Bharanidharan Padmanabhan v. Loretta Cooke.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1310

BHARANIDHARAN PADMANABHAN

vs.

LORETTA COOKE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the self-

represented plaintiff, Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, appeals from a

judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the defendant,

Loretta Cooke, for claims of slander, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and abuse of process. The plaintiff

contends that certain of the trial judge's evidentiary rulings

and denial of his motion for a new trial amounted to an abuse of

discretion. The plaintiff also claims that various judges of

the Superior Court abused their discretion in the denial of his

seven motions to disqualify the Attorney General's office from

representing the defendant. Finally, the plaintiff claims that

another judge (motion judge) abused her discretion in the grant
of an emergency motion limiting the plaintiff's communications

with jurors after trial. We affirm.

Background. This case stems from an investigation into and

ultimately the suspension of the plaintiff's license to practice

medicine. Between 2007 and 2011, Padmanabhan was a neurologist

with medical staff privileges at a hospital operated by

Cambridge Health Alliance (CHA). See Padmanabhan v. Cambridge,

99 Mass. App. Ct. 332, 334 (2021).1 Following the death of one

of his patients, CHA undertook an investigation and peer review

process of his practice. The Massachusetts Board of

Registration in Medicine (board) also began an investigation of

the plaintiff's practice. The defendant, a registered nurse and

board employee, conducted that investigation.

The defendant first became concerned for her safety after

she received a letter from the plaintiff that accused her of

acting in bad faith and generally alleging that members of the

board were corrupt. The defendant requested that the

plaintiff's hearing before the board be moved to a location with

more security. Her concern grew when she witnessed his angry

and erratic behavior at the hearing. The situation came to a

1 In Padmanabhan v. Cambridge, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 332 (2021),
we affirmed the judgment of dismissal on statute of limitation
grounds of all but three claims. See Id. at 334 n.3 (listing
cases brought by the plaintiff).

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head when the defendant found in her mailbox an envelope

containing a hard object addressed to her from the plaintiff.

She had not shared her home address with the plaintiff. The

defendant took the unopened envelope2 to her supervisor at the

board and expressed her concerns.

That same day, the defendant spoke to an officer at the

Methuen Police Department about the plaintiff's behavior. The

defendant told the police officer that she was frightened by the

plaintiff because of her investigation into his medical

practice. The defendant believed that the plaintiff had

obtained a license to carry a firearm and purchased a handgun,

and she told the officer that the plaintiff had threatened and

verbally assaulted all the members of the board. The defendant

explained that she had not shared her home address with the

plaintiff and, by sending her the envelope, the plaintiff was

sending a "clear message" that he would not stop threatening

her. The police officer advised that if she was concerned for

her safety, she should go to court and apply for a harassment

prevention order. The following day, the defendant applied for

a harassment prevention order under G. L. c. 258E. At the

The hard object was a compact disc, and the police
2

confirmed that the plaintiff had not communicated any threats in
the mailing. The envelope was a copy of a lawsuit filed by the
plaintiff naming the defendant in an action in federal court.

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hearing, the defendant contended that the plaintiff had harassed

her by taking pictures of her in the courtroom and at the board

hearing and by mailing her legal process. The request for a

harassment prevention order was denied by a judge of the

District Court.

On the heels of that denial, the plaintiff filed the

present civil action against the defendant claiming that the

defendant committed slander by making false statements to the

police. The plaintiff also made claims for intentional

infliction of emotional distress and abuse of process. A jury

trial was held in the Superior Court over the course of three

days beginning on June 24, 2024. On June 26, 2024, the jury

returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, finding that the

plaintiff had failed to establish his burden of proof on all

counts. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, raising

several claims including that certain witnesses' testimony was

not credible. The trial judge denied the motion, ruling that

the "verdict was overwhelmingly support[ed] by the weight of the

evidence and the Jury exercised honest and reasonable judgment

in accordance with the controlling principles of [l]aw."

Several months later, the plaintiff notified defendant's

counsel that he intended to send the jurors a letter asking "one

simple question" regarding a particular witness's testimony and

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whether her credibility was damaged because of her testimony.

When the plaintiff refused to send the defendant's counsel a

draft of the letter, defendant's counsel filed an emergency

motion to preclude the plaintiff from inquiring into the jurors'

thought processes and deliberations. The motion judge allowed

the motion, acknowledging the plaintiff's attempt to comply with

Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5, as amended, 490 Mass. 1309 (2022), but

reasoning that the plaintiff lacked awareness of what juror

communication may be allowed. Therefore, the motion judge

prohibited the plaintiff from contacting jurors "without first

complying with Rule 3.5 and obtaining prior Court approval for

any contemplated contact."

Discussion. We note at the outset that the plaintiff,

acting pro se, is required to abide by the Massachusetts Rules

of Appellate Procedure and is held to the same standard as

litigants represented by counsel.3 See Maza v. Commonwealth, 423

3 The plaintiff, who refers to himself as "Victim, pro se"
has made several "claims" on appeal, including his contention
that he discovered evidence of Medicaid fraud and then was fired
as a result of exposing the truth, that certain witnesses had
conflicts of interest, that both the former and current Attorney
General and others obstructed justice and suborned perjury, and
that Chief Justice Kimberly Budd and the entire Massachusetts
judiciary obstructed justice and tampered with the recording
system, For The Record. These claims do not comport with
Massachusetts Rule of Appellate Procedure 16 (a) (4), as
appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019), and were not meaningfully
raised to the trial court. We therefore do not address them.

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Mass. 1006, 1006 (1996). See also Brossard v. West Roxbury Div.

of the Dist. Court Dep't, 417 Mass. 183, 184 (1994). The

plaintiff's brief is difficult to comprehend, often referring to

various conspiracies, collusions, and obstructions of justice

the plaintiff claims were committed by the board, the state and

federal judiciary, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and many other

entities and issues that are not properly before this court. To

the extent that the plaintiff's brief identifies legal issues

that could be reviewed on appeal, they often are unsupported by

references to relevant legal authority or record citations and

are presented inadequately for appellate review. See Mass.

R. A. P. 16 (a) (9), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). We

understand that proceeding as a self-represented litigant can be

challenging, and we have allowed the plaintiff's informal brief,

nonetheless pro se litigants are still responsible for

presenting materials necessary to permit a meaningful review.

See Mass. R. A. P. 18, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019).

See also Everett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, 604 n.26 (2009)

("It is [appellant's] obligation to include in the record

appendix any document on which he relies"); Arch Med. Assocs.,

Inc. v. Bartlett Health Enters., Inc., 32 Mass. App. Ct. 404,

406 (1992) ("The burden is on the appellant in the first

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instance to furnish a record that supports his claims on

appeal").

Recognizing his pro se status, however, we have reviewed

the record and the plaintiff's arguments to reach the merits of

his claims on appeal. The thrust of the plaintiff's arguments

appears to be that the trial judge erred in denying his motion

for a new trial because the Attorney General should have been

disqualified from representing the defendant and that the

defendant's witnesses committed perjury at trial. He also

contends that the motion judge erred in limiting his ability to

communicate with the jurors after trial. We will address each

argument in turn.

1. Motion for a new trial. In his motion for a new trial,

the plaintiff claimed that the verdict was "against the weight

of the credible evidence, and tantamount to a miscarriage of

justice." Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that witnesses

committed perjury at trial and that the Attorney General should

have been disqualified from defending the defendant's actions.

The trial judge denied the motion, stating that the "verdict was

overwhelmingly support[ed] by the weight of the evidence and the

Jury exercised honest and reasonable judgment."

In a civil case, when ruling upon a motion for a new trial,

the trial judge considers "whether the verdict is so markedly

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against the weight of the evidence as to suggest that the jurors

allowed themselves to be misled, were swept away by bias or

prejudice, or for a combination of reasons, including

misunderstanding of applicable law, failed to come to a the

reasonable conclusion." W. Oliver Tripp Co. v. American Hoechst

Corp., 34 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 748 (1993). Trial judges have

been cautioned that they should not take it upon themselves to

"nullify a jury's verdict by granting a new trial unless it

appears on a survey of the whole case that otherwise a

miscarriage of justice would result." Evans v. Multicon Constr.

Corp., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 295 (1978).

We review the denial of a motion for a new trial "for a

significant error of law or abuse of discretion." Commonwealth

v. Sanchez, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 644, 647 (2022). We give special

deference to a motion judge who was also the trial judge. See

Commonwealth v. Nieves, 429 Mass. 763, 771 (1999). The

plaintiff claims that one of the witnesses at trial, Dr.

Marianne Felice, committed perjury when she testified about

certain actions of the defendant that included a threat.

According to the plaintiff, he conclusively proved at trial that

Dr. Felice was not a board member when his license to practice

medicine was suspended, so therefore her testimony must be

perjurious. The plaintiff also argues that the defendant lied

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to the Methuen police officer, although it is not clear what the

plaintiff claims the defendant lied about.

We have reviewed the record and find no abuse of discretion

or other error in the denial of the motion for a new trial on

these grounds. The jury was free to credit the testimony of

certain witnesses, including Dr. Felice's testimony that she was

concerned for her personal safety when she was acting in her

capacity as a board member. See Commonwealth v. Spinucci, 472

Mass. 872, 878 (2015). During the trial, Dr. Felice testified

that the plaintiff approached her angrily and said "[t]his is

all your fault, Felice, and I will get you for this." So too

could the jury consider and weigh the testimony of the defendant

about the reasons she was fearful of the defendant and what

prompted her to speak to the police and apply for a harassment

protection order.

2. Motions to disqualify the Attorney General's office

from representing the defendant. Throughout the course of this

case, the plaintiff has filed no less than seven motions to

disqualify the Attorney General's office from representing the

defendant, because, in his view, the defendant was not acting in

the scope of her employment when she committed libel and slander

against him. According to the plaintiff, representation of the

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defendant by the Attorney General is "unlawful as a matter of

law."

We review a denial of a motion to disqualify an attorney

for an abuse of discretion. See Wessell v. Mink Brook

Associates, Inc., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 747, 752 (2015). The

plaintiff confuses and conflates the duty of the Attorney

General to defend a public employee with the issue of

indemnification, and he also misstates the law regarding legal

representation of a public employee alleged to have committed an

intentional tort. The defendant, an employee of the board, only

came across the plaintiff because she was tasked with the

responsibility of investigating the plaintiff's actions as a

medical doctor. Whether the plaintiff alleged that the

defendant acted negligently or intentionally is of no moment.

There was no error of law or abuse of discretion in the denials

of the motions to disqualify the Attorney General from

representing the defendant in this action.

3. Evidentiary issue. Next, the plaintiff claims that

evidence of the audio recordings from the Lawrence District

Court when the defendant applied for a harassment prevention

order were improperly excluded. We review a judge's evidentiary

rulings for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Andre, 484

Mass. 403, 414 (2020). We discern no abuse of discretion in the

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exclusion of the audio recording of the harassment prevention

order, especially here, where the defendant's statements to the

police and to the court during the G. L. c. 258E hearing were

protected under the litigation privilege. See generally, Mackie

v. Rouse-Weir, 495 Mass. 252, 260-261 (2025).

4. Postverdict contact with jurors. The plaintiff argues

that the motion judge improperly granted the defendant's motion

to require judicial approval for postverdict contact with the

jurors. Contrary to the plaintiff's claims, the motion judge

did not prohibit the plaintiff from contacting jurors

altogether. Rather, the motion judge required some procedural

safeguards to ensure that the content of the plaintiff's

communications with the jurors was permissible. Considering the

reasons for the plaintiff's request to initiate contact with the

jurors, the motion judge's decision was proper.

Attorneys are generally not required to seek court approval

before initiating postverdict contact with the jury. See

Commonwealth v. Moore, 474 Mass. 541, 551 (2016). An attorney

may not, however, initiate contact with the jury if "the

communication is prohibited by law or court order" (emphasis

added). Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5 (c) (1), as amended, 490 Mass.

1309 (2022). See Moore, supra at 549 n.10 ("We do not question

that, when appropriate, a judge in a particular case may

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restrict or even prohibit attorneys' unsupervised communication

with jurors postverdict; such a court order is expressly

contemplated by rule 3.5 (c) (1)"). A judge may bar postverdict

contact with the jury if the attorney seeks to inquire "into the

contents of jury deliberations and thought processes of jurors."

Id. at 548.

In response to the defendant's motion to require judicial

approval for postverdict contact with the jurors, the plaintiff

explained that he sought to contact jurors to ask them whether

they believed the testimony of a certain witness, Dr. Felice,

and whether their credibility assessment of Dr. Felice changed

after she testified about the specific dates that she served as

a member of the board. The motion judge correctly determined

that this communication sought to understand the subjective

mental processes of the jurors and thus was beyond the scope of

permissible communication. See Doull v. Foster, 487 Mass. 1, 23

(2021), quoting Moore, 474 Mass. at 548 (requesting juror's

thought process was "far afield of anything resembling a valid

reason for approaching jurors and instead appear[s] to be aimed

at 'inquiry into the contents of jury deliberations and thought

processes of jurors and the impeachment of jury verdicts based

on information that might be gained from such inquiry'").

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For the first time on appeal, the plaintiff argues that, as

a pro se litigant, he is not bound by or required to comply with

the rules of professional conduct. This argument, having not

been raised below, is waived. See Boss v. Leverett, 484 Mass.

553, 563 (2020) ("The reason for this fundamental rule of

appellate practice is well established: it is important that an

appellate court have before it an adequate record and findings

concerning a claim to permit it to resolve that claim properly"

[citation omitted]).

Even if we were to consider the substance of the

plaintiff's argument, we are not persuaded. Judges are

empowered to protect jurors from inquiries, whether it be from

an attorney or a pro se litigant, that seek to inquire about the

deliberative process. See Doull 487 Mass. at 23-24. The motion

judge's order regarding communication with the jurors provided

the plaintiff with guidance as to the permissible bounds of

inquiry. By requiring that the plaintiff seek prior judicial

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approval, the motion judge appropriately created an additional

check to ensure that it was done properly.

Judgment affirmed.

Order denying motion for new
trial affirmed.

Order allowing in part motion
to preclude inquiry into
jury thought processes and
deliberations affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Neyman &
Walsh, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: November 25, 2025.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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