Commonwealth v. Daniel J. O'quinn.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1036

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

DANIEL J. O'QUINN.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury trial in the District Court, the defendant was

found guilty of negligent operation of a motor vehicle and

failure to stop for police.1 On appeal, the defendant claims

there was insufficient evidence to support those convictions.

We affirm.

Discussion. The defendant claims that because he did not

exceed the speed limit; did not actually endanger any

pedestrians; did not actually hit any vehicles; used the

1The jury found the defendant not guilty of operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor. The judge
found the defendant not responsible for a marked lanes violation
and possession of an open container of an alcoholic beverage in
a motor vehicle.
breakdown lane appropriately;2 and stopped at a stop sign,3 there

was insufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that

he operated the vehicle in a negligent manner. For the same

reasons, as well as the bizarre explanation he provided the

officers for his failure to stop,4 the defendant also argues that

his conviction for failure to stop for police was unsupported by

sufficient evidence. We disagree.

"When analyzing whether the record evidence is sufficient

to support a conviction, an appellate court is not required to

'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt'" (citation

omitted). Commonwealth v. Rocheteau, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 17, 19

(2009). "Rather, the relevant 'question is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

2 The defendant claims that the jury could infer that he was
using the breakdown lane properly as a "climbing lane" for slow
traffic. However, the officer testified that in the town of
Shelburne, where he personally observed the defendant driving in
the breakdown lane, there is only one travel lane. The
breakdown lane is only a travel lane in the city of Greenfield.

3 Whether the defendant actually stopped at the stop sign
was a question of fact for the jury to resolve, and the jury
could reasonably infer from the officer's testimony that the
defendant did not do so.

4 The defendant, who has been diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, claimed that he had been poisoned by consuming anti-
freeze and needed to get home to obtain an "antidote," that
being liquor. In reality, the defendant was apparently
suffering from a poison ivy rash.

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prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"

Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677

(1979). "The evidence may be direct or circumstantial, and we

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth."

Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 51 (2018). When evaluating

sufficiency, the evidence must be reviewed with specific

reference to the substantive elements of the offense. See

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 n.16 (1979); Latimore,

supra at 677-678.

To establish the defendant's guilt of negligent operation

of a motor vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a),

the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant (1) operated a

motor vehicle; (2) upon a public way; and (3) negligently so

that the lives or safety of the public might be endangered. See

Commonwealth v. Tantillo, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 20, 26 (2023);

Commonwealth v. Daley, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 255 (2006).

"General Laws c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), 'only requires proof that the

lives or safety of the public might be endangered, not that they

were endangered." Tantillo, supra, quoting Daley, supra at 256.

"The question is whether the defendant's driving had the

potential to cause danger to the public, not whether it actually

did." Commonwealth v. Sousa, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 47, 51 (2015).

"One may operate a vehicle 'in such a way that would endanger

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the public although no other person is on the street.'"

Tantillo, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Constantino, 443 Mass.

521, 526-527 (2005).

As for the defendant's guilt of failure to stop for police,

in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 25, the Commonwealth was required

to establish that he refused or neglected to stop when signaled

to stop by a person he knows is a police officer. See

Commonwealth v. Ross, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 181, 183-184 (2008).

Here, at approximately 3:15 P.M. on a rainy day, the

defendant was driving his car, with both passenger tires

completely in the breakdown lane, "roughly within the speed

limit" on a state highway in moderate traffic. A uniformed

police officer activated the overhead emergency blue lights on

his marked police cruiser and attempted to initiate a traffic

stop of the defendant. Operators of other motor vehicles pulled

over in response, and the officer was traveling directly behind

the defendant's car. The defendant continued driving in the

breakdown lane "for a substantial distance," and the officer

activated his horn and siren, to no avail. The defendant

eventually left the breakdown lane to make a left turn at an

intersection, but he kept driving, in clear disregard of the

officer's signals to pull over.

At one point during the pursuit, on a "very narrow"

downhill roadway with "a lot of traffic in that area," the

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police officer nearly collided with the defendant's motor

vehicle from behind. The officer saw the defendant look in his

side mirror and motioned with his hand outside his cruiser to

pull over, and the defendant pointed forward in response. Then,

the defendant "continued through" a four-way "stop sign area"

while pedestrians were crossing the street. After having led

the officer through multiple towns, the defendant's motor

vehicle finally jumped a roadside curb and landed in his

driveway. He then ran from his vehicle into the residence.

Shortly thereafter, the defendant emerged with a "decent size

bottle of alcohol," from which he proceeded to drink.

Three other police officers arrived, and the defendant re-

entered the residence, not wanting to speak with them. Officers

entered through an open door and observed the defendant having

"red, kind of bloodshot and glassy, almost marbleish-like eyes"

and slurring his speech. The defendant agreed to participate in

field sobriety tests and, based on his faulty performance that

led the officers to believe that he was intoxicated, the

defendant was placed under arrest. Officers conducted a search

of the defendant's motor vehicle, and they found a can of

alcoholic malt beverage, in the center console.

These facts, viewed together in the light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, were sufficient for the jury to infer that the

defendant operated his motor vehicle in a negligent manner and

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failed to stop for police. See Ross, 73 Mass. App. Ct. at 184;

Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 34-36 (2007);

Daley, 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 256. See also Commonwealth v.

Larose, 483 Mass. 323, 332 (2019) (drivers pose serious danger

to themselves and others when failing to operate in conformity

with applicable traffic rules, "particularly one as fundamental

as the directive to drive entirely within one lane"). During a

rainy afternoon, the defendant drove for a substantial distance

in the breakdown lane on a state highway with moderate vehicle

traffic, failed to stop at a stop sign while pedestrians were

crossing, and led an officer on a chase through multiple towns,

which the jury could infer had the potential to cause danger to

the public. The jury also could have inferred that the near

collision between the officer and the defendant was due, at

least in part, to the defendant's conduct. Moreover, "[t]he

fact that the jury ultimately did not convict the defendant of

[operating while under the influence of alcohol] does not

preclude their consideration of the evidence of intoxication in

considering the negligent operation charge." Commonwealth v.

Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 380 (2017). This included the

defendant's appearance, his slurred speech, the alcoholic

beverage found in his motor vehicle, and his failure to

successfully complete the field sobriety tests. Finally, the

jury was entitled to reject the defendant's "antidote" excuse as

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a valid reason for the defendant's refusal to stop when signaled

to do so by a police officer in a marked cruiser.

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Blake &
Brennan, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: August 8, 2024.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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