Crowder, Jacob v. State

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. C-02-CR-24-000424
UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 1460
September Term, 2024
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JACOB CROWDER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
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Wells, CJ
Reed,
Battaglia, Lynne A.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
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Opinion by Reed, J.
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Filed: October 15, 2026
* This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule
of stare decisis. 	It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to
Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

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The instant appeal arises out of Jacob Crowder’s (“Appellant”) jury trial, conducted
on July 30 through August 3, 2024, and ultimate conviction of second-degree assault and
false imprisonment. On August 26, 2024, Appellant was sentenced to fifteen years, all but
three years suspended, and to be followed by five years’ probation. On September 23, 2024,
Appellant noted this appeal.
In bringing his appeal, Appellant presents two questions for appellate review:
I. 	Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to strike an Anne Arundel
County Police Officer from the jury and requiring Appellant to use a peremptory
strike to remove him?
II. 	Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that Appellant
refused 	to 	provide 	a 	DNA 	sample 	as 	consciousness 	of 	guilt 	and 	then
propounding a jury instruction to that effect?
For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County.
F ACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Incident
On February 17, 2024, Michelle Chen picked up her friend, Emily Hernandez, from
Hernandez’s father’s home and drove Hernandez to the apartment she shared with
Appellant. Hernandez and Appellant’s shared apartment is located at 1625 Parkridge Circle
in Crofton, Maryland. Chen testified that Hernandez and Appellant had gotten in an
argument the day before, and that Hernandez wanted to retrieve her dog and her car from
the apartment.

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Chen testified that upon arriving at the apartment, she and Hernandez waited outside
for some time while Hernandez texted with Appellant about the dog. Hernandez went to
the apartment to try to get the dog but soon came back to Chen’s car without the dog, and
continued texting with Appellant. Chen stated that Hernandez was mad she did not get the
dog. Chen testified that she and Hernandez were in her car outside the apartment for a
“couple hours” while this back and forth about the dog ensued. Chen testified that
Appellant eventually texted Hernandez that he would give her the dog. Hernandez went
into the apartment for about thirty minutes but still did not get the dog, and Appellant took
her phone. Hernandez returned to the car, without the dog or her phone.
Chen testified that Hernandez returned to the apartment for a third time, stating:
But the third time she went up, at first, I did text her, and I was like, “are you
okay?” Because I think the third time, she was taking longer than usual, and
it was getting late at that point, so I texted her. I was like, “are you okay,”
but the message didn’t go through, like her phone was off or something. So
then while that was happening, that’s when I was looking for her dad’s
number and stuff like that and her mom. So that’s when, later on, the message
ended up going through as if her phone was turned back on or something. So,
I ended up calling her. I was like, “are you okay?” Or, I don’t remember if
that what I said, but I did call her, and she was like crying.
Chen stated that on the phone Hernandez said, “He’s hurting me.” Chen asked if Hernandez
wanted her to call her father, to which Hernandez answered “no.” Chen testified that
Appellant responded, “yes, call her dad[,]” and then the phone hung up.
Chen testified that she called Hernandez’s father and told him what was happening.
About twenty to thirty minutes after the phone call between Hernandez and Chen,
Hernandez came running back to Chen’s car, and she was “shaking” and had “little marks

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and stuff” on her wrist and neck. Hernandez and Chen then called the police. This 911 call
was played at trial. In the 911 call, Hernandez said:
Basically, I was trying to retrieve my things, and [Appellant] was trying to,
like hold me hostage. He tried to put zip ties on me, and he tried to get my
dad to call – like instead of the police trying to get my dad so he can kill me
or whatever he was going to do. And as soon as I got the chance to run, I ran.
He was hurting me, covering my mouth; at this time, I was yelling.
Hernandez also told the 911 dispatcher that Appellant had a gun “[w]ith him in the living
room.”
Chen testified that she stayed with Hernandez while they waited for Hernandez’s
father and the police to arrive, and once Hernandez was done “handling all the business
with the police,” Chen took Hernandez home.
Hernandez’s father testified that when he arrived, Hernandez was crying, “in a lot
of stress[,]” and “shriveling.” When asked what Hernandez told him at this time, he stated:
She said that something happened to her, and she was zip-tied at that point.
She had marks on her arm – on her wrist. And then she had her face was red
like, you know, like something grafted from, you know her face, neck. At
that point, the police arrived when she was trying to explain what happened
and all that.
Hernandez’s father noted that Hernandez was also bruised the next day.
Hernandez’s testimony at trial was mostly consistent with Chen’s testimony.
Notably, Hernandez testified that Appellant is her current boyfriend. Hernandez testified
that the first time she went into the apartment, Appellant told her that he did not want to
give her the dog. She returned to the car for some time, and then eventually went into the
apartment for a second time. Hernandez testified that Appellant still would not give her the

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dog and took her phone. Hernandez testified that she went into the apartment a third time
to get her phone back. This time, Hernandez testified:
So, he pulled me inside the house. We went to the couch, he sat me down; he
was trying to talk to me at first, but I just wanted to leave. I just wanted my
stuff, and I just wanted to leave. We got into an argument.
Hernandez provided that this argument “got heated . . . on both sides.” Hernandez stated
that Appellant was holding her down and would not let her leave, and that she “was kind
of screaming, telling him to let me go. He turned up the music so he can – nobody can hear
me screaming.” Hernandez testified that she tried to get her phone from him, “but he kind
of pushed me back.” Hernandez stated that she “kind of got a little bit aggressive with
him[,]” and then stated:
I remember we went to the bathroom. He turned the water on, and then, the
water was running. I was still a little bit – my anxiety it acts up a lot of times,
and I start to hyperventilate a lot. So, he turned the water on, and we sit down
on the ground, and I’m sitting in the middle of him to where he’s trying to
calm me down, holding me, trying to calm me down.
Hernandez testified that she and Appellant went back downstairs, but Appellant still would
not let her leave. Hernandez stated that when she was trying to leave, she “threw [her] hand
up at him.” Hernandez testified that when she was trying to open the door, Appellant
pushed her into a wall. Shortly thereafter, Hernandez was able to get out and ran to Chen’s
car.
When the 911 call was played at trial, Hernandez testified that she “[did not]
remember saying all that[,]” and she did not fully remember the 911 call or what she said
to the police. Hernandez confirmed that Appellant 	zip-tied her that night and that she
remembered 	seeing 	Appellant 	with 	a 	gun. 	However, 	Hernandez 	testified 	that 	she

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exaggerated the incident to the police, including exaggerating about the zip ties and about
Appellant holding her down and lied about Appellant pointing a gun at her. Hernandez
wrote a letter to the State’s Attorney stating that she did not want to go forward with the
case.
Officer Phillips, who was the first to respond to this incident, testified that
Hernandez was “scared” and “a little shaken up” when he arrived. He testified that
Hernandez’s neck, chin, chest, and wrists were bruised. Officer Phillip’s body-worn
camera footage from the incident were admitted at trial as substantive evidence of prior
inconsistent statements. On this video, Hernandez tells Officer Phillips:
We go back downstairs, and he proceeds – I’m sorry, I (unintelligible). He
proceeds to – he sat me down on the couch there. And then, he put me on the
floor, held like right where he had the gun in his right hand. He flipped it
back, and he was just doing weird things like kissing me and like he still
wouldn’t – I just, like, let me leave. Then, I tried to run to the door, but that’s
when he pinned down on the floor again.
Detective Williams obtained a search warrant for Appellant’s residence and his
DNA. Appellant was placed in a police car, read his Miranda rights, and advised about
both warrants. Detective Williams testified that Appellant was “[a]gitated, defensive, was
adamant that he wasn’t going to let [Detective Williams]” collect his DNA. Detective
Williams testified that Appellant repeatedly asked for an attorney to review the warrant to
collect his DNA. Detective Williams testified that ultimately, Appellant had to be sedated
at the hospital for his DNA to be collected.
When officers executed the search warrant for Appellant’s home, they recovered
two cell phones and a handgun in the front pocket of a yellow sweatshirt. The discovery of

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the handgun was captured in footage from Corporal Ballard’s body-worn camera, and this
footage was admitted into evidence. Additionally, a box of “unused zip ties” were found
on an air mattress in the upstairs bedroom of the apartment, and “used zip ties were located
on the floor in between the air mattress and the television.”
Notably, at trial, Alysha Breland, the State’s expert in forensic DNA analysis,
testified about her findings regarding the DNA found on the gun and the zip ties that were
recovered from the apartment. Breland testified that it was highly likely that DNA on the
“trigger slash trigger guard” and on the gun’s grip belonged to Hernandez and Appellant.
Breland testified that it was highly likely that DNA on the zip ties also belonged to
Hernandez and Appellant.
Court’s Refusal to Strike Prospective Juror 29 For Cause
During voir dire, prospective juror 29 answered that he has some strong feelings on
domestic violence, sexual assault, and use of a handgun, stating, “in a general sense and
it’s a serious offense.” The court asked prospective juror 29 if he would be able to set aside
his feelings on these topics, keep an open mind, and make his decision based on the facts
and evidence, to which prospective juror 29 answered yes. Prospective juror 29 also
indicated that he is a patrol officer for the Anne Arundel County Police Department, a
position he has held for the past two years, and that he is a member of the Fraternal Order
of Police. Prospective juror 29 stated that he was not familiar with any of the officers listed
as involved with this case. Prospective juror 29 answered yes when the court asked if he
would be able to “set aside [his] experiences and contact that [he] had in [his] job” and
keep an open mind. Prospective juror 29 answered that he would evaluate police officer’s

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testimony in light of the evidence, rather than believing them simply because of their
occupation. Prospective juror 29 also answered that he would not hold the defense
questioning a police officer’s credibility against the defense.
Defense counsel made a motion to strike prospective juror 29 for cause, stating:
I mean, he’s an Anne Arundel County police officer; there’s going to be a lot
of Anne Arundel County police officer witnesses.
…
You know, it’s going to be very difficult for me to, you know, make questions
about, you know, the credibility or being hard or the thoroughness or even to
suggest that, you know, police officers are not telling the truth, you know, to
somebody who is a colleague of their’s. I think that, you know, I get his
answers to the questions, but I think common sense shows that –
The court denied the defense’s motion to strike for cause, noting that prospective
juror 29 “seems to be candid and honest[.]” The defense ultimately used one of its
peremptory strikes to keep prospective juror 29 off the jury.
Consciousness of Guilt Evidence
As 	provided 	previously, 	Detective 	Williams 	obtained 	a 	search 	warrant 	for
Appellant’s residence and his DNA. Appellant was placed in a police car, read his Miranda
rights, and advised about both warrants. At trial, the State asked Detective Williams, “[w]as
[Appellant] cooperative with you?” Defense counsel objected to this question as to
“relevance and prior bad acts, character evidence.” The State responded that it intended to
play Detective Williams’s body-worn camera footage of this encounter, State’s Exhibit 9.
The State argued that this footage is relevant as concealment because it shows Appellant
refusing to give his DNA, and ultimately Appellant had to be sedated at a hospital for his
DNA to be taken. Appellant responded that he was merely refusing to provide his DNA

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until he had a lawyer present, even though he was misunderstood about his rights.
Appellant also argued:
[T]he objection to the tape is that it’s totally not relevant. [. . .] It’s highly
prejudicial. There’s no probative value. I mean, what is the probative value?
That he thinks that he can have a lawyer before they execute a search warrant
for DNA. I mean, so what? He’s not obfuscating, or he’s not trying to hide
anything. He’s just saying, “I want a lawyer.”
. . .
There’s no admissions. He’s asking for a lawyer, whether he needs one or
not. There’s just no relevance to it.
In response, the State argued:
[T]he probative value is that [Appellant] is being uncooperative with regards
to providing a sample of DNA. It’s concealment of evidence. It’s an attempt
to conceal the evidence, which is incredibly probative in this case. It’s going
to be probative in this case, the DNA and where the DNA was located. And
the fact that the Defendant was refusing to provide his DNA shows a
consciousness of guilt.
After reviewing the video and considering the parties’ arguments, the court ruled as
follows:
So, the Court is not going to allow that portion anywhere where he is
referencing an attorney in.
[T]he Court does think that it is relevant that [Appellant] is unwilling to give
evidence over. I think it goes straight to consciousness of guilt. His refusal
to comply with a search warrant that demands that he gives his DNA. That
is relevant. I think it is also relevant the extent to which he continued to
refuse. The fact that he needed to be sedated in order to have his DNA taken.
The rest of the video, however, does contain numerous statements that are
not relevant.
. . .
So, what the Court’s ruling is going to be is that Exhibit 9 cannot be played
for the jury. However, this detective can absolutely explain that he had a valid
Court order, that he presented [Appellant] with a valid Court order, and that
[Appellant] refused to comply on multiple occasions to him, because that
was done multiple times on the video. Also, what is, I believe, relevant and
admissible, would be the fact that [Appellant] needed to be sedated in order

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to collect the evidence that they were lawfully allowed to collect. Everything
else is […] outweighed by the prejudicial value.
Appellant objected to the admission of the evidence of “him needing to be sedated
or being uncooperative as consciousness of guilt[.]” In response, the court reiterated:
[T]he fact that he is refusing to comply or give evidence shows consciousness
of guilt in that it is concealment of evidence. He does not want them to have
his DNA. It is very clear during his interactions there. As – and I think the
fact that he went to the extent that he needed to be sedated is relevant to that,
and that’s why I am making that ruling. It’s showing his level of refusal. And
at this point, I do think that the probative value outweighs any prejudicial
value with regards to it.
The court later modified its ruling to allow Appellant to play the portion of the video
in which Appellant requested an attorney to provide context to his refusal to provide a
DNA sample. The court noted that in turn, this would allow the State to adduce evidence
on Appellant’s refusal to provide the DNA sample even after being advised that he had no
right to an attorney in this context. The court further noted that it “would allow the officer
to testify that it ultimately resulted in [Appellant] having to be sedated to get his DNA.”
Detective Williams testified within these parameters, as previously described.
The State requested a jury instruction on Appellant’s attempt to conceal evidence as
consciousness of guilt. Appellant objected to this argument, incorporating his previous
arguments against the admission of State’s Exhibit 9. Appellant reiterated his objection
prior to and after the jury instructions were given.
D ISCUSSION
The Court’s Refusal to Strike Prospective Juror 29
A. Parties’ Contentions

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Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike for
cause an Anne Arundel County police officer, prospective juror 29, from the jury.
Appellant’s argument principally relies on the police officer’s answers to three voir dire
questions:
[F]irst, that he had strong feelings, “in a general sense,” against the crimes
with which Appellant was charged; second, that he was a patrol officer with
the Anne Arundel County Police Department; and third, that he was a
member of the Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”).
Appellant provides that he moved to strike prospective juror 29 for cause because it
would “‘be very difficult’ for defense counsel to challenge the credibility of the officers,
who were colleagues of [prospective juror 29], or the thoroughness of their investigation.”
However, Appellant states that the trial judge refused to strike prospective juror 29 for
cause in light of his answers that he could be fair and impartial, which Appellant argues
required him to use his last peremptory strike to keep prospective juror 29 off the jury.
Appellant argues that this abuse of discretion entitles Appellant to reversal of his conviction
and a new trial.
Appellant specifically argues that the court should have granted his motion to strike
prospective juror 29 for cause because several Anne Arundel County police officers, who
work for the same agency as prospective juror 29, were “witnesses at this trial whose
credibility and investigative efforts were under intense scrutiny by the defense[.]”
Appellant argues that having prospective juror 29 on the jury would have “risked the juror’s
unconscious perception of the State’s witnesses as cloaked with a ‘presumption of
credibility’ simply because of the positions occupied rather than the facts of the case.”

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Appellant argues that by failing to strike prospective juror 29 for cause, Appellant was
required to exercise a peremptory strike to remove him, “thereby impairing his statutory
right to ten peremptory challenges.” Appellant asserts that “[t]he denial or impairment of
the right to exercise peremptory strikes is reversible error without a showing of prejudice[,]
and thus, “Appellant is entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a new trial.”
Appellee argues that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in declining to
strike prospective juror 29 for cause and thus, this Court should affirm. Appellee provides
that “[t]he right to an impartial jury does not require a prospective juror to ‘be free of all
preconceived notions relating to guilt or innocence,’ but only ‘that he can lay aside his
impressions or opinions and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in the
case.’” Further, Appellee asserts that “a juror is not automatically disqualified by service
as a police officer in the jurisdiction where trial occurs.”
Appellee highlights prospective juror 29’s answers to various voir dire questions
and additional inquires of the court as support for the court’s determination that “it was
[not] appropriate to strike Juror 29 for cause.” Appellee also notes that the juror confirmed
that “his experiences, associations, and feelings [. . .] would not affect his ability to consider
the evidence objectively and return a verdict ‘based on the law and the evidence presented
at trial.’” Appellee argues that in-person assessments of credibility are for the trial judge to
decide, and here, the judge determined that prospective juror 29 was “candid and honest,”
and thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to strike prospective juror 29
and this Court should not disturb the court’s ruling.
B. Standard of Review

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“The decision as to whether to excuse a juror for cause is ordinarily left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal except for an abuse of
discretion.” Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 666 (2000) (internal citations omitted). “In
reviewing a trial judge’s exercise of discretion, as in reviewing his fact-finding for clear
error, the appellate reviewer should not decide what he or she would probably have done
under the circumstances [. . .] [t]he appellate court’s only proper inquiry is whether the trial
judge had some rational basis for exercising his discretion as he did.” Morris v. State, 153
Md. App. 480, 503-04 (2003). Furthermore, “[t]he trial court is in the best position to assess
a juror’s state of mind, by taking into consideration the juror’s demeanor and credibility.”
Ware, 360 Md. at 666.
C. Analysis
A defendant has the right to an “impartial jury[.]” U.S. CONST . amend. VI; M D .
D ECL . OF RTS . A RT . 21; see also Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 356 (2014). “[T]hese
constitutional guarantees do not, however, insure that a prospective juror will be free of all
preconceived notions relating to guilt or innocence, only that he can lay aside his
impressions or opinions and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in the
case.” Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 138 (1978).
Under Maryland Rule 4-312(e), a party can challenge a prospective juror for cause.
Md. Rule 4-312(e)(2). “Voir dire is ‘the process by which prospective jurors are examined
to determine whether cause for disqualification exists.’” Brice v. State, 225 Md. App. 666,
676 (2015) (quoting Moore v. State, 412 Md. 635, 644 (2010) (internal citations omitted)).
There are two categories of specific cause for juror disqualification: “(1) a statute

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disqualifies a prospective juror; or (2) a ‘collateral matter [is] reasonably liable to have
undue influence over’ a prospective juror.” Pearson, 437 Md. at 357 (internal citations
omitted). Specifically, “[a] juror may be struck for cause only where he or she displays a
predisposition against innocence or guilt because of some bias extrinsic to the evidence to
be presented.” McCree v. State, 33 Md. App. 82, 98 (1976).
Furthermore, “[b]ias is a question of fact.” Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 15 (2000). In
considering whether such bias exists, Maryland appellate courts have determined that a
prospective juror is not automatically struck simply for affirmatively responding to a voir
dire question asking whether they have “strong feelings” about the charged offense.
Pearson, 437 Md. at 364. Furthermore, a prospective juror’s service as a police officer in
the jurisdiction where a trial occurs does not automatically disqualify the prospective juror.
See Morris, 153 Md. App. at 497-501 (holding that the trial court did not commit an abuse
of discretion in declining to strike a prospective juror who was a police officer for cause).
In addition to striking juror for cause, a defendant who is charged with “a common
law offense for which no specific penalty is provided by statute, is permitted ten
peremptory challenges and the State is permitted five peremptory challenges for each
defendant.” Md. Rule 4-313(a)(3).
Here, the trial court judge did not commit an abuse of discretion by denying
Appellant’s motion to strike prospective juror 29 for cause. It was up to the sound discretion
of the trial court judge to determine whether prospective juror 29, an Anne Arundel County
police officer, displayed “a predisposition against innocence or guilt because of some bias
extrinsic to the evidence to be presented.” McCree, 33 Md. App. at 98. As previously

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stated, prospective juror 29 confirmed that his experiences, feelings, employment, and
other associations, would not affect his ability to make a determination “based on the law
and the evidence presented at trial.” The court acted within its discretion to assess
prospective juror 29’s credibility and conclude that he “seems to be candid and honest[.]”
We cannot say that “no reasonable person” would reach the same conclusion as the court
in this instance or that the court lacked a rational basis for its conclusion. See Wilson v.
John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185 (2005) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court’s refusal to strike prospective juror 29 for cause.
Appellant’s argument that “[t]he court’s failure to strike the police officer for cause
required Appellant to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove him, thereby impairing
his statutory right to ten peremptory challenges[,]” is misguided. Maryland appellate courts
have clearly established that when a juror is struck peremptorily, rather than for cause, a
party’s “only arguable claim [. . .] would be that he was required to use up unnecessarily
one of his store of peremptory challenges.” McCree, 33 Md. App. at 98. No such argument
can be made when the party has remaining, unused peremptory challenges. Id. However, a
trial court’s refusal to strike a juror for cause, thus requiring a party to use one of its
peremptory strikes to keep this prospective juror off the jury, does not automatically equate
to an impairment of the statutory right to exercise ten peremptory strikes, as Appellant
seems to suggest. Here, the trial court acted within its discretion to deny striking

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prospective juror for cause, and thus the court did not commit any error that constituted an
impairment of Appellant’s statutory right to exercise ten peremptory strikes. 1
Consciousness of Guilt Evidence
A. Parties’ Contentions
Appellant argues that “the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that
Appellant refused to provide a DNA sample as consciousness of guilt, and in propounding
a jury instruction to that effect.” Appellant asserts that this abuse of discretion requires
reversal.
Appellant bases this argument on the differences between the instant circumstances
and those in Stevenson v. State, 222 Md. App. 118 (2015) and Thomas v. State, 397 Md.
557 (2007). In Stevenson, the defendant argued that the circuit court erred by admitting a
detective’s testimony that the defendant initially refused to provide a DNA sample but
eventually complied once he was informed that he was required to do so by a court order.
In Stevenson, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that his initial hesitancy could
not be connected to consciousness of guilt because “it is up to the defendant to offer an
alternative explanation for his resistance, not the State’s burden to prove that there isn’t
one[.]” Further, the Stevenson court noted that “[s]imply because there is a possibility that
1 	This court is unable to find a case directly on point, but the cases Appellant cites (Whitney
v. State, 158 Md. App. 519 (2004) and King v. State Roads Comm’n, 284 Md. 368 (1979)) are not
on point with the facts of the instant case. The judge did not commit an abuse of discretion in
denying the request to strike for cause, and just because that rightful denial caused Appellant to
use a peremptory strike does not equate to impairment of his right to peremptory strikes. We find
that only an error by the court could equate to an impairment of that right.

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there exists an innocent, or alternate explanation for the conduct does not mean that the
proffered evidence is per se inadmissible.”
Appellant urges that the instant case differs from Stevenson and Thomas because
“the record here amply explains the reason Appellant refused to comply with the court
order for a DNA sample, and it had nothing with consciousness of guilt.” Appellant
provides that “he ‘was not obfuscating’ or ‘trying to hide anything;’ he was merely
expressing his desire ‘to have a lawyer before they execute a search warrant for DNA.’”
Appellant asserts that even though he was legally mistaken about his entitlement to a
lawyer in the circumstances, “his repeated requests for a lawyer when asked to provide a
DNA sample ‘paints a full picture as to what’s happening . . . in his mind[.]’”
Finally, Appellant argues that “the errors in admitting the evidence and giving a
corresponding jury instruction were not harmless” because in closing argument, the
prosecutor 	“relied 	heavily 	on 	Appellant’s 	refusal 	to 	provide 	a 	DNA 	sample 	as
demonstrative of his consciousness of guilt[.]” Thus, Appellant urges that “[r]eversal is
required.”
Appellee argues that the trial court “properly exercised its discretion when it
admitted 	evidence 	of 	[Appellant’s] 	refusal 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	DNA 	warrant 	as
consciousness of guilt evidence[,]” and appropriately allowed the “subsequent jury
instruction.” Thus, Appellee concludes that this Court should affirm.
Appellee relies on Thomas, 397 Md. 557, which provides that the “proper inquiry is
whether the evidence could support an inference that the defendant’s conduct demonstrates
a consciousness of guilt.” Appellee asserts that given the relevant context, “[Appellant’s]

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statements allowed for the inference that he intended to obstruct or delay the collection of
evidence relevant to the charges.” Appellee specifies that Appellant attempted “to exercise
control over the officers and the situation[,]” and “to mislead officers about whether the
search warrant was being executed at his home[.]” Additionally, Appellee argues that
Appellant 	threatened, 	cursed 	at, 	and 	insulted 	the 	officers. 	Appellee 	urges 	that
“[Appellant’s] statement and demeanor was such that the trial court could infer from the
entirety of the exchange that [Appellant] desired to conceal evidence because he was
conscious of his guilt in the assault and wanted to hamper the prosecution of that assault.”
Additionally, Appellee argues that Appellant’s innocent or alternative explanation
for his refusal to provide the DNA sample “did not make the evidence inadmissible as
evidence of consciousness of guilt.”
Appellee provides that “[o]nce relevance is established, it is within the discretionary
authority of the court to determine whether the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice[.]” Appellee asserts that Appellant
“advances no reason to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion here.”
Finally, Appellee argues that “even if the court did err, any error was harmless,
because other evidence was sufficient to establish [Appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt[,]” and thus, this court should affirm. Specifically, Appellee provides that “the jury
only convicted [Appellant] of Second Degree Assault and False Imprisonment[,]” two of
the four counts against him. Appellee provides that these convictions “were predicted by
an abundance of evidence introduced a trial[,]” and provided a list of this evidence that
“was exclusive of the testimony, instruction, and argument regarding [Appellant’s] refusal

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to provide his DNA.” Thus, Appellee concludes “[t]here is no reasonable possibility that
the contested testimony and jury instruction influenced the verdict as to Second Degree
Assault and False Imprisonment[,]” and “[a]s the evidence was sufficient for a jury to
convict Smith, any error relating to his refusal to provide his DNA as evidence of
consciousness of guilt was harmless.”
B. Standard of Review
“The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court
and will not be reversed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Thomas v. State, 397
Md. 557, 579 (2007) (internal citations omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs “when a
trial judge exercises discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner or when he or she acts
beyond the letter or reason of the law.” Kelly v. State, 392 Md. 511, 531 (2006) (internal
citations omitted).
C. Analysis
First and foremost, evidence admitted at trial must be relevant, meaning it must have
“any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Md.
Rule 5-401. Additionally, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” Md. Rule 5-403.
In Thomas v. State, 397 Md. 557 (2007), the Supreme Court of Maryland explained
the admissibility of consciousness of guilt evidence:

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A person’s behavior after the commission of a crime may be admissible as
circumstantial evidence from which guilt may be inferred. This category of
circumstantial evidence is referred to as ‘consciousness of guilt.’ We
observed in Snyder v. State, 361 Md. 580, 591 (2000), that ‘[i]f relevant,
circumstantial evidence regarding a defendant’s conduct may be admissible
under Md. Rule 5–403, not as conclusive evidence of guilt, but as a
circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt.’ Conduct typically
argued to show consciousness of guilt includes flight after a crime, escape
from confinement, use of a false name, and destruction or concealment of
evidence.
A person’s post-crime behavior often is considered relevant to the question
of guilt because the particular behavior provides clues to the person’s state
of mind. The reason why a person’s post-crime state of mind may be relevant
is because, as Professor Wigmore suggested, the commission of a crime can
be expected to leave some mental traces on the criminal.
Id. at 575 (citing Thomas I, 372 Md. at 351-52 (internal citations omitted)). In Thomas, the
Court 	further 	determined 	that 	a 	defendant’s 	refusal 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	police 	in
administering a blood test can be relevant to show consciousness of guilt where the
following four-part foundation is established:
The relevance of the evidence as circumstantial evidence of petitioner’s guilt
depends on whether the following four inferences can be drawn: (1) from his
resistance to the blood test, a desire to conceal evidence; (2) from a desire to
conceal evidence, a consciousness of guilt; (3) from a consciousness of guilt,
a consciousness of guilt of the murder of Ms. Mitchell; and (4) from a
consciousness of guilt of the murder of Ms. Mitchell, actual guilt of the
murder.
Id. at 576. To be relevant, it is not necessary that guilt of the crime charged is conclusively
established, but rather “[t]he proper inquiry is whether the evidence could support an
inference that the defendant’s conduct demonstrates a consciousness of guilt. If so, the
evidence is relevant and generally admissible.” Id. at 577.

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The Court further stated that “[s]imply because there is a possibility that there exists
some innocent, or alternate explanation for the conduct does not mean that the proffered
evidence is per se inadmissible.” Id. at 578. Rather, it is “incumbent” on the defendant to
raise such an innocent or alternate explanation at trial. Id. at 578-79; see also Stevenson v.
State, 222 Md. App. 118, 146-67 (2015).
Here, Appellant’s repeated refusal to comply with the warrant for a sample of his
DNA is analogous to the defendant’s refusal to provide a blood sample in Thomas, and his
refusal could support an inference of his consciousness of guilt. See Thomas, 397 Md. at
575-77. However, Appellant argues that unlike in Thomas and Stevenson, he adequately
provided an innocent or alternate explanation for his refusal at trial. Specifically, Appellant
argues that his refusal was based on his mistaken understanding of his right to a lawyer in
the circumstances. Appellee argues that “when viewed in context, [Appellant’s] statements
and refusal were part of his attempts to exercise control over the officers and the situation.”
The trial court was in the best position to determine whether to credit Appellant’s
or Appellee’s characterization of Appellant’s refusal to comply with the warrant for his
DNA. After reviewing the officer’s body-worn camera footage, both on and off the record,
the court determined that the evidence of Appellant’s refusal to comply with the warrant
for his DNA was relevant as evidence of consciousness of guilt. Further, the court engaged
in the proper balancing test and ruled that the “probative value outweighs any prejudicial
value” of the evidence of the extent of his refusal, specifically that he had to be sedated for
his DNA to be taken. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in making its
relevance determination or in its 5-403 balancing test analysis because it followed the law

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and provided reasoned explanations for its conclusions. See Kelly, 392 Md. at 531 (internal
citations omitted). Therefore, the court also did not abuse its discretion by permitting a jury
instruction on the attempt to conceal evidence as consciousness of guilt.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR 	ANNE 	ARUNDEL 	COUNTY
AFFIRMED; COSTS TO APPELLANT.