Commonwealth v. Michael Williams.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-173

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

MICHAEL WILLIAMS.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In 2010, a Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of

two counts of aggravated rape and one count of assault with

intent to rape. In April 2024, the defendant filed his third

motion for a new trial, claiming that the indictments for which

he was found guilty fell outside the statute of limitations.

After a Superior Court judge denied the motion for a new trial,

the defendant filed a timely appeal. We affirm.

Discussion. Although the defendant appeals from the order

denying his third motion for a new trial, which was based on a

claim that he was indicted outside the relevant statute of

1 Also known as Michael Johnson.
limitations, he does not raise that argument in his brief on

appeal.2 We are not required to consider arguments not properly

raised in a party's brief, and we decline to do so here. See

Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628

(2019).

However, even if we were to consider the statute of

limitations, the defendant's claim is unavailing. The

defendant's convictions stemmed from two separate indictments.

On March 29, 2005, the defendant was indicted for an aggravated

rape that occurred on April 10, 1990. On May 4, 2005, the

defendant was indicted for aggravated rape and assault with

intent to rape, both occurring on or about May 6 to 7, 1990.

Pursuant to G. L. c. 277, § 63, at the time that the defendant

was indicted, the statute of limitations for rape and assault

with intent to rape was fifteen years.3 Because March 29, 2005,

2 The defendant's appellate brief instead raises new
arguments about deoxyribonucleic acid test results and
comparisons, which were not the basis of the present motion for
a new trial and, in any event, were resolved by a panel of this
court in the defendant's appeal from the order denying his
second motion for a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Williams,
102 Mass. App. Ct. 1109 (2023).

3 In 1987, the statute of limitations for aggravated rape
and assault with intent to rape was ten years. In 1996, that
statute of limitations for aggravated rape and assault with
intent to rape was amended to fifteen years. Because the
statute of limitations was amended before the initial ten year
period elapsed, the defendant could be indicted within fifteen
years. See Commonwealth v. Rocheleau, 404 Mass. 129, 130
(1989).

2
was within fifteen years of April 10, 1990, and May 4, 2005, was

within fifteen years of May 6, 1990, the defendant was indicted

within the statute of limitations for all three counts. See

Commonwealth v. Dixon, 458 Mass. 446, 454-455 (2010).

Therefore, were we to consider the substance of the defendant's

appeal on the statute of limitations issue, we would conclude

that the judge properly denied the motion for a new trial. See

Commonwealth v. Fanelli, 412 Mass. 497, 504 (1992) (judge may

grant motion for new trial only if it appears justice may not

have been done).

Order dated January 28, 2025,
denying motion for new
trial, affirmed.

By the Court (Grant,
Brennan & Smyth, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: November 20, 2025.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

3