Commonwealth v. Rudy Morales.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

20-P-758

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

RUDY MORALES.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of rape of

a child aggravated by a five-year age difference. Finding there

was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, we affirm.

"[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask
whether, taking the evidence and all reasonable inferences
that may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, any rational trier of fact could find
that each of the essential elements of the crime has been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."1

Commonwealth v. Santos, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 3 (2021), citing

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979). Here,

the victim testified that when she was about ten years old, the

defendant (an adult family friend) raped her at his home. That

1 The offense required proof that: (1) the defendant had sexual
intercourse (2) with a victim under twelve years of age, and (3)
there existed more than a five-year age difference between the
defendant and the victim. G. L. c. 265, § 23A (a).
"testimony, which the jury found to be credible, was sufficient,

standing alone, to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt."2

Santos, supra.

The defendant nevertheless argues that the evidence was

insufficient because the victim had a potential reason to lie,

namely that as a rape victim, she could pursue a so-called "U-

Visa" that would allow her and her family to stay in the United

States.3 See Commonwealth v. Sealy, 467 Mass. 617, 621-623

(2014) (providing overview of U-Visa application process). The

U-Visa issue provided the defendant a legitimate basis to

attempt to impeach the credibility of the victim and her mother

who also had testified. See supra, note 3. However, the extent

to which any of the Commonwealth's witnesses was biased was a

2 Although not necessary, the Commonwealth also presented
circumstantial evidence, including the testimony of the victim's
mother, that corroborated much of the victim's testimony. See
Santos, 100 Mass. App. Ct. at 4 ("Corroborative evidence . . .
is of course still admissible, but it is permitted in order to
overcome, not give voice to, the societal tendency to disbelieve
sexual assault victims" [quotations and citations omitted]).

3 The parties stipulated that the victim's mother had a U-Visa
application pending at the time of trial with the same District
Attorney's office that was prosecuting this case. The mother
testified that after school officials brought to her attention
the victim's rape disclosure, the school put her in touch with
an immigration lawyer. That lawyer assisted with the U-Visa
application. Although the immigration status of the victim and
her mother is not clearly established in the record, the jury
reasonably could have concluded that the family may have been
here illegally and that obtaining the U-Visa would have allowed
them to stay in the country.

2
factual question for the jury to resolve. See Sealy, supra at

624-625 (weight to give victim's potential motive to lie was

question for jury). See also Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 Mass.

119, 131 (2010) (where probationer alleged that child rape

victim lied because probationer had "refused to give her ice

cream," it was "a matter for the [fact finder] to decide how

much weight to give the evidence"). The defendant's claim that,

as a matter of law, the presence of the U-Visa issue created

reasonable doubt that precluded a guilty finding is simply an

incorrect statement of the law.4 See Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin,

446 Mass. 188, 203 (2006) ("if the Commonwealth has presented

sufficient evidence that the defendant committed the crime, the

fact that the defendant has presented evidence that he did not

does not affect the sufficiency of the evidence unless the

contrary evidence is so overwhelming that no rational jury could

conclude that the defendant was guilty"). Because it was up to

the jury to assess whether the victim was telling the truth, her

testimony that the defendant raped her sufficed to support the

jury's verdict. The judge did not err in denying the

4 This is true whether the U-Visa issue is considered on its own,
or in combination with the victim's age and the one-year delay
in her reporting the rape.

3
defendant's motions for a required verdict.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Milkey, Walsh &
Smyth, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: June 1, 2023.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

4