Baystone Revere LLC v. Marian Omidiji.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-1237

BAYSTONE REVERE LLC

vs.

MARIAN OMIDIJI.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Marian Omidiji, a self-represented litigant,

appeals from an Eastern Housing Court judge's order denying the

defendant's "Motion to Withdraw Agreement for Judgment and

Dismiss the case" pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass.

828 (1974) (rule 60 [b]). The defendant principally contends

that (1) the judge abused her discretion in denying the

defendant's motion, and (2) defects in the notice to quit

rendered the agreement for judgment void. We affirm.

Background. On December 6, 2024, the plaintiff, Baystone

Revere LLC, sent the defendant a notice to quit for nonpayment

of rent. The plaintiff filed a summary process complaint on

January 10, 2025. On March 7, 2025, the parties participated in
mediation with a housing specialist but did not reach an

agreement to settle. The defendant did not appear at the March

24, 2025 trial and, on March 26, 2025, a judge entered a default

judgment against the defendant. On April 28, after a hearing, a

judge allowed the defendant's motion to vacate the default

judgment and scheduled a trial for May 12, 2025.

On May 12, 2025, the plaintiff and the defendant

participated in mediation with a housing specialist, the parties

signed an agreement for judgment, and the case was reported

settled to the trial judge. The next day, the defendant filed a

rule 60 (b) "Motion to Withdraw Agreement for Judgment and

Dismiss the case," contending that the plaintiff's notice to

quit was defective, she did not understand her rights, and that

the plaintiff's signing of the settlement agreement was neither

knowing nor voluntary. On May 14, 2025, the trial judge

approved the agreement for judgment. On June 2, 2025, the judge

who previously had allowed the defendant's motion to vacate the

March 26, 2025 default judgment held a hearing on the

defendant's rule 60 (b) motion to withdraw the agreement and

dismiss the case. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge

denied the motion. On June 3, 2025, the judge's order denying

the motion entered on the docket.

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On June 11, 2025, the defendant filed a notice of appeal

"from Judgment dated 06/02/2025." On July 18, 2025, the same

judge who heard the motion to withdraw the agreement "denied"

the notice of appeal as untimely from the May 14, 2025 judgment

and directed the defendant to file a notice of appeal from the

postjudgment order. However, a single justice of this court

ruled that the June 11, 2025 notice of appeal was a timely

appeal from the June 2, 2025 postjudgment order, and directed

the Housing Court to assemble the record for this appeal.

Discussion. 1. The motion judge's order. "We review the

denial of a motion under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) for abuse of

discretion." Matter of M.C., 481 Mass. 336, 344 (2019). "[A]

judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of

discretion where we conclude the judge made a 'clear error of

judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision, such

that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable

alternatives" (citation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470

Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). "We accord the credibility

determinations of the judge who heard the testimony of the

parties . . . [and] observed their demeanor . . . the utmost

deference" (quotation and citation omitted). Noelle N. v.

Frasier F., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 664 (2020).

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The defendant advances several arguments to challenge the

judge's order denying her rule 60 (b) motion, none of which rise

to the level of appellate argument.1 See Mass. R. A. P.

16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).

Nevertheless, to the extent that the defendant contends that the

judge's denial of the rule 60 (b) motion was an abuse of

discretion, we disagree. See Matter of M.C., 481 Mass. at 344.

The judge's order denying the defendant's "Motion to

Withdraw Agreement for Judgment and Dismiss the case" states, in

full: " DENIED. This Court does not find any merit to the

defendant's claim that she 'did not understand the terms of the

Agreement for Judgment.'"2 During the motion hearing, the judge

repeatedly stated that she did not believe the defendant's claim

1 Namely, the defendant contends: (1) that the judge
erroneously believed that she could not rule on the merits of
the rule 60 (b) motion (though the judge, in fact did so);
(2) that the judge arbitrarily considered the defendant's
"sophistication" when stating why she did not credit the
defendant; (3) that the mediation scheduled on the same day as
the bench trial was a "surprise" meriting relief pursuant to
rule 60 (b); and (4) that the motion judge's conduct and
dismissal of her notice of appeal showed bias and contempt. To
the extent that the defendant supports these arguments with case
law, the defendant cites Federal law that is irrelevant to the
issues on appeal. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as
appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).

2 The defendant's assertion that the judge erroneously
believed that she could not rule on the merits of the motion is
belied by the fact that the judge explicitly denied the motion
on the merits.

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that the defendant did not understand she had signed an

agreement for judgment. The judge supported this credibility

determination with her knowledge of the advisements that housing

specialists provide to parties prior to mediation, the

advisements on the consent to mediation form that the defendant

signed,3 and the fact that the defendant's motion demonstrated a

degree of sophistication. The judge was well supported in not

crediting the defendant's claim that she did not understand the

terms of the agreement for judgment. See Noelle N., 97 Mass.

App. Ct. at 664. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in

the judge's denial of the defendant's rule 60 (b) motion. See

Matter of M.C., 481 Mass. at 344.

2. Notice to quit. We also disagree with the defendant's

contention that the notice to quit was defective such that it

rendered the Agreement for Judgment "void ab initio." To be

sure, the notice to quit that the plaintiff sent to the

defendant did omit required information on rental assistance

programs, applicable trial court rules, and relevant Federal or

State restrictions on residential evictions. See G. L. c. 186,

3 The judge explicitly noted that the consent to mediation
form that the defendant signed states that "[m]ediation is a
voluntary and confidential process," and "[t]he parties
understand that they have a right to be heard and [the case]
decided by a judge if any party does not want to meet with a
housing specialist, any party wants to end mediation once it
begins, or the parties do not settle."

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§ 31. However, "[t]o be void, a judgment must issue from a

court that 'lacked jurisdiction over the parties, lacked

jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failed to provide due

process of law'" (citation omitted). McIntire, petitioner, 458

Mass. 257, 264 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1012 (2011). The

notice to quit did not cause the court to lack jurisdiction

because "the issue whether a notice to quit is legally adequate

is not jurisdictional." See Cambridge St. Realty, LLC v.

Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 128 (2018). We are also satisfied that

any omissions from the notice to quit did not deny the defendant

due process of law. See McIntire, petitioner, supra. The

motion judge held a hearing on the defendant's motion and had

previously allowed the defendant's motion to vacate the March

26, 2025 default judgment. See Spenlinhauer v. Spencer Press,

Inc., 81 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 65 (2011) ("Due process

fundamentally requires notice and the opportunity to be heard at

a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" [quotations and

citation omitted]). As a result, any defects in the notice to

quit did not deny the defendant due process, the judgment is not

void, and the judge did not err or abuse her discretion in

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denying the rule 60 (b) motion on that basis. See Matter of

M.C., 481 Mass. at 344.

Order dated June 2, 2025,
denying motion to withdraw
agreement for judgment and
to dismiss case, affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin,
Desmond & Allen, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: June 9, 2026.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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