Commonwealth v. Sierra R. Cobbs.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-345

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

SIERRA R. COBBS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury trial in the District Court, the defendant was

convicted of assault and battery on a family or household

member. On appeal, the defendant claims that her motion to

suppress statements as involuntarily made should have been

allowed; that even if the motion to suppress was properly

denied, the trial judge should have given the jury a humane

practice instruction, sua sponte, before permitting the jury to

consider the statements; and that the trial judge also erred by

not instructing the jury on self-defense. We affirm.

1. Motion to suppress. The defendant filed a motion to

suppress statements, arguing that her statements to

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Police Officer Adam
Moeller were the product of custodial interrogation, that she

was not advised of her Miranda rights, and that her statements

were not voluntarily made. A District Court judge (motion

judge) denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. On

appeal, the defendant presses only her claim that her statements

were involuntary because they were the product of cognitive

impairment caused by a head injury, which was so severe that it

caused a seizure.

"It is well established that a confession or an admission

is admissible in evidence only if it is made voluntarily."

Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 206 (2011). "A

voluntary statement is one that is the product of a rational

intellect and a free will, and not induced by physical or

psychological coercion" (quotations and citations omitted). Id.

at 207. If the defendant produces evidence tending to show that

a statement was involuntary, the Commonwealth must prove beyond

a reasonable doubt, based on the totality of the circumstances,

that the statement was voluntarily made. See id. at 206-207;

Commonwealth v. Hilton, 450 Mass. 173, 177 (2007). Relevant

factors include the defendant's conduct, age, education,

intelligence, emotional stability, experience with the criminal

justice system, and physical and mental condition. See

Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 413 (1986). A condition

like a head injury may, but does not necessarily, render a

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statement involuntary. Compare Commonwealth v. Bohigian, 486

Mass. 209, 219-220 (2020) (substantial risk of miscarriage of

justice where evidence of head injury called in question

voluntariness of statements that formed basis for charge of

misleading investigator), with Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434

Mass. 570, 579 (2001) (statements held to be voluntary beyond

reasonable doubt notwithstanding "[e]vidence of the defendant's

head injury and that at times at the hospital he was loud,

boisterous, and agitated").

The motion judge rejected the defendant's claim because

there was "[n]o evidence whatsoever that the statements were

coerced or . . . involuntary. And there was no evidence

presented . . . of cognitive impairment." We need not decide

whether the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant's statements were voluntarily made, because we

conclude that any error in admitting the statements was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass.

676, 700 (2010), quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24

(1967) (constitutional errors preserved by motion to suppress

reviewed under "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard);

Commonwealth v. Masskow, 362 Mass. 662, 668-669 (1972) (assuming

that defendant's confession to murder was involuntary,

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statement's admission in evidence was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt). 1

The defendant's statements did not form the basis for the

charges against her and were not central to the Commonwealth's

proof that she committed an assault and battery on Trey Moore,

the father of her child or children. The Commonwealth asserted

that the assault and battery occurred when the defendant "bear-

hugg[ed] one of Mr. Moore's legs." Moore testified that the

defendant was sitting on his lap on an Orange Line train and

refused to get up when he repeatedly asked her to. When he

finally stood up to get off the train at Back Bay station, she

fell to the floor, tried to scratch and bite him, and grabbed

onto his leg. He had to drag her off the train by his leg.

Video footage showed Moore struggling to get onto the train

platform while the defendant held his leg. Another passenger

who saw and heard the defendant and Moore arguing testified that

Moore "was trying to get out of the train, and [the defendant]

1 The defendant argues that the erroneous admission of her
statement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. She does
not argue that error was structural error requiring automatic
reversal. While the Supreme Court of the United States has held
as a matter of Federal law that the admission of an involuntary
statement is trial error subject to harmless error review, the
Supreme Judicial Court has never held that the Massachusetts
Constitution requires a structural error standard; rather, it
has avoided the question on two occasions. See Commonwealth v.
Monroe, 472 Mass. 461, 472 (2015); Commonwealth v. Durand, 457
Mass. 574, 592 (2010).

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was like wrapped around his left leg, not letting go, and

[Moore] was just trying to like slowly get himself off the

train." Moeller did not arrive on the scene until the couple

were already on the platform. After removing Moore, Moeller

spoke with the defendant, who then made the statements at issue

here: she had been trying to prevent Moore from leaving the

train, and the abrasion on the back of her head was self-

inflicted.

"When analyzing whether an error was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt, 'we ask whether, on the totality of the record

before us, weighing the properly admitted and the improperly

admitted evidence together, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable

doubt that the tainted evidence did not have an effect on the

jury and did not contribute to the jury's verdicts.'"

Commonwealth v. Molina, 467 Mass. 65, 79 (2014), quoting Tyree,

455 Mass. at 701. Given the strength of the evidence against

the defendant, particularly the testimony of an impartial

bystander and the video, and the fact that the defendant's

statements were tangential to the Commonwealth's case, we

discern no reasonable possibility that the defendant's

statements contributed to the verdict. See Commonwealth v.

Perez, 411 Mass. 249, 260 (1991).

2. Humane practice instruction. The defendant also

asserts that when her statements were admitted, the judge should

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have given a humane practice instruction, requiring the jury to

find beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were

voluntary before considering them. See Commonwealth v. Brown,

449 Mass. 747, 767 (2007). Because the defendant did not

request a humane practice instruction, we review for a

substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Bohigian, 486

Mass. at 219; Commonwealth v. Tillson, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 180,

196 (2024). We discern no such risk. As we have concluded that

the defendant's statements had little or no effect on the jury's

verdict, the absence of a humane practice instruction likewise

had little or no effect, let alone cause a substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice.

3. Self-defense. Finally, the defendant contends that the

trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on self-

defense. A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction

if the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to her,

raises "a reasonable doubt as to whether the prerequisites of

self-defense were present." Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass.

393, 395 (1998). With respect to the defendant's use of

nondeadly force -- grabbing Moore's leg -- the prerequisites

were that she had a reasonable concern for her personal safety,

that she used reasonable means to avoid physical contact, and

that the degree of force she used was unreasonable under the

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circumstances. See Commonwealth v. King, 460 Mass. 80, 83

(2011).

The defendant argues that, in the light most favorable to

her, when Moore stood up, "he caused her to fall to the ground

and hurt her," she grabbed onto his leg out of fear for her

physical safety, and she had no means to escape the situation in

a crowded train. We are not persuaded. Even if the defendant

felt threatened, grabbing onto Moore's leg and holding on as he

was trying to get away was the opposite of avoiding physical

contact. Contrast Commonwealth v. Abubardar, 482 Mass. 1008,

1010 (2019) (defendant entitled to self-defense instruction

where, viewing evidence most favorably to him, he "pushed

[victim] back" in effort to get away from her). The evidence

did not permit the jury to entertain reasonable doubt that

holding Moore's leg was reasonably necessary for the defendant

to protect herself from any threat of physical harm that Moore

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posed to her.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Massing,
Neyman & Wood, JJ. 2),

Clerk

Entered: May 21, 2025.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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