PETER J. CHONGARLIDES, SR. v. THOMAS M. HODGSON & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1257

PETER J. CHONGARLIDES, SR.

vs.

THOMAS M. HODGSON 1 & others. 2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In December 2021, the self-represented plaintiff, Peter J.

Chongarlides, filed a complaint seeking certiorari, G. L.

c. 249, § 4, challenging six administrative disciplinary

decisions from the Bristol County house of correction. The

defendants timely answered but failed to attach the

administrative record as required under Superior Court Standing

Order 1-96 (2020). Citing this error, the plaintiff moved for a

default judgment. A judge of the Superior Court denied the

1Sheriff, Bristol County, in his official and individual
capacities.

2Steven J. Souza, Superintendent; Joseph J. Oliver, Third,
Colonel; Ryan Suave, Disciplinary Captain; Kayla Motta,
Disciplinary Officer; and Treveor Tavares, Disciplinary Officer,
all in their official and individual capacities.
motion and ordered the defendants to file the administrative

record. The defendants complied. Pursuant to Superior Court

Standing Order 1-96 the judge allowed the plaintiff thirty days

to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Mass. R.

Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). Almost a year passed

without the plaintiff's filing the motion. The defendants

eventually moved to dismiss for failure to comply with Superior

Court Standing Order 1-96, citing Mass. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (2),

365 Mass. 803 (1974). The motion was allowed. We affirm.

1. Involuntary dismissal. "The power to invoke [the

sanction of dismissal for want of prosecution] is necessary in

order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending

cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars." Bucchiere v.

New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 396 Mass. 639, 641 (1986), quoting

Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-630 (1962). We

review a judge's decision to allow a motion under Mass. R.

Civ. P. 41 (b) (2) for an abuse of discretion, Bucchiere, supra,

characterized as "a clear error of judgment in weighing the

factors relevant to the decision, such that the decision falls

outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (quotation and

citations omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185

n.27 (2014). The plaintiff maintains that because the

defendants initially failed to attach the administrative record

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to their answer the judge erred by allowing the defendants'

motion to dismiss.

"Certiorari is a limited procedure" reserved for correction

of "substantial errors of law committed by a judicial or quasi-

judicial tribunal." St. Botolph Citizens Comm., Inc. v Boston

Redev. Auth., 429 Mass. 1, 7 (1999). It is not like a civil

action in which discovery is typically propounded and taken.

The plaintiff was on notice of the nature of his suit, his

filing obligation, and the due date for that filing. The

defendants complied with the judge's post-answer order to file

and serve the administrative record in August 2022. See

Superior Court Standing Order 1-96 (2). "The Court may alter

the time for filing the record, for good cause shown, on an

appropriate motion." Superior Court Standing Order 1-96 (2).

The next move was the plaintiff's.

Superior Court Standing Order 1-96 (4) dictates that "[a]

claim for judicial review shall be resolved through a motion for

judgment on the pleadings," Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), which

"shall be served within thirty (30) days of the service of the

[administrative] record." Standing Order 1-96 (4). See Bulldog

Investors Gen. Partnership v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 457

Mass. 210, 213 (2010); Sullivan v. Superintendent, Mass.

Correctional Inst., Shirley, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 766, 771 (2022).

The judge notified the parties of this requirement and provided

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a deadline for the plaintiff to file his motion. Superior Court

Standing Order 1-96 (4). The notice warned that "[f]ailure to

strictly comply with the provisions of Standing Order 1-96 may

result in the entry of dismissal or default."

After seeking and receiving three extensions of time to

file (through which his time was expanded from the thirty days

allowed by the standing order to approximately 200 days), the

plaintiff failed to file the required motion. Instead, he filed

numerous discovery requests and other motions. 3 In April 2023,

with the plaintiff's motion over a month overdue from its third

extended filing date, the defendants moved to dismiss for

failure to comply with Superior Court Standing Order 1-96, and

the plaintiff again sought default judgment. The plaintiff

never filed the required motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Once the defendants filed the administrative record, "the

only appropriate way for the court to evaluate the claim [was]

through a review of the administrative record upon a motion for

judgment on the pleadings." Crowell v. Massachusetts Parole

Bd., 477 Mass. 106, 110 (2017), citing School Comm. of Hudson v.

3 The plaintiff's arguments related to the defendants' lack
of response to some of these motions despite having been allowed
more time to do so do not rise to the level of appellate
argument. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (a), as appearing in
481 Mass. 1628 (2019); Zora v. State Ethics Comm'n, 415 Mass.
640, 642 n.3 (1993). We decline to exercise our discretion to
consider them.

4
Board of Educ., 448 Mass. 565, 575–576 (2007). As that motion

was never filed, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the

judge's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.

"Litigants must act with reasonable diligence to bring

their litigation to a final conclusion." Bucchiere, 396 Mass.

at 642, quoting State Realty Co. of Boston v. MacNeil Bros. Co.,

358 Mass. 374, 379 (1970). It is "essential that [a court]

devote its time and efforts to those litigants who prosecute

their cases with reasonable diligence, and that it deny further

consideration of cases which the litigants have unreasonably

failed, neglected or refused to prosecute." Bucchiere, supra,

quoting State Realty Co., supra. In making his ruling, the

judge cited the plaintiff's "engage[ment] in frivolous delay

tactics rather than advanc[ing] the case" and his many

"duplicative and redundant" filings. "[W]hen a noncompliant

litigant has manifested a disregard for orders of the court and

been suitably forewarned of the consequences of continued

intransigence, a trial judge need not first exhaust milder

sanctions before resorting to dismissal" (quotation omitted).

Friedman v. Globe Newspaper Co., 38 Mass. App. Ct. 923, 924

(1995), quoting Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegria, 896 F.2d 645, 649 (1st

Cir. 1990). See Maciuca v. Papit, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 540, 544

(1991) ("Courts have the inherent power to dismiss an action

which the plaintiff has not prosecuted diligently").

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2. Default judgment. The plaintiff also claims that the

delayed filing of the administrative record warranted entry of

default judgment. For the reasons explained above, we are not

persuaded. The entry or denial of default judgments "has to do

with the management of the case and, as such, is committed to

the sound discretion of the trial judge." Greenleaf v.

Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 22 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 429

(1986). By denying the plaintiff's motions, the judge

appropriately balanced the concern for "giving parties their day

in court," while "not so blunting the rules that they may be

ignored with impunity" (quotation and citations omitted). Id.

at 429-430. Cf. USTrust Co. v. Kennedy, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 131,

135 (1983) (although procedural rules are not mere guidelines,

judge may "forgive a failure to comply with a rule if the

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failure does not affect the opposing party's opportunity to

develop and prepare a response"). 4

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Sacks,
Hershfang & Tan, JJ. 5),

Clerk

Entered: July 21, 2025.

4 The plaintiff also maintains that his complaint is not
moot. Because the case was properly dismissed, we need not
address this argument.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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