DEBRA DEPAUL MULLOY v. JONATHAN CRAFTS & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

2024-P-1228

DEBRA DEPAUL MULLOY

vs.

JONATHAN CRAFTS & others.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff appeals from a judgment of a Superior Court

judge dismissing the plaintiff's legal malpractice complaint

filed on July 11, 2023, against the defendant lawyers, whose

representation of the plaintiff in connected criminal and civil

actions concluded in 2020. The judge ruled that the plaintiff's

complaint was time-barred, finding that her claims relating to

the criminal action accrued by December 2018 and that her claims

relating to the civil action accrued by July 1, 2020.

Accordingly, the judge allowed the defendants' motion to

dismiss, finding that the July 11, 2023, action was filed beyond

1 Issac Garcia-Dale, Thomas E. Dwyer, Jr., and Dwyer LLC.
the three-year statute of limitations governing legal

malpractice claims, G. L. c. 260, § 4. We affirm.

Discussion. "We review the allowance of a motion to

dismiss de novo." Magliacane v. Gardner, 483 Mass. 842, 848

(2020), quoting Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass.

674, 676 (2011). "For purposes of that review, [in addition to

accepting] as true the facts alleged in the plaintiffs'

complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, [we draw] all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor." Magliacane,

supra, quoting Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 476 Mass.

591, 595 (2017).

The plaintiff first argues that her claims against the

defendant attorneys were for breach of contract and negligence,

so the judge erred in treating them all as "legal malpractice"

claims. She urges us to examine each theory separately under

the six-year statute of limitations governing certain contract

actions in G. L. c. 260, § 2. This argument fails.

General Laws c. 260, § 4, provides that, "Actions of

contract or tort for malpractice, error or mistake against

attorneys . . . shall be commenced only within three years next

after the cause of action accrues" (emphasis added). Here, the

plaintiff brought an action against her attorneys, alleging "the

defendants failed to provide adequate representation and legal

2
services to the plaintiff," and asserting claims for breach of

contract and negligence. This is the precise type of action the

language of G. L. c. 260, § 4 addresses. The judge was correct

in so characterizing the plaintiff's claims and in applying the

time limit in G. L. c. 260, § 4 to them.

The plaintiff next argues that the judge erred in

calculating when her claims accrued. She argues she was never

served with the defendants' motion to withdraw in the civil

action so all of her claims accrued, at the earliest, by the

July 16, 2020, hearing date on the motion for default, rendering

her July 11, 2023, filing timely. We disagree.

A cause of action for legal malpractice accrues when the

plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that she has sustained

appreciable harm because of a defendant's negligence, see

Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 473 (1996), or when the attorney

terminates representation of the plaintiff in the undertaking.

See Murphy v. Smith, 411 Mass. 133, 136-137 (1991). We address

the accrual of the plaintiff's claims relating to the

defendants' representation in the criminal case and civil case

in turn.

The plaintiff first alleges malpractice by the defendants

in connection with the criminal case against her, contending

they did not show her the full contents of her plea agreement

3
before its execution. The absolute latest the plaintiff could

have learned about the contents of the plea agreement was at her

December 2018 sentencing hearing. At this time, she knew or

should have known of any appreciable harm suffered because of

the defendants' handling of her criminal case. See Vinci v.

Byers, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 138-140 (2005). The plaintiff's

claim for legal malpractice based on this representation thus

accrued by December 2018.

The plaintiff next alleges malpractice by the defendants in

connection with the civil case against her, asserting numerous

wrongful actions around January 2020. The defendants'

representation of the plaintiff ended in late February 2020 when

the judge allowed their motion to withdraw as counsel. The

plaintiff claims she was not served with the defendants' motion

to withdraw and that she wrote the defendants on June 25, 2020,

inquiring about their failure to file an answer to the civil

complaint against her. Taking these allegations as true, the

plaintiff knew of the defendants' alleged wrongdoing -- failure

to file an answer -- by June 25, 2020, at the latest. The

Supreme Judicial Court tolled all civil statutes of limitations

from March 17, 2020, through June 30, 2020, due to the Covid-19

pandemic. See Second Updated Order Regarding Court Operations

Under the Exigent Circumstances Created by the Covid-19

4
(Coronavirus) Pandemic, No. OE-144, par. 12 (May 26, 2020);

Third Updated Order Regarding Court Operations Under the Exigent

Circumstances Created by the Covid-19 (Coronavirus) Pandemic,

No. OE-144 (June 24, 2020). Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim

for legal malpractice accrued no later than July 1, 2020.

The plaintiff filed this action on July 11, 2023, more than

three years after both claims accrued. As such, it is time-

barred under G. L. c. 260, § 4, and the judge correctly

dismissed the complaint.2

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin, Shin &
Singh, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: January 23, 2026.

2 The parties have briefed the plaintiff's ability to make
out a malpractice claim. We decline to reach these arguments.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

5