SETH WATSON v. CAROL MICI & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-1252

SETH WATSON

vs.

CAROL MICI1 & others.2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff appeals from a Superior Court judgment on the

pleadings on the plaintiff's claims under G. L. c. 30A, § 14,

and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983). Because we conclude that the

plaintiff's allegations do not establish a viable claim for

relief, we affirm.

Background. As the Superior Court judge decided this case

on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we take the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences therefrom in the nonmoving party's favor. See Barron

v. Kolenda, 491 Mass. 408, 415 (2023). The complaint alleges

1Individually and as commissioner of the Department of
Correction.

2Matthew Divris, individually and as superintendent of the
North Central Correctional Institution at Gardner, and the
Department of Correction.
that the plaintiff is incarcerated at the North Central

Correctional Institution at Gardner (NCCI-Gardner). This case

arises from an incident that occurred on June 14, 2020, when the

plaintiff was attacked by a group of inmates. The plaintiff was

transferred to the health services unit to receive medical

treatment. He was told by a correction officer that his

property would be secured immediately. Subsequently he was

placed in the restricted housing unit (RHU) while the attack was

investigated. The plaintiff's belongings were left unattended

for several hours. Prison staff ultimately packed up and

secured his remaining belongings and placed them in storage.

When he was released from the RHU on June 18, the plaintiff went

to retrieve his belongings and found that several of his

personal items were missing, including a television and a tablet

he had recently purchased with his own money.

The next day, the plaintiff filed an informal complaint,

followed by a formal grievance with the institutional grievance

coordinator a few weeks later. The plaintiff's grievance was

denied. The decision stated that, pursuant to 103 Code Mass.

Regs. § 403.21 (2017), the Department of Correction (department)

is not liable for loss, damage, or destruction of inmate

property. Additionally, the grievance coordinator held that

"there is no evidence that you had the claimed missing property

in your possession at the time you went to the Restricted

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Housing Unit." The plaintiff appealed the decision to the

prison superintendent and the denial was affirmed. The

plaintiff sought judicial review of the denial of his grievance

pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and asserted a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants moved for a judgment on the

pleadings under Mass. R. Civ. P 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974),

which the judge allowed. The plaintiff appealed.

Discussion. The plaintiff argues that the judge erred in

allowing the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings.

On the § 1983 claim, the plaintiff argues that the judge erred

by finding that the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that

the defendants had violated the plaintiff's due process rights.

On the G. L. c. 30A, § 14 claim, he argues that the judge failed

to consider the superintendent's mishandling of the grievance

process by skipping required investigatory steps -- in

particular by failing to interview the plaintiff.

"We review de novo a judge's order allowing a motion for

judgment on the pleadings under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365

Mass. 754 (1974)." Merriam v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 464

Mass. 721, 726 (2013).

As to the plaintiff's § 1983 claim, the plaintiff never

alleged that the defendants intentionally deprived him of his

property, but only that they failed to timely secure his items

to prevent them from being stolen. Prison staff secured the

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items approximately three hours after the plaintiff was sent to

the health services unit for medical treatment. Because the

plaintiff has not alleged that prison staff deliberately delayed

securing his personal items in an effort to deprive him of those

items, we understand the plaintiff to be alleging that the staff

acted negligently by not acting more quickly. As the motion

judge noted, however, and as our law provides, such an

allegation of negligence is not sufficient to establish a

deprivation of property without due process under § 1983.3 See

Baptiste v. Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 97 Mass.

App. Ct. 110, 117 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2626 (2021).

The judge therefore was correct in allowing the defendants'

motion as to the § 1983 claim.4

3 The plaintiff argues that the prison superintendent is
liable for the plaintiff's lost property because the
superintendent's conduct amounted to "deliberate indifference"
of the plaintiff's property rights. The allegations with
respect to the superintendent fail to state a claim under
section 1983, because, among other reasons, it is not alleged
that the superintendent played any role in the events that led
to the plaintiff's loss of his property.

4 The plaintiff sued the individual defendants in both their
official and individual capacities. State officials acting in
their official capacities are not "persons" subject to personal
liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and any claim for
equitable relief against the individual defendants in their
official capacities under § 1983 fails for the reasons stated
above. See O'Malley v. Sheriff of Worcester County, 415 Mass.
132, 141-142 (1993). Therefore the motion to dismiss the
defendants in their official capacities was properly allowed as
well.

4
The plaintiff also argues that the defendants failed to

follow the rules for investigations in the prisoner grievance

process. Specifically, he asserts that the department's failure

to interview him as part of its investigation was unlawful. The

judge agreed with the plaintiff that the department erred by not

interviewing him, but the judge determined that this error did

not prejudice the plaintiff's substantial rights because the

department is not liable in this circumstance for lost inmate

property. The judge also stated that "[i]t was rational to

conclude that there was insufficient evidence that plaintiff had

this property at the time he claimed it went missing." But

where the department never interviewed the plaintiff, there was

paperwork indicating he possessed the items, and one item, a

fan, was later found hidden in the ceiling of a bathroom, it was

error to suggest that there was insufficient evidence that the

plaintiff had possessed the missing items. Perhaps had the

department followed its procedures and interviewed the

plaintiff, there would have been sufficient evidence of the

plaintiff's possession of the items.

The error does not require reversal, however, for the

reason raised by the judge. The plaintiff has not met his

burden of demonstrating that he is legally entitled to relief

for negligently lost property through the grievance procedure.

The defendants state that the plaintiff is not, and he cites no

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statute, regulation, or case law to the contrary. We conclude

that, although we need not and do not decide definitively

whether relief is available with respect to such a grievance,

the plaintiff has in this case failed to meet his burden. As

the judge explained, "[e]ven if [the] plaintiff had produced

witnesses who could attest that the missing property had been in

his possession at the time of the assault, nothing in the record

suggests that the outcome would have been different."

Accordingly, we agree with the judge that the plaintiff did not

sufficiently allege that the department's adjudication of his

grievance was arbitrary or capricious. See Kenney v.

Commissioner of Correction, 393 Mass. 28, 35 (1984). The judge

appropriately allowed the defendants' motion as to this claim as

well.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin,
Englander & D'Angelo, JJ.5),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: June 5, 2024.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

6