Adoption of Seraphina.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1325

ADOPTION OF SERAPHINA.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The mother appeals from a decree issued by a judge of the

Juvenile Court finding her unfit and terminating her parental

rights to her daughter, Seraphina. We affirm.

Background. Seraphina was born in November 2021. She is

the mother's fifth child. The mother's parental rights have

been terminated for each of her older four children. The day

after Serafina's birth, the Department of Children and Families

(department) filed a petition alleging that Seraphina was in

need of care and protection based on persistent, negative

symptoms of the mother's mental health conditions and the

mother's history of substance use and domestic abuse. At a

court hearing four days after Seraphina's removal, the mother

waived her right to temporary custody. Since her removal,

1 A pseudonym.
Seraphina has remained in the department's custody and lived

with her maternal great aunt and two of her half-siblings, whom

the great aunt has adopted. Seraphina enjoys a significant,

positive bond with each of them. The great aunt also plans to

adopt Seraphina. A trial on the department's petition and

request to terminate parental rights was held on three

nonconsecutive days beginning February 20, 2024.2 The judge

heard from four witnesses and considered twenty exhibits. The

judge subsequently issued detailed findings supporting her

conclusions that the department had met its burden of

demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the mother

was unfit to parent Seraphina and was likely to remain so, and

that termination of the mother's parental rights was in

Seraphina's best interests. See Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass.

512, 515 (2005).

Discussion. To terminate parental rights to a child and to

dispense with parental consent to adoption, "a judge must find

by clear and convincing evidence, based on subsidiary findings

proved by at least a fair preponderance of evidence, that the

parent is unfit to care for the child and that termination is in

the child's best interests" (citation omitted). Adoption of

Oren, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 842, 844 (2020). "[T]he 'parental

2 The putative father established paternity in April 2022,
but he died before the date of trial.

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fitness' test and the 'best interests of the child test' are not

mutually exclusive, but rather 'reflect different degrees of

emphasis on the same factors.'" Adoption of Garret, 92 Mass.

App. Ct. 664, 671 (2018), quoting Care & Protection of Three

Minors, 392 Mass. 704, 714 (1984). "The judge must also find

that the current parental unfitness is not a temporary

condition" (quotation and citation omitted). Adoption of

Arianne, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 716, 720 (2024). "We give

substantial deference to the judge's decision to terminate

parental rights and 'reverse only where the findings of fact are

clearly erroneous or where there is a clear error of law or

abuse of discretion'" (citation omitted). Id. "An abuse of

discretion exists where the decision amounts to a clear error of

judgment [in weighing the relevant factors, such] that [the

decision] falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives"

(citation omitted). Id.

1. Unfitness standard. The mother argues that the judge

failed to conclude that the department proved she was unfit by

clear and convincing evidence, and that the judge instead

focused solely on whether termination of her parental rights was

in Seraphina's best interests. In doing so, she contends, the

judge implicitly lowered the department's burden. To support

her argument, the mother points to a portion of paragraph four

of the judge's rulings of law stating that the department

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"established by clear and convincing evidence that returning

[Seraphina] to [the mother's] care is contrary to [Seraphina's]

best interest." However, within the same paragraph, the judge

also found that "[t]here is clear and convincing evidence of

[the mother's] parental unfitness." See Adoption of Oren, 96

Mass. App. Ct. at 844.

We disagree with the mother's contention that the judge's

analysis was limited to the length of separation between the

mother and Seraphina, the bond between Seraphina and her great

aunt, and the ability of the great aunt to "be a better

caretaker" for Seraphina. To the contrary, the judge reviewed

each factor required to assess parental fitness in her detailed

and comprehensive findings and rulings. See G. L. c. 210

§ 3 (c). To the extent the judge infused some of her findings

with discussion of Seraphina's best interests, we discern no

error, where the judge examined each of the fourteen enumerated

statutory factors and applied eight in support of termination

being in Seraphina's best interests, before concluding that the

department "met its burden by clear and convincing evidence of

[proving the mother's] parental unfitness, and established such

unfitness is not merely a temporary condition." See Adoption of

Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011).

2. The mother's unfitness. The finding of the mother's

unfitness resulted from the judge's proper consideration of a

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"constellation of factors." Adoption of Greta, 431 Mass. 577,

588 (2000). The parent's fitness is "determined by taking into

consideration a parent's character, temperament, conduct, and

capacity to provide for the child in the same context with the

child's particular needs, affections, and age." Adoption of

Mary, 414 Mass. 705, 711 (1993). "The inquiry is whether the

parent's deficiencies place the child at serious risk of peril

from abuse, neglect, or other activity harmful to the child"

(quotation and citation omitted). Adoption of Olivette, 79

Mass. App. Ct. 141, 157 (2011).

a. Mental health conditions. The mother has been

diagnosed with mental health conditions including substance use

disorder. The judge found that manifestations of the mother's

conditions persisted even though she cooperated to an extent

with the department's service plans by taking medications and

attending counseling, and that these manifestations negatively

affected her ability to parent Seraphina. Notwithstanding the

mother's efforts to address the symptoms of her mental health

conditions, her participation in treatment was inconsistent, and

she continued to struggle with anger management. About twice a

month while the case was pending, the mother had outbursts of

anger where she yelled, punched objects, and threw things. The

mother also engaged in abuse of alcohol, cocaine, and opiates,

beginning when she was seventeen years old. Although the judge

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credited the mother's testimony that she had not abused

substances since 2019, the mother overdosed on prescribed pills

in 2021. The mother also continued to expose herself to drugs

and alcohol by associating with substance users and permitting

substance use in her home without appreciating the risks these

exposures posed to her sobriety and to her child. On this

evidence, we discern no error in the judge's determination that

there was a nexus between the mother's mental health and

substance use challenges and her inability to parent Seraphina.

See Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139, 146 & n.17 (2020) (mental

health conditions and substance use can be factors in finding of

parental unfitness where there is sufficient nexus between

conditions and parent's ability to provide for child).

b. Domestic abuse. The mother experienced domestic abuse

in multiple past intimate relationships. During her

relationship with Seraphina's father, he inflicted mental,

emotional, and physical abuse on the mother. In 2021, while she

was pregnant with Seraphina, she sustained spinal fractures and

a laceration to her head during an altercation with the father.

Shortly thereafter, while still pregnant with Seraphina, the

mother sprayed chemicals on the father and tried to light him on

fire. Although the mother obtained a G. L. c. 209A restraining

order against the father after these incidents, she later

modified the conditions of the order to maintain contact with

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the father. Despite working with a domestic violence program

where she received education and counselling for over a decade

beginning in 2011, the mother remained unaware of the risks or

warning signs of domestic abuse. See Adoption of Ulrich, 94

Mass. App. Ct. 668, 677 (2019) (parent's failure to benefit from

services "relevant to the determination of unfitness" [citation

omitted]). We thus discern no error in the judge's conclusion

that the mother's history of domestic abuse, and particularly

her lack of insight into its potential impact on Seraphina,

contributed to the mother's unfitness. See Care & Protection of

Lillith, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 132, 139 (2004) (discussing harm to

children of witnessing or being victim of domestic abuse).

c. The mother's efforts to improve her parenting capacity.

To the extent that the mother contends that the judge failed to

consider her efforts to work with the department to improve her

parenting capacity, we are not persuaded. The judge

acknowledged the mother's efforts to improve her parenting

capacity but found that the mother "has not been able to make

lasting change in her judgement or behavior to be able to safely

parent her child full time." The mother engaged with many of

the services on her action plans, but she did not provide her

social worker with a safety plan for domestic abuse or complete

a parental fitness and psychological evaluation. Her apartment

remained unsuitable for a child because of lead paint and

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clutter. Starting in 2023, the mother became very inconsistent

with visiting Seraphina and asked to reduce the length of the

visits. She did not have a parenting plan for if she were

granted custody of Seraphina, and she was reluctant to change

her schedule to accommodate Seraphina's needs. We discern no

error in the judge's conclusion that despite her efforts to

improve her parenting capacity, the mother remained unfit to

parent Seraphina. See Adoption of Lorna, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 134,

143 (1999) ("The judge was not obliged to believe that the

parenting skills of the mother . . . had improved simply because

of [her] recent cooperation with the department").

3. The mother's future unfitness. The mother briefly

argues that the judge erred by failing to explain why the mother

could not continue to improve her parental capacity. The judge

addressed this issue with "specific and detailed findings"

supporting her conclusion that the mother's unfitness was not

temporary. Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. 882, 888 (1997). See

Adoption of Virgil, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 298, 301 (2018) (judge

must "find that the current parental unfitness is not a

temporary condition"). Those findings include, as discussed,

the persistent manifestations of the mother's mental health

conditions and history of substance use, volatile behavior, and

domestic abuse; as well as her lack of insight into how each of

those could negatively impact Seraphina. Furthermore, the judge

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found that the mother had failed to improve her parenting

capacity substantially, even after her engagement with services

recommended by the department. Considered in their entirety,

the judge's findings and conclusions established by clear and

convincing evidence that the mother's unfitness was not

temporary.

Decree affirmed.

By the Court (Henry, Hand &
Brennan, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: October 16, 2025.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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