ARVIND KUMAR JAY JAISWAL v. RAHUL CHATURVEDI & Another.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1166

ARVIND KUMAR JAY JAISWAL

vs.

RAHUL CHATURVEDI & another.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Defendant Rahul Chaturvedi appeals from a judgment granting

the plaintiff, Arvind Kumar Jay Jaiswal, declaratory relief,

injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. On appeal,

the defendant appears to argue that a Superior Court judge

abused her discretion in allowing a motion for a preliminary

injunction and that a second judge abused his discretion in

finding the defendant in contempt by entering a final amended

judgment in favor of the plaintiff that, among other things,

permanently enjoined the defendants from performing certain

acts. We affirm.

1 Moolex, LLC, which did not participate in this appeal.
Factual and procedural background. In January 2023, the

plaintiff filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court

alleging that the defendant had fraudulently recorded Uniform

Commercial Code (UCC) filings against the plaintiff, his family,

and companies affiliated with the plaintiff. In essence, the

plaintiff claimed that even though he never entered into any

agreement with the defendant and never granted the defendant a

security interest in his assets, the defendant filed numerous

financial statements with the Massachusetts Secretary of State

and in several other States asserting that he held such an

interest.2

The plaintiff requested declaratory judgment that the

plaintiff is not a debtor of the defendant, that there are no

security agreements between the plaintiff and defendant, and

that the defendant filed false financial statements alleging an

2 As alleged, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff
agreed to become a founding member of his limited liability
company, Moolex, and separately agreed to become a party to an
invention called "CA-System," which, plaintiff alleges, is
described on Moolex's website as an "imaginary cross border
commercial goods train network." Sometime in July 2018, the
defendant claimed he had acquired a security interest in
plaintiff's assets when the plaintiff entered into a "Founding
Member Agreement" with Moolex. The plaintiff denied ever
entering into such an agreement and made repeated requests
through counsel to be provided with a copy of the purported
security agreement. Despite those numerous requests, the
defendant was not forthcoming with any documentation or proof of
a security agreement.

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interest in the plaintiff's assets. The plaintiff also

requested that the court order the defendant to remove all

documents that were falsely filed with the Secretary of State

and to refrain from filing such documents in the future.

Finally, the plaintiff sought an award of damages and attorney's

fees.

At the time he filed the complaint, the plaintiff requested

that the court issue a preliminary injunction requiring the

defendant to remove the unauthorized UCC filings and that the

defendant be ordered to show cause as to why final judgment

should not enter in plaintiff's favor by providing the court

evidence of a written agreement securing an interest in the

plaintiff's assets. A preliminary injunction hearing was

scheduled for January 19, 2023, and notice was given to the

parties. On the day of the hearing, the defendant filed a

notice of removal to Federal court. On May 15, 2023, a Federal

court judge, noting that there was no basis for Federal

jurisdiction, remanded the case back to the Superior Court.

On June 8, 2023, a judge of the Superior Court (motion

judge) heard arguments on the plaintiff's motion for a

preliminary injunction and motion to compel the defendant to

provide the court with documentation of the purported security

interest. The motion judge heard from both the plaintiff's

attorney and the defendant, appearing pro se. The plaintiff

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argued that the defendant had falsely claimed a security

interest in the plaintiff's assets and had refused to provide

any proof that one existed for over two years. The plaintiff

also argued that a preliminary injunction and show cause order

should issue because the case boiled down to whether in fact a

valid security interest agreement, which is required to file

with the Secretary of State's office, existed. In turn, the

defendant argued that a written agreement existed and offered

several different reasons why he did not have it in his

possession. First, he said, "It's being filed in federal court

as we --." Then he told the judge, "Your Honor, this is a

chattel. It's stored according the UCC control systems. Legal

notices of -- I have delivered an entire copy of the chattel,

which he has refused to accept, the plaintiff. He rejected

that." The judge gave the defendant wide leeway to provide his

version of the facts and to present his arguments. Finally, the

judge told the defendant that she wanted the agreement to be

presented to her at the hearing. The defendant said that he was

working on it and would "have it filed here, if you require."

The judge replied, "No, today. Right now. That's the hearing,

right now." The defendant responded, "Your Honor, I am going to

give the authenticated agreement in federal court. I can

provide a copy here." A few moments later, he told the judge,

"I absolutely have those contracts and the rights and the

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security agreements." When pressed by the judge as to where the

written agreement was, the defendant said, "[I]t's in the

control system of the UCC."

At the conclusion of the hearing, the motion judge issued

the preliminary injunction, ordering the defendant to remove any

financial statements he had filed against the plaintiff, his

family, or any businesses associated with the plaintiff, and to

cease filing further UCC filings relating to the plaintiff. The

judge also ordered the defendant to show cause why final

judgment should not enter in the plaintiff's favor, by providing

the court with evidence of a written document granting the

defendant a security interest in the plaintiff's assets. The

judge gave the defendant fourteen days, until June 22, 2023, to

comply with the show cause order.

On June 21, 2023, the defendant once again attempted to

remove the case to Federal court. This motion was denied, and

the Federal judge warned the defendant "that any future attempt

to remove the case to federal court without a plausible basis

may result in sanctions and an award of attorney's fees."

The compliance date of June 22, 2023, came and went, and

the defendant did not file the written agreement. On July 6,

2023, the defendant still had not filed any documents with the

court evidencing a security interest in the plaintiff's assets.

However, on that date, the defendant filed an "emergency motion"

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to stay execution of the show cause order (despite the fact that

the time for compliance had already lapsed) and to impose

sanctions on the plaintiff. This motion was denied. On July

27, 2023, when the defendant still had not produced the

documentation ordered in the show cause order, the plaintiff

moved for a finding of contempt and for final judgment to enter.

On July 28, 2023, a different judge (contempt judge)

conducted a hearing on the plaintiff's request for final

judgment and a finding of contempt. The contempt judge gave the

defendant an opportunity to be heard and ordered the defendant

several times to provide the documents proving that he had a

security interest in the plaintiff's assets. The defendant

stated that the documents did in fact exist but that he was not

prepared to submit them. He referenced some concerns about

intellectual property and trademark secrets in the agreement and

suggested that if there were an impoundment order he would

provide the court with redacted documents under seal. The judge

assured the defendant that he would take his motion to file the

documents under seal under advisement.

In a well-reasoned decision, the contempt judge found the

defendant in willful contempt of the motion judge's show cause

order and in willful contempt of the contempt judge's oral order

at the contempt hearing. Specifically, the defendant had been

repeatedly ordered to provide a copy of the alleged agreement or

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security agreement underlying the filing of the UCC statements

and had repeatedly refused to do so. The judge added that the

defendant offered "no factual or legal excuse as to why he had

not complied with the terms of the Court's injunction." The

judge concluded that no written document existed, that the

defendant filed fraudulent financial statements claiming to have

a security interest in plaintiff's assets, and that the

defendant had committed a fraud on the court by repeatedly

representing that such an agreement was in existence.

Accordingly, the contempt judge entered a final judgment in

the plaintiff's favor, declaring that the plaintiff is not a

debtor of the defendant and that there is no security agreement

between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the contempt judge

permanently enjoined the defendant from filing any further UCC

filings and ordered him to remove any UCC statements he had

filed against the plaintiff, his family, or any business entity

affiliated with the plaintiff. Finally, the contempt judge

allowed the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees in the amount

of $74,443.16. The defendant now appeals.

Discussion. We first note that appellate review is

significantly hampered by the defendant's failure to comply with

the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure, as several

arguments in his brief lack citation to relevant legal

authority, his record appendix consists largely of unrelated

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documents, and often his arguments are not based upon a

recognizable legal theory or claim, such as his claims of

"Manifest Injustice in the Face of Coerced Solomon Choices" and

violation of the "Economic Espionage Act." An appellant's brief

must contain "the contentions of the appellant with respect to

the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations

to the authorities and parts of the record on which the

appellant relies." Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing

in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). The rule "is more than a 'mere

technicality. It is founded on the sound principle that the

right of a party to have this court consider a point entails a

duty; that duty is to assist the court with argument and

appropriate citation of authority.'" Cameron v. Carelli, 39

Mass. App. Ct. 81, 86 (1995), quoting Lolos v. Berlin, 338 Mass.

10, 14 (1958). Nonetheless, we have reviewed the record and

address what appears to be the substance of the defendant's

challenges and general objections.

1. Order dated June 8, 2023. The defendant devotes much

of his brief to claiming that the motion judge erred on June 8,

2023, in ordering a preliminary injunction. We need not address

these arguments, however, because the preliminary injunction

lapsed when the final judgment entered. Any question concerning

the preliminary injunction is now moot. See Judge Rotenberg

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Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental

Retardation (No. 2), 424 Mass. 471, 472 (1997).

2. Orders dated July 28, 2023; July 31, 2023; August 1,

2023; and August 16, 2023. The defendant also appears to argue

that the contempt judge erred in entering the July 28, 2023

order granting the plaintiff final judgment, a permanent

injunction, attorney's fees, and denying defendant's motion

under seal and to impound. The heft of the defendant's argument

appears to be that the plaintiff was untruthful and perjured

himself in court. The defendant also claims that his

unsupported statement to the court alleging the existence of a

security agreement was sufficient to defeat the request for a

permanent injunction.

Trial judges have broad discretion to grant injunctive

relief, and we review a judge's decision for an abuse of that

discretion. LightLab Imaging, Inc. v. Axsun Techs., Inc., 469

Mass. 181, 194 (2014). This means that we may reverse the

judge's decision only if "we conclude the judge made a clear

error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the

decision such that the decision falls outside the range of

reasonable alternatives" (citation and quotation omitted). L.L.

v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

The judge provided the defendant with notice and an

opportunity to be heard, which satisfied the requirements of due

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process. See Wilkins v. Cooper, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 271, 276–277

(2008). The defendant was given ample time to provide

documentation supporting his claim that the plaintiff signed a

security agreement. The defendant refused to do so when given

every opportunity, and final judgment and injunctive relief was

in order. The entire basis of the plaintiff's suit was that the

defendant falsely filed statements with the Secretary of State's

office purporting to have a financial interest in plaintiff's

assets. Simply put, there was no abuse of discretion in the

judge's order for final judgment or a permanent injunction when

the defendant either refused or could not provide any evidence

an agreement existed. Whether the defendant intentionally

committed a fraud in the filing or whether he acted in good

faith does not change the outcome that final judgment was

warranted because the defendant could not show that he had an

interest.

Nor do we discern any error in the judge's finding the

defendant to be in contempt of court. "We review the judge's

ultimate finding of contempt for abuse of discretion, but we

review underlying conclusions of law de novo and underlying

findings of fact for clear error." Jones v. Jones, 101 Mass.

App. Ct. 673, 688 (2022). The motion judge's June 8, 2023 order

to show cause was clear and unequivocal, as were the contempt

judge's orders at the July 28, 2023 hearing ordering the

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defendant to provide the court with the required documentation

evidencing an agreement. There can be no dispute that the

defendant was given adequate notice of what was expected and a

generous amount of time to deliver the evidence.

Once a judge finds that a party received a clear and

unequivocal command, the judge must then find, by clear and

convincing evidence, that the party "disobediently refrained"

from following that command. Warren Gardens Hous. Coop. v.

Clark, 420 Mass. 699, 701 (1995). Here, the defendant's

repeated disobedience was clearly and convincingly established.

Again, the defendant was given ample opportunity to produce

evidence of any security interest underlying the UCC filings,

and he never did so. The judge's ultimate finding of contempt

was not an abuse of discretion.

Finally, the award of attorney's fees was well warranted.

"As a matter of law, the awarding of attorney's fees and costs

is an appropriate element of a successful civil contempt

proceeding" (quotation omitted). Martinez v. Lynn Hous. Auth.,

94 Mass. App. Ct. 702, 708 (2019). When attorney's fees are

awarded, the amount is in the discretion of the trial judge, see

McGrath v. Mishara, 386 Mass. 74, 87 (1982), and on appeal our

review is to determine whether the award was clearly erroneous.

See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 400 Mass. 272, 274 (1987). Nothing in

the record suggests any error in the award or amount of

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attorney's fees. See Cargill, Inc., v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co.,

424 Mass. 356, 363 (1997).

Conclusion. The amended judgment is affirmed.3 The

plaintiff's request for appellate attorney's fees on the basis

that the defendant's appeal is frivolous is allowed. In

accordance with the procedure specified in Fabre v. Walton, 441

Mass. 9, 10-11 (2004), the plaintiff may, within fourteen days

of issuance of the decision in this matter, submit an

application for appellate attorney's fees and costs. The

defendant shall have fourteen days thereafter to respond.

So ordered.

By the Court (Massing,
Walsh & Brennan, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: February 5, 2025.

3 Other points, relied on by the defendant but not discussed
in this decision, have not been overlooked. We find nothing in
them that requires further discussion. See Commonwealth v.
Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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