Commonwealth v. Vannara Rom.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-481

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

VANNARA ROM.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

A District Court judge revoked the defendant's probation

following a violation hearing in which he concluded that the

defendant had committed new crimes. On appeal the defendant

claims the judge erred in admitting and relying on hearsay

evidence and in excluding impeachment evidence. We affirm.

Background. The defendant admitted to sufficient facts to

support a conviction for vandalism, in violation of G. L.

c. 266, § 126A, on December 13, 2023, and was placed on

probation for one year. One of the conditions of his probation

was to obey "all local, state and federal laws." On January 22,

2024, the probation department alleged that the defendant had
violated his probation by committing new offenses of assault and

battery, kidnapping, strangulation, and witness intimidation.

At the defendant's subsequent probation violation hearing,

the judge admitted, over the defendant's objection, two police

reports containing statements from the victim of the new

offense. Through these statements, the victim detailed that the

defendant had held her against her will for the previous four

days, punched her face and body numerous times, pulled out her

hair, and broken her ribs. Though she did not identify her

attacker by name, she stated that he was and had been her

boyfriend for the previous seven months, provided his address,

identified that address as the location of the assaults, and

stated that she had been involved in previous domestic incidents

at that address.

The reporting officers wrote in their police reports and

also testified at the probation violation hearing about their

direct observations of the victim's injuries that were

consistent with her report. By searching the police database

for incident reports involving the victim, the police identified

the defendant as her boyfriend. Upon arriving at the address

provided by the victim, the officers found and arrested the

defendant, who was wearing a sweatshirt with "multiple blood

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stains" and had been sleeping in a small bedroom which "was

completely destroyed."

Based on this evidence, the judge found the defendant in

violation of his probation.

Discussion. 1. Reliability of evidence. We review a

judge's finding of a violation of probation to determine

"whether the record discloses sufficient reliable evidence to

warrant the findings by the judge[, by a preponderance of the

evidence,] that [the probationer] had violated the specified

conditions of his probation" (citation omitted). Commonwealth

v. Jarrett, 491 Mass. 437, 440 (2023). Hearsay is admissible at

probation violation hearings and can be the basis of a

revocation "where it has substantial indicia of reliability."

Commonwealth v. Hartfield, 474 Mass. 474, 484 (2016). Here,

sufficient evidence supported the violation finding.

The police report admitted in evidence contained hearsay,

but the judge could reasonably find that hearsay was

substantially reliable. The reports were created within hours

of the victim's alleged abuse and captivity. See Abbott A. v.

Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 36 (2010) (reliability of hearsay

bolstered by observations made "close in time to the events in

question" [citation omitted]). The statements of the victim

contained in the report were highly detailed, alleging numerous

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specific instances of abuse, many resulting in physical injuries

which were directly observed by the interviewing officers. See

Commonwealth v. Rainey, 491 Mass. 632, 648 (2023) ("factually

detailed" hearsay statements corroborated by injuries observed

by officer were substantially reliable). The officers'

observations that the victim was "visibly shaking," that the

defendant's bedroom was "completely destroyed," and that his

sweatshirt displayed "multiple blood stains" also support the

reliability of the victim's statements. Id. (circumstances of

statements, including "emotional distress of the victim,"

support reliability). Many of the victim's statements were

excited utterances because she was still under the influence of

the "exciting events" as she described them. Commonwealth v.

King, 436 Mass. 252, 254 (2002) (statement admissible as

exception to hearsay rule when "made under the influence of an

exciting event" and which tends to "explain the underlying

event"). The victim initially spoke to police the same morning

that she stated she had been abused by the defendant; the

reporting officer noted that she was "visibly shaking" as she

discussed the events. Any evidence admissible as an exception

to the hearsay rule, such as an excited utterance, is

"presumptively reliable." See Commonwealth v. Durling, 407

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Mass. 108, 118 (1990). The judge's finding of substantial

reliability was proper and well-founded.1

Additionally, the violation finding was supported by the

officers' non-hearsay testimony describing their personal

observations of the victim, the defendant, and the room in which

the alleged abuse occurred. See Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 491

Mass. at 445 (affirming violation finding based on hearsay

testimony and corroborating testimony of direct observations).

2. Exclusion of evidence. The defendant claims that the

judge's exclusion of the victim's medical records and court

activity record information (CARI) so impeded his ability to

impeach her admitted statements that it deprived him of his

right to present a defense. We disagree.

Although a "probationer's right to present a defense is not

coextensive with the parallel right held by a criminal

defendant," Commonwealth v. Costa, 490 Mass. 118, 132 (2022),

quoting Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 464 Mass. 315, 324 (2013), he

must nevertheless have "a meaningful opportunity" to do so.

1 The victim's subsequent recantation letter did not require
the judge to find her earlier statements unreliable. See
Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 131 (2010) (recantation
letter raises "not a question of admissibility . . . but of the
sufficiency of the evidence"). It was for the judge "to decide
how much weight to give the evidence of recantation," and he
committed no error in finding that the Commonwealth sustained
its burden. Id.

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Costa, supra, quoting Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 480. However, "a

probationer is not necessarily deprived of the right to present

his theory of defense simply because the judge excludes a piece

of evidence supporting such theory" (citation omitted). Costa,

supra. The judge must consider "the totality of the

circumstances," weighing whether the proposed evidence might be

significant in determining whether a violation occurred; whether

the evidence would be cumulative; and, where live testimony is

at issue, whether there is an unacceptable risk that the

witness's well-being would be significantly jeopardized by

testifying. Hartfield, supra, at 480-481.

The defendant's constitutional right was not infringed

here. The judge admitted in evidence a letter from the victim

recanting her accusations and claiming that she suffers from

"depression" and "hallucinations," that she had attended at

least one treatment center, and that she was hallucinating on

the day she spoke with the officers. As the defendant concedes,

the excluded medical records were largely cumulative of this

evidence. Thus, the judge's exclusion of those records did not

deny the defendant the right to present a defense. Cf.

Commonwealth v. Pickering, 479 Mass. 589, 598 (no infringement

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where defendant "presented other compelling evidence that was

more probative of his theory of defense").2

3. Identification and arrest. The defendant also claims

that the police violated his constitutional right to due process

by identifying and arresting him without adequate evidence that

he had committed a new offense. We are unpersuaded. The victim

did not provide the officers with the defendant's name, but she

did reveal that the attacker was "her boyfriend of 7 months,"

that they had a history of previous "domestic incidents

involving [the Lowell Police Department]," that she had been

held captive at his residence,3 and that she "was not

romantically involved with any other individual at this

address." The officer's search of the police database which

revealed the prior reported domestic assaults did not implicate

the defendant's privacy rights. See Roe v. Attorney General,

2 For substantially the same reasons, we find that the judge
did not abuse his discretion by excluding a CARI report offered
to show that the victim "had a motive to lie." See Costa, 490
Mass. at 132-133. While it is not entirely clear, the defendant
seems to argue that he should have been permitted to call the
victim. This argument is also unavailing, as the judge properly
determined that the victim had validly invoked her Fifth
Amendment privilege. See Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 827,
834 (2009) ("witness's valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination trumps a defendant's right
to call the witness").

3 The victim provided the officers with the defendant's
address and stated that he "lived in the basement."

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434 Mass. 418, 438 (2001) (no privacy interest implicated by

police looking at information they already have). And the

victim's statements, combined with the corroborating

observations of the officers, were plainly adequate to satisfy

the relatively low threshold of probable cause necessary to

effect the arrest. See Commonwealth v. Richardson, 53 Mass.

App. Ct. 201, 206-07 (2001).

Order revoking probation
affirmed.

By the Court (Ditkoff,
D'Angelo & Woods, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: November 14, 2025.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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