Wesley A. Nagy v. Meta Elizabeth Nagy.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1252

WESLEY A. NAGY

vs.

META ELIZABETH NAGY.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The parties were divorced in 2022 after a trial in the

Probate and Family Court. The husband appealed from the divorce

judgment, as amended, and a panel of this court vacated a

portion of the amended judgment and remanded the case to the

judge for additional findings on a limited issue relating to the

valuation of the parties' real estate. See Nagy v. Nagy, 103

Mass. App. Ct. 1120 (2024) (Nagy I). Considering the husband's

appeal from the updated judgment of divorce after remand, we

discern neither error nor an abuse of the judge's discretion in

the judge's award of the increased value of the real estate to

the wife. Because the updated judgment was neither plainly
wrong nor excessive, we affirm it. See Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469

Mass. 230, 245 (2014).

Background. As relevant to this appeal, at the time of the

divorce, the parties owned four pieces of real estate on

Martha's Vineyard. After trial, the judge awarded three of the

four properties to the wife and the remaining one to the

husband. In her calculation of the value of the marital estate,

the judge valued the parties' real estate as of the date of the

parties' separation in 2017. To effect an "approximately equal

division . . . of the marital estate," the judge ordered the

wife to pay the husband $297,397.77 (equalizing payment).1

As we have noted, the husband appealed from the divorce

judgment, as amended, that entered after the trial. Although

the panel otherwise affirmed, it vacated so much of that

judgment as established 2017 as the year of valuation for the

parties' real estate, then remanded the matter "on the limited

issue of whether and, if so, to what degree, the increase in

fair market value of the real estate between the date of

separation and the date of trial is due solely to the wife's

1 This amount accounted for division of the total equity in
the properties as they were valued at the time of the parties'
separation in 2017, advances on the marital estate, shared
expenses incurred as part of the divorce litigation, and the
value of other retained property.

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postseparation efforts." Nagy I, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 1120. The

panel ordered,

"If, on remand, the judge determines that all or some of
the increase is attributable to market forces, then the
judge should consider the relationship between the amount
of increase due to the market and that due solely to the
wife's efforts. If some portion of the increase is due to
the market, then the judge should consider whether, and to
what degree, to award the husband a portion of the market-
based increase."

Id.

On remand, the judge found that market forces were the sole

reason for the $678,026 increase in the collective value of the

parties' real estate but that without the wife's financial and

nonfinancial contributions to maintenance of the properties, the

increase would not have been possible. By contrast, the judge

found that after the parties' separation in 2017, the "[h]usband

stopped any, but very limited contribution to the preservation

or appreciation in value of the real property." Moreover, the

judge found that the "[h]usband's actions on more than one

occasion . . . not only fail[ed] to add to the value of the real

property but negatively impacted the ability of the [p]arties to

rent the properties."2 The judge concluded that the husband was

2The judge gave specific examples of the husband's
detrimental conduct, including his failure to contribute to the
mortgage or taxes on the properties, despite residing in them
rent free; his accumulation of storage containers, vehicles of
varying sorts, "a huge amount of large doors and windows," and
other detritus on the properties; and his delays or failure to
remove those items when asked to do so. The judge also noted

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not entitled to any portion of the market-based increase in the

properties' value, "[g]iven each [p]arty's conduct following

separation as well as their respective contribution to the

preservation and appreciation in value of the marital estate."

The judge made no other changes to the original division of the

parties' real estate and did not change the amount of the

equalizing payment. "Using the increased value of the real

property combined with all other assets which make up the total

marital estate," the judge found that the "[w]ife received

54.44% and [the] [h]usband received 45.56%." "[W]ith due

consideration of all of the other G. L. c. 208, § 34[,] factors

already considered in the original trial and resulting divorce

judgment," the judge found the asset division "to be equitable

with no additional amounts being paid to either [p]arty."3 An

updated judgment of divorce after remand entered and the husband

appealed.

the husband's involvement with the police and with renters on
one of the properties, which impeded the wife's ability to rent
it. The judge contrasted this information with findings about
the wife's payment of the "mortgage, taxes, insurance,
utilities, maintenance costs and repair costs for all the
properties"; her role in physically maintaining and repairing
the properties; and her initiation of and payment of legal fees
for two summary process actions stemming from the properties'
rentals.

3 The judge explicitly struck from her earlier findings any
reference to an "equal" division of the marital estate.

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Discussion. 1. Standard of review. Where, as here, a

divorcing spouse challenges the judge's division of marital

property, "[w]e review the judge's findings to determine whether

she considered all the relevant factors under G. L. c. 208,

§ 34, and whether she relied on any irrelevant factors,"

Zaleski, 469 Mass. at 245, then "determine whether the reasons

for the judge's conclusions are 'apparent in [her] findings and

rulings.'" Adams v. Adams, 459 Mass. 361, 371 (2011), S.C., 466

Mass. 1015 (2013), quoting Redding v. Redding, 398 Mass. 102,

108 (1986). "The ultimate goal of G. L. c. 208, § 34, is an

equitable, rather than an equal, division of property"

(quotations omitted). Connor v. Benedict, 481 Mass. 567, 580

(2019), quoting Adlakha v. Adlakha, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 860, 864

(2006). "We will not reverse a judgment with respect to

property division unless it is plainly wrong and excessive"

(quotation and citation omitted). Zaleski, supra. See Rice v.

Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 401 (1977) (judge has broad discretion to

equitably divide marital property).

2. Judge's treatment of parties' periods of disability

from work. In the amended findings the judge made after trial

(trial findings), she noted that both the wife and the husband,

at different times, had medical problems or injuries that

temporarily prevented them from contributing financially and

otherwise to the marriage. Specifically, the judge found that

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the wife was disabled from work for a ten-year period beginning

in 2000. Although the judge found that during that time, the

husband cared for the wife and was primarily responsible for

essentially all household duties, including moving the parties

from California to Martha's Vineyard in 2004, the judge also

found that beginning in 2004, the wife began receiving

disability benefits, which "contributed significantly" to the

parties' income through the date of the trial. The judge found

that the husband suffered "multiple medical issues during the

marriage, particularly in recent years," including two eye

surgeries that left him temporarily unable to work in

construction, an injury to his finger that restricted his

ability to work,4 and a painful condition affecting his hands

that interfered with some activities, including "play[ing] music

to his full capacity." In her further findings after remand

(postremand findings), the judge found that after the parties'

separation in March 2017, the husband stopped contributing to

the preservation or appreciation in the properties' value, and

that "on more than one occasion," he "not only fail[ed] to add

4 The judge found that at the time of the trial, the husband
had been employed as a church music director since 2005 and
played in a professional band at approximately twenty events per
year. The husband also worked in construction until 2020, when
he stopped due to his finger injury.

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to the value of the real property but negatively impacted the

ability of the [p]arties to rent the properties."

To the extent that, taken together, the judge's findings

reflect her determination "that the husband may simply have been

unwilling to contribute to the preservation of [the

properties]," the conclusion is not clearly erroneous. See Twin

Fires Inv., LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 445 Mass.

411, 420 (2005) ("On appeal, we are bound by a judge's findings

of fact that are supported by the evidence, including all

inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence").

The judge's findings reflect that the husband's inability to

work was only temporary, as in the case of the recovery period

from his two retinal surgeries and the repair of the injury to

his finger; limited in scope, as for the condition affecting his

hands and limiting his ability to do certain activities at full

capacity; or both.5 The trial findings show that the husband was

employed and earning income in each year from 2017 to 2021, and

in that same interval, he made discretionary expenditures on

travel and entertainment, as well as did work on his

girlfriend's property.6 The judge's conclusion that the husband

5 Indeed, the husband does not challenge the judge's finding
that he has been continuously employed as a music director since
2005.

6 The husband does not challenge these findings as clearly
erroneous. Cf. Nagy I, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 1120 ("The husband

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could have contributed to the upkeep of the properties, but did

not do so, was a reasonable inference from the evidence. See

id.

Nor are we persuaded that the judge improperly penalized

the husband for his failure to contribute financially or

otherwise to the upkeep of the properties during the parties'

separation by failing to take into account the wife's ten-year

period of incapacity for work and household activities, from

2000 to 2010. Contrary to the husband's argument, the judge did

credit the husband for his support of the wife during the time

she was disabled, but she also noted that despite the wife's

inability to work, the wife "contributed significantly upon

receiving her disability benefits." The judge's findings also

reflect her determination that after the wife returned to work,

she resumed shared responsibility for marital obligations,

including maintaining the parties' properties. In sum, although

both parties suffered conditions at different times that reduced

their ability to contribute to the creation and preservation of

the marital estate, the judge's findings support the conclusion

that the wife opted to contribute what she could, given her

limitations, while the husband did not. We discern no abuse of

has not argued, let alone shown, that the judge's findings
concerning his health, employment, and employability were
clearly erroneous").

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discretion in the judge's "disparate" treatment of this aspect

of the parties' conduct.

3. Rental income and depreciation on real estate.

Contrary to the husband's contentions, the judge did not

erroneously fail to consider the wife's receipt of rental income

from the parties' properties in 2020 and 2021. Rather, in her

postremand findings, the judge noted that the "[w]ife received

rental income from the properties."

As to depreciation, the fact that the postremand findings

did not include explicit reference to any properties'

depreciation in 2020 and 2021 does not persuade us that she

overlooked it or failed to recognize its significance. The

judge's trial findings demonstrate her proper application of

depreciation for the years 2017 through 2019, and we have no

reason to believe that the judge failed to similarly account for

depreciation when considering the ongoing rental of the

properties.

Even if we were to conclude that the judge failed to

account for the properties' depreciation during the last two

years of the marriage, we would not reverse the judgment. The

judge's decision not to allocate any of the increase in the

properties' value did not turn on the precise amounts the wife

received or expended on the properties, but on the judge's

determination that the wife alone made positive contributions

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toward their maintenance and operation. See Williams v. Massa,

431 Mass. 619, 632 (2000), quoting Moriarty v. Stone, 41 Mass.

App. Ct. 151, 157 (1996) ("The parties' respective contributions

to the marital partnership remain the touchstone of an equitable

division of the marital estate"). The husband has not shown

that the judge's failure to address depreciation explicitly in

her explanation of the allocation of the increase in the

properties' value rendered the resulting judgment plainly wrong

or excessive, and we see no reason to disturb the judgment on

that basis. See Zaleski, 469 Mass. at 245.

4. Investment with wife's friend. The judge did not

"ignore" the fact that the parties lost money when, sometime

before 2004, they invested with the wife's friend, who later

defrauded them. The judge addressed this situation in her trial

findings. Given the timing of the investment and the judge's

unchallenged finding that -- based on the husband's testimony --

"both parties agreed to invest this money," the judge

permissibly declined to treat the ill-advised investment as

marital property dissipated by the wife. See Kittredge v.

Kittredge, 441 Mass. 28, 42-43 (2004) ("one of the features that

makes an expenditure a dissipation of marital assets is its

timing, i.e., that it is incurred at a time when the marriage is

breaking up, thus making it apparent that the expenditure will

reduce the assets available to the other spouse"). Cf. Caveney

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v. Caveney, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 102, 113-114 (2012) (no error in

judge's treatment of husband's withdrawal of funds from

individual retirement arrangement account as dissipation where

husband acted without wife's permission and for purpose of

maintaining high standard of living for himself to detriment of

wife).

Updated judgment of divorce
after remand affirmed.

By the Court (Henry, Hand &
Brennan, JJ.7),

Clerk

Entered: November 21, 2025.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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