Alison Metcalfe v. Arbella Mutual Insurance Company.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-450

ALISON METCALFE

vs.

ARBELLA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

This appeal originates from a judgment in a personal injury

action against Steven Martin (Steven),1 under which he was

ordered to pay Alison Metcalfe $300,000. Because Steven was

unable to satisfy this judgment, Metcalfe brought an action

against Arbella Mutual Insurance Company (Arbella) to indemnify

him. Steven did not have an insurance policy in his name with

Arbella. Instead, Metcalfe's suit alleged that Steven was

covered by an insurance policy that Elizabeth Martin

(Elizabeth), Steven's grandmother, held with Arbella. After a

bench trial, a Superior Court judge found that Steven, at the

We will refer to the Martins by their first names to avoid
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confusion.
time he injured Metcalfe, was a resident of Elizabeth's

household and thus an insured person entitled to policy

coverage. The judge ordered Arbella to indemnify Steven and pay

Metcalfe the $300,000. Arbella appeals from this judgment, and

we reverse.

Elizabeth held two insurance policies with Arbella at the

time Steven injured Metcalfe. One policy covered Elizabeth's

property in Ludlow (Ludlow policy), and the other covered her

property in East Longmeadow (East Longmeadow policy). The

Ludlow policy is a dwelling policy, i.e., it covers liability

for insured members for injuries which accrue or arise on the

property covered. The East Longmeadow policy is a homeowner's

policy, i.e., it covers liability for insured members under the

policy, regardless of where the alleged injury occurred. It is

undisputed that the injury to Metcalfe did not occur on or arise

on the Ludlow property. Thus, the Ludlow policy cannot be used

to indemnify Steven against Metcalfe. Therefore, the only

policy at issue is the East Longmeadow policy and the question

before us is whether Steven is covered by this policy.

"The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of

law for the trial judge and the reviewing court." Sullivan v.

Southland Life Ins. Co., 67 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 442 (2006). See

Chow v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 622, 625

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(2013). Thus, we review de novo the trial judge's determination

of whether Steven is an "insured" under the East Longmeadow

policy.2 See Upper Cape Realty Corp. v. Morris, 53 Mass. App.

Ct. 53, 58 (2001). See Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v.

Morel, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 379, 382 n.5 (2004) (question of who

qualifies as "insured" under policy is legal question).

The East Longmeadow policy defines those who are covered by

the policy as the named insured and "residents of [their]

household." Neither the policy nor our case law provides a

definition of "resident" or "household," and we resolve the

2 Metcalfe claims that we should give deference to the
judge's determination that Elizabeth's household included Steven
and set this determination aside only if found to be clearly
erroneous. We disagree. The Supreme Judicial Court has held
that the resolution of the question of whether someone was a
member of an individual's household in a particular factual
setting "is a question of law." Vaiarella v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
409 Mass. 523, 526 (1991). Furthermore, our case law states
that interpretation of an insurance contract is a pure question
of law and thus reviewed de novo. Zurich American Ins. Co. v.
Medical Props. Trust, Inc., 494 Mass. 382, 386-387 (2024).
Metcalfe cites to Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miville, 491 Mass.
489 (2023) (Miville), and United States Bank N.A. v. Village at
Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387 (2018) (Lakeridge), to support her
argument that we should review the judge's determination of who
is an "insured" here under the standard we generally use to
review findings of fact. We disagree as the Supreme Judicial
Court in Miville actually reviewed the interpretation of an
insurance contract de novo and did not give deference to the
trial judge's interpretation of the legal implications of the
policy. Miville, supra at 493-494. Additionally, Lakeridge is
not on point, as it addresses review of mixed questions of fact
and law. Lakeridge, supra at 395-397.

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issue as a matter of law on a case-by-case basis. Vaiarella v.

Hanover Ins. Co., 409 Mass. 523, 526-527 (1991). As Steven is

not the named insured on the policy, the question is whether he

is considered a "resident of [the] household" of the named

insured, which here is Elizabeth. Metcalfe claims, and the

judge agreed, that when applying the factors set forth in

Vaiarella, Steven is a resident of Elizabeth's household and

subject to insurance coverage. We disagree.

In Vaiarella, the Supreme Judicial Court set forth several

factors to consider when deciding whether someone is an insured

under an insurance policy, where the definition of "insured" is

ambiguous. Vaiarella, 409 Mass. at 526-530. Those factors

include: (1) whether the individual has an established

connection to the named insured's household; (2) whether the

individual uses the same address as the named insured for

matters such as receiving mail, registering a car, or applying

for a driver's license; (3) in the case of an accident, whether

the individual went to the named insured's household after the

accident; (4) whether the individual has a financially dependent

relationship with the named insured; and (5) the subjective

intent of the individual to become a member of the insured's

household. See id. See also Morel, 60 Mass. App. Ct. at 383.

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At oral argument, Metcalfe conceded that the only Vaiarella

factor that is present here is financial dependency. We agree.

There is little to no established connection between Steven and

Elizabeth. Even though Steven is Elizabeth's grandson, he spoke

to or saw Elizabeth just once in the years surrounding 2016,

when the injury to Metcalfe occurred.3 Elizabeth also did not

claim Steven as a dependent on her 2016 taxes. Additionally,

Steven did not receive mail at the East Longmeadow address nor

did he have a car registered to the East Longmeadow address or a

driver's license with the East Longmeadow address.

Elizabeth bought the Ludlow property to help Steven's

family. Although she asked Steven's parents to pay $600 per

month in rent, they were frequently unable to do so, and she

never tried to collect that unpaid rent. Elizabeth paid the

mortgage, the real estate taxes, and the water and sewer bills.

To this extent, she provided financial support for Steven and

his parents.

At the time Steven injured Metcalfe, he was residing at the

Ludlow property and had been since 1998, except for a brief

3 The judge found the minimal interaction between Elizabeth
and Steven as possibly attributable to his substance use
disorder, and not due to a breakdown in their relationship or
lack of intention in having a familial relationship. Where
there was no testimony or evidence put forth to support this
finding, we do not credit it. See Jablonski v. Casey, 64 Mass.
App. Ct. 744, 747 (2005).

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incarceration period and a four-month period, several years

prior, when Steven lived with Elizabeth at the East Longmeadow

address. There was no evidence that Steven had any intention to

move to the East Longmeadow address. Elizabeth did not provide

any other financial support for Steven.

Nevertheless, Metcalfe argues that while the only factor

present here is financial dependency, this factor alone is

sufficient to find that as a matter of law, Steven was a part of

Elizabeth's household and covered under the East Longmeadow

policy. We disagree.

First, the weight given to financial dependency is lessened

in the case of relatives for whom there is no legal

responsibility to provide financial support. Vaiarella, 409

Mass. at 529. Here, Elizabeth had no legal responsibility to

provide for Steven.

Second, we disagree with Metcalfe's assertion that the

instant case is akin to Morel, 60 Mass. App. Ct. at 379. In

Morel, we addressed whether an individual resided in his

father's household, for purposes of an insurance contract, where

the father lived apart from the family home. Morel, 60 Mass.

App. Ct. at 380. We concluded that he did, finding relevant

that the father was frequently present at the family home, he

received his mail at the family home, he regularly performed

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significant household tasks there, and he had a significant

financial responsibility for his wife and sons who resided

there. Id. at 383-384.

Several material facts present in Morel are missing here.

Steven did not frequently visit the East Longmeadow address, nor

did Elizabeth frequently visit the Ludlow address. Steven did

not receive mail at the East Longmeadow address, and Elizabeth

did not receive mail at the Ludlow address. Steven did not

perform significant household tasks at the East Longmeadow

address, and likewise for Elizabeth at the Ludlow address.

While Elizabeth, like the father in Morel, did financially

support Steven with housing, this factor, as mentioned above, is

weakened when there is no legal responsibility to provide

financial support.

At oral argument, Metcalfe asserted that while the question

of who is an "insured" under the Vaiarella analysis is decided

on a case-by-case basis, financial dependency acts as a "trump

card" in these types of cases. Accordingly, she claims that

this single, and in this case, weakened factor established as a

matter of law that Steven is a household member. In support of

this contention, Metcalfe again cites Morel and argues that

financial dependency was "the basis" for our determination that

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the adult child was a member of his father's household as

defined in an insurance policy. We disagree.

Contrary to Metcalfe's claim, financial dependency was not

the sole basis for our holding in Morel that an adult son was a

member of his father's household. Rather, as noted above, we

weighed several factors to reach that determination. We held

that the son was a household member in the insured's house

because the son lived at the relevant address, received mail

there, kept his belongings there, and his father remained

actively involved with the family at that address. See Morel,

60 Mass. App. Ct. at 383-384.

Furthermore, had the Supreme Judicial Court thought that

financial dependency outweighed other factors, they would have

said as much. They did not. See Vaiarella, 409 Mass. at 529.

Instead, in Vaiarella, the court addressed five nonexclusive

factors and did not state, nor even suggest, that economic

dependence is a "trump card" over the other factors. See

Vaiarella, supra. No published case in this jurisdiction that

addressed this same issue has amended the analysis to suggest

that financial dependency deserves significantly more weight

than the other factors. See, e.g., Sister Thattil v. Dominican

Sisters of Charity of Presentation of the Blessed Virgin, Inc.,

415 Mass. 381, 387 n.11 (1993); John Hancock Prop. & Cas. Ins.

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Co. v. Scannell, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 906, 908-909 (2005); Morel,

60 Mass. App. Ct. at 383. Indeed, had the Supreme Judicial

Court intended financial dependency to significantly outweigh

the other factors, as Metcalfe suggests, much of the court's

analysis in Vaiarella would be superfluous. Vaiarella, at 527-

529. We do not read Vaiarella in such a way. Cf. Donis v.

American Waste Servs., LLC, 485 Mass. 257, 266 (2020).

Having reviewed the material facts, we conclude that

Steven, as a matter of law, is not a member of Elizabeth's

household and not insured under the East Longmeadow policy. See

Vaiarella, 409 Mass. 529-530. Accordingly, the judgment is

reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for

entry of a declaration consistent with this memorandum and

order.

So ordered.

By the Court (Meade,
Desmond & Wood, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: January 15, 2026.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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