ADOPTION OF RYA (And a Companion Case).

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1417

ADOPTION OF RYA (and a companion case1).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

This appeal involves the mother's parental rights to her

children, Rya and Lois (collectively, the children). A Juvenile

Court judge found the mother unfit to care for her children and

terminated her parental rights.2 On appeal, the mother

challenges those determinations.3 We affirm.

1 Adoption of Lois. The children's names are pseudonyms.

2Rya's father executed an adoption surrender on the first
day of trial. Lois does not have a legal father.

3At trial, the children stated that their preference is "to
return home to [the mother's] care and custody." The judge
found, however, that despite the children's caring and loving
connection to the mother, it would not be in the children's best
interests to return them to their mother. On appeal, Lois filed
a brief supporting the judge's decision. Rya did not file a
brief. Her appellate counsel, however, noting that Rya had
changed her mind, filed a motion requesting that Rya be allowed
to join the mother's brief. We allowed that motion. We leave
Background. We summarize the relevant facts from the

judge's findings, reserving certain details for later

discussion. The mother's two youngest children are the subject

of this care and protection petition.4 Rya was born in November

2013. Rya has no unique medical issues or needs out of the

range of a child her age. Lois was born in January 2018. Lois

has attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and demonstrates

behaviors that challenge her caretakers such as defiance,

hitting, kicking, throwing things, and stealing. As a result of

her social and emotional needs, Lois has an individualized

education plan.

The mother has a history of involvement with the Department

of Children and Families (the department), as well as a long

history of poorly managed mental health problems. She has been

diagnosed with depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and

bipolar disorder. Her mental illnesses have exposed the

children to violent, erratic behaviors and culminated in

it to the sound discretion of the trial judge whether, upon
motion of the child, to reconsider visitation in light of this
change.

4 The mother has five total children; her eldest three
children were the subject of a separate care and protection
petition. The oldest turned eighteen and was dismissed from the
petition; the mother signed a stipulation for judgment
terminating her rights to twin boys born in 2009.

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neglect, discord, and chaos for the children. The mother's

mental illnesses are not stable, as she has failed to take her

medications consistently resulting in multiple psychiatric

hospitalizations and in removal of her children. Consequently,

the mother's ability to parent her children is limited; she is

unable to provide independent care and protection for her

children and she lacks insight into the harm to the children

caused by her unmanaged mental illness.

In November 2023, a trial regarding the mother's fitness as

to her children took place in the Juvenile Court. At the time

of trial, Rya was nine years old, and Lois was five years old.

Ultimately, the judge held the mother unfit to parent her

children and terminated her parental rights, awarding permanent

custody of the children to the department.

Discussion. The mother argues that the judge's findings do

not establish that she was unfit by clear and convincing

evidence because the judge relied on stale evidence. We are not

persuaded. "To terminate parental rights to a child, the judge

must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is

unfit and that the child's 'best interests will be served by

terminating the legal relation between parent and child.'"

Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139, 144 (2020), quoting Adoption of

Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011). "We give substantial deference

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to a judge's decision that termination of a parent's rights is

in the best interest of the child and reverse only where the

findings of fact are clearly erroneous or where there is a clear

error of law or abuse of discretion." Adoption of Ilona, supra.

In determining parental fitness, "a judge must consider 'a

parent's character, temperament, conduct, and capacity to

provide for the child in the same context with the child's

particular needs, affections, and age.'" Adoption of Garret, 92

Mass. App. Ct. 664, 671 (2018), quoting Adoption of Mary, 414

Mass. 705, 711 (1993). "Mental disorder is relevant only to the

extent that it affects the parent['s] capacity to assume

parental responsibility, and ability to deal with a child's

special needs" (citation omitted). Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass.

at 146. Also "relevant to the determination of unfitness" is a

parent's failure "to recognize the need for or to engage

consistently in treatment" (citation and quotation omitted).

Id. at 146-147.

The mother challenges the judge's analysis, claiming that

it was error for the judge to speculate about future harm to her

children and to consider the mother's fitness as to her children

collectively. The mother also asserts that the judge abused her

discretion in terminating the mother's parental rights because

the permanency plan proposed by the department was not adequate.

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1. Unfitness. The evidence that mother's mental illness

has negatively impacted her ability to parent her children is

compelling. She has been psychiatrically hospitalized eight

times in twelve years. The mother takes medications for her

mental illnesses, but she does not take the medications

consistently, achieving only temporary management. The mother

also struggles "to maintain stable, healthy relationships" and

to provide "a safe, stable lifestyle" that is suitable for her

children.

The trial judge acknowledged that the mother has engaged in

some services to address her mental health, parenting skills,

and domestic violence and the judge was "convinced that [the

mother] loves [Rya and Lois] deeply." However, the mother's

efforts "did not result in any substantial and material or

permanent change" and the mother's love "is simply not enough to

prevent [the children] from harm in her care." Because her

"energy is consumed with trying to manage her own needs and

mental health," the mother remains unable to understand and meet

her children's current needs. Thus, the judge did not clearly

err or abuse her discretion in concluding, based on the clear

and convincing evidence, that the mother was unfit.

2. Predictive Evidence. In determining parental fitness,

a judge is "entitled to consider the evidence of [a] mother's

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most recent improvements within the context of her earlier and

continuing deficits." Adoption of Jacques, 82 Mass. App. Ct.

601, 608 (2012). Accordingly, a judge "is permitted to assess

prognostic evidence derived from prior patterns of parental

neglect or misconduct in determining future fitness and the

likelihood of harm to the child." Custody of Two Minors, 396

Mass. 610, 621 (1986). See Adoption of Knox, 102 Mass. App. Ct.

84, 94-95 (2023), quoting Care and Protection of Bruce, 44 Mass.

App. Ct. 758, 761 (1998) (judge may "use past conduct, medical

history, and present events to predict future ability and

performance as a parent").

Here, the judge considered the mother's participation in

individualized therapy and the fact that she has a medication

provider whom she sees every four-to-six weeks. The judge also

credited that, by the time of trial, the mother had maintained

housing and attended a domestic violence education program for

approximately one month. However, the mother has resisted more

intensive, longer-term treatment. She still possesses "little

insight into the cyclical pattern she has established of

stability followed by chaos," and her recent improvements were

"not significant enough to offset the substantial risk posed by

[her] unstable mental health[] and the likely psychiatric

hospitalizations in the future."

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The judge's consideration of the mother's predicted conduct

was proper. The judge did not err or abuse her discretion in

relying on the mother's past, present, and predicted conduct to

conclude that the mother was unfit, a conclusion supported by

clear and convincing evidence. See Care and Protection of

Bruce, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 761.

3. Individualized approach. In determining whether

termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests, a

judge must consider a parent's fitness regarding each child.

See Petitions of Dep't of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent

to Adoption, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 698 (1985) ("judge erred in

considering the children's best interests collectively only

rather than also individually"). "The specialized needs of a

particular child when combined with the deficiencies of a

parent's character, temperament, capacity, or conduct may

clearly establish parental unfitness" (citation omitted). Care

& Protection of Thomasina, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 563, 576 (2009).

Here, the judge made specific findings about the status of

each individual child at trial, including each child's

individual needs and the mother's impact on each. However, the

judge issued inconsistent findings about Rya; the conclusions

that Rya has "special needs" "beyond the typical needs of

children of [her] age" clearly contradicted both the evidence

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and other findings that "[s]he has no special education needs

and no behavioral issues to speak of."5 While this may have been

error, it was ultimately harmless; the mother's demonstrated

"pattern of dangerous and unstable behavior" and inability to

break her "cyclical pattern of stability, followed by chaos and

hospitalization," have created an "instability [that] would

place the [c]hildren's welfare at great hazard." As a result,

"[the mother's] own mental health needs . . . eclipse the

normal, developmental needs" of each child.

That the judge also made findings about the children's

shared needs does not render her decision improper. The judge

listed the children's shared need for "safe and stable housing,

consistent access to food and medical care, . . . assistance and

supervision in their daily activities such as eating, bathing,

playing, and sleeping, . . . constant supervision for their

safety and support for their social, emotional, and educational

growth and development." These and others were noted by the

judge to be "typical needs of youngsters of their ages." That

those particular needs overlap does not mean that the judge

failed to consider their individual needs as well. The judge

noted that her conclusion that the mother is currently unfit to

5 The judge did note that Rya is engaged in individual
therapy and that this should continue.

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parent either of the children arises from consideration of each

of the children's "age-appropriate and typical needs, as well as

their special educational and developmental needs."

Findings to support a termination of parental rights must

be by "clear and convincing evidence, based on subsidiary

findings proved by at least a fair preponderance of evidence."

Adoption of Darlene, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 696, 702 (2021), quoting

Adoption of Jacques, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 606 (2012).

"Parental unfitness . . . means more than ineptitude, handicap,

character flaw, conviction of a crime, unusual life style, or

inability to do as good a job as the child's foster parent.

Rather, the idea of parental unfitness means grievous

shortcomings or handicaps that put the child's welfare much at

hazard. Darlene, supra, quoting Adoption of Leland, 65 Mass.

App. Ct. 580, 584 (2006).

Although the judge's findings about the children's shared

needs was regrettable, there was clear and convincing evidence

for the judge to conclude that the mother was unfit. The judge

considered evidence of the mother's mental health problems, as

well as the best interests of Rya and Lois to determine that the

mother was unfit. The judge's conclusions do not reflect any

"clear error of law or abuse of discretion." Adoption of Ilona,

459 Mass. at 59.

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4. Permanency plan. Prior to determining whether it would

be in a child's best interest to terminate parental rights, "the

judge must consider the adoption plan proposed by [the

department]." Adoption of Dora, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 474

(2001). That "adoption plan need not be fully developed to

support a termination order; it need only provide sufficient

information about the prospective adoptive placement 'so that

the judge may properly evaluate the suitability of the

department's proposal.'" Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass. 636, 652

(2001), quoting Adoption of Vito, 431 Mass. 550, 568 n.28

(2000).

Here, the department's plan at the time of trial was to

"recruit an adoptive home for both [c]hildren together." The

department planned to recruit a "family prepared to keep the

[c]hildren together and support the healing they need through

on-going services[,]" including continued individualized therapy

for the children. See Adoption of Lars, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 30,

31-32 (1998) (department's abbreviated adoption plan was

sufficient where it contained "content and substance enough to

permit the court meaningfully to evaluate and consider" the

department's proposal [citation omitted]). As the department's

plan provided sufficient information for the judge to properly

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evaluate the department's proposal, there was no abuse of

discretion. See Adoption of Willow, supra at 652-653.

Conclusion. Based on the evidence, we discern no error in

the judge's finding that the mother is unfit to parent her

children and that termination of her parental rights was in the

best interests of her children.

Decrees affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin,
D'Angelo & Toone, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: October 17, 2025.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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