Commonwealth v. Matthew S. Grigas.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-643

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

MATTHEW S. GRIGAS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

On appeal from his convictions of various offenses

involving operation of a motor vehicle, the defendant contends

that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he operated

a motor vehicle. Specifically, he contends that the

Commonwealth failed to present evidence sufficient to establish

that the vehicle he operated satisfied the criteria set forth in

G. L. c. 90, § 1. We discern no cause to disturb the judgments,

and affirm.

As a threshold matter, we observe that we are unable to

undertake any evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence,

since the defendant has failed to include a transcript of the

trial evidence in the record on appeal. "It is the defendant's

burden, as appellant, to bring us a satisfactory transcript."

Commonwealth v. Montanez, 388 Mass. 603, 604 (1983). See Mass.
R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019). Without

a transcript of the evidence presented at trial, we are utterly

without any capacity to consider what evidence was presented,

much less whether it was sufficient to establish any particular

question of fact.

In any event, so far as we may tell from the descriptions

of the trial evidence contained in the parties' respective

briefs, we are deeply skeptical of the defendant's argument that

the evidence was insufficient to establish that the vehicle

operated by the defendant was a motor vehicle. The defendant

argues only that the evidence was insufficient to establish that

the vehicle was not exempt -- in particular, the defendant

claims that the Commonwealth failed to show that his vehicle was

capable "of being driven at a speed exceeding twelve miles per

hour." G. L. c. 90, § 1 (defining "Motor vehicles"). As the

Commonwealth observes, however, the jury could readily infer

from Officer Lareau's description of the defendant's attempt to

escape police pursuit that the vehicle could be driven at a

speed exceeding twelve miles per hour. 1

1 Specifically, as described by the Commonwealth in its brief,

"Officer Lareau reported that when he first encountered the
defendant and his companion, the companion was 'able to
take off' on his ATV, implying that it could outrun Officer
Lareau's police vehicle. The defendant also 'attempted to
speed up' on his ATV in an apparent effort to keep up with
his companion, suggesting that his ATV could also have

2
The defendant's attempt to rely on cases arising in the

context of insurance coverage is unavailing, for the reasons

explained in Commonwealth v. Soldega, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 853, 855

n.3 (2011), and Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 56 Mass. App. Ct.

506, 509 (2002).

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Green, C.J.,
Englander & Brennan, JJ. 2),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: March 27, 2024.

outrun the police vehicle, had it not become stuck in a
ditch."

Again, since we do not have a transcript of the trial evidence,
we are unable to determine whether the Commonwealth's
description of the evidence is accurate, or whether any other
evidence bearing on the potential speed of the vehicle was
presented at trial.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

3