Thomas S. & Cynthia v. Corrado v. Board of Assessors of the Town of Sharon (September 22, 2011)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD



THOMAS S. & CYNTHIA V. 	   v.	   BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF 
CORRADO					        THE TOWN OF SHARON

Docket No. F307098				   Promulgated:
							   September 22, 2011


	This is an appeal filed under the formal procedure pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65 from the refusal of the appellee to abate taxes on real estate located in the Town of Sharon, owned by and assessed to the appellants under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal year 2010 ("fiscal year at issue").
	Commissioner Rose heard this appeal.  Chairman Hammond and Commissioners Scharaffa, Egan and Mulhern joined him in the decision for the appellee. 
	These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a request by the appellants under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.
		
	Thomas Corrado, pro se, for the appellants.
	Mark Mazur, assessor, for the appellee.


FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
On the basis of the exhibits and testimony offered into evidence during the hearing of this appeal, the Appellate Tax Board ("Board") made the following findings of fact.  
On January 1, 2009, the appellants were the assessed owners of an improved parcel of real estate located at 7 Mink Trap Lane in the Town of Sharon ("subject property").  For the fiscal year at issue, the Board of Assessors of Sharon ("assessors") valued the subject property at $544,500, and assessed a tax thereon, at the rate of $17.92 per thousand, in the total amount of $9,837.09.  In accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 57C, the appellants paid the tax due without incurring interest, and in accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 59, the appellants timely filed an Application for Abatement with the assessors on February 9, 2010. The assessors denied the appellants' abatement application on March 11, 2010, and on June 8, 2010, the appellants seasonably filed an appeal with the Board.  On the basis of these facts, the Board found and ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal.
The subject property consists of a 2.3-acre parcel of land improved with a single-family, Colonial-style home built in 1986. The dwelling, which contains 2,658 square feet of living area and 3,384 square feet of effective living area, has eight rooms, including three bedrooms, two full bathrooms and one half bathroom.  The dwelling's amenities include central air conditioning, a fireplace, a finished basement, a finished enclosed porch, a finished two-car garage, an open porch, and a wooden deck.  
The subject property was the focus of an appeal to the Board for fiscal year 2009. See Corrado  v. Assessors of Sharon, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2010-825 ("Corrado I"). In Corrado I, which is incorporated herein by reference, the Board issued a decision for the assessors having found that the appellants' evidence, which consisted of data relating to purportedly comparable sales and assessments, did not provide reliable or persuasive evidence of the subject property's fair cash value. 
For the fiscal year at issue, the appellants presented their case primarily through the testimony of appellant Thomas Corrado, who argued that the subject property was overvalued. In support of his argument, Mr. Corrado disputed elements of the Board's decision in Corrado I, and submitted various assessment and sales data relating to Sharon for calendar years 2007 through 2010. 
As they did for fiscal year 2009, the appellants offered for consideration a purportedly comparable property located at 121 Furnace Street. The appellants claimed that the 121 Furnace Street property was comparable to the subject property and stated that the assessed value of the subject property was approximately 6.2% higher than the assessed value of 121 Furnace Street for fiscal year 1996, a difference which had progressively grown to approximately 12.6% by fiscal year 2010. According to the appellants, this divergence between the assessed values of the two comparable properties indicated that the subject property's assessment increased without justification, which demonstrated overvaluation of the subject property that was ignored by the Board in Corrado I. The appellants also cited the 2007 sale of 121 Furnace Street for $505,000, arguing that this sale was indicative of the subject property's fair cash value. Finally, the appellants disagreed with the Board's finding in Corrado I that the location of 121 Furnace Street was inferior to the subject property's location, noting both that the average assessed value of properties on Furnace Street was a mere $51,000 lower than on Mink Trap Lane and that two properties on Furnace Street were valued at over one million dollars, more than any property on Mink Trap Lane. The Board found none of these arguments persuasive. 
Although the appellants again claimed that the 121 Furnace Street property provided a basis to establish the fair cash value of the subject property, they failed to submit property record cards or other documentary evidence which would allow the Board to verify claimed comparability and to account for differences between the properties. Absent such evidence, neither the progressive divergence between the properties' assessed values nor the sale of the 121 Furnace Street property provides any basis to establish the fair cash value of the subject property. Further, the appellants failed to demonstrate that the Board's findings in Corrado I relating to the 121 Furnace Street property were not warranted. More specifically, the appellants' generalized assertions regarding relative assessed values on Mink Trap Lane and Furnace Street did not serve to contravene the Board's prior finding that the comparability of the 121 Furnace Street property was greatly compromised because it was in a less desirable neighborhood on a cut-through street and was encumbered by the presence of considerable wetlands and power lines running across its parcel. Corrado I, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2010-829. 
The Board also found that the appellants' contentions regarding the assessed values of homes on Furnace Street relative to those on Mink Trap Lane are not germane to the subject property's value. Assuming the assessment figures presented by the appellants are accurate, the data in no way speak to the particular attributes of the subject property, nor do they provide a basis for comparison with other potentially comparable properties. In sum, the Board found that the evidence relating to the 121 Furnace Street property as well as Furnace Street in general was not sufficiently probative to establish the fair cash value of the subject property.
The appellants also presented a summary of assessed values and sale prices for all Sharon single-family properties from 2007 through 2010. The appellants noted that for each of these calendar years, the aggregate assessed values of the homes exceeded their aggregate sale prices. This differential was as large as 8.3% for 2009 and as small as 1.8% for 2010. According to the appellants, these figures indicate that single-family properties in Sharon, including the subject property, have been overvalued. The Board, however, found that the data were not probative of the value of the subject property.
As a threshold matter, the appellants' argument fails to consider that the relevant assessment date for sales completed in a given calendar year is January first of the preceding year, and the appellants provided no adjustment for market conditions (i.e., sale dates) to account for the temporal disparity between the cited properties' valuation and sale dates, which varies between one and two years. Moreover, the appellants' presentation provides no basis to compare any particular property with the subject property to determine if the subject property was overvalued for the fiscal year at issue. Finally, to the extent that the appellants' presentation may be construed as an allegation of disproportionate assessment, the Board found that it fails for lack of evidence. More specifically, the record contains no evidence to support an assertion that the assessors engaged in a scheme of discriminatory, disproportionate assessment. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Board found that the appellants' presentation of sale prices and assessed values was unavailing.      
For their part, the assessors submitted two sales of properties, located at 38 Knob Hill Street and 5 Canoe River Road, which the Board found were comparable to the subject property. These properties were similar to the subject property in several respects, including neighborhoods, the dwellings' effective living area and their dates of construction. The assessors' analysis incorporated adjustments for various elements of each comparable sale including parcel size and topography, time of sale, and each dwelling's amenities. The Board found that this analysis, including the resultant indicated values, supported the contested assessment. 
Having considered the evidence of record, the Board found that the appellants did not provide a reliable basis to establish the fair cash value of the subject property. The Board therefore found and ruled that the appellants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that the subject property's assessed value exceeded its fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue. The Board also found and ruled that the comparable-sales evidence presented by the assessors supported the disputed assessment. On this basis, the Board issued a decision for the assessors in this appeal. 
OPINION
Assessors are required to assess real estate at its fair cash value.  G.L. c. 59, § 38.  Fair cash value is defined as the price on which a willing seller and a willing buyer will agree if both of them are fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).  
An assessment is presumed valid unless the taxpayers sustain their burden of proving otherwise.  Schlaiker v. Board of Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974).  Accordingly, the burden of proof is upon the appellants to make out their right as a matter of law to an abatement of the tax.  Id. In appeals before this Board, taxpayers "‛may present persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors' valuation.'" General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 600 (1984) (quoting Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 (1983)). 
The present appeal relates to property that was the subject of an appeal for the prior fiscal year.  In support of their assertion that the subject property was overvalued for the fiscal year at issue, the appellants presented a single purportedly comparable property, located at 121 Furnace Street, and compilations of assessment and sales data. The Board found and ruled that none of this evidence provided "persuasive evidence of overvaluation." Id. 
Sales of comparable realty in the same geographic area and within a reasonable time of the assessment date generally contain probative evidence for determining the value of the property at issue. Graham v. Assessors of West Tisbury, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2008-321, 400 (citing McCabe v. Chelsea, 265 Mass. 494, 496 (1929)), aff'd 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1107 (2008). Properties are "comparable" to the subject property when they share "fundamental similarities" with the subject property, including similar age, locations, sizes and dates of sale.  Lattuca v. Robsham, 442 Mass. 205, 216 (2004). 
The appellant bears the burden of "establishing the comparability of . . . properties [used for comparison] to the subject property." Fleet Bank of Mass. v. Assessors of Manchester, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1998-546, 554. Accord New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 470 (1981). "After researching and verifying  . . . data and selecting the appropriate unit of comparison, [an] appraiser adjusts for any differences." appraisal institute, the appraisal of real estate 307 (13th ed. 2008). "Adjustments for differences are made to the price of each comparable property to make that property equivalent to the subject in market appeal on the effective date of the opinion of value." the appraisal of real estate at 430. Further, absent such adjustments various factors would otherwise cause disparities in the comparable prices. See Pembroke Industrial Park Co., Inc. v. Assessors of Pembroke, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1998-1072, 1082.  
	As they had in Corrado I, the appellants claimed that the 121 Furnace Street property was comparable to the subject property, a comparability which served as the foundation for a significant portion of their overvaluation argument. Yet the appellants failed to provide property record cards or other documentary evidence to establish comparability or provide any basis to make adjustments to account for differences between the properties. Further, the appellants failed to contravene the Board's prior finding that the comparability of the 121 Furnace Street property was greatly compromised because it was in a less desirable neighborhood on a cut-through street and was encumbered by the presence of considerable wetlands and power lines running across its parcel. Corrado I, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2010-829. Lacking evidence of comparability or a basis for adjustment to account for differences between the properties, the Board found that any comparison with the 121 Furnace Street property was of little probative value. Similarly, the appellants' data relating to the assessed values of homes on Furnace Street did not speak to the particular attributes of the subject property or provide a basis for comparison with other potentially comparable properties.
In contrast, the assessors submitted two sales of properties, which the Board found were comparable to the subject property. These properties were similar to the subject property in several respects, and the assessors' analysis incorporated adjustments for various elements of each comparable sale. The Board thus found that this analysis, including the resultant indicated values, supported the contested assessment. 
	The appellants also presented sales and assessment data for Sharon single-family properties from 2007 through 2010 indicating that for each of these calendar years the aggregate assessed values of the homes exceeded their aggregate sale prices. The appellants argued that these figures demonstrated that single-family properties in Sharon, including the subject property, had been overvalued. The Board, however, found that the data did not provide probative credible evidence of the subject property's fair cash value.
First, the appellants failed to consider the temporal disparity between the cited properties' valuation and sale dates, which varies between one and two years, and the appellants provided no adjustment for market conditions. Market conditions are one of several transactional elements of comparison integral to the sales comparison valuation approach that "help to explain the variances in the prices paid for real property." the appraisal of real estate at 309. Adjustments for these elements of comparison, in addition to others, are necessary to avoid disparities in comparable properties' sale prices. See Pembroke Industrial Park Co., Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 1998-1082.  
The appellants' submissions also provided no basis to derive an indicated value for the subject property because there is no data relating to any particular property enabling meaningful comparison with the subject property. Absent such comparison, the Board could not determine if the subject property was overvalued for the fiscal year at issue. 
Finally, to the extent that the appellants' presentation may be construed as an assertion of disproportionate assessment, the Board found that it must fail for lack of evidence. "If the taxpayer can demonstrate in an appeal to the [B]oard that he has been a victim of a scheme of discriminatory, disproportionate assessment, he 'may be granted an abatement . . . which will make . . . [his] assessment proportional to other assessments, on a basis which reaches results as close as is practicable to those which would have followed application by the assessors of the proper statutory assessment principles.'"  Coomey v. Assessors of Sandwich, 367 Mass. 836, 838 (1975) (quoting Shoppers' World, Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. 366, 377-78 (1965)).  The burden of proof as to existence of a "scheme of discriminatory, disproportionate assessment" is on the taxpayers.  First National Stores v. Assessors of Somerville, 358 Mass. 554, 559 (1971). In the present matter, the record contains no evidence to support an assertion that the assessors engaged in a scheme of discriminatory, disproportionate assessment. 
On the basis of the foregoing, the Board found and ruled that the appellants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that the assessed value of the subject property exceeded its fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue. Accordingly, the Board issued a decision for the assessors in this appeal.
	    		     
     APPELLATE TAX BOARD


				 By:				_________undefinedundefined_______ __
				     Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman
A true copy,

Attest:	______		_________
	      Clerk of the Board

  This sum included a Community Preservation Act charge of $79.65 that was abated by the assessors on April 20, 2010.
  This discussion assumes that the data provided by the appellants are accurate, although the appellants provided no documentation to support their calculations. 

ATB 2011-816