Robert X. Jenkins v. Shantal M. Jenkins.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-1020

ROBERT X. JENKINS

vs.

SHANTAL M. JENKINS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The mother, Shantal M. Jenkins, appeals from a judgment of

contempt entered by a Probate and Family Court judge.

Concluding that the mother is obligated to obey the modification

judgment of the court, from which she has neither appealed nor

filed a motion for relief, we affirm.

On November 7, 2022, the parties entered into a stipulation

that, among other things, requires the mother to pay the father

$13 per week (in addition to base child support) and to provide

proof of her current address. A judge issued a judgment of

modification on April 26, 2023, requiring the mother to abide by
the stipulation and to pay $319 per week in base child support.1

The mother neither appealed this judgment nor filed a motion for

relief from this judgment.

On March 19, 2025, the court held a trial on the father's

complaint for contempt. The father testified that the mother

failed to make any of the $13 per week payments and that she

failed to provide proof of her address. The mother refused to

answer the judge's questions about this. She stated that the

stipulation "was made also under duress," but described no

duress other than that the father had physical custody of the

children and she "was upset."2

1 The mother suggests in passing that she was not notified
of the April 26, 2023, hearing in which the judgment was
discussed. The docket sheet does not reflect her absence, and
it does not appear that the mother ordered a transcript of the
April 26, 2023, hearing. In any event, this is a matter that
could have been raised in a motion for relief from judgment.

2 The mother also testified that, despite having employment,
she had "no money to support myself and the children and give
[the father] 13." The mother makes no argument on appeal that
she was incapable of making the payment or providing proof of
address, and thus any such argument on appeal is waived. See
Tody's Serv., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 496 Mass. 197, 199
n.3 (2025). Moreover, she has failed to provide us with the
financial statements we would need to determine whether the
judge erred in implicitly finding that the mother was capable of
paying $13.00 per week. See Friedman v. Division of Admin. Law
Appeals, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 821 (2024), quoting Lodigiani
v. Paré, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 140, 141 n.3 (2023) ("We stress that
it is an appellant's duty to produce an appendix containing all
portions of the record relevant to the issues raised on
appeal").

2
The mother argues that the stipulation should be

disregarded because it "was executed under duress." She did not

establish at trial that the stipulation was executed under

duress, which is defined as being "under the influence of such

fear as precludes [the signer] from exercising free will and

judgment." Biliouris v. Biliouris, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 149, 156

(2006), quoting Coveney v. President & Trustees of the College

of the Holy Cross, 388 Mass. 16, 22 (1983). See Okoli v. Okoli,

81 Mass. App. Ct. 371, 378 n.12 (2012) ("agreements were

invalidated due to duress only where one party held absolute and

preclusive control over an essential element of the divorce").

The terms were quite simple, and thus the mother's assertion

that she lacked "a meaning opportunity . . . to understand or

negotiate its terms" lacks credibility. The fact that she was

not provided with counsel does not invalidate the stipulation; a

parent is not entitled to appointed counsel in a custody dispute

with another parent, much less in a dispute over child support

payments and verification of a home address. See Ryan v.

Lovendale, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 564, 569 (2025).

Moreover, the mother was found in contempt not for

violating the stipulation, but for violating the judgment of the

court dated April 26, 2023. She could have challenged that

judgment by appealing it or by filing a motion for relief from

3
judgment. See Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60 (b). She could not

simply disobey it, as "an attack on a judgment is not ordinarily

a defense to a charge of contempt for disobeying the judgment."

Banville v. Banville, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 951, 952 (1986). See

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 431 Mass. 705, 707 (2000). Until such

time -- if ever -- that she obtains relief from (or a

modification of) that judgment, she must obey it.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono,
Ditkoff & D'Angelo, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: March 6, 2026.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

4