Commonwealth v. Raycha Mojica.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-1285

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

RAYCHA MOJICA.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Raycha Mojica, was charged in the District

Court with several drug and firearms offenses, including

carrying a loaded firearm without a license in violation of

G. L. c. 269, §§ 10 (a) and 10 (n). The firearm in question was

recovered during the execution of a warrant to search the

defendant's car. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence

seized from her car on grounds that the warrant was issued

without probable cause and lacked particularity. A District

Court judge allowed the defendant's motion, and the Commonwealth

obtained leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We affirm the

order granting the motion to suppress.
Discussion. "Whether a search warrant is supported by

probable cause 'is a question of law that we review de novo.'"

Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 482 Mass. 850, 866 (2019), quoting

Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 102 (2017). "That review

begins and ends with the four corners of the affidavit"

(quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Defrancesco,

99 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 211 (2021). "The basic question for the

magistrate, when evaluating an affidavit supporting an

application for the issuance of a search warrant, is whether

there is a substantial basis on which to conclude that the

articles or activity described are probably present or occurring

at the place to be searched." Commonwealth v. Spano, 414 Mass.

178, 184 (1993). Where, as here, the search warrant pertains to

a vehicle, the supporting affidavit must establish "a timely

nexus" between the criminal activity and the vehicle, such that

evidence of that activity "reasonably could be expected to be

found there." Commonwealth v. Wade, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 651

(2005).

Here, the police applied for warrants to search the

defendant's residence and car for evidence that the defendant

was selling crack cocaine.1 The applications were supported by

1 The defendant does not challenge the issuance of the
warrant to search her residence.

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the same affidavit. The affidavit described an investigation

into suspected drug distribution out of the defendant's

residence in Springfield, based on reports from a confidential

informant that he had purchased crack cocaine from the defendant

through the second-floor bathroom window on the back side of the

house "on multiple occasions." The informant also stated that

the defendant drove a black Acura MDX. Police conducted

surveillance of the house and saw a black Acura MDX parked in

the driveway. It was registered to the defendant at that

address, and the informant identified the defendant as the

person who sold him drugs, presumably from a photograph that the

affiant obtained from the Registry of Motor Vehicles.

The affidavit described three controlled buys of crack

cocaine from the defendant, all arranged by the informant by

placing a telephone call to the defendant. The first and third

buys were conducted out of the second-floor rear bathroom window

of the residence. The second controlled buy, which took place

about three weeks before the police applied for the search

warrants, was the only transaction that involved the defendant's

car. When the informant telephoned the defendant to arrange a

purchase, she told him she was not home but would arrive

shortly. When she arrived in the Acura and pulled into the

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driveway, the informant approached the driver's side of the car

and bought crack cocaine from the defendant through the window.

The Commonwealth argues that the description of this second

buy permits a reasonable inference that the defendant kept a

ready supply of crack cocaine in her car. We disagree.

Generally, "[a] controlled purchase of narcotics, supervised by

the police, provides probable cause to issue a search warrant."

Commonwealth v. Warren, 418 Mass. 86, 89 (1994). However, the

circumstances of the controlled buy must support an inference

that contraband will be found in the particular location to be

searched, at the time the warrant is executed. To establish

probable cause to search a car, the supporting affidavit must

contain evidence establishing a pattern of drug distribution and

specific facts demonstrating the car's involvement in the drug-

related activity. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Staines, 441 Mass.

521, 526 (2004) (undercover officer conducted six controlled

narcotics buys, all from defendant's car, and defendant appeared

to stash additional drugs in car); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 66

Mass. App. Ct. 515, 524 (2006) ("extensive drug operation"

involved multiple sites of sale; car served as meeting place for

defendant and cohort; defendant returned to car to retrieve

drugs during sale, suggesting "drugs were kept and ready in the

car"; and defendant used car during drug sale within seventy-two

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hours of issuance of warrant); Commonwealth v. Dion, 31 Mass.

App. Ct. 168, 174 (1991) ("connection between the automobile and

the contraband was established by the defendant's suspicious

behavior in attempting to hide the automobile key while he was

being booked on a drug charge," plus recent break-ins at

defendant's apartment permitted "inference that the defendant

was storing drugs in the automobile as a safer depository").

See also Commonwealth v. Burt, 393 Mass. 703, 716 (1985)

(probable cause to search car where defendants accused of

larceny were observed moving packages between cars and

residences, and where "hasty disposal of [contraband] could have

been risky"). The affidavit in this case contained no evidence

suggesting that "the defendant used the vehicle to store drugs,"

"that the defendant routinely carried an inventory of drugs

ready for delivery," or that the car was otherwise integral to

the defendant's drug distribution operation. Wade, 64 Mass.

App. Ct. at 651-652. We are left to rely on the informant's

description of just one controlled buy involving the defendant's

car, approximately three weeks before the warrant application

was submitted.

At best, the facts in the affidavit permitted an inference

that the defendant engaged in drug distribution out of her house

and, on one occasion, conducted a transaction from her car upon

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her return to her house. That is inadequate to establish

probable cause to search the car. See Commonwealth v. Pina, 453

Mass. 438, 442 (2009) (search warrant for apartment not

supported by probable cause where based on "single observation"

of sale of cocaine from motor vehicle at another location three

days before warrant application); Commonwealth v. Reddington,

395 Mass. 315, 323 (1985) ("information as to a single

transaction [that] could be seen to describe no more than an

isolated event in the past . . . would not create probable cause

to believe that similar or other improper conduct is continuing

to occur" [citation omitted]).

Moreover, to the extent the single transaction established

a nexus between the defendant's drug distribution operation and

the Acura, it was not a timely nexus, having occurred three

weeks before the warrant was sought. The Commonwealth argues

that the affidavit provided evidence of an ongoing or continuous

drug distribution activity, curing any staleness problem. See

Commonwealth v. Cruz, 430 Mass. 838, 843 (2000) (ongoing

criminal activity cured staleness of warrant issued two weeks

after last controlled buy); Commonwealth v. Colon, 80 Mass. App.

Ct. 162, 170 (2011) (ongoing criminal activity cured staleness

of warrant issued four days after last controlled buy from

defendant and two days after defendant conducted "street-level

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drug transactions"). However, here, the affidavit described a

continuing operation out of the defendant's house, not out of

her car. "Information establishing that a person is guilty of a

crime does not necessarily constitute probable cause to search"

a particular location. Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197,

213, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983). Evidence of continuing

criminal activity out of the defendant's house was not

sufficient to overcome the three-week gap between the single

transaction out of the defendant's car and the issuance of the

warrant. The motion judge correctly concluded that the warrant

application failed to establish a reasonable inference that

evidence of drug distribution would be found in the defendant's

car.

We also note that the warrant to search the car did not

provide any description of the items the police were authorized

to search for. The Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of

Rights require that a warrant describe with particularity the

place to be searched and the items to be seized. See

Commonwealth v. Padilla, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 138, 141 & n.3

(2024). "By defining and limiting the scope of the search,

these constitutional and statutory particularity requirements

prohibit general warrants amounting to 'exploratory rummaging in

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a person's belongings.'" Commonwealth v. Molina, 476 Mass. 388,

394 (2017), quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467

(1971). Where the Commonwealth seeks to search two separate

locations, each warrant must independently satisfy the

particularity requirement. We emphasize that this

constitutional obligation applies regardless of whether related

warrants are sought in the same investigation. See Commonwealth

v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 521-529 (2017) (reviewing

particularity of each warrant independently where multiple

warrants issued). Because we conclude that the warrant

application did not establish probable cause to search the

Acura, we need not address whether the Commonwealth carried "its

burden of demonstrating that the affidavit was attached to the

search warrant or present at its execution." Padilla, supra at

143-144.

Order granting motion to
suppress affirmed.

By the Court (Massing,
Ditkoff & Hand, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: June 5, 2026.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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