AMGAD MUKHTAR & Others v. MAURA HEALEY & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-1201

AMGAD MUKHTAR & others1

vs.

MAURA HEALEY2 & others.3

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment issued by a Superior

Court judge dismissing their complaint alleging that numerous

Massachusetts firearm licensing statutes and other laws are

unconstitutional. Like the motion judge, we conclude that the

1Robert Egri, Katalin Egri, Michael Bush, Edward Chisholm,
Vincent Cedrone, Phillip McLaine, and Joshua Ulrich.

2Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in her
official and individual capacities.

3Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, in her official and individual capacities;
Geoffrey D. Noble, Colonel of the Massachusetts State Police, in
his official capacity; Jordan Maynard, Chair of the
Massachusetts Gaming Commission, in his official and individual
capacities; Terrence M. Reidy, Secretary of the Executive Office
of Public Safety and Security, in his official and individual
capacities; and the Massachusetts Port Authority, intervener.
plaintiffs failed to establish standing to challenge any of the

laws except for the licensing fee. Further concluding that

binding Supreme Judicial Court precedent forecloses the

challenge to the licensing fee, we affirm.

1. Standard of review. "We review de novo the dismissal

of a complaint under either rule 12 (b) (1) or (6)." Hladik v.

LPL Fin. LLC, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 592, 594 (2026).4 "Where a

party's challenge [to standing] is supported by affidavits or

other matters outside the record, the challenge is factual and

the burden falls to the nonmoving party to prove jurisdictional

facts." Id. at 595. By contrast, where the challenge is

unsupported by matters outside the complaint, the allegations of

the complaint are "taken as true for purposes of resolving the

complaint." Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 437 Mass. 505,

516 n.13 (2002). Here, the defendants presented extrinsic

evidence regarding only the Firearms Control Advisory Board. In

reviewing whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, we invariably "accept the allegations in

the complaint as true and draw 'all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff[s'] favor.'" Allegaert v. Harbor View Hotel Owner

LLC, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 486 (2021), quoting Baptiste v.

4 Because we review the dismissal de novo, the alleged
procedural irregularities in the Superior Court are immaterial.

2
Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 97 Mass. App. Ct.

110, 114 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2626 (2021).

2. Standing. "A party has standing when it can allege an

injury within the area of concern of the statute, regulatory

scheme, or constitutional guarantee under which the injurious

action has occurred." Gibson v. Department of Correction, 106

Mass. App. Ct. 201, 206 (2025), quoting Doe No. 1 v. Secretary

of Educ., 479 Mass. 375, 386 (2018). "Simply alleging injury

alone is not sufficient and '[i]njuries that are speculative,

remote, and indirect' do not confer proper standing." Pugsley

v. Police Dep't of Boston, 472 Mass. 367, 371 (2015), quoting

Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court,

448 Mass. 15, 21 (2006).

Here, the plaintiffs allege that they would act in various

ways currently prohibited by law were it not for those laws.

Each such allegation is conclusory. For example, the plaintiffs

allege that they "would bear arms on the property of and in

schools, colleges, and universities were it not for M.G.L.

Chapter 269 § 10(j)," and that they "have each been on the

property of and in schools, colleges, and universities multiple

times and intend to continue doing so." Nowhere in their

complaint do the plaintiffs provide any plan to act in these

3
ways, state which institutions they intend to visit, or explain

why they so desire to visit them while armed.

It is, of course, true that "when fear of criminal

prosecution under an allegedly unconstitutional statute is not

imaginary or wholly speculative a plaintiff need not 'first

expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to

challenge [the] statute.'" Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l

Union, 442 U.S. 289, 302 (1979), quoting Steffel v. Thompson,

415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974). Nonetheless, the plaintiffs must

produce factual allegations that raise their assertion of

standing beyond the speculative. The sort of boilerplate

attempt to manufacture standing by ipse dixit attempted here is

not permitted. As the United States Supreme Court explained,

"'some day' intentions -- without any description of concrete

plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day

will be -- do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent'

injury that our cases require." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992). The standing analysis concerns itself

with whether the plaintiffs actually face an imminent injury,

not whether they can recite the magic words in their complaint.

Similarly, it is hardly fair to the future plaintiff with

potentially an actual need, for instance, to bring a firearm

into a municipal building (for example, a municipal employee

4
with a dangerous ex-lover) to allow the legality of this

prohibition to be litigated by litigants without a concrete

stake in the question to be litigated.

The case relied upon by the plaintiffs, Susan B. Anthony

List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014), is in accord. There,

"[b]oth petitioners ha[d] pleaded specific statements they

intend[ed] to make in future election cycles," and supported

these specific statements with examples of "substantially

similar activity" in the past. Id. at 161. Unlike the

petitioners in Susan B. Anthony List, the plaintiffs here have

provided no specific averments. The motion judge properly

determined that they lack standing to raise any of their claims

except for their challenge to the licensing fee.

3. Licensing fee. Except for Kaitin Egri, each of the

plaintiffs has a license to carry firearms and thus has been

directly harmed by the $100 fee to obtain a license to carry.

See G. L. c. 140, § 121F (o) (i). The Supreme Judicial Court

has held that a licensing scheme with reasonable processing

delays and fees is consistent with the Second Amendment. See

Commonwealth v. Marquis, 495 Mass. 434, 458-459 (2025), cert.

denied, 223 L. Ed. 2d 520 (2026). This is consistent with the

United States Supreme Court's statement in dicta that such

licensing schemes are constitutional unless "lengthy wait times

5
in processing license applications or exorbitant fees deny

ordinary citizens their right to public carry." New York State

Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 38 n.9 (2022). It is

true, as the plaintiffs point out, that the Supreme Judicial

Court was considering the fee imposed on nonresident applicants,

but we can see no reason why that would make a constitutional

difference.5

Finally, the plaintiffs assert that a violation of equal

protection arises from the reduced or waived fees provided to

certain government officials, gunsmiths, and elderly persons.

They provide no argument -- nor do we envision any -- that there

is no rational basis for these reasonable exemptions. Rather,

they argue that strict scrutiny is required "whenever a

fundamental right is implicated." This is not so. Rather,

"strict scrutiny applies only where State action 'significantly

interfere[s] with' the fundamental right at issue,' not simply

where State action involves a fundamental right (citations

omitted)." Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 Mass. 81, 87 (2022). The

plaintiffs make no argument -- nor could they -- that the $100

5 The plaintiffs also state that they are preserving the
issue whether Marquis was properly decided for review by the
Supreme Judicial Court, presumably on further appellate review.
We acknowledge that this claim was fully raised here. We, of
course, are bound to follow the law as set forth by the Supreme
Judicial Court. See Commonwealth v. Colon, 52 Mass. App. Ct.
725, 730 n.1 (2001).

6
fee significantly interferes with the fundamental right to bear

arms. Accordingly, the motion judge properly concluded that the

plaintiffs' complaint on this point failed to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted.6

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Shin, Ditkoff &
Tan, JJ.7),

Clerk

Entered: June 5, 2026.

6 The plaintiffs argue in passing that the motion judge
should have granted them leave to amend their complaint.
Denials of such motions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
See Chang v. Winklevoss, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 202, 212 (2019). A
motion to amend must attach a proposed complaint or "describe[]
the proposed amendment in enough detail to meet the notice
pleading requirement." Williamson v. Barlam, 103 Mass. App. Ct.
727, 737 (2024). Accord Johnston v. Box, 453 Mass. 569, 582
(2009). Here, the plaintiffs provided no description of any
proposed amendments but rather asked the court to identify how
they should amend their complaint. The motion judge acted
within his discretion in declining this invitation.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

7