MICHELLE STEWARDSON, Trustee v. EDWARD P. HARRINGTON, Personal Representative, & Another (And Four Consolidated Cases and a Companion Case).

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-262
23-P-264

MICHELLE STEWARDSON, trustee,1

vs.

EDWARD P. HARRINGTON, personal representative,2 & another3
(and four consolidated cases4 and a companion case5).

1 Of the Greenspring Realty Trust.

2 Of the estate of Leonard S. French.

3Julie A. Evans, as trustee of the Norwood Park South IV
Trust. The lead appeal pertains to Superior Court Docket No.
1482CV940.

4Michelle Stewardson, trustee, & another vs. Edward P.
Harrington, personal representative, & another (Docket No.
1482CV941); Michelle Stewardson, trustee, vs. Edward P.
Harrington, personal representative, & others (Docket No.
1482CV942); Michelle Stewardson, trustee, vs. Edward P.
Harrington, personal representative, & others (Docket No.
1482CV943); Michelle Stewardson, trustee, vs. Sally J. Winters,
trustee, & another (Docket No. 1482CV944).

5The companion case is a consolidated appeal from judgments
of contempt addressing multiple contempt complaints in Docket
Nos. 1482CV940, 1482CV941, 1482CV942, and 1482CV943.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

This matter arises from a dispute regarding the amount of

distributions owed to Joseph Verna from five joint real estate

ventures: Norwood Park South IV Associates (NPS IV), Norwood

Park South VI Associates (NPS VI), Silver Maple Associates

(Silver Maple), PAR Associates (PAR), and Franklin South Realty

Associates (Franklin South).6 In July 2014, Verna brought a

separate action for each joint venture, claiming that he had not

received his full distributions and seeking accountings and

damages (merits actions).7 Subsequently, Verna filed contempt

complaints in four of the merits actions -- the NPS IV, NPS VI,

Silver Maple, and PAR actions -- claiming that the managers of

those joint ventures did not comply with consent orders entered

in the corresponding merits actions requiring them to provide

accountings and produce books and records (contempt actions).

6 Verna held his interests in the joint ventures through two
trusts: the Greenspring Realty Trust, of which he was the
trustee, and the JIVE Family Trust 2008, of which his attorney,
David Hern, Jr., was the trustee.

7 As a technical matter, Verna commenced the NPS IV, Silver
Maple, PAR, and Franklin South actions as the trustee of the
Greenspring Realty Trust, and Verna and Hern commenced the NPS
VI action as the trustees of the Greenspring Realty Trust and
the JIVE Family Trust 2008. See note 6, supra. Since bringing
the merits actions, Verna has passed away, and a successor
trustee has been substituted in his place. For ease of
reference, we refer to the successor trustee as Verna.

2
Judgments on the merits actions entered on July 15, 2022.

Those judgments awarded Verna damages in four of the merits

actions -- the NPS IV, NPS VI, PAR, and Franklin South actions -

- plus costs and statutory interest running from the date of the

complaints, provided that interest was tolled for the period

from January 1, 2019, to May 31, 2021. However, the judgments

did not award Verna precomplaint interest or attorney's fees.

The judgments also awarded Verna damages and attorney's fees in

the contempt actions, plus costs and statutory interest running

from the date of the judgments. Verna appeals. With respect to

the merits actions, we affirm. With respect to the contempt

actions, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for

reconsideration of attorney's fees.

Background. Before we turn to the facts underlying these

appeals, we note that Verna filed a sixth action pertaining to

another joint venture. The sixth action, referred to as the

Motel Realty action, was tried separately as a bellwether case

and was the subject of a prior appeal.8 See Stewardson v.

Winters, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 1119 (2022). The Motel Realty case,

8 The judge who presided over the bench trial of the Motel
Realty action also presided over the bench trial of the merits
actions currently on appeal. The same judge also decided the
merits of the contempt actions, although different judges heard
some preliminary matters related to the contempt actions.

3
including our discussion of the issues in the appeal, are

relevant to the conclusions we reach here, and we rely, in part,

on the analysis set forth in the unpublished memorandum and

order.

Verna participated in the joint ventures with Leonard S.

French.9 Verna and Leonard structured each joint venture

similarly. For each joint venture, Verna and Leonard created a

separate trust solely to hold the joint venture's assets.

Leonard was a manager of NPS IV, NPS VI, Silver Maple, PAR, and

Franklin South, as well as the trustee of the corresponding

trusts for NPS IV, NPS VI, Silver Maple, and PAR. Leonard's

wife, Shirley A. French, was a comanager of Silver Maple and

PAR, although her role was limited to occasionally writing

checks at Leonard's request. Leonard's daughter, Sally J.

Winters, was the trustee of the Franklin South trust. However,

Leonard effectively served as the manager of all the joint

ventures, with Verna's full knowledge and consent. In addition,

despite the legal distinctions between the joint ventures and

the trusts, Verna and Leonard treated each joint venture and its

corresponding trust as a single financial entity. Leonard kept

9 As we discuss, Leonard French's wife, Shirley A. French,
is also a party to this case. Accordingly, we refer to them
individually by their first names and collectively as French.

4
accounts and records for the trusts but not the joint ventures

themselves. Verna held a 12.5 percent interest in each joint

venture.

As noted, Verna brought the merits actions in July 2014.10

The requests for relief included (1) accountings of the joint

ventures and trusts and (2) damages. In September 2014, consent

orders entered in the NPS IV, NPS VI, Silver Maple, and PAR

actions requiring French to provide accountings and produce

books and records for the joint ventures and trusts. It is

undisputed that French did not provide accountings in a timely

fashion or produce all books and records in his possession or

control.11 As a result, Verna was required to obtain missing

records from various third parties through the issuance of

10Verna brought the NPS IV, NPS VI, Silver Maple, and PAR
actions against Leonard, individually and as trustee of the NPS
IV, NPS VI, Silver Maple, and PAR trusts. Verna also named
Shirley as a defendant in the Silver Maple and PAR actions.
Separately, Verna brought the Franklin South action against
Leonard, individually, and Winters, as trustee of the Franklin
South trust. Leonard has since passed away, and a successor
personal representative and successor trustees have been
substituted in his place. For ease of reference, we refer to
the successor personal representative and successor trustees as
Leonard.

11We reserve for later discussion the background pertinent
to the contempt actions, infra.

5
keeper of the record subpoenas.12 However, some records still

remained missing. For example, with respect to Silver Maple,

Verna was able to obtain bank statements but not copies of

canceled checks for the years prior to 2009. After Verna

collected the available records, French hired a financial expert

to prepare accountings, which French provided to Verna on March

3, 2017. It is also undisputed that the expert relied, at least

in part, on the records obtained by Verna.

Shortly thereafter, Leonard passed away, and the trial on

the merits actions was delayed until June 2021. French's expert

testified at trial, as did a financial expert retained by

Verna.13 The experts offered very different views of the books

and records. French's expert treated each joint venture and its

corresponding trust as a single financial entity, whereas

Verna's expert calculated revenue for each joint venture and its

corresponding trust separately. The experts also disagreed, at

least in some respects, on the amount of certain expenses and

the value of certain assets.

12As mentioned, there were no records for the joint
ventures, themselves; the records that were obtained were all
for the trusts.

13While Verna's expert testified regarding his opinion on
the amount of money due to Verna, he explicitly stated that he
did not prepare accountings of the joint ventures or trusts.

6
The trial judge adopted the methodology and calculations of

French's expert. The judge found that Leonard managed the joint

ventures at the trust level "with the full knowledge and consent

of . . . Verna over a period of decades," and that it was

therefore "fair and logical" to treat the joint ventures and

their corresponding trusts as single financial entities. The

judge also found that Verna's expert "frequently ignored

relevant financial information that was available to him in

conducting his analysis." For example, Verna's expert "did not

include expenses for mortgage payments on the Silver Maple

[p]roperty after 2014, even though copies of the relevant

mortgage documents were available to him and regular mortgage

payments in and after 2014 were reflected in the Silver Maple

monthly bank account statements." Based on the testimony of

French's expert, the judge found that Verna was owed

distributions in the following amounts: $96,745.75 for NPS IV;

$37,032.40 for NPS VI; nothing for Silver Maple; $136 for PAR;

and $60,035.75 for Franklin South.14

14In the NPS IV, NPS VI, and PAR actions, the judgments
entered against Leonard's estate. In the Franklin South action,
the judgment entered against Leonard's estate and Winters, as
trustee of the Franklin South trust. The trial judge did not
find Shirley individually liable in the Silver Maple and PAR
actions.

7
Discussion. 1. Merits actions. a. Accountings. Verna

raises several arguments challenging the trial judge's

calculations of the distributions owed to him. Primarily, Verna

argues that the judge's methodology was flawed. In addition,

Verna argues that the judge erred in determining the trusts'

legitimate expenses and the value of assets. We address each

argument in turn.

i. Methodology. Verna's primary argument on appeal is

that the trial judge was required to consider the account of

each joint venture and the account of its corresponding trust

separately. Verna relies, in part, on the fact that his prayers

for relief requested separate accountings. As an initial

matter, Verna does not explain how the amount of damages would

have been any different had the judge proceeded in the manner he

requested. Verna also does not point us to any analogous cases

requiring separate accountings where the parties, themselves,

treated separate entities as a single financial entity.

Accordingly, we conclude that Verna has not met his burden on

appeal of establishing grounds to vacate and remand for separate

accountings. See, e.g., Krasne v. Tedeschi & Grasso, 436 Mass.

103, 108 (2002).

ii. Expenses. Verna's argument regarding expenses stems

from the fact that some records remained missing at trial.

8
Verna argues that (1) French's expert used public accounting

concepts to fill in some of the missing information and (2) the

trial judge erroneously relied on the expert's conclusions

regarding the missing information to find allowable expenses

that were not documented in the available books and records.15

The argument is unavailing. The Supreme Judicial Court has

"recognize[d] that even a corporate officer who has acted with

scrupulous propriety may be faced with very serious practical

problems when called upon to account for expenditures made over

a period of years and periodically drawn or reimbursed in

accordance with current practice in the particular corporation"

and that there may be times when "an officer may be able to meet

his obligation to account by showing in general terms the

nature, purpose, and extent of such expenditures." Samia v.

Central Oil Co. of Worcester, 339 Mass. 101, 127 (1959).16 That

is what French did here. He presented an expert who reviewed

the available books and records and used her knowledge of public

15Verna does not identify the specific expenses he believes
were found in error but says that they total in the "tens of
thousands of dollars."

16In Samia, 339 Mass. at 127 & n.11, the Supreme Judicial
Court was "not called upon to consider to what extent such an
officer may be able to meet his obligation to account" through
something other than direct documentation in the books and
records but noted several scenarios where the evidence would be
sufficient.

9
accounting concepts to fill in some of the missing information.

The judge permissibly credited the expert's testimony.17 See The

Woodward Sch. For Girls, Inc. v. Quincy, 469 Mass. 151, 170 n.29

(2014) ("judge is entitled to credit any properly admitted

expert testimony he or she deems credible").

iii. Assets. As to the assets, Verna makes two arguments.

His first argument pertains to PAR and whether PAR was the

beneficial owner of one or two parcels of land. We briefly

describe the background underlying this argument. There is no

dispute that PAR was the beneficial owner of the first parcel of

land. As to the second parcel, Leonard executed two deeds on

November 13, 2012 that had the effect of conveying the parcel to

PAR: (1) as trustee of the French Realty Trust and the Baver-

Norwood Trust, Leonard executed a corrective quitclaim deed

conveying the parcel to NPS IV and (2) as trustee of the NPS IV

trust, Leonard executed a confirmatory quitclaim deed conveying

the parcel to PAR. The same day, PAR sold both parcels to a

third party. Leonard testified at his deposition, a transcript

Verna relies on the broad proposition that all allowable
17

expenses had to be documented in the books and records.
Notably, he does not argue that the testimony of French's expert
regarding the nature, purpose, and extent of any specific
expense was insufficient. See note 15, supra. Accordingly, we
do not address whether the expert's testimony as to any specific
expense was sufficient.

10
of which was admitted in evidence, that he conveyed the second

parcel to PAR for the sole purpose of consummating the sale and

that the French Realty Trust and the Baver-Norwood Trust were

the beneficial owners of the second parcel. The trial judge

appears to have credited this evidence and found that the French

[Realty] Trust and the Baver-Norwood Trust, as opposed to PAR,

were the beneficial owners of the second parcel. Verna argues

that this finding was unsupported by the evidence and was

"foreclosed by operation of statute," citing G. L. c. 183,

§§ 11, 17.18 However, the evidence discussed above supports the

judge's finding. As to Verna's statutory argument, which is

made without further explanation or support, the argument does

not rise to the level of appellate argument and is waived. See

Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628

(2019).

Verna also argues that certain payments made to Leonard,

his family, or their businesses were assets in the form of

income-generating loans and that the trial judge erred in

18General Laws c. 183, § 11, sets forth the covenants and
warranties that come with quitclaim deeds; G. L. c. 183, § 17,
provides that, in conveyances of real estate, the words
"quitclaim covenants" and "limited covenants," have a specific
meaning, as set forth in the statute.

11
finding that the payments were instead distributions.19 On this

point, there was contradictory evidence. For example, some

ledger entries for checks written against the trusts to Leonard,

his family, or their other businesses stated that the funds were

loans. However, other evidence showed that the funds were not

loans, including the fact that no promissory notes or other

formal documentation memorialized the transactions as loans. In

addition, French's expert offered opinion testimony that the

transactions were not loans and that members of closely held

family businesses sometimes label distributions as loans to

avoid tax consequences.20 It was within the judge's province to

weigh this conflicting evidence and conclude that the

transactions were distributions, not loans. See Goddard v.

Goucher, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 49-50 (2016).

b. Interest and attorney's fees. Verna also argues that

he was entitled to precomplaint interest and attorney's fees in

the merits actions, and that the trial judge abused his

discretion in tolling the accrual of postcomplaint interest.

19The characterization of the transactions mattered because
Verna sought imputed interest on loans.

20That is what the trial judge found occurred here. While
Verna argues that the judge's finding "condon[ed] attempted
criminality," we disagree. The judge found the facts based on
the evidence. Whether Leonard should face any tax penalties for
his actions was not before the judge.

12
Verna's arguments regarding precomplaint interest and

attorney's fees are based on the unfounded premise that he was

pursuing the merits actions to protect the trusts' assets for

all the trusts' beneficiaries. Verna argues that precomplaint

interest was necessary to restore the trusts' assets to what

they would have been had the trusts been properly administered,

see Berish v. Bornstein, 437 Mass. 252, 270-271 (2002), and that

he was entitled to attorney's fees for bringing a successful

action to protect common funds, see Coggins v. New England

Patriots Football Club, Inc., 406 Mass. 666, 669 (1990). Verna

made the same arguments in the Motel Realty action, and they

fail for the same reason here as they did in that action. In

sum, Verna brought the merits actions to obtain damages for

himself, individually, not to protect the trusts' assets for all

the trust's beneficiaries.21

As to the tolling of the accrual of postcomplaint interest,

Verna has ignored the fact that the trial judge also tolled the

accrual of postcomplaint interest in the Motel Realty action and

that the judge's reasoning for doing so was the same as his

reasoning in the merits actions currently on appeal. And, more

21As Verna testified, he only wanted the 12.5 percent due
to him, and it did not matter to him what happened to the other
87.5 percent.

13
importantly, a panel of this court affirmed the judge's decision

in the Motel Realty action. Where Verna does not offer any

reason why we should reach a different result here, we refer the

parties to the analysis of the issue as set forth in the Motel

Realty decision and reject the claim.

c. Shirley's liability. Verna's final argument regarding

the merits actions is that Shirley committed gross negligence in

her comanagement of Silver Maple and PAR and that the trial

judge erred in not holding her individually liable in those

actions.22 See note 14, supra. In arguing that Shirley

committed gross negligence, Verna asserts that (1) Shirley, as a

comanager, was contractually required to manage the joint

ventures' assets, maintain accurate books and records, and keep

each joint venture's money in an account in the name of the

joint venture and (2) Shirley acted in dereliction of these

obligations. The argument disregards that Leonard effectively

served as the manager of the joint ventures, that he did so with

22While, normally, Shirley would have been held to a
fiduciary obligation of utmost good faith and loyalty, see
Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 8 (1952), the pertinent joint
venture agreements expressly provided that "[n]o member of the
Management Committee shall be liable to the Venturers or to the
Venture by reason of his acts or decision as such, except in the
case of his gross negligence or actual fraudulent or dishonest
conduct." Verna does not dispute that the joint venture
agreements control.

14
Verna's full knowledge and consent, and that Shirley's role was

limited to occasionally writing checks at Leonard's request.

Where Verna consented to this arrangement, he cannot complain

now that Shirley should have been held responsible.

2. Contempt actions. On September 15, 2014, Verna filed

civil contempt complaints in the NPS IV, NPS VI, Silver Maple,

and PAR actions alleging noncompliance with the consent orders

that required French to provide accountings and produce books

and records. At a September 30, 2014 hearing, a Superior Court

judge (first motion judge) gave French until October 28, 2014,

to comply on the condition that if he did not do so, he would be

assessed a daily sanction of $200.

On November 24, 2014, Verna filed a second set of contempt

complaints, along with requests for attorney's fees incurred in

connection with the first set of contempt complaints. At a

December 23, 2014 hearing, another Superior Court judge (second

motion judge) gave French until January 15, 2015, to comply and

denied Verna's requests for fees. The second motion judge

relied on affidavits filed by Leonard attesting that he had

produced the books and records in his possession or control. On

January 6, 2015, the first motion judge allowed Verna's requests

for fees, apparently not realizing that the second motion judge

had denied them.

15
Following a dispute over whether Verna's requests for fees

incurred in connection with the first set of contempt complaints

had been allowed, the trial judge issued an order on October 3,

2016, in which he ruled that the second motion judge's denial

controlled and also stated that "[n]o attorney's fees or costs

are awarded to [Verna] on his [s]econd [set of contempt

complaints]." At the time, however, Verna had not made a

request for fees incurred in connection with his second set of

contempt complaints. The trial judge's October 3, 2016 order

also increased the amount of the daily sanctions in the Silver

Maple action to $250.

In December 2015 and November 2016, Verna filed a third set

of contempt complaints.23 Then, on June 23, 2017, Verna filed a

fourth and final contempt complaint in the NPS IV action.24 On

April 20, 2022, the trial judge issued an order outlining how he

planned to address the remaining issues pertaining to the

contempt actions. The judge stated that the first and second

sets of contempt complaints were fully resolved and limited the

issues to (1) whether French failed to produce, "in a timely

fashion, documents or information that he eventually provided

23Verna filed the third contempt complaint in the Silver
Maple action on December 1, 2015. He filed the remainder of the
third set of contempt complaints on November 16, 2016.

24 The judgments all entered against Leonard's estate.

16
to, or made available to [the parties' experts]" and (2) "[i]f

so, what [were] the actual, demonstrable damages that [Verna]

incurred." The judge also limited the hearing to two hours.

Following the hearing, the judge found that Verna's damages

equaled the costs and attorney's fees incurred to obtain records

from third parties. The judge also awarded Verna attorney's

fees incurred in connection with the third set of contempt

complaints and the fourth NPS IV contempt complaint, although he

found that much of the work across the contempt complaints was

duplicative and reduced the requested fees by eighty percent.

a. No trial on second set of contempt complaints. Verna

argues that he was entitled to a trial on the second set of

contempt complaints and was not afforded one. However, all the

contempt complaints went to the same underlying issue: whether

French provided accountings and produced all books and records

in his possession or control. The trial judge adjudicated this

issue in addressing the third set of contempt complaints and the

fourth NPS IV contempt complaint. Verna also argues that the

relief awarded by the judge did not fully compensate him for the

harm resulting from French's noncompliance. We address that

argument below.

b. Attorney's fees on the first and second sets of

contempt complaints. Verna raises a number of arguments in

17
support of his position that he should have been awarded

attorney's fees incurred in connection with the first and second

sets of contempt complaints.25 While a trial judge has broad

discretion to award attorney's fees against a contumacious

party, see Passatempo v. McMenimen, 461 Mass. 279, 304 (2012),

it appears from the record that the decisions not to award

attorney's fees incurred in connection with the first and second

sets of contempt complaints were based on facts that were later

found not to be true. The second motion judge's December 23,

2014 denial was grounded in Leonard's affidavits attesting that

he had produced the books and records in his possession or

control, but it is now undisputed that French did not do so.

The trial judge then relied on the second motion judge's

December 23, 2014 decision to conclude that Verna was not

entitled to attorney's fees incurred in connection with his

second set of contempt complaints. On this record, and in light

of the facts that were eventually found, we conclude that the

second motion judge and trial judge may have "made a clear error

25In particular, Verna argues that (1) the second motion
judge abused his discretion in denying Verna's requests for fees
incurred in connection with the first set of contempt
complaints, (2) on October 3, 2016, the trial judge erred in
denying requests for fees that Verna had not yet made, and (3)
on April 20, 2022, the trial judge erred in concluding that the
first and second sets of contempt complaints were fully
resolved.

18
of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision"

(quotation and citation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470

Mass. 169, 185, n.27 (2012). Accordingly, we remand for

reconsideration of whether Verna is entitled to attorney's fees

incurred in connection with the first and second sets of

contempt complaints.

c. Scope of final hearing on contempt actions. Verna also

argues that the trial judge's April 20, 2022 order improperly

restricted the parameters of the final hearing on the contempt

actions. Verna argues both that (1) the judge placed an

unreasonable two-hour time limitation on the hearing and (2) the

judge limited the substantive scope of the hearing too narrowly.

With respect to the time limitation, Verna argues that the

trial judge's decision was motivated by "judicial fatigue"

rather than "an informed analysis of case-specific

circumstances, including but not limited to the complexity of a

case and the parties' representations of their needs."

Babaletos v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 493 Mass. 460, 466

(2024). We are not persuaded. Having reviewed the transcript

of the hearing, we conclude that the judge's deep familiarity

with the case enabled him to conduct an efficient hearing on the

contempt actions. Regardless, we note that Verna did not come

19
to the hearing prepared to present any witnesses, and he has not

shown what he would have done differently with more time.

With respect to the substantive scope of the hearing, Verna

argues that he did not have an opportunity to show that French

failed to provide accountings in a timely fashion, and that the

judge therefore did not have the opportunity to consider whether

to award Verna damages or sanctions. However, a review of the

hearing transcript reveals that Verna did raise this issue. At

the hearing, the parties' attorneys argued whether Verna would

have incurred the expense of having his attorney and expert

review the financial records had French provided the accountings

in a timely fashion, and the judge engaged with Verna's attorney

and asked him questions on this point. The judge's decision on

the contempt actions, which did not award damages or sanctions

in connection with French's failure to provide accountings in a

timely fashion, implicitly reflects that the judge did not find

Verna's argument persuasive. Cf. Jones v. Clark, 272 Mass. 146,

149 (1930) (judge's ultimate findings of fact can import

requisite subsidiary findings necessary to support ultimate

finding).

d. Reduction to attorney's fees on the third set of

contempt complaints and the fourth NPS IV contempt complaint.

Lastly, Verna argues abuse of discretion in the trial judge's

20
decision to reduce by eighty percent the amount of attorney's

fees that Verna requested on the third set of contempt

complaints and the fourth NPS IV contempt complaint. We are not

persuaded. Determination of the amount of reasonable attorney's

fees rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See

Tatar v. Schuker, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 436, 451 (2007). Here, the

judge had reason to reduce the amount of the fee request where,

as the judge found, much of the work across the contempt

complaints was duplicative. There was no abuse of discretion.26

Conclusion. So much of the judgments as denied an award of

attorney's fees on the first and second sets of contempt

complaints is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the

Superior Court for reconsideration of that narrow issue. In all

other respects, the judgments are affirmed.

So ordered.

By the Court (Vuono,
Englander & Hodgens, JJ.27),

Clerk

Entered: January 24, 2025.

26 The parties' requests for appellate attorney's fees are
denied.

27 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

21