Cephas, Ronique v. McIntyre

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule
of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to
Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No.: C-03-FM-25-810107
UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 1030
September Term, 2025
______________________________________
RONIQUE CEPHAS
v.
MONAE McINTYRE
______________________________________
Reed,
Shaw,
Eyler, James R.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Reed, J.
_____________________________________
Filed: October 15, 2026

‒Unreported Opinion‒
This is an appeal from the entry of a Final Protective Order issued pursuant to the
domestic violence provisions of the Family Law Article, Md. Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.,
2025 Supp.), §§ 4-501 et seq. of the Family Law Article (“FL”). The parties to this appeal,
Mr. Ronique Cephas (“Mr. Cephas” or “Appellant”) and Ms. Monae McIntyre (“Monae”
or “Appellee”), have two children in common. 1 At the time of these events they were
involved in unrelated litigation over custody of their children. The custody matter is not
before us, and the course of that litigation has no bearing on the issues raised in this appeal.
Nevertheless, the parties’ shared custody provides a factual backdrop because when the
time came for a “visitation exchange” at which Mr. Cephas arrived at Monae’s residence
to pick up the children, a dispute and confrontation between the parents resulted. 2 Cross-
petitions for protective orders followed.
Following the circuit court’s issuance of a Final Protective Order in favor of Monae,
Mr. Cephas filed a timely appeal to this Court. He presents a single question for appellate
1 To avoid confusion, we refer to Ms. McIntyre as “Monae” because the record
contains testimony from her mother, Mrs. Janet McIntyre.
2 The parties “reached an interim agreement” in their custody litigation, agreeing to
shared physical custody and that “all visitation exchanges” would “take place at 2401
Oswego Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland[.]” The “Interim Consent Order” also provided
details as to when visitation exchanges would take place. An amended Order was issued
on October 27, 2025. The Amended Order provided in part that the exchange of the minor
children would continue to take place at the Northern Baltimore City Police Precinct during
the pendency of a Final Protective Order, and thereafter at the maternal grandmother’s
house.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
2
review, 3 as follows: Was there sufficient evidence before the court to support a finding of
abuse? For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm.
INTRODUCTION - M OOTNESS
At the outset, we must consider whether the validity of the Final Protective Order is
a moot issue. The Order in favor of Monae McIntyre that is the subject of this appeal
expired on July 14, 2026. Although the parties have not argued this issue, Mr. Cephas’s
counsel has commendably asked this Court to “vacate the Final Protective Order entered
against Mr. Cephas on July 14, 2025, whether or not the same remains in effect.”
Maryland courts “ordinarily [do] not render judgment on moot questions.” LaValle
v. LaValle, 432 Md. 343, 351 (2013). A “case is considered moot when past facts and
occurrences have produced a situation in which, without any future action, any judgment
or decree the court might enter would be without effect.” Id. (cleaned up). Our Supreme
Court has observed, however, that there are nonetheless several instances in which an
“appeal can ostensibly appear moot, yet appellate review is warranted. First, mootness will
not preclude appellate review in situations where a party can demonstrate that collateral
consequences flow from the lower court’s disposition.” D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys.,
Inc., 465 Md. 339, 352 (2019) (cleaned up). Such is the case here, and on this record, we
3 In his brief, Appellant poses the question, verbatim as:
I. 	Whether it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to issue a final
protective order when there was no evidence to support a finding of
abuse?

‒Unreported Opinion‒
3
will address the merits of Mr. Cephas’s appeal, given the “significant repercussions” or
collateral “consequences” for him that derive from a Final Protective Order. See generally,
Piper v. Layman, 125 Md. App. 745, 752-53 (1999) (describing potential consequences).
B ACKGROUND
Procedural History
The events of June 27, 2025, in which a child custody exchange took place, have
prompted the filing of three petitions for protective relief. On June 28, Mr. Cephas filed his
first Petition for Protective Order in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore
County. (D-08-FM-25-001553). This Petition was denied on June 30. In denying the initial
Petition, the district court reasoned that there was “No Statutory Basis for Relief.” Mr.
Cephas filed his second Petition on the 30 th . The district court denied this Petition the same
day, finding that “Petitioner could not meet required burden of proof[,]” (D-08-FM-25-
819350). Mr. Cephas took an immediate de novo appeal to the circuit court. See FL §§ 4-
507(b)(1), (b)(2); Md. Rule 7-112.
Monae McIntyre filed her Petition for a Protective Order on July 2, 2025. The court
granted a Temporary Protective Order on that date, and scheduled a Final Protective Order
hearing for July 9. At the July 9 hearing, the circuit court continued the matter until July
14 and consolidated it with Mr. Cephas’s de novo appeal. The circuit court extended the
Temporary Protective Order until the 14th. Following the July 14 consolidated hearing on
the cross-petitions, the circuit court denied Appellant’s de novo appeal, and issued a Final

‒Unreported Opinion‒
4
Protective Order in favor of Appellee. The Final Protective Order was to remain effective
for one year until July 14, 2026.
Factual Background
Monae McIntyre
Monae testified first, and recounted that she and Mr. Cephas have two children in
common and had been in an “on and off relationship” for “five or six years.” 4 The
relationship ended because it was “on and off” and “was a physically and emotionally
abusive relationship.” She had suffered a miscarriage in 2023 which “resulted from the
stress and the verbal abuse that [she] received.” She characterized the relationship as
physically and emotionally abusive. Monae recalled:
Well, Mr. Cephas would bite. He would choke me. He would hit me. All
under the context of him not getting his way or if I wasn’t listening to him.
Most of the time, it resulted in me becoming very emotional and defensive,
and he would blame me for my reactions. He would provoke me to get
reactions out of me and then blame me for the reactions as to why I was
receiving the abuse.
The children were present during these incidents. She had taken photographs to
illustrate the effects of physical abuse, showing some “redness” on the back of her head,
“bite” marks, a shattered cell phone, a tooth that had suffered trauma, and scratch marks.
A number of instances occurred some years before. For example, the “bite marks” were
4 At the time of the hearing, Monae had two pending criminal charges involving Mr.
Cephas. The trial court directed her counsel to advise her on the record of her Fifth
Amendment rights against self-incrimination. Those charges have no impact on this case.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
5
suffered in “2018 or 2019.” Her cellphone was shattered in 2022; the “redness” was due to
an altercation in 2022. She suffered trauma to her tooth in 2019; bruises and scratch marks
on her neck dated from an altercation in late 2022.
After their relationship ended, Monae and Mr. Cephas fought over custody. An
Interim Consent Order in their custody dispute provided that Mr. Cephas would pick up
the children at Monae’s parents’ house. Monae explained that she did not “feel safe with
Mr. Cephas visiting [her] residence at all.” Mr. Cephas was scheduled to pick up the
children at her parents’ home for an exchange on Friday, June 27. Monae recalled:
So we arrived about 15 minutes after the time written in the consent order.
The children have extracurriculars. 	Once we arrived, it had been drizzling
once we got there. So Mr. Cephas came down to my car. Usually my mother
takes the children to his car. 	He never comes in contact with me or comes
close to me whatsoever. This day, in particular, he walked down to my
vehicle to retrieve the children. He asked about rain jackets. I mentioned that
they didn’t have them because it was sunny all day and it was hot outside.
He then became aggressive and was saying that they need their jackets. This
is ridiculous. I’m going to take -- I’m going to have to record this and send
this to the courts and show how you’re incompetent. So he pulled his phone
out and started recording. 	I stated that I did not want to be recorded. 	He
became aggressive. 	Where are their jackets? 	Why don’t they have on
jackets?
At this point, I’m still in the car and I shut the door; the children are out. My
mom mentioned something to him about them not needing jackets early in
the day, and he’s still going back and forth with her. I opened the car door
and I asked him to please take the children inside of the car and to stop
arguing with my mother. 	He’s saying things about, you’re going to need
your lawyer. 	I’m going to submit all of these documents to the courts
because I’m going to destroy your daughter.
So that’s why I got out and I said, can you please just get the kids in the car
and stop arguing with my mom. At that point, he then says to me, be quiet -

‒Unreported Opinion‒
6
- or shut up or you better go ahead before I bring somebody around here to
come and get you. 	Immediately I was triggered and it took me back to the
years of abuse and I became emotional. He then started recording my reaction
at that point like he’s done before in the past, where he would provoke a
reaction out of me and then only record my reaction to try to use against me
later.
Monae was on the phone with her sister, who overheard the altercation and who
urged Monae to contact the police. Monae continued:
He comes around to the driver’s side of my vehicle with his phone still out
recording me, and he’s yelling things at me. I’m emotional at that point, so
I’m not sure what he’s saying, but he’s being very aggressive. So I get in the
car and I close my door. 	And that’s all that I can remember from that
situation. Like I said, I was very emotional.
Monae recalled that Mr. Cephas had not returned to his car. He was holding their
daughter “while he was yelling and recording” during this encounter. She was “afraid”
because “of past abuse, because he mentioned sending someone around and because of all
of the escalation that he’s been doing in the last couple weeks. I don’t know what he’s
capable of or what he’s willing to do, how far he’s willing to go.”
Monae recounted that Mr. Cephas has summoned the police “about seven or eight
times … where he brings the police to the exchanges.” She questioned why he would call
the police since her mother “does the exchanges” so there would be “no reason for the
police to be involved.” She emphasized that it “causes stress and anxiety for the children
and just for everyone involved.”

‒Unreported Opinion‒
7
She explained that she has not reported Mr. Cephas to the police, or “press charges
or anything that could get him in trouble with his job.” 5 She “didn’t want to cause any more
turmoil for the children and just trying my best to keep the peace within the situation.
Monae eventually submitted a victim statement to the police on July 1. The statement
provided a “brief synopsis of what happened on Friday, June 27, with the threats that were
made and how [she] was afraid[.]” Mr. Cephas had also filed criminal charges against her
and had also filed for an “emergency custody hearing” as well as a contempt petition in the
unrelated custody proceedings. The custody-related petitions were denied. Monae recalled
that Mr. Cephas has “been filing different things almost every day[.]”
Monae asked the court for the following relief:
I’m asking for a permanent extension of my temporary protective order from
Mr. Cephas. I believe that he is capable of harm as he has been in the past,
and I feel that I need to be protected by all means. Especially with, like I said,
the past, the current threat, and the continuing escalation of things. I don’t
know what he’s willing to do, who he’s willing to send, or I’m not sure.
She allowed that Mr. Cephas could contact her under the Order for purposes of facilitating
“custody, visitation, and exchanges.”
On cross-examination, when asked why she had never reported Mr. Cephas to the
police for “past actions,” Monae explained that she “was coerced into believing that the
abuse that [she] was receiving was [her] fault.” She added that “the decisions that I made
around calling the police was revolving around being emotionally manipulated, yes.” The
5 Mr. Cephas has a security clearance for his work.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
8
questioning turned to the issue with injuries Monae suffered, primarily to her tooth, and
she was questioned at length about the source of this injury. 6
After further cross-examination strayed from the issues relevant to the protection of
either party, the trial court declared:
These tangential issues is not before me. She’s made allegations against you,
and you’ve made allegations against her. When it’s your turn to testify, I’m
going to hear about your allegations against her. Right now all I want to focus
on is what supposedly happened during this exchange, where she says you
threatened her. You were going to get people to beat her up and things like
that. Let’s talk about that. We’re getting late. Let’s go.
On re-direct examination, the questioning returned to the injury to the tooth. Monae
testified that the tooth was originally injured from trauma or damage “due to an altercation
[she] had with Mr. Cephas.” She could not fix a specific date of injury, or its sequelae, but
stated that “it’s been years of altercations and abuse that could have [caused it]. So I’m not
sure which particular incident of me getting hit or thrown or whatever caused the trauma.
I’m not sure which incident, but it was one of the inciden[ts] that occurred during our
relationship.”
Janet McIntyre
Mrs. Janet McIntyre testified on behalf of her daughter, Monae. Her residence, 2401
Oswego Avenue, is where the events of June 27, 2025 took place because it was designated
as a site for the children’s custody exchanges. Mr. Cephas arrived at the house for the
6 There was cross-examination about various injuries and whether they were
documented, especially dental records.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
9
exchange at about 5:50 P.M. The children had been to swimming lessons and had yet to
show up. Monae had texted Mr. Cephas to inform him that she would be late.
The protocol dictated that Mrs. McIntyre would facilitate the exchange with the
children. Mrs. McIntyre testified that when the grandchildren arrived, her daughter texted
her and asked her to “come get the kids[.]” When she began getting the kids out of her
daughter’s car, Mr. Cephas noticed that they were not wearing rain jackets, and addressed
Mrs. McIntyre “in a real aggressive way, where’s their jackets?” Mrs. McIntyre recalled
that Mr. Cephas produced his cellphone and stated that “I’m going to record this to send
down to the courts with all the other evidence that I have that’s going to destroy your
daughter.” At that point Monae, who remained in her car, asked Mr. Cephas to “stop
arguing with my mother. Put the kids in the car, stop arguing with my mother.” Mrs.
McIntyre testified that he responded to this “real aggressively. You shut up because I’ll
send somebody to come get you and all you’re going to do is run just because you’re scared,
you know.” Mrs. McIntyre’s testimony continued:
He walked around to his car, as if he was going to get in, and then he walked
around to her driver’s side, real aggressive. And I was trying to get around
there to her side and asking him to leave, you know, please leave, leave
Monae alone, just leave. So when he finally left, he got in his car, rolled down
his window, was yelling stuff still out his window at her. …
He put the kids in the car, but he just kept coming back towards my
daughter’s car …
She never got out of her car. She never did touch him or anything.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
10
Mrs. McIntyre explained that she would handle the exchanges “[b]ecause of the
ongoing conflict between those two. … [E]very time they [communicate] they argue.”
On cross-examination, Mrs. McIntyre explained that her relationship with Mr.
Cephas deteriorated when he started to “call[] the police to my house, embarrassing my
house, embarrassing our peace. … Making the kids nervous.” Mrs. McIntyre emphasized
that her daughter “didn’t do anything,” and she testified that the “[o]nly thing she did” was
to tell Mr. Cephas to “bring them” when he threatened to have someone come by. During
this cross-examination, Mr. Cephas introduced text messages to Mrs. McIntyre that
complained that Monae has “been violent towards me unprovoked, and no one has ever
made an attempt at speaking with her. I can only take but so much[.]” He sought to establish
through text messages that the McIntyres were aware of multiple incidents in which Monae
was abusive towards Mr. Cephas.
William McIntyre
William McIntyre is Monae McIntyre’s father. He was present during the visitation
exchange that took place on June 27. He described what he observed:
My wife took the kids out of the car, out of Monae’s car to give to
[Appellant]. [Appellant] went off about the kids not having jackets because
it was drizzling rain somewhat, and they started arguing back and forth. My
wife and he started arguing back and forth about that. So my wife told him
to take the kids and go ahead. He says he’s going to destroy Monae. And my
wife says, well, whatever you present is going to be shredded. And she says,
please do not start recording me. I mean, he has a thing about recording,
recording folk.
After that, I heard them arguing and [Appellant] came down towards
Monae’s car. Where I stand at on my porch, [Appellant] cannot see me. I’ve

‒Unreported Opinion‒
11
got a 10 foot evergreen. So I stand on that portion of my porch. As he walked
down the street, I heard him say -- no, Monae says, stop arguing with my
mom, go ahead. She cracked her door and said that. He says, shut up or
something like that. I’m going to get somebody to come around here and take
care of you.
He emphasized that Monae did not get out of her car, although she “cracked her
door when she yelled, leave, stop arguing with my mom.” He also testified that Monae did
not threaten Mr. Cephas and that she was not armed. He had seen Monae and Mr. Cephas
arguing in the past, but had never seen him put his hands on her. When asked whether Mr.
Cephas had raised concerns about whether Monae had abused him, Mr. McIntyre recalled
that Mr. Cephas “came to me blaming her for you all disturbances.”
Sara Rosenberg
Sara Rosenberg testified on behalf of Mr. Cephas. She is the mother of Mr. Cephas’s
youngest child, and was present on June 27 in order to “see th[e] scene” and had been
concerned that Mr. Cephas did not have an “advocate.” She remained in her vehicle, which
was parked some distance away from the McIntyre residence, but she could see the
interaction and hear that they were talking. Ms. Rosenberg testified that she saw Monae
exit her car, and that Mrs. McIntyre was attempting to restrain her. She denied hearing Mr.
Cephas threaten Monae.
On cross-examination, Ms. Rosenberg explained why she was present at the
exchange on June 27:
I attended this specific exchange because I know it’s been a lot of, like,
hostile, like, environment with the exchanges and I wanted to be, like -- I
wanted to witness it for myself with anything going on and possibly, like,

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12
advocate for him as well because he -- I feel like it was, like, ganging up on
him. I feel like everybody is -- I feel like they were, like, ganging up on him
a lot and I just wanted to be a non-biased person sort of.
* * *
[T]o see what was going on, just to be a witness to a situation.
* * *
I didn’t want to attend this to specifically testify.
Ms. Rosenberg did not hear anything that was said by Mr. Cephas, Monae or the
McIntyres. On re-direct examination, she recalled witnessing the police arrive on June 27.
When asked whether she had seen Mr. Cephas making “any threats or anything” on June
28, she answered “No, I didn’t see you do anything.”
Ronique Cephas
Mr. Cephas testified on behalf of his Petition. He played three videos that he had
recorded on his cellphone. The videos confirmed earlier testimony as to what was said
concerning the origins of the dispute on June 27. The first depicted the dispute over the
raincoats. The second video shows, according to Mr. Cephas, Monae “reaching for what I
believe is a Stanley water bottle, and she’s trying to throw it at me.” He testified that he
went to the police after leaving the McIntyres’ and “[b]ased off” what he told police he
sought to file criminal charges against Monae. He did so “[i]n retaliation to that is what
they put in today, which was the protective order against me stating that I was the one that
somehow made the threats that I recorded her making to me.” Mr. Cephas emphasized:

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13
Yes, I have never placed my hands on Monae McIntyre. I’ve never abused
her. I’ve never hurt her in any way, shape, or form. I have a secret -- security
clearance, and what that means is even an investigation is enough to derail
me being able to work. As opposed to this, I’m also trying to start up a LLC
that I had a carry permit for. She sought - after this protective order, they
seized all of my weapons from my house. So not only did she make the threat
against my life and to send people to my house, she strategically used the
courts to remove my firearm so I can’t defend myself. And I stated all of this
in court.
I submitted all of the evidence of what’s going on, and I am actually in fear
for my life because there’s been strategic manipulation of the court system
to kind of bind my hands to include Ms. McIntyre telling me if I ever reached
out to law enforcement, she would disrupt my clearance.
Mr. Cephas introduced a text message essentially outlining what he asserted were
threats made by Monae to prosecute or rely on “appropriate legal action.” The trial court
disagreed, explaining that “[s]he’s telling you what her legal rights are. That’s not a
threat[.]”

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14
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The court ruled as follows:
All right. Based on the evidence, testimony, witnesses presented, I do believe
that -- by a preponderance of the evidence, Ms. McIntyre has been placed in
fear of imminent bodily harm based on a pattern of abuse during her domestic
relationship and that she was --felt threatened on September -- excuse me --
on June 28th of 2025. And I’m going to grant the order of protection on her
behalf.
And I’m going to order that Mr. Cephas not abuse, threaten or harass her,
don’t call her, don’t write her. You can text her only with regard to issues
relative to the minor children in the exchange thereof.
I’m granting -- ordering that you stay away from her residence at 3300 Ripple
Road. You also need to stay away from her residence, I mean, excuse me,
her place of employment at 3400 North Charles Street, 21218. And you can
only go to her parents’ residence at 2401 Oswego Avenue when Ms.
McIntyre is not present. The custody and visitation will be as already
previously ordered in C-03-FM-24-004219.
With regard to Mr. Cephas’s petition for protective order, I do not find that
he has met the burden and I am denying that request. This order will remain
in effect for a period of one year until … July 14th of 2026.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Maryland Rule 8-131(c) addresses appellate review of an action that is tried without
a jury, and relevantly provides that “an appellate court will review the case on both the law
and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless
clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.
In reviewing the issuance of a final protective order, “we accept the facts as found
by the hearing court unless it is shown that its findings are clearly erroneous.” Barton v.

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15
Hirschberg, 137 Md. App. 1, 21 (2001) (cleaned up). In doing so, “[w]e leave the
determination of credibility to the trial court, who has the opportunity to gauge and observe
the witnesses’ behavior and testimony during the trial.” Id. (cleaned up).
“Determining the meaning of a statute,” such as the definition of “abuse” and what
behavior is by law embraced by that provision, is a “question of law and subject to de novo
review.” Medical Mgmt. & Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Maryland Dep’t of Health & Mental
Hygiene, 225 Md. App. 352, 360 (2015). See Edwards v. State, 453 Md. 174, 185 (2017)
(plenary review of interpretation of statute). “As to the ultimate conclusion, however, we
must make our own independent appraisal by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts
of the case.” Piper, 125 Md. App. at 754.
F INAL PROTECTIVE ORDERS
The Maryland Domestic Violence Act is set forth in Title 4, subtitle 5 of the Family
Law Article (“FL”). The purpose of the statute “‘is to protect and ‘aid victims of domestic
abuse by providing an immediate and effective’ remedy.’” Walston v. Lindsay, 495 Md.
495, 504 (2026) (quoting Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 252 (1996) (further citation
omitted). To do so the Act “provide[s] a civil remedy to victims of violence in interpersonal
relationships.” Morgan v. State, 252 Md. App. 439, 454 (2021). It accomplishes this by
“giving trial courts a wide array of options to address individualized circumstances,
provided that the complaining witness provides proof of violence or the potential for
violence by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. The Domestic Violence Act is remedial

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16
legislation, Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 231 (2007), and as such must be liberally
construed to effectuate its core purpose. See Coburn, 342 Md. at 256.
“A petitioner may seek relief from abuse by filing with a court ... a petition that
alleges abuse of any person eligible for relief by the respondent.” FL § 4-504(a)(1). A
“petitioner” means “an individual who files a petition.” FL § 4-501(p)(1). A “petitioner”
includes “a person eligible for relief[,]” FL § 4-501(p)(2)(i), and also means “an individual
who has a child in common with the respondent[.]” FL § 4-501(n)(6). The parties before
us meet that definition.
FL § 4-501(b) defines abuse, and provides in part:
(b)(1) “Abuse” means any of the following acts:
(i) 	an act that causes serious bodily harm;
(ii) 	an act that places a person eligible for relief in fear of imminent
serious bodily harm; …
FL § 4-506(c)(1)(ii) provides that “if the judge finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the alleged abuse has occurred, or if the respondent consents to the entry of
a protective order, the judge may grant a final protective order to protect any person eligible
for relief from abuse.”
Evidence of Abuse
Mr. Cephas strenuously argues that the “trial court committed plain error … because
there was no evidence that Mr. Cephas had committed an act of abuse.” He maintains that
the record does not satisfy the necessary finding of abuse by a preponderance of the
evidence. Mr. Cephas cites to our decision in Piper v. Layman, supra, in which this Court

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17
reversed the issuance of a protective order. The respondent in that case, Mr. Piper, had been
found to have “abused” the petitioner, Ms. Layman, by engaging in behavior that she
alleged was a continued pattern of harassment and stalking. Piper allegedly followed
Layman, parked and loitered in her driveway a number of times, and called Layman’s
house a number of times when she had visitation custody of their child. Piper, 125 Md.
App. at 755. There was no evidence that Piper had any physical contact with Layman. Id.
at 757. The circuit court in that matter found that an alleged violation of the harassment
statute constituted abuse. He explained: “I think Mr. Piper could be on notice, at this point,
even if this is not in the stalking statute, the harassment statute says ‘anyone who seriously
annoys anyone else by following them around is guilty of the crime of harassment.’” Id.
(footnotes omitted). We disagreed with the trial court and explained:
The Domestic Violence Act is clear that a finding of abuse requires at
least one of the following acts: an act that causes serious bodily harm; an act
that places a person in fear of imminent serious bodily harm; assault; rape; a
sexual offense; or false imprisonment. See FL § 4–501. After a careful
review of the record, we find no testimony given by appellee or her witness
that allows an inference that appellant committed any of the conduct
constituting “abuse.” At the ex parte hearing appellee herself acknowledged
that Mr. Piper did not have any physical contact with her. Appellee was only
able to recount one instance of Mr. Piper’s “following” her while both were
driving their respective vehicles, and in that instance, she did not indicate
that he threatened her in any manner or that she feared that he would harm
her. Rather, she maneuvered her vehicle from a position in front of him to a
position behind him, so that she could identify his license plate number,
presumably for purposes of identification.
Testimony 	by 	appellee’s 	roommate 	that 	she 	saw 	appellant 	or
appellant’s family in the driveway of Ms. Layman’s house during the times
that the parties’ minor child was visiting appellee is not sufficient to show
abuse. The parties are parents of a child who is in the custody of appellant,

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18
and with whom appellee has visitation. In his efforts to investigate and
monitor appellee’s activities during her visitation with the child, appellant
may have over-stepped his role as custodial parent and inappropriately
interfered with appellee’s visitation rights. Such conduct might properly be
the subject of a request for injunctive or other relief by the court that issued
the custody and visitation order. The described conduct, however, does not
constitute abuse within the meaning of the Domestic Violence Act.
Id. at 757-58.
We conclude that Piper does not support Mr. Cephas’s claims for relief. Unlike the
record before us in that case, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Appellee, is sufficient to establish that Monae had suffered physical injury in the past, and
that Mr. Cephas acted aggressively towards her during the events of June 27. The record is
not limited, as Mr. Cephas asserts, to his statement to Monae that she should “be quiet --
or shut up or you better go ahead before I bring somebody around here to come and get
you.” We conclude that the evidence, as presented on the record before and credited by the
trial court, satisfies the standard for acts that placed Monae “in fear of imminent serious
bodily harm.” FL § 4-501(b)(ii).
We also conclude that the trial court was entitled to find that Monae suffered a
“pattern of abuse during her domestic relationship” and that she felt threatened during the
events of June 27. The trial court, in our view, did not ignore Mr. Cephas’s testimony or
give short shrift to his case. Although Mr. Cephas complains that the trial court “only
focused on [Monae’s] testimony,” the court made its ruling “[b]ased on the evidence,
testimony, witnesses presented[.]” As this Court has recently observed: “Judges are
presumed to know the law[,]” and “[a]bsent an indication to the contrary, we must assume

‒Unreported Opinion‒
19
that judges apply the law correctly to the case before them.” Bailey v. Happer, 268 Md.
App. 618, 638 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 494 Md. 185 (2026). In this instance, that duty to
consider the record as a whole and provide an adequate explanation for the court’s ruling
was more than satisfied.
Again, we must emphasize that a trial court’s factual determinations are “afforded
significant deference on review.” Jackson v. 2109 Brandywine, LLC, 180 Md. App. 535,
567, cert. denied, 406 Md. 444 (2008). “A finding is clearly erroneous when although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Kusi v. State, 438 Md. 362, 383
(2014) (cleaned up). See generally, United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 395 (1948). It is “not our role, as an appellate court, to second-guess the trial judge’s
assessment of a witness’s credibility.” Gizzo v. Gertsman, 245 Md. App. 168, 203 (2020).
In view of the above, we conclude that the record is sufficient to support a finding
of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence, and that, in assessing that proof, the trial court
neither misinterpreted the definition of “abuse,” nor clearly erred in rendering its findings
of fact. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a Final
Protective Order. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s issuance of the Final Protective
Order.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.