ALEXANDER THAYER v. JARED GOSSELIN & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-444

ALEXANDER THAYER

vs.

JARED GOSSELIN & others.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The underlying action concerns plaintiff Alexander Thayer's

complaint against employees of the North Dartmouth house of

correction (HOC) wherein he asserts that the HOC employees

falsely arrested and detained him, assaulted and battered him,

withheld necessary medical treatment, and threatened him to

coerce a confession for drug possession. A jury trial was held

in the Superior Court. At the close of Thayer's case, the

defendants moved for a directed verdict; the judge allowed it as

to some counts.2 At the close of evidence, Thayer moved for a

1Eric Roque, Matthew Boyer, Christopher Goncalves, and
Steven Souza.

2Directed verdicts were allowed as to all counts against
Steven Souza and Eric Roque, as to counts 5 and 10 against Jared
directed verdict, and the judge denied that motion. The jury

returned a verdict in the defendants' favor on the remaining

counts. A judgment entered on the directed verdict and a

separate judgment entered on the jury verdict. On appeal from

both judgments, Thayer asserts that the judge committed two

evidentiary errors which require relief from this court.3

Discerning no abuse in the judge's evidentiary decisions, we

affirm.

Gosselin, as to counts 7 and 12 against Christopher Goncalves,
and as to counts 8 and 13 against Matthew Boyer. The remaining
counts were counts 1, 3, and 4, alleging assault and battery;
counts 15, 17, and 18, alleging civil rights violations under 42
U.S.C. § 1983; and count 20, alleging civil conspiracy, all
against Jared Gosselin, Matthew Boyer, and Christopher
Goncalves.

3 Thayer filed three postjudgment motions, including a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a motion for
relief from judgment, and a motion for new trial. The judge
denied each motion.

In his notice of appeal, Thayer states that he appeals from
the judgments on directed verdict and the jury verdict.
However, in his brief, he asserts that the judge abused his
discretion in denying the postjudgment motions. When asked
about the discrepancy between his notice of appeal and brief at
oral argument, Thayer's counsel conceded that he was appealing
the admission and exclusion of a docket sheet and a special
investigations unit report. He also stated he sought to appeal
"everything that is appealable." Accordingly, we address only
the evidentiary issues in this decision as they are the only
appealable issues before us; the orders on the postjudgment
motions are not before us in this appeal. See Mass.
R. A. P. 3 (c) (1) (A) (ii), as appearing in 491 Mass. 1601
(2023) (in civil cases, notice of appeal "shall designate" "the
judgment, decree, adjudication, or separately appealable order
from which the appeal is taken"). See also Visnick v. Hawley,
69 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 902 (2007).

2
Docket sheet.4 Thayer asserts that the judge erred in

admitting a District Court docket sheet (exhibit 17) that

revealed the reason why Thayer's probation was revoked. He

claims it was prejudicial impeachment evidence and "wholly

immaterial" to the issue at trial. Thayer also claims that the

introduction of the docket sheet was "ambush" evidence because

it was not proffered during the pretrial meetings, and he had

not previously reviewed it. We disagree.

Thayer specifically put at issue the reason for his

probation revocation. On direct examination, Thayer testified

that he was placed on probation for using his mother's credit

card without her permission in March 2015; he was charged with

credit card larceny and credit card fraud, in violation of G. L.

c. 266, §§ 37B (b) and 37C (e). Thayer explained that after he

"missed two appointments with [his] probation officer," he was

subsequently detained at the HOC in September 2016. His counsel

asked him to confirm "the reason for your violation was the fact

that you missed those appointments?" Thayer answered, "Correct,

yes."

During cross-examination, the defendants introduced the

docket sheet to impeach Thayer's explanation for his probation

revocation. The docket sheet indicated that, on September 24,

4 In his brief, Thayer refers to the exhibit as the District
Court "order."

3
2016, Thayer was charged with assault and battery on a family or

household member, G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a).5 Defense counsel

inquired, "Isn't it fair to say, Mr. Thayer, that the reason you

were sent to the [HOC was] because a judge found that you

committed a serious offense and that you had a history of

defaults in Rhode Island and in Massachusetts, correct? That's

what it says, right?" Thayer responded, "That's what it says,

but . . . I did not assault anyone."

The evidence elicited by defense counsel was relevant and

admissible to impeach Thayer's testimony. Thayer opened the

door to this line of cross-examination when he misrepresented to

the jury why his probation was revoked. He testified that his

probation was revoked merely because he missed two meetings with

his probation officer, whereas the record shows that his

probation was revoked because he was charged with assault and

battery on a family or household member. The defendants were

entitled to rebut Thayer's testimony regarding the reason for

his probation revocation. See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 35 Mass.

App. Ct. 827, 834 (1994). Furthermore, Thayer's credibility was

of the utmost importance in this matter because there was little

to no evidence regarding the alleged assault. See Commonwealth

v. White, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 77 (2007) (credibility central

5 That charge was ultimately dismissed.

4
to case with lack of physical evidence). Thus, the reason for

Thayer's probation revocation became highly relevant. See

Commonwealth v. Hoffer, 375 Mass. 369, 373 (1978).

As to Thayer's assertion that the introduction of the

docket sheet was "ambush" evidence, we also are not persuaded.

Thayer, who participated in the probation revocation

proceedings, obviously knew the basis of the revocation, and the

docket sheet was public information available to Thayer and his

counsel. At oral argument, Thayer's counsel stated that he had

no reason to check the docket because he trusted that Thayer was

truthful when he told him why his probation was revoked.

Counsel's failure to review the docket before trial does not

make the introduction of the document an "ambush." Accordingly,

the admission of the docket sheet was not an abuse of

discretion. See Laramie v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 488 Mass.

399, 414 (2021) ("We review a trial judge's evidentiary

decisions under an abuse of discretion standard" [citation

omitted]).

Special investigations unit (SIU) report. Thayer also

asserts that it was error for the judge to exclude the entirety

of an SIU report. He maintains that the SIU report "was

admissible to the extent that it contained [the defendants']

statements given to the SIU investigators that were inconsistent

with their reports and/or what appears on the photos and video."

5
Further, Thayer asserts that the judge denied him "the

opportunity to cross examine [the defendants] on the statements

they made to SIU shortly after the incident." Again, we

disagree.

The judge did not bar Thayer from presenting evidence about

statements contained in the SIU report. In fact, the judge

allowed the parties to question the defendants on the substance

of their statements contained in the SIU report. The judge

stated that the SIU report contains "the statements of some of

the individual [d]efendants which I have indicated to you I

would allow you to get those particular statements in." During

the cross-examination of defendant Christopher Goncalves,

Thayer's counsel asked about the SIU report, specifically, "Do

you recall being asked by the SIU investigators as to why six

people were required to conduct this second strip search?"6 The

judge sustained the defendants' objection. Thayer's counsel did

not make an offer of proof as to the purpose of the question.

Instead of taking this as an opportunity to rephrase the

question or ask about other alleged prior inconsistent

statements, Thayer's counsel turned to another line of

questioning unrelated to the SIU report. Thus, the judge did

6 This question was an attempt to impeach Goncalves's
testimony since he previously testified that there were only two
people in the cell.

6
not abuse his discretion in excluding the SIU report's

introduction nor did he bar Thayer from introducing statements

from the SIU report. See Laramie, 488 Mass. at 414.

Judgments entered November
30, 2022, affirmed.

By the Court (Singh,
D'Angelo & Hodgens, JJ.7),

Clerk

Entered: July 11, 2025.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

7