standard of review
applicable to the summary judgment procedure so that these inform our analysis.
“The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action . . . .” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). It “is
favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends.” Id. A trial court grants a
motion for summary judgment if “[a]fter an opportunity for adequate discovery,”
the mover's “motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is
no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). On a motion for summary judgment,
“[t]he burden of proof rests with the mover.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

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As this Court has explained in discussing the summary judgment procedure:
[T]he party seeking summary judgment has the burden of proving
there is no genuine issue of material fact. This Court has previously
defined a genuine issue to mean a triable issue. More particularly, an
issue is genuine if reasonable persons could disagree about the issue.
If, however, reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion on
the particular issue in light of the state of the evidence, then there is
no need for a trial on that issue. A fact is material when its existence
or non-existence may be essential to the plaintiff’s cause of action
under the applicable theory of recovery. Further, a fact is material
when it potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant’s
ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. In
determining whether a particular disputed fact is material or not, a
court must analyze the substantive law applicable to the case as the
applicable substantive law determines materiality.
If the movant proves that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, thereby satisfying the initial burden of proof, at that point the
burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to present
factual support sufficient to show he or she will be able to satisfy the
evidentiary burden at trial.
Pulliam v. Curahealth New Orleans, LLC, 2025-0240, pp. 11-12 (La. App. 4 Cir.
12/3/25), 430 So.3d 420, 428 (internal citations, alterations, and quotation marks
omitted).
As established by La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1), if the party moving for
summary judgment “will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is
before the court on the motion for summary judgment,” then “the mover’s burden
on the motion does not require him [or her] to negate all essential elements of the
adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the
absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s
claim, action, or defense.” Then, if “the motion has been made and properly
supported . . .[t]he burden shift[s] from the mover to the adverse party.” Pulliam,
2025-0240, p. 12, 430 So.3d at 428 (quoting Barnes v. Turn Servs., L.L.C., 2025-
0439, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/17/25), 431 So.3d 138, 147). When the burden

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shifts, “the adverse party [must] produce factual support sufficient to establish the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). To produce such support,
“[the] adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his [or her]
pleading, but his [or her] response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided . . ., must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” La. C.C.P.
art. 967(B).
Concerning the trial court’s consideration of the motion, this Court has
explained that “[t]he trial court cannot make credibility determinations but must
construe reasonable factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion,
resolving all doubt in favor of the opponent.” Pulliam, 2025-0240, p. 12, 430 So.3d
at 428 (quoting Barnes, 2025-0439, p. 11, 431 So.3d at 147). Upon the burden
shifting, the trial court shall render summary judgment against the party opposing
the motion if that party has failed to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” La. C.C.P. art. 967(B). As explained by this Court, “[t]he
reason for judgment against the party opposing the motion for summary judgment
at that juncture is because that party has failed to provide factual evidence
sufficient to establish that he or she will be able to satisfy his or her evidentiary
burden of proof at trial, such that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
summary judgment is appropriate.” Pulliam, 2025-0240, pp, 12-13, 430 So.3d at
428-29 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barnes, 2025-
0439, p. 12, 431 So.3d at 147).
Thereafter, “[o]n appeal, appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a
motion for summary judgment de novo and utilize ‘the same criteria that govern
the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate.’” Id. at

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p. 13, 430 So.3d at 429 (quoting Barnes, 2025-0439, p. 12, 431 So.3d at 147).
Stated differently, “in ascertaining whether summary judgment was appropriate,
‘an appellate court considers the same questions as the trial court,’ specifically
‘whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the mover is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. With those principles and that
standard of review in mind, we consider the propriety of the trial court’s grant of
GoAuto’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Whether the Trial Court Erred in Granting GoAuto’s Motion for Summary
Judgment
As stated previously, the applicable substantive law determines materiality
on a motion for summary judgment. The main issue in this appeal is whether there
is a genuine issue of material fact as to coverage based on Ms. Walker’s purported
failure to comply with the Cooperation Clause. Thus, we must look at the law
concerning cooperation clauses.
As this Court explained in another cooperation clause case, Bankers
Insurance Co. v. EMIII Holdings, LLC:
Interpretation of an insurance policy ordinarily involves a legal
question that can be properly resolved by a motion for summary
judgment. As this Court has explained, the purpose of the cooperation
clause in an insurance policy is to require the insured to disclose all of
the facts within his or her knowledge, and otherwise aid the company
to determine its liability under the policy. As the Louisiana First
Circuit Court of Appeal has described it, a cooperation clause protects
the insurer against fraud by enabling it to obtain relevant information
concerning the claimed loss while the information is fresh. Louisiana
courts have held that violation of a cooperation clause, including the
failure to submit to an examination under oath or the refusal to
produce documentation, constitutes a material breach of an insurance
contract and a defense to a suit on the policy. In so holding, however,
the courts should be mindful that a cooperation clause is not an escape
hatch for the insurer to flee liability for trivial policy violations, and
dismissing a suit for breach of a cooperation clause is a draconian
remedy. Accordingly, for a policy to be deemed void on the basis of
non-compliance with a cooperation clause, the insurer must

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demonstrate that it made a diligent effort to obtain the requested
information, and the insurer bears the burden of proving that the
breach of the cooperation clause was both material and prejudicial.
Thus, when an insurance company asserts a denial of coverage based
on the insured’s refusal to cooperate, a central question for the courts
to consider is whether there was prejudice to the insurer. If the insurer
argues general prejudice but does not show how it was prejudiced or
any particular prejudice, then the insurer has not met its burden of
proof.
2024-0386, pp. 24-25 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/24), 407 So.3d 681, 697 (internal
citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted).
In determining whether a lack of cooperation by its insured relieves the
insurer of liability, courts must be mindful “[t]hat each case rests on its own facts
and circumstances.” Freyou v. Marquette Cas. Co., 149 So.2d 697, 699 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1963) (citations omitted). However, in Bankers Insurance Co., this Court
listed examples of when it is inappropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of
the insurer on the basis of lack of cooperation by the insured:
[I]n Trosclair [v. CNA Insurance Co.], this Court reversed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer,
Transportation, stating that while Transportation had “argued general
prejudice,” it had “not shown how it [was] prejudiced, nor . . . any
particular prejudice.” 637 So.2d [1168,] 1170 [(La. App. 4th Cir.
1994)]. Similarly, in McCartney [v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co.],
the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal (“First Circuit”), reversed
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer,
Shelter, partially on the basis of the prejudice issue. 2017-1398, p. 7
[(La. App. 1 Cir. 7/10/18)], 255 So.3d [1060,] 1064. In support of its
motion for summary judgment, Shelter attached the affidavit of Sonya
White (“Ms. White”), who was the claims representative tasked with
investigating the claim of the insureds, the McCartneys. Id. at p. 5,
255 So.3d at 1063. In her affidavit, Ms. White attested that “the
McCartneys ‘failed to provide the information requested and failed to
give an examination under oath.’” Id. at p. 6, 255 So.3d at 1063. She
further attested that “[t]he ability to investigate and investigate early is
critical,” and that the “the inability to do so substantially prejudiced
Shelter’s investigation into the McCartneys’ claim.” Id. The First
Circuit concluded this was insufficient, noting that “the record
contains no evidence suggesting Shelter was prejudiced by any action
or inaction by the McCartneys.” Id. at p. 7, 255 So.3d at 1064.

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Id. at pp. 25-26, 407 So.3d at 698 (third and ninth alterations in original).
Moreover, with reference to the insurer’s attempts to contact its insured, in
Desadier v. Safeway Insurance Co., the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
(“Third Circuit”) noted the insurance company had attempted to contact its insured
via letters and telephone calls but did not attempt to contact him at home or
otherwise in person. 1997-1412, p. 5 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/8/98), 712 So.2d 925, 928.
In this latter sense, the Third Circuit stated it was “clear that further steps could
have been taken to secure statements from” the insured. Id. With regard to the
issue of prejudice, the Third Circuit held “there was little or no information that
[the insured] could have provided which otherwise would have not been available
at trial.” Id. at p. 6, 712 So.2d at 928.
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, GoAuto did not establish it was
entitled to summary judgment. As in Desadier, GoAuto delineated its attempts to
contact Ms. Walker via telephone, email, and written correspondence and to secure
her deposition and an examination under oath. However, GoAuto did not establish
it attempted to contact Ms. Walker at home or to otherwise contact her in person to
obtain her cooperation, such that it arguably could have taken further steps to
contact her. This notion of trying to communicate with Ms. Walker in person is
particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that GoAuto stated in its Motion for
Summary Judgment that the St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office confirmed with
GoAuto that it personally served Ms. Walker with Mr. Enclarde’s Petition. Also,
Mr. Enclarde’s Opposition established that Ms. Walker received her deposition
subpoena via domiciliary service.3
3 At the outset, we disclaim the following information is not dispositive to our holding
because we have not discussed the admissibility of the sources of said information. Nonetheless,

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Additionally, GoAuto asserted that Ms. Walker’s lack of cooperation
prejudiced it but did so merely in general terms—stating it had to “blindly defend”
Mr. Enclarde’s claims—and did not demonstrate how it was prejudiced or point to
a specific prejudice just like the insurer failed to do in Trosclair. Similarly,
GoAuto’s allegation of prejudice because of an inability to investigate Mr.
Enclarde’s claims is analogous to the overly broad one at issue in McCartney. In
particular, and like the insurer in Desadier, GoAuto failed to delineate what
information it needed from Ms. Walker about the accident and what information
Ms. Walker would provide that Mr. Enclarde had not already provided.
Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred in granting GoAuto’s Motion for
Summary Judgment; reverse the trial court’s judgment; and remand this matter. In
so doing, we reiterate something said by the First Circuit in McCartney,
specifically that “[t]he jurisprudence cautions against allowing an insurer to use a
cooperation clause to flee liability based on trivial policy violations.” 2017-1398,
p. 7, 255 So.3d at 1064 (citations omitted). To allow an insurer like GoAuto to
we felt compelled to separately write this note to raise another point. Louisiana courts have
declined to dismiss an insurer when its “insured had a reasonable explanation for his actions.”
Bankers Ins. Co., 2024-0386, p. 26, 407 So.3d at 698 (quoting McCartney, 2017-1398, p. 5, 255
So.3d at 1063). Certain facts and circumstances of the matter sub judice evoke that principle.
For one, GoAuto’s timeline in its Motion for Summary Judgment listed three different
telephone numbers at which it tried to reach Ms. Walker. GoAuto described the first telephone
number as “not a working number” in one instance and “not in service” in another instance. This
begs the question of the reliability of reaching Ms. Walker by phone. Second, according to Mr.
Enclarde’s counsel, around July 9, 2024, Ms. Walker contacted him and explained she missed
her deposition because she did not have transportation to the location of the deposition.
Moreover, during the November 2025 hearing, Ms. Walker’s counsel confirmed that Ms. Walker
did not have access to transportation or the internet to appear for a deposition (or, by logical
extension, for an examination under oath) either in-person or virtually. Thus, it is unsurprising
that Ms. Walker had not appeared for her previously-scheduled deposition or examination under
oath. Third, according to Mr. Enclarde’s counsel, around July 10, 2024, Ms. Walker’s original
counsel informed him that Ms. Walker had verified the facts of loss. Assuming arguendo that
this was true, the record indicates no experience Ms. Walker has with the insurance or legal
systems to understand that to cooperate she needed to take further action. In other words, Ms.
Walker might have logically concluded that speaking to the attorney GoAuto appointed to
represent her was sufficient to constitute cooperation with GoAuto itself.

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avoid liability in this situation when it has not established how it was specifically
prejudiced by the lack of cooperation would constitute such a trivial policy
violation. Our holding renders Mr. Enclarde’s second assignment of error moot;
therefore, we decline to address it as doing so would merely yield dicta.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s March 10, 2026
judgment, which granted GoAuto’s Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed
Mr. Enclarde’s claims with prejudice. We remand this matter to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED

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