COMMONWEALTH v. DAWSON D., a Juvenile.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1149

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

DAWSON D., a juvenile.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury-waived trial, the juvenile was adjudicated

delinquent for carrying a firearm without a license. On appeal

the juvenile argues that the evidence was insufficient to show

that he possessed the firearm. We affirm. 1

1The juvenile challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
through a motion for a required finding of not delinquent at the
close of the Commonwealth's case and a posttrial motion to
reconsider. The Commonwealth asserts that only the order
denying reconsideration is properly before us because the
juvenile did not file a notice of appeal from the adjudication
of delinquency itself. We disagree. The adjudication of
delinquency entered on the docket on April 29, 2024. After the
judge denied the juvenile's motion to reconsider on May 22,
2024, the juvenile filed a notice of appeal on May 24, 2024,
which was timely both as to the adjudication of delinquency and
the order denying reconsideration. See Mass. R. A. P. 4 (b), as
appearing in 489 Mass. 1601 (2022). Although the notice of
appeal refers to the order denying reconsideration as the order
being appealed from, that does not, as the Commonwealth
Background. At around 2 A.M. on September 30, 2023,

Shrewsbury police officer Eric Sloan was monitoring traffic when

he saw a vehicle with faulty rear license plate lights, making

him "unable to read the license plate from the required distance

of 60 feet away." Officer Sloan pulled his cruiser into traffic

and behind the vehicle. As he did so, the vehicle first slowed

down under the posted speed limit and then "took an erratic lane

change." Officer Sloan conducted a query on the vehicle's

registration, which returned a "no status found on record,"

indicating that the registered owner did not have a valid

driver's license.

Officer Sloan activated his cruiser lights and initiated a

traffic stop. The vehicle did not pull over immediately but

went an additional sixty feet, slowing to about five miles per

hour before coming "to a slow, rolling stop." While this was

happening, Officer Sloan "had [his] spotlight on the back

window, and [he] could see the rear passengers moving around and

reaching into the back trunk area." Both of the passengers

suggests, deprive us of jurisdiction to review the adjudication
of delinquency itself. See Mass. R. A. P. 3 (c) (1) (A), as
appearing in 491 Mass. 1601 (2023) (notice of appeal in criminal
case need designate only "the party or parties taking the
appeal"). See also Mass. R. A. P. 3 (c) (3), 491 Mass. 1602
(2023) ("An appeal should not be dismissed for minor defects,
such as . . . a technical error in how the judgment, decree,
adjudication, or separately appealable order is identified, if
it is otherwise clear from the notice what is being appealed").

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"were turned, reaching around in the backseat or behind the

backseat area."

Officer Sloan approached the vehicle, which had four

occupants: the driver, a front-seat passenger, and the two

backseat passengers. The juvenile was one of the backseat

passengers. When Officer Sloan asked the driver for his license

and registration, the driver provided a name and birthdate but

said he did not have a license on him and that the vehicle was a

rental and had no registration. Officer Sloan then noticed that

none of the passengers were wearing seatbelts and asked for

their names and birthdates. When Officer Sloan called in the

information provided, "none of the information of any of the

occupants was able to be located by dispatch." 2 Determining that

nobody in the vehicle had a valid driver's license, Officer

Sloan began issuing exit orders.

By this point other officers had arrived on the scene to

assist. After the juvenile and the other backseat passenger

exited the vehicle, one of the officers saw, in plain view, two

spent nine-millimeter shell casings on the floor of the backseat

2 Police later learned that all of the occupants had
provided false names and birthdates. They further learned that
the occupants were all sixteen years old, under the age required
to obtain a license to carry a handgun. See G. L. c. 140,
§ 131 (d) (iv), as amended through St. 2018, c. 123, §§ 11, 12;
Commonwealth v. Quahir Q., 496 Mass. 748, 749 n.2 (2025).

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passenger compartment. He then discovered a nine-millimeter Sig

P320 firearm under the front passenger seat.

All four occupants were placed under arrest, and the

vehicle was towed to the police station. There, officers

conducted an inventory search of the vehicle. In the rear

hatchback area, there were eight or nine backpacks and "gym

bags," "kind of stacked all over the place." When one of the

officers pulled down a larger bag in the middle of the pile, a

nine-millimeter Taurus firearm fell down "right away" either

from "between the bags" or from "on top." The firearm was

"located directly behind the rear seat," "right up against the

seat back." There was no covering over the hatchback area that

would have obstructed a view of the bags.

At trial the juvenile testified in his own defense that

neither firearm was his, that the Sig P320 firearm recovered

from under the front seat belonged to the front-seat passenger,

and that the Taurus firearm recovered from the hatchback area

belonged to the other backseat passenger. During cross-

examination the juvenile admitted that he knew that the other

passengers were carrying firearms. When shown the Taurus

firearm, 3 the juvenile denied having seen it before and denied

3 Only the Taurus firearm was admitted in evidence, and it
is clear that the judge found the juvenile delinquent based on
his possession of this firearm.

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having moved it right before the traffic stop. When the

prosecutor then asked -- "Did you hold the gun at all?" -- the

juvenile answered, "Yes." In response to the prosecutor's

follow-up question -- "In the car?" -- the juvenile again

answered, "Yes."

Discussion. The juvenile moved for a required finding of

not delinquent at the close of the Commonwealth's case. We

therefore consider the state of the evidence at that point in

the trial to determine whether, in the "light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, notwithstanding the contrary evidence

presented by the [juvenile]," it "was sufficient . . . to permit

the [factfinder] to infer the existence of the essential

elements of the crime charged." Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass.

794, 799 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass.

188, 198 (2006). The Commonwealth can meet its burden of proof

by "rely[ing] entirely upon circumstantial evidence" and the

inferences drawn therefrom. West, supra at 800. Those

inferences "need only be reasonable and possible and need not be

necessary or inescapable." Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Casale,

381 Mass. 167, 173 (1980).

Under a theory of constructive possession, the Commonwealth

needed to show that the juvenile had "knowledge" of the firearm

and "the ability and intention to exercise dominion and control"

over it. Commonwealth v. Than, 442 Mass. 748, 751 (2004),

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quoting Commonwealth v. Sespedes, 442 Mass. 95, 99 (2004). The

Commonwealth's evidence sufficed to establish these elements.

Unlike in Commonwealth v. Romero, 464 Mass. 648, 656-659 (2013),

on which the juvenile relies, this was not a case involving mere

presence and proximity to the firearm. The Commonwealth

presented additional incriminating evidence -- most

significantly, evidence of the juvenile's actions just prior to

the traffic stop. Based on Officer Sloan's testimony that he

saw the juvenile and the other backseat passenger turning around

and reaching into the hatchback area, the judge could reasonably

have inferred that the juvenile was attempting to conceal, or

helping the other passenger conceal, the firearm that was later

found directly behind the backseat. The judge could also have

viewed the juvenile's producing a false name and birthdate as

evidence of consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Albano,

373 Mass. 132, 135 (1977); Commonwealth v. Elysee, 77 Mass. App.

Ct. 833, 846-847 (2010). Viewed favorably to the Commonwealth,

the evidence was sufficient to prove possession. See Than,

supra at 751-752 (evidence sufficient to prove that defendant

possessed handgun found under passenger seat of vehicle he was

driving, where he made movements from which it could be inferred

he "had hurriedly placed the handgun under the passenger seat

before raising his hands to the police"); Elysee, supra at 847

(jury could have found that defendant had control, though not

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exclusive control, of firearm found under his seat in rear of

vehicle, where officers observed "rocking," consistent with

attempt to conceal, originating from rear seat and defendant's

actions suggested consciousness of guilt); Commonwealth v.

Cotto, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 589, 594 (2007) (evidence sufficient to

prove that defendant possessed firearm "found directly under the

front passenger seat where the defendant had been seen shoving

his feet").

Although the juvenile did not move for a required finding

of not delinquent at the close of all the evidence, much of his

brief focuses on the testimony that he gave in his own defense.

Specifically, the juvenile argues that (a) the judge, in

announcing his decision, erred by finding that the juvenile

admitted to "hold[ing] the gun," when the juvenile's testimony

was vague as to which gun, the Taurus or Sig P320, he was

referring to and (b) the juvenile's admission to briefly holding

a firearm owned by another was not, in any event, sufficient to

establish possession where G. L. c. 140, § 130 1/2, allows a

minor to handle a firearm in the presence of its owner. These

arguments provide no basis for reversal. Where the Taurus

firearm was the only one in evidence and the only one shown to

the juvenile at trial, the judge could have inferred that the

juvenile's admission related to that firearm in particular.

More fundamentally, putting aside the juvenile's testimony, the

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evidence presented in the Commonwealth's case-in-chief was

sufficient to prove possession, as discussed above. Finally, to

the extent the juvenile asks us to treat his motion to

reconsider as a motion for a required finding of not delinquent

at the close of all the evidence, he would need to show

deterioration to succeed on such a motion. See O'Laughlin, 446

Mass. at 198. Deterioration occurs where the Commonwealth's

evidence "is later shown to be incredible or conclusively

incorrect." Id. at 203, quoting Kater v. Commonwealth, 421

Mass. 17, 20 (1995). The juvenile's testimony merely

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contradicted certain aspects of the Commonwealth's evidence,

which does not establish deterioration. See O'Laughlin, supra

at 203-204.

Adjudication of delinquency
affirmed.

Order denying motion to
reconsider affirmed.

By the Court (Shin, Ditkoff &
Tan, JJ. 4),

Clerk

Entered: June 15, 2026.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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