State v. Houston, James S.

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. C-02-CR-24-001865
UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
Nos. 513 & 707
September Term, 2025
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STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
JAMES S HOUSTON
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Wells, C.J.,
Arthur,
Kehoe, S.,
JJ.
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Opinion by Arthur, J.
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Filed: October 9, 2026
* This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the
rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms
to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

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This interlocutory appeal arises from the prosecution of James Houston for the
alleged murder of his wife, Nancianne Houston. Within three weeks of the scheduled
trial date, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County issued an order disqualifying the
State’s Attorney for Anne Arundel County from the case. At the same time, the court
imposed a “firewall,” prohibiting all communication about the case between the State’s
Attorney and any other attorneys prosecuting the case.
The State noted an immediate appeal, and this Court stayed all trial proceedings
during the pendency of the appeal. This Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that
the order disqualifying the State’s Attorney was not an appealable interlocutory order.
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court of Maryland agreed that the
disqualification order was not appealable. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that
the order imposing a firewall between the State’s Attorney and other prosecutors was
appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The Supreme Court remanded the case
with instructions for this Court to review the merits of the firewall order.
For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we conclude that the circuit court’s
findings did not justify the imposition of a firewall that prohibits communication between
the State’s Attorney and others prosecuting the case. Consequently, we reverse that order
and remand this case for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
A. 	Homicide of Nancianne Houston
On the night of August 9, 2024, James Houston, M.D., called 911 to report that he
and his wife, Nancianne Houston, stabbed each other during an argument at his apartment

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in Edgewater, Maryland. At that time, Dr. Houston and Ms. Houston were involved in
divorce proceedings and lived at separate residences.
When first responders arrived, they found the Houstons lying in a pool of blood.
Ms. Houston was dead, with a large kitchen knife stuck in her chest and several other
knife wounds across her body. Dr. Houston sustained a stab wound to his abdomen and
several other knife wounds. A second knife was found on the floor, between Dr. Houston
and the body of Ms. Houston.
B. 	Police Interview with Steven Valladares
As part of the investigation, Anne Arundel County detectives interviewed
neighbors of Dr. Houston, including Steven Valladares. On August 14, 2024, Detective
George Davis and Detective Ronald Ram interviewed Mr. Valladares inside a patrol
vehicle. Detective Davis made a video recording of the interview and documented it in a
written report. Among other things, the interview concerned Mr. Valladares’s knowledge
of prior domestic disputes between Dr. Houston and Ms. Houston.
A few days later, Mr. Valladares called a detective to give additional information
that he had failed to mention during the initial interview. According to Mr. Valladares,
he provided three items of information in the follow-up phone call. First, Mr. Valladares
disclosed that Dr. Houston mentioned that Ms. Houston had transferred funds from Dr.
Houston’s individual accounts into joint accounts. Second, Mr. Valladares disclosed that
Dr. Houston owned body-worn cameras, which he used to record interactions with Ms.
Houston during their separation. Third, Mr. Valladares disclosed that Dr. Houston once
stated that Ms. Houston had “pulled a knife on” him.

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The officers did not document the follow-up phone call from Mr. Valladares.
Nevertheless, the lead investigator, Detective Downey, included Mr. Valladares’s
statements about cameras in a search warrant application dated August 21, 2024. In the
affidavit supporting the application, Detective Downey wrote: “One of the former
neighbors was interviewed and stated to detectives that [Dr. Houston] would wear a
‘pinhole camera’ anytime he had contact with [Ms. Houston] after their separation over
concerns of her actions.” The application quoted the neighbor as saying: “‘I wouldn’t be
surprised if [Dr. Houston] had a hidden camera in the apartment.’” According to
Detective Downey, he received that statement from Detective Davis, who had received a
phone call from Mr. Valladares shortly after the initial interview.
C. 	Murder Charges Against Dr. Houston
On September 25, 2024, the State filed a statement of charges in the District Court
of Maryland for Anne Arundel County, charging Dr. Houston with the murder of Ms.
Houston and other offenses. A few weeks later, the State filed a criminal information in
the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The State charged Dr. Houston with first-
degree murder of Ms. Houston and openly wearing or carrying a dangerous weapon with
the intent to injure.
After a scheduling conference in January 2025, the circuit court scheduled the case
for a jury trial to begin on May 23, 2025. The State’s Attorney for Anne Arundel
County, Anne Colt Leitess, served as the lead prosecutor. The defense anticipated that it
would claim that Dr. Houston acted in self-defense.

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D. 	Phone Interview of Mr. Valladares by State’s Attorney Leitess
During March and April 2025, amid preparation for a pretrial motions hearing
concerning character evidence, State’s Attorney Leitess interviewed approximately 15
witnesses. Ms. Leitess spoke to each witness without any other prosecutors or officers
present. This group of witnesses included Mr. Valladares.
On April 1, 2025, Ms. Leitess called Mr. Valladares to schedule a phone
conversation. Mr. Valladares agreed to speak with Ms. Leitess in the evening later that
day. Ms. Leitess called Mr. Valladares sometime after 6:00 p.m., and they spoke for
approximately 43 minutes. Mr. Valladares activated the speaker phone and allowed his
girlfriend, Mary Elizabeth Steele, to listen to the conversation.
Near the end of their conversation, Mr. Valladares told Ms. Leitess about his
follow-up phone call to a detective in August 2024. Among other things, Mr. Valladares
disclosed that he previously told a detective about Dr. Houston’s statement that Ms.
Houston once “pulled a knife” on him. Ms. Leitess reacted with surprise, stating that the
detectives who interviewed Mr. Valladares made no record of that statement.
Later that same night, Mr. Valladares called the attorneys representing Dr.
Houston. Mr. Valladares believed that, because Ms. Leitess seemed unaware of Dr.
Houston’s statement that Ms. Houston had “pulled a knife” on him, the defense attorneys
might not have received that information. Mr. Valladares informed a defense attorney
that he had previously told a detective about the knife statement in August 2024 and that
he told Ms. Leitess about the knife statement in their phone call on April 1, 2025.
In the weeks that followed her phone conversation with Mr. Valladares, State’s

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Attorney Leitess did not disclose to the defense the information that she obtained from
him.
E. 	Disclosure of the Knife Statement to the Court
On April 29, 2025, the parties appeared for a hearing concerning a defense motion
to exclude certain testimony from expert witnesses designated by the State. During a
break in the proceedings, defense counsel asked to “bring something to the [c]ourt’s
attention.” Defense counsel informed the court that the State had failed to disclose
“exculpatory evidence[.]” Specifically, defense counsel asserted that the State withheld
evidence that Ms. Houston “had pulled a knife on Dr. Houston sometime before” her
death.
Defense counsel described to the court the content of the phone conversation
between State’s Attorney Leitess and Mr. Valladares on April 1, 2025. Counsel informed
the court that, even though nearly a month had passed since that conversation, the State
had not disclosed the knife statement to the defense. Counsel stated that the defense team
had carefully reviewed all disclosures and confirmed that the State never provided any
information about the statement that Ms. Houston had pulled a knife on Dr. Houston.
In response, Ms. Leitess admitted that, several weeks earlier, Mr. Valladares told
her about the knife statement made by Dr. Houston. Ms. Leitess asserted that, after her
phone conversation with Mr. Valladares, she instructed Detective Downey to re-interview
Mr. Valladares. Ms. Leitess asserted that she had “followed up with Detective Downey
several times” over the previous several weeks. According to Ms. Leitess, despite her
repeated requests, Detective Downey still had not conducted another interview of Mr.

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Valladares.
Upon learning this information, the court expressed two main concerns. The court
stated that the State had violated its discovery obligations by failing to make a timely
disclosure of potentially exculpatory information, even though less than one month
remained before the scheduled trial. The court also expressed concern that Ms. Leitess
“made [her]self a witness” in the case when she obtained a statement from Mr.
Valladares without anyone else present.
The court asked the defense “what remedy, if any,” they were seeking. The court
added: “And then if not, the [c]ourt will fashion one.” As the discussions continued, the
court stated that it “need[ed] to hear” from Mr. Valladares and Ms. Steele “now before
trial[.]” The court announced that it would “interview or examine them on the record,
under oath, and . . . figure out . . . the implications” for the trial. The court directed the
State to procure the attendance of Mr. Valladares “for a deposition under oath forthwith.”
F. 	The Circuit Court’s “General Fact-Finding Mission”
The circuit court scheduled what it characterized as a “Deposition Hearing” to take
place on May 5, 2025. The hearing took place 18 days before the scheduled trial date.
The court received testimony for approximately eight hours from Detective Downey, Mr.
Valladares, Ms. Steele, Detective Davis, Detective Ram, and State’s Attorney Leitess.
At the beginning of the hearing, the court imposed a “rule on witnesses,” i.e., a
sequestration order excluding all prospective witnesses from the courtroom during the
testimony of other witnesses. The court allowed Ms. Leitess to remain in the courtroom
for an “introductory portion” only, stating that she was “a witness in this matter.” As a

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result of these rulings, Assistant State’s Attorney David Russell served as the State’s
primary representative at the hearing, along with Assistant State’s Attorney Carolyn
Grammas. The court instructed the Assistant State’s Attorneys that they should not “back
brief” Ms. Leitess about the testimony of other witnesses.
The court described the proceeding as “a general fact-finding mission” and as
“somewhat of an unorthodox hearing.” In preliminary discussions, the court described
the events that preceded the hearing, but no party made any specific requests for relief.
Mr. Russell stipulated that, on April 1, 2025, Mr. Valladares told Ms. Leitess that “Dr.
Houston had told him previously that Ms. Houston had come at Dr. Houston with a knife
on a prior occasion.” Mr. Russell further stipulated that the State had an obligation to
disclose this statement to the defense but failed to do so. 1
The court itself, rather than the attorneys, called the witnesses to testify. The court
conducted the initial examination of each witness before it allowed the parties to examine
the witness. After hearing from the first witness (Detective Downey), the court
remarked: “I usually don’t make sort of forecasting roadmaps or pronouncements, but I
will say that if it were right now, I don’t see how Ms. Leitess hadn’t made herself a
1 Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(1) provides: “Without the necessity of a request, the
State’s Attorney shall provide to the defense . . . [a]ll written and all oral statements of
the defendant . . . that relate to the offense charged and all material and information,
including documents and recordings, that relate to the acquisition of such statements[.]”
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(5) provides: “Without the necessity of a request, the State’s
Attorney shall provide to the defense . . . [a]ll material or information in any form,
whether or not admissible, that tends to exculpate the defendant or negate or mitigate the
defendant’s guilt or punishment as to the offense charged[.]” These rules implement
some of the State’s constitutional obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), and its progeny.

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witness in this case, and the [c]ourt will be ordering her off the case.”
Mr. Valladares testified that, in either March or June 2024, he attended a dinner
party hosted by his girlfriend, Ms. Steele. 2 Mr. Valladares recalled that Dr. Houston
attended the dinner party and that Dr. Houston’s girlfriend also might have attended. Mr.
Valladares testified that, during the dinner conversation, they began sharing their
experiences with “crazy exes.” According to Mr. Valladares, this topic prompted Dr.
Houston, who was in the midst of divorce proceedings, to share that Ms. Houston had
“pulled a knife on [him] before[.]” After hearing that “shocking statement[,]” Mr.
Valladares tried to change the subject without seeking additional details.
Mr. Valladares recounted that, after Ms. Houston’s death in August 2024, he
participated in an interview with two detectives. Within a few days after the interview,
Mr. Valladares made a follow-up call to provide three items of information that he failed
to mention during the interview because it did not occur to him that the information
might be relevant. Mr. Valladares testified that he told a detective: (1) that Ms. Houston
had transferred funds into joint accounts; (2) that Dr. Houston used body cameras to
record his interactions with Ms. Houston; and (3) that Dr. Houston had stated that Ms.
Houston once “pulled a knife” on him. Mr. Valladares could not remember the name of
the detective to whom he spoke, but he believed that it was someone other than Detective
Davis, who had conducted the initial interview.
Most of the court’s questions to Mr. Valladares concerned his phone conversation
2 Based on information saved in her phone, Ms. Steele believed that the dinner
party took place in June or July 2023.

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with State’s Attorney Leitess on April 1, 2025. Mr. Valladares explained that the call log
from his phone showed that the conversation lasted for approximately 43 minutes. Mr.
Valladares took the phone call in the living room of his home and activated the speaker
phone, allowing Ms. Steele to listen to the entire conversation. Mr. Valladares did not
inform Ms. Leitess that he was using the speaker phone with another person present.
Mr. Valladares testified that much of the conversation “covered some basic
items[,]” including his initial interview with two detectives and whether he had been in
contact with Dr. Houston since Ms. Houston’s death. Near the end of their conversation,
Mr. Valladares told Ms. Leitess that he had made a follow-up call, in which he told a
detective about Ms. Houston’s money transfers, Dr. Houston’s use of cameras, and the
knife statement. Mr. Valladares recalled that, when he gave this information to Ms.
Leitess, the “attitude and tone” of her questioning “became a little more aggressive” and
“progressively got worse.” According to Mr. Valladares, Ms. Leitess insisted that his
follow-up call to a detective had “never happened[.]” After the conversation ended, Mr.
Valladares discussed the situation with Ms. Steele and decided to contact Dr. Houston’s
attorneys to share “what [he] just experienced.”
In her testimony, Ms. Steele largely confirmed the account provided by Mr.
Valladares. Ms. Steele testified that she was present for the dinner party conversation in
which Dr. Houston stated that Ms. Houston had “come at [him] before with [a] . . .
knife.” Ms. Steele confirmed that she was also present for Mr. Valladares’s phone
conversation with Ms. Leitess, which Ms. Steele overheard through the speakerphone.
Ms. Steele recalled that, when Mr. Valladares told Ms. Leitess about his follow-up call to

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a detective, Ms. Leitess stated that there was “no record” of that call and insisted that “it
didn’t happen[.]” Ms. Steele stated that the tone of Ms. Leitess’s questioning became
“accusatory[,]” and that she “kept asking the same question . . . numerous times” about
Mr. Valladares’s friendship with Dr. Houston.
In his testimony, Detective Davis discussed his initial interview of Mr. Valladares
on August 14, 2024, which he recorded with his body-worn camera and documented in a
report. Detective Davis explained that, at the end of this type of interview, he always
gives the witness an electronic business card, which provides his phone number and the
phone number for the lead investigator. “[T]o the best of [his] recollection,” Detective
Davis could not say whether he ever spoke with Mr. Valladares again after the initial
interview. Detective Davis admitted that it was “possible” that he might have received a
follow-up phone call from Mr. Valladares. Detective Davis maintained, however, that no
one “ever called [him] and told [him] about a knife.” Detective Davis testified that, if
someone had reported to him that Ms. Houston previously pulled a knife on Dr. Houston,
he would have documented the statement. 3
Detective Downey, the lead investigator, testified that, sometime in August 2024,
Detective Davis reported that he had received a follow-up phone call from Mr. Valladares
a few days after the initial interview. Detective Downey made notes of Detective Davis’s
3 Detective Ronald Ram testified that he accompanied Detective Davis during the
initial interview of Mr. Valladares in August 2024. Detective Ram testified that he never
had any communication with Mr. Valladares after that interview. The court later
explained that it had “erred on the side of caution” by calling Detective Ram to testify
“for purposes of completeness[.]”

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account of that phone call. Detective Downey then included the statement that Dr.
Houston owned a “pinhole camera” in a search warrant application dated August 21,
2024. Detective Downey testified that he never spoke directly with Mr. Valladares.
Detective Downey testified that, at the beginning of April 2025, Ms. Leitess
“reached out to [him] and informed [him] that, upon speaking with Mr. Valladares
regarding his interview with Detective Davis, some additional information had come
forward[.]” Detective Downey testified that Ms. Leitess told him that the information
concerned a domestic incident between the Houstons in which “a knife may have been
involved in some way[.]” Detective Downey stated that Ms. Leitess “requested that [he]
attempt to reinterview Mr. Valladares.”
Detective Downey admitted that, as of the hearing date on May 5, 2025, he still
had not made an effort to interview Mr. Valladares. Detective Downey stated that April
2025 was “an extremely busy month” for him and that he did not realize how little time
remained before the scheduled trial. Contrary to Ms. Leitess’s assertions that she had
repeatedly tried to contact him, Detective Downey testified that he did not remember
receiving any further communication from her until after the hearing on April 29, 2025,
at which the court first learned of the undisclosed knife statement. Detective Downey
claimed that he was “having issues with [his] phone” during that month and that it was
“possible” that Ms. Leitess had been trying to contact him. Detective Downey testified
that he obtained a new phone very recently and that his call log did not transfer over from
the older phone.
At the beginning of the hearing, the court had informed Assistant State’s Attorney

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Russell that he would need to decide whether to call Ms. Leitess, after discussing that
decision with her. The court later mentioned that, even if Mr. Russell decided not to call
her, the court might call her on its own initiative. After consulting with Ms. Leitess, Mr.
Russell informed the court that the State would not call her as a witness. Immediately
after he announced that decision, the court itself called Ms. Leitess to testify.
The court questioned Ms. Leitess primarily about her phone conversation with Mr.
Valladares on April 1, 2025, and her actions after that conversation. Ms. Leitess denied
telling Mr. Valladares that his follow-up phone call to a detective had, in fact, never
happened. Ms. Leitess stated that she merely told Mr. Valladares that he did not mention
the knife statement during his initial interview. According to Ms. Leitess, Mr. Valladares
reacted in a “hostile” manner to “certain innocuous questions” and “laughed at [her]” at
one point during the conversation. Ms. Leitess also stated that Mr. Valladares became
“annoyed” with her and “snapped at [her]” near the end of their conversation.
Ms. Leitess testified that, immediately after her conversation with Mr. Valladares,
she contacted Detective Davis. According to Ms. Leitess, Detective Davis claimed that
he had never received any follow-up phone call from Mr. Valladares and that Mr.
Valladares had never said anything about Ms. Houston wielding a knife. Ms. Leitess
testified that, on the following day, Detective Davis assured her that he would “fall on
[his] sword,” by admitting that he had “no independent memory” of the follow-up phone
call from Mr. Valladares.
Ms. Leitess testified that, one day after her conversation with Mr. Valladares, she
also “talked to Detective Downey about what he needed to do to follow-up with Mr.

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Valladares.” Ms. Leitess stated that she wanted Detective Downey to “do a full
interview” to avoid the possibility that she might “become a witness” in the case. Ms.
Leitess testified that Detective Downey agreed to re-interview Mr. Valladares. Ms.
Leitess testified that, a few weeks later, she “reached out to” Detective Downey on two
occasions. Ms. Leitess testified that, on April 23rd, she sent Detective Downey a text
message, asking whether he had interviewed Mr. Valladares yet. Ms. Leitess testified
that, on April 25th, she called Detective Downey and left a voice message. Ms. Leitess
stated that “those messages went unanswered.”
While questioning Ms. Leitess, the court asked whether she had ever informed
Assistant State’s Attorney Russell about the knife statement reported by Mr. Valladares.
Mr. Leitess claimed that she shared that information with Mr. Russell sometime after the
April 1st phone call, but she could not remember details about exactly what she said to
him.
After Ms. Leitess testified, Mr. Russell told the court that, contrary to her
testimony, Ms. Leitess had never discussed the knife statement with him previously. The
court placed Mr. Russell under oath to make his testimony part of the record. Mr. Russell
testified that Mr. Leitess did not mention the knife statement to him at any time after the
April 1st phone call. Mr. Russell testified that he first learned of the knife statement
when defense counsel brought that information to the court’s attention during the April
29th hearing.
G. 	Disqualification Order and Firewall Provision
Before concluding the proceedings on May 5, 2025, the court made extensive

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comments on the record concerning the evidence. The court announced its conclusion
that State’s Attorney Leitess “made herself a witness in th[e] case” when she interviewed
Mr. Valladares without anyone else present. 4 The court directed the parties to return to
make arguments on the following day. The court instructed defense counsel to decide
“what relief they [we]re seeking in light of the information that was gained” at the
hearing. The court instructed Assistant State’s Attorney Russell to decide whether the
State would oppose whatever relief might be requested by the defense.
When the proceedings resumed on May 6, 2025, the court specified that the
attorneys should address “whether it [wa]s appropriate for Ms. Leitess to remain on this
case at all.” On behalf of the State, Mr. Russell asked the court to consider a “less
severe” alternative than “[d]ismissing Ms. Leitess from the case[,]” such as precluding
the State from attempting to impeach witnesses based on information that she obtained
during her interviews. Mr. Russell argued that the State would suffer considerable
prejudice if the court removed the lead prosecutor within three weeks before the first-
degree murder trial. Defense counsel argued that the court should disqualify Ms. Leitess
immediately and then consider imposing additional sanctions on the State.
After a recess, the court delivered a lengthy oral ruling. 5 In general, the court
4 The court reasoned that, because the State intended to dispute Mr. Valladares’s
account of the knife statement, the “only way” to “complete [the] impeachment” of Mr.
Valladares would be to call Ms. Leitess as a witness. We express no opinion on the
validity of the court’s reasoning.
5 State’s Attorney Leitess was not present in the courtroom when the court
announced its ruling.

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described much of the testimony as “glaringly inconsistent.” Among other things, the
court noted: that Ms. Leitess described the April 1st phone conversation “very
differently” from the way Mr. Valladares and Ms. Steele did; that Detective Downey was
unable to verify Ms. Leitess’s claim that she made repeated attempts to contact him by
phone and text message during April 2025; that Detective Davis appeared to have no
memory of telling Ms. Leitess that he “agreed that he would fall on his sword” one day
after the April 29th hearing; and that Mr. Russell contradicted Ms. Leitess’s assertion that
she told him about the content of her phone conversation with Mr. Valladares before the
April 29th hearing. 6
The court determined that the State violated its discovery obligations by failing to
make a timely disclosure of Mr. Valladares’s statements to the defense. The court
observed that, under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), prosecutors have a duty to
disclose all material information in their possession that is favorable to the accused. The
court reasoned that Mr. Valladares’s statement that Dr. Houston stated that Ms. Houston
once pulled a knife on him was relevant to his claim of self-defense and that it would be
admissible as a “prior consistent statement[.]” The court reasoned that, if Dr. Houston
were to testify about the knife incident, Ms. Leitess might become a necessary witness for
the purpose of impeaching his testimony or rebutting an attempt to impeach his
testimony.
The court expressed its opinion that Ms. Leitess’s practice of speaking to
6 The court stated that it credited “one hundred percent” Mr. Russell’s testimony
that Ms. Leitess never told him about her conversation with Mr. Valladares.

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witnesses without any others present was “troubling[.]” 7 The court opined that, under the
Rules of Professional Conduct, “prosecutors are commanded not to make themselves
witnesses in their own case.” The court referred to Maryland Rule 19-303.7, which
generally prohibits an attorney from serving as an advocate at a trial in which the attorney
is likely to be a necessary witness. The court explained that the justification for this Rule
is that “a trier of fact can be mis[led] by an attorney serving as both an advocate and a
witness.”
The court concluded: “So in sum, the State’s Attorney has irreparably made
herself a witness in her own case.” The court ruled that the defense “now . . . has the
right to call the State’s Attorney in [its] own case.” The court stated that Dr. Houston
should be free to call her as a witness “without any fear that the fact-finder w[ould]
impart to her greater credence because of her role as an active advocate within the same
7 We express no opinion concerning the circuit court’s criticisms of the State’s
Attorney’s interview practices. The American Bar Association has issued the following
recommendation for assessing whether a prosecutor should ensure that a third-party
observer is present for a witness interview:
A prosecutor should avoid the prospect of having to testify personally about
the content of a witness interview. The prosecutor’s interview of most
routine or government witnesses (for example, custodians of records or law
enforcement agents) should not require a third-party observer. But when
the need for corroboration of an interview is reasonably anticipated, the
prosecutor should be accompanied by another trusted and credible person
during the interview. The prosecutor should avoid being alone with any
witness who the prosecutor reasonably believes has potential or actual
criminal liability, or foreseeably hostile witnesses.
American Bar Ass’n, Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function,
Standard 3-3.4(f) (4th ed. 2017).

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trial.” For those reasons, the court “order[ed] that the State’s Attorney be removed as
counsel on this case.”
The court further ordered the State to “establish[]” a “complete and absolute
firewall going forward . . . between the assistants who will prosecute this case and Ms.
Leitess.” As a “very limited exception” to this requirement, the court permitted the
Assistant State’s Attorneys to speak to Ms. Leitess about her preparations for an
upcoming hearing concerning the admissibility of certain expert testimony. The court
also ruled that, in deciding who should replace Ms. Leitess at trial, the Assistant State’s
Attorneys could speak to her about the “availability” of attorneys under her supervision,
but they could not discuss with her any “strategic considerations” about the case against
Dr. Houston.
In addition to its rulings regarding Ms. Leitess, the court ruled that, as a
“necessary precondition” to allowing Detective Downey to testify at trial, he must
“produce an affidavit under oath, under penalties of perjury,” affirming that the testimony
he gave regarding the replacement of his phone was “true and accurate.”
After the hearing, the court signed and filed a hearing sheet, which stated that the
court “[o]rdered State’s Attorney Leitess dismissed as [c]ounsel from this case.”
G. 	Clarification of the “Firewall Mandate”
On May 8, 2025, two days after the court issued its disqualification order, the
State moved for a postponement of the trial. The State asserted that no prosecutor had
been assigned to replace Ms. Leitess and that the State lacked adequate time to prepare
for the trial, which was scheduled to begin in 15 days.

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On the morning of the following day, May 9, 2025, the State filed a notice of
appeal. The notice stated that the State sought to appeal from “the disqualification of
elected State’s Attorney Ms. Anne Colt Leitess from the case and the related prohibition
against her involvement in the case.”
Later that same day, the circuit court convened what it called an “immediate ad
hoc hearing[,]” at which it restated and clarified the scope of its “firewall mandate[.]”
The court explained that, two days earlier, it had ruled that “Ms. Leitess had made herself
unequivocally a witness in her own case for myriad reasons.” The court stated that “it
was absolutely incumbent that related to that decision that she had made herself a witness
in her case that she be firewalled[.]” The court continued: “And, therefore, having
concluded she is a witness she has to be a witness for all purposes.” The court stated that
“the State’s Attorney’s Office internally has to treat her like a witness.”
In that context, the court explained that the Assistant State’s Attorneys had
informed the court that they found “at least digital indicia that Ms. Leitess ha[d] been
continuingly in some fashion involved in the case” since the disqualification and firewall
orders. The court announced that the requirement that Ms. Leitess “be firewalled from
the case” also meant that she could not “unilaterally” access, modify, or delete any
electronically-stored information related to the case. The court directed Assistant State’s
Attorney Russell, whom the court described as “the Acting State’s Attorney[,]” to inform
Ms. Leitess that the court had ordered her “to remove herself from [the role of] an active
participant in this case and adopt a role that she is obligated now to adopt, which is that
of exclusively a witness.” The court specified that it would be “a gross

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19
misinterpretation” of the court’s order to construe it to apply only to communications
between Ms. Leitess and the Assistant State’s Attorneys representing the State in her
absence. The court added: “[Ms. Leitess] cannot touch, involve herself in the case
digitally, remotely through third persons, or otherwise.”
In a hearing sheet filed on the same day, the court found that “State’s Attorney
Anne Leitess is now a witness in this case” and ordered that she “is forbidden from doing
any work in this case.”
In a separate written order filed that day, the court ordered Detective Downey and
Detective Davis to “preserve all internal and external electronic communications” related
to the case, including any communications with Ms. Leitess, and to produce all of those
communications to the Assistant State’s Attorneys as soon as practicable.
H. 	Post-Appeal Proceedings in the Circuit Court
On May 12, 2025, the State moved for the circuit court to stay the trial
proceedings pending the outcome of the State’s interlocutory appeal. During a hearing
on the same day, the court heard arguments concerning the State’s motion for a
postponement and its motion for stay. The defense opposed both motions. The court
denied the motions, concluding that the State lacked good cause to justify a postponement
of the trial date.
In lieu of providing a supplemental affidavit, Detective Downey testified under
oath during the hearing on May 12, 2025. Detective Downey testified that he had certain
“cell phone communication throughout the month of April” with Ms. Leitess, including
phone calls and text messages, but he could not recall specific details about those

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20
communications. Detective Downey testified that, aside from one conversation at the
beginning of April and another at the end of April, he did not recall whether Ms. Leitess
repeatedly asked him to “follow up with Mr. Valladares[.]”
Detective Downey further testified that, when he replaced his phone in early May
2025, technicians transferred only the contacts from his old phone, but not other data
such as call logs or text messages. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked
whether, when he obtained his new phone, Detective Downey instructed a technician to
“wipe” the old phone, “meaning just delete the data from [his] old phone.” Detective
Downey refused to answer that question, invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.
Meanwhile, shortly after the court issued its decision disqualifying State’s
Attorney Leitess, the defense had filed a letter asking the court to consider a list of
“proposed remedies.” The proposed remedies included dismissal of the charges, various
limitations on the State’s presentation of evidence, and certain stipulations adverse to the
State.
After hearing arguments on May 14, 2025, the circuit court denied the request to
dismiss the charges. The court evaluated the request for dismissal under the framework
used to determine the appropriate remedy for a violation of the State’s disclosure
obligations. See generally Williams v. State, 416 Md. 670, 698 (2010) (citing Thomas v.
State, 397 Md. 557, 570-71 (2007)). The court found that the State withheld information
from the defense intentionally, rather than carelessly or recklessly. The court concluded,
however, that this discovery violation did not cause any irreparable prejudice to the

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21
defense.
Although the court declined to dismiss the charges, the court ruled that it would
prohibit Detective Davis from testifying at trial. The court also ruled that, if either party
called Detective Downey at trial, the defense could ask him the same questions that
previously prompted him to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. The court further
ruled that, at trial, it would “permit and . . . read into the record a stipulated fact that the
State’s Attorney willfully withheld evidence from the [d]efense[,]” to the effect that “the
Defendant had previously claimed that the decedent had pulled a kitchen knife on him.” 8
I. 	Initial Appellate Proceedings in this Court
On May 14, 2025, the State filed an emergency motion, asking this Court to stay
the proceedings in the circuit court pending the outcome of the State’s interlocutory
appeal. This Court granted the motion and imposed a stay of the circuit court
proceedings, including any trial, until the resolution of the appeal.
Dr. Houston moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that the interlocutory order
disqualifying Ms. Leitess was not an appealable order. The State opposed the motion,
contending that the disqualification order was appealable under the collateral order
doctrine. This Court established an expedited schedule for briefing and arguments on the
motion to dismiss.
On June 3, 2025, this Court granted Dr. Houston’s motion to dismiss the appeal.
State v. Houston, No. 37, Sept. Term 2025, 2025 WL 1603439 (App. Ct. Md. June 3,
8 The propriety of these rulings is not before us, and we express no opinion on that
subject.

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22
2025). In an unreported opinion, this Court concluded that the interlocutory order
disqualifying the State’s Attorney was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
Id. at *5.
As this Court explained in its opinion, the collateral order doctrine is a very
narrow exception to the rule that ordinarily prohibits parties from appealing from an
interlocutory order. State v. Houston, 2025 WL 1603439, at *2. To qualify as a
collateral order, a ruling must satisfy four requirements: (1) it must conclusively
determine a disputed issue; (2) it must resolve an important issue; (3) it must be
completely separate from the merits of the action; and (4) it must be effectively
unreviewable on an appeal from a final judgment. Id. This Court reasoned that the order
disqualifying the State’s Attorney and imposing a firewall satisfied three of those four
requirements. Id. We stated that the order was “as conclusive as any interlocutory order
could be.” Id. We reasoned that “the issue of whether a circuit court can disqualify the
elected State’s Attorney and limit her ability to communicate with her subordinates is
obviously an important one.” Id. We also reasoned that, because the State has no right to
appeal after a conviction or acquittal, the court’s rulings would be “completely—and not
just effectively—unreviewable on the merits after a final judgment.” Id.
We explained that, to evaluate the remaining requirement—whether the order was
completely separate from the merits of the case—it was necessary to “inquire into the
basis for the order.” State v. Houston, 2025 WL 1603439, at *2. Based on our review of
the record, we concluded that the circuit court “disqualified the State’s Attorney because
it found, in essence, that she was likely to be a necessary witness.” Id. at *3. We

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23
explained that a reviewing court “cannot evaluate whether the State’s Attorney is likely
to be a necessary witness at trial without evaluating how the trial might progress, how the
several witnesses might testify, and how the court might rule on various evidentiary
issues.” Id. at *4. We concluded that “the question of whether the State’s Attorney is
likely to be a necessary witness, and thus cannot serve as an advocate, is entwined with
the merits of the case, in that it is inseparable from evidentiary issues that will arise at
trial.” Id. at *5. We determined that, because the disqualification decision was not
completely separate from the merits, the collateral order doctrine did not authorize the
State’s interlocutory appeal. Id.
One day after this Court filed its opinion, the State filed a supplemental notice of
appeal, seeking to protect its right to appellate review of any appealable rulings made
after the State filed its first notice of appeal.
J. 	Review Proceedings in the Supreme Court of Maryland
After this Court issued its opinion, this Court issued an order to stay the effect of
the appellate mandate and to continue the stay of the trial proceedings, pending the
outcome of any certiorari review in the Supreme Court of Maryland.
The State made a timely petition for writ of certiorari, raising two questions. First,
the State asked whether “an immediate appeal [can] be taken under the collateral order
doctrine from an interlocutory order disqualifying a State’s Attorney as counsel in a
criminal prosecution” based on the advocate-witness rule. Second, the State asked:
“Regardless of whether the disqualification ruling is immediately appealable, can an
immediate appeal be taken under the collateral order doctrine from an interlocutory order

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24
directing that a firewall be erected between an elected State’s Attorney and her Assistant
State’s Attorneys?” The Supreme Court of Maryland granted the petition as to both
questions. 9
On March 20, 2026, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the
order dismissing the State’s appeal. State v. Houston, 493 Md. 279, 285 (2026). In an
opinion by Chief Justice Fader, the Court analyzed the circuit court’s rulings as two
separate orders: the “disqualification order” and the “firewall order.” Id. at 290 n.1.
The Court first addressed whether the disqualification order satisfied the
requirements of the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 299. Dr. Houston conceded, and the
Court agreed, that the disqualification order satisfied three of the four requirements. Id.
The Court reasoned that the order “conclusively disqualified the State’s Attorney[;] [i]t
was not a tentative, conditional, or preliminary ruling.” Id. at 300. The Court reasoned
that “[a]n order disqualifying an elected State’s Attorney also resolves an important issue
in that it ‘implicates separation of powers issues.’” Id. (quoting U.S. v. Bolden, 353 F.3d
870, 879 (10th Cir. 2003)). The Court further reasoned that, because the State ordinarily
cannot appeal after a conviction or acquittal, the disqualification order would be
effectively unreviewable after a final judgment. Id. at 301.
The Court determined, however, that the disqualification order was not completely
separate from the merits of the case. Id. at 301. The Court stated: “Any review of the
disqualification order here would necessarily be focused on the circuit court’s basis for
9 The Court also denied Dr. Houston’s cross-petition, in which he asked the Court
to review the merits of the circuit court’s orders.

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25
ordering disqualification, which was the court’s conclusion that the State’s Attorney was
likely to be a necessary witness in the case.” Id. The Court explained that “a reviewing
court cannot assess the basis for an order disqualifying a prosecutor for violating the
advocate-witness rule without considering the merits of the litigation.” Id. at 304.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the disqualification order failed to meet the
requirements of the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 305.
The Court proceeded to analyze the appealability of the firewall order, separate
and apart from the disqualification order. Id. The Court determined that “the firewall
order conclusively determines the issue—that the State’s Attorney is barred from
communicating with her subordinates concerning the case in almost all respects—and
would be effectively unreviewable on appeal after final judgment.” Id. The Court
concluded that “an order that bars an elected State’s Attorney from communicating with
her deputies and supervising litigation easily meets the threshold of being an important
issue for purposes of the collateral order doctrine.” Id. at 306. In this regard, the Court
“agree[d] with the State that the firewall order raises important separation of powers
concerns.” Id.
Analyzing the final requirement, the Court concluded that the firewall order was
completely separate from the merits of the case. Id. at 306-07. To reach that conclusion,
the Court determined the basis for the firewall order:
The circuit court’s basis for ordering the firewall was that once it concluded
that the State’s Attorney had made herself a witness, “she ha[d] to be
treated like a witness in every way[,]” including not having access to any of
the prosecution’s files and not discussing the case with anyone in her
office. According to the court, the fact that the State’s Attorney would be a

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26
witness required the court to order that she “remove herself from [being] an
active participant in this case and adopt a role that she is obligated now to
adopt, which is that of exclusively a witness.” The court thus articulated a
bright-line rule that a prosecutor who will be a witness in a prosecution
must be walled off from any other involvement in that prosecution simply
by virtue of being a witness.
Id. at 307.
The Court reasoned that “[a]ppellate review of the circuit court’s firewall order
does not require review of the circuit court’s ruling that the State’s Attorney is likely to
be a necessary witness.” Id. The Court explained that the “advocate-witness rule aims to
prevent ‘the trier of fact’ from being confused or misled by an attorney serving as both
advocate and witness in the same case.” Id. The Court explained further that the
disqualification order guaranteed that Ms. Leitess would not appear before the jury as an
advocate; she would appear, if at all, only as a witness. Id. The Court concluded that
“[t]he interests served by the advocate-witness rule, to the extent they are implicated
here, [] are thus fully protected by the disqualification order.” Id.10
The Court added: “Beyond what has already been accomplished by the
disqualification order—the assurance that the State’s Attorney will not serve as both an
advocate and witness before the same jury—the advocate-witness rule itself has nothing
to say about whether an attorney witness can participate in litigation behind the scenes.”
Id. at 308. The Court observed that “[t]he circuit court believed that the firewall order
was compelled by the fact of the State’s Attorney’s status as a witness in the case.” Id.
10 In a footnote, the Court cautioned: “Our opinion should not be read as opining
in any way on the merits of either the disqualification order or the firewall order.” Id.
n.7.

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27
The Court saw “no reason why the Appellate Court cannot assess that conclusion without
its analysis becoming intertwined with the merits.” Id.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the order creating a firewall between the
State’s Attorney and other prosecutors was appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
Id. at 308. The Supreme Court reinstated the appeal in part and remanded the case for
this Court to review the merits of the firewall order. Id.
After the Supreme Court issued its decision, this Court renewed its stay of the trial
proceedings pending the outcome of this appeal. In the same order, this Court
consolidated the appeal resulting from the first notice of appeal (No. 513, Sept. Term
2025) with the appeal resulting from the second notice of appeal (No. 707, Sept. Term
2025).
D ISCUSSION
In this appeal, the State seeks reversal of the order imposing a “firewall” between
the State’s Attorney for Anne Arundel County and other attorneys prosecuting the case.
The State’s appellate brief presents a single question: “Did the circuit court err and abuse
its discretion in imposing a firewall barring communication regarding a pending criminal
case between the county’s elected State’s Attorney and her Assistant State’s Attorneys
prosecuting the case?”
Before this Court addresses the State’s contentions, it is important to clarify the
limited scope of this interlocutory appeal. Under Maryland law, the collateral order
doctrine is “‘very limited’” in scope and applies to “‘only a narrow class of orders that
are offshoots of the principal litigation in which they are issued[.]’” In re M. P., 487 Md.

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28
53, 68 (2024) (quoting Stephens v. State, 420 Md. 495, 502 (2011)). “‘[I]n an appeal that
is permissible only if the subject matter is ‘completely separate from the merits of the
action,’” an appellate court generally lacks authority “to consider and decide every
interlocutory ruling pertaining to the merits of the case.” Maryland Bd. of Physicians v.
Geier, 225 Md. App. 114, 141 (2015) (quoting Addison v. Lochearn Nursing Home, LLC,
411 Md. 251, 285 (2009)). In light of “the narrow purpose of the collateral order
doctrine, orders that do not independently satisfy the four-part test may not be appealed
by ‘piggybacking’ onto another interlocutory order that does satisfy the test.” Maryland
Bd. of Physicians v. Geier, 451 Md. 526, 554-55 (2017).
In its prior decision in this case, the Supreme Court of Maryland determined that
“(1) the circuit court’s order disqualifying the State’s Attorney is not appealable under
the collateral order doctrine because it is not completely separate from the merits; and (2)
the circuit court’s order creating a firewall between the State’s Attorney and others in her
office is appealable under the collateral order doctrine.” State v. Houston, 493 Md. 279,
308 (2026). Consistent with those determinations, this Court’s task is to review “the
circuit court’s decision to mandate a firewall, separate and apart from the disqualification
order[.]” Id. This Court must assess the circuit court’s conclusion “that the firewall
order was compelled by the fact of the State’s Attorney’s status as a witness in the case . .
. without [our] analysis becoming intertwined with the merits.” Id. In this context, the
“merits of this case” encompass not only the ultimate questions of guilt or innocence, but
also evidentiary matters, including “the court’s conclusion that the State’s Attorney was
likely to be a necessary witness in the case.” See id. at 301.

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29
Accordingly, this Court has authority to review only the firewall order—the order
that satisfies the requirements of the collateral order doctrine. Our analysis begins by
accepting, without reservation, the disqualification decision that preceded the firewall
order. Thus, we proceed from the premises that the circuit court has already determined
that State’s Attorney Leitess is a necessary witness in the case and that, because she is a
necessary witness, she is disqualified from serving as a prosecutor. The focus of our
analysis is whether, in light of those established premises, the circuit court erred or
abused its discretion when it imposed a “firewall” between the disqualified State’s
Attorney and other attorneys prosecuting the case.
In their briefs, both parties acknowledge that they have uncovered no authority
prescribing a standard of review for this type of order, which prohibits a State’s Attorney
from communicating with other subordinate prosecutors. Dr. Houston notes that the
firewall order is “closely related” to the issue of attorney disqualification. Generally,
decisions of whether to disqualify an attorney are subject to review for abuse of
discretion. See Young v. State, 297 Md. 286, 298 (1983); Lykins v. State, 288 Md. 71, 84
(1980). Dr. Houston further argues that the firewall order implicates the trial court’s
broad authority over witnesses and its control of the course and conduct of trial, matters
ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Choate v. State, 214 Md.
App. 118, 151 (2013); Applied Indus. Techs. v. Ludemann, 148 Md. App. 272, 289
(2002) (citing Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 413 (1974)).
For its part, the State tells us that it “presumes” that the firewall order should be
reviewed for abuse of discretion. The State observes that, “‘when an otherwise

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30
discretionary decision is premised upon legal error, that decision is necessarily an abuse
of discretion[.]’” Tallant v. State, 254 Md. App. 665, 681 (2022) (quoting Bass v. State,
206 Md. App. 1, 11 (2012)). The State contends that “the circuit court’s reasoning in
imposing the firewall was beset by multiple legal errors.” First and foremost, the State
contends that the firewall order is “a substantial incursion on the separation of powers”
between the executive and judicial branches of government.
When the Supreme Court of Maryland determined that the firewall order was
appealable, the Court reasoned that “the firewall order raises important separation of
powers concerns.” State v. Houston, 493 Md. at 306. The Court explained that “[a]
State’s Attorney has ‘broad official discretion to institute and prosecute criminal
causes[.]’” Id. (quoting Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 90 (1944)). The Court noted that the
State’s Attorney “‘generally may assign to [her] deputies and assistants the performance,
subject to [her] discretion and control, of the duties required of [her] by law[.]’” Id.
(quoting State v. Aquilla, 18 Md. App. 487, 494 (1973)). The Court explained that the
circuit court “remov[ed] that discretion and authority with respect to” this case, by
“barr[ing] an elected State’s Attorney from communicating with her deputies and
supervising litigation[.]” Id.
The Maryland Constitution mandates that all branches of government must adhere
to the principle of separation of powers. Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights provides
that “the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever
separate and distinct from each other” and that “no person exercising the functions of one
of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.” Under this

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31
principle, the judicial branch is not “empowered to interfere with the exercise of the
authority vested exclusively in an equal and coordinate branch of government.”
Cirincione v. State, 75 Md. App. 166, 186 (1988); see also State’s Attorney of Baltimore
City v. City of Baltimore, 274 Md. 597, 608 (1975) (holding that a court order
“[m]andating” that the State’s Attorney prosecute all violations of building code and
electrical code was an improper “interference by the judiciary with the discretion vested
in the State’s Attorney”).
It is axiomatic that State’s Attorneys are part of the executive branch of
government. See Sinclair v. State, 27 Md. App. 207, 214 (1975) (citing Powell v. State,
16 Md. App. 685, 694 n.1 (1973)), rev’d on other grounds, 278 Md. 243 (1976). “Under
the Constitution and laws of Maryland, the State’s Attorney is a constitutional officer
elected by the people and entrusted by them with the prosecution of persons accused of
crime.” State v. Hunter, 10 Md. App. 300, 305 (1970). The Maryland Constitution
provides that the voters in each county and Baltimore City shall elect a State’s Attorney
(Md. Const., art. V, § 7), who “shall perform such duties . . . as shall be prescribed by the
General Assembly.” Md. Const., art. V, § 9. Although the General Assembly has not
exhaustively defined these duties (see Babbitt v. State, 294 Md. 134, 137 (1982)), the
General Assembly has authorized each State’s Attorney, “in the county served by the
State’s Attorney,” to “prosecute and defend on the part of the State all cases in which the
State may be interested.” Md. Code (2001, 2025 Repl. Vol.), § 15-102 of the Criminal
Procedure Article.
Although the Maryland Constitution and Maryland Code refer to an “office” of

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32
State’s Attorney, this “office” is not an independent agency or entity. Owens v.
Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office, 767 F.3d 379, 395 (4th Cir. 2014). The phrase
“‘State’s Attorney’s Office’ is a term of convenience[,]” sometimes used to describe an
elected State’s Attorney and “the collection of government employees who work under
the supervision” of that officer. Id. In Anne Arundel County, as in other counties, the
General Assembly has empowered the State’s Attorney to appoint deputy State’s
Attorneys, assistant State’s Attorneys, and clerical, administrative, investigative, and
other staff as necessary to perform the duties of the office. Md. Code (2001, 2025 Repl.
Vol.), § 15-403 of the Criminal Procedure Article. State’s Attorneys “generally may
assign to [their] deputies and assistants the performance, subject to [their] discretion and
control, of the duties required of [them] by law with respect to the institution and
prosecution of criminal actions.” State v. Aquilla, 18 Md. App. at 494.
“Maryland courts have noted that the State’s Attorney is ‘vested with the broadest
official discretion’ to institute and prosecute criminal cases.” State v. Brown, 200 Md.
App. 47, 52 (2011) (quoting State v. Romulus, 315 Md. 526, 537 (1989)). Subject to
certain conditions, “State’s Attorneys retain the broad discretion they have historically
enjoyed in determining which cases to prosecute, which offenses to charge, and how to
prosecute the cases they bring.” Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 298 (2006). “An integral
and necessary part of this broad official discretion is the ability to delegate the power and
duties of the office of the State’s Attorney to persons beyond the individual occupying
that constitutional position.” State v. Brown, 200 Md. App. at 52.
“While prosecutorial discretion is subject to oversight by the courts to ensure that

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33
it is exercised within constitutional and statutory constraints, ‘the office of State’s
Attorney is not a branch of the judiciary, nor is it directly subject to its supervision.’”
Oglesby v. State, 441 Md. 673, 680 (2015) (quoting State v. Hunter, 10 Md. App. at 305).
The principle of separation of powers ordinarily prohibits courts from unwarranted
“‘interference . . . with the function of [the State’s Attorney]’” or from “‘arrogat[ing]
unto [the judicial] branch supervisory powers which the Constitution does not bestow[.]’”
Oglesby v. State, 441 Md. at 680 (quoting State v. Lykins, 43 Md. App. 472, 473 (1979),
modified, 288 Md. 71 (1980)). Although courts have authority to appoint trial counsel
under certain circumstances, that authority generally “does not authorize the court to
assume the State’s Attorney’s constitutional power to determine when and if to
prosecute[.]” Babbitt v. State, 294 Md. at 138. Moreover, the choice to pursue a
particular penalty for a crime “is a prerogative resting exclusively with the State’s
Attorney’s Office, part of the executive branch of government.” Cirincione v. State, 75
Md. App. at 185.
In this appeal, the State argues that “a judicial directive that bars a State’s
Attorney from communicating with and supervising the litigation of her Assistant State’s
Attorneys, and effectively appoints her deputies as ‘Acting State’s Attorneys[,]’ . . . is a
serious encroachment on the separation of powers.” In response, Dr. Houston attempts to
minimize the extent to which the firewall order interferes with the authority reserved to
the State’s Attorney. Dr. Houston argues that the “defining feature” of a prosecutor’s
authority is the power to decide whether to initiate a prosecution. Dr. Houston argues
that, because the “determination of when, whom, and whether to prosecute ha[s] already

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34
been made[,]” the firewall order does not substantially interfere with the authority
reserved to State’s Attorney.
Dr. Houston’s argument reflects too-narrow a view of the authority that the
Constitution and laws of Maryland vest in the State’s Attorney. Prosecutorial discretion
is not simply a discrete, binary decision, which terminates immediately when a charging
document is filed. State’s Attorneys have “broad discretion” to determine “how to
prosecute the cases they bring.” Evans v. State, 396 Md. at 298. Just as prosecutors have
discretion to decide whether to file charges (see Md. Rule 4-202(a)), prosecutors have
ongoing authority to decide whether to withdraw charges (see Md. Rule 4-247(a), to enter
into plea agreements (see Md. Rule 4-243), or to request a particular penalty after a
conviction (see Md. Rule 4-342). Under the Constitution and laws of Maryland, elected
State’s Attorneys are the officers empowered to make those decisions and other related
decisions, either directly or through subordinates under their supervision, in light of their
evaluation of the evidence against the accused.
Nevertheless, as counsel for Dr. Houston aptly observed at oral argument, the
State’s separation-of-powers arguments may be overly broad. The mere fact that a court
order interferes, to some extent, with certain prerogatives normally reserved to
prosecutors does not necessarily make the order erroneous or unlawful. Blind adherence
to a policy of non-interference with a prosecutor’s authority could impair other
constitutional guarantees, such as a defendant’s right to a fair trial under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. As Dr. Houston observes: “‘Neither
prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement

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35
officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate the
court’s] function.’” In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007, 1010 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 553-54 (1976)) (emphasis omitted).
We agree with Dr. Houston that the separation-of-powers problems identified by
the State do not, by themselves, dictate the conclusion that the firewall order must be
reversed. Nevertheless, because the firewall order here completely divests the State’s
Attorney of prosecutorial authority and oversight over this case, we conclude that the
order requires at least a well-grounded, if not compelling, justification. Thus, it is
necessary to analyze the justifications for the circuit court’s firewall order.
The State argues that there was “no adequate justification for the interference with
the constitutional and statutory responsibilities of the State’s Attorney caused by the
firewall order.” The State asserts that the “stated basis” for the circuit court’s firewall
ruling was the advocate-witness rule, which generally prohibits attorneys from serving
both as an advocate and as a witness in the same trial. The State observes that,
throughout the hearings that preceded and followed the firewall order, the court’s
“repeated refrain” was its conclusion that “the State’s Attorney had ‘made [her]self a
witness in [her] own case[.]’” The State concludes that “the sole justification the circuit
court articulated for imposing the firewall was the advocate-witness rule violation it
perceived.”
In Maryland, the advocate-witness rule is designated as Maryland Rule 19-303.7,
formerly known as Rule 3.7 of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct.
Section (a) of this Rule provides, in full:

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36
(a) An attorney shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the attorney is
likely to be a necessary witness unless:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the attorney would work substantial hardship
on the client.
Md. Rule 19-303.7(a).
Generally, this Rule “prohibits an attorney from simultaneously serving as
advocate and necessary witness” except in certain specified circumstances. Md. Rule 19-
303.7, cmt. 3. The primary rationale for this Rule is that “[c]ombining the roles of
advocate and witness can prejudice the tribunal and the opposing party[.]” Md. Rule 19-
303.7, cmt. 1. Grounds for a “proper objection” exist “when the trier of fact may be
confused or misled by [an] attorney serving as both advocate and witness.” Md. Rule 19-
303.7, cmt. 2. In addition, “[t]he opposing party has proper objection where the
combination of roles may prejudice that party’s rights in the litigation.” Id. Where one
person serves as both advocate and witness, “[i]t may not be clear whether a statement by
an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.” Id.
“Whether the tribunal is likely to be misled or the opposing party is likely to suffer
prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the
attorney’s testimony, and the probability that the attorney’s testimony will conflict with
that of other witnesses.” Md. Rule 19-303.7, cmt. 4.
The possibility of prejudice may be especially apparent in the context of the trial

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of a criminal case. “In general, courts have held that in those cases in which the
prosecutor is a necessary witness for the prosecution, it is within the sound discretion of
the trial court to require the prosecutor to withdraw from the case, and testify as a
witness.” Raines v. State, 142 Md. App. 206, 213 (2002). Courts are “reluctant” to
permit prosecutors to serve as witnesses in the same cases they are prosecuting, because
of “a ‘concern that jurors will be unduly influenced by the prestige and prominence of the
prosecutor’s office and will base their credibility determinations on improper factors.’”
Id. at 212-13 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 1998)).
As the State observes, the language of this Rule prohibits an attorney who is likely
to be a necessary witness from “act[ing] as advocate at a trial[.]” Md. Rule 19-303.7(a)
(emphasis added). The Rule does not expressly state whether the attorney-witness may
(or may not) act as an advocate for other purposes, such as pre-trial motions or post-trial
litigation. As the Supreme Court noted in its prior opinion, “[t]he advocate-witness rule
aims to prevent ‘the trier of fact’ from being confused or misled by an attorney serving as
both advocate and witness in the same case.” State v. Houston, 493 Md. at 307. Because
the disqualification order ensures that the State’s Attorney cannot appear before the jury
as an advocate, the Court concluded that the “interests served by the advocate-witness
rule, to the extent they are implicated here, are . . . fully protected by the disqualification
order.” Id. (footnote omitted). The Court further noted that “the advocate-witness rule
itself has nothing to say about whether an attorney witness can participate in litigation
behind the scenes.” Id. at 308.
The language of Maryland Rule 19-303.7 is derived from Rule 3.7 of the

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American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct. As the State
observes, courts in other states have concluded that their own counterparts to Rule 3.7 do
“not necessarily disqualify an attorney from ‘behind-the-scenes work.’”
In Smaland Beach Ass’n, Inc. v. Genova, 959 N.E.2d 955, 966 (Mass. 2012), the
court observed that the Massachusetts version of Rule 3.7(a) “contains the limiting phrase
‘at trial.’” The court held that, in general, “an attorney considered to be a necessary
witness may participate in pretrial proceedings[.]” Id. The court reasoned that, “because
the rule strives to mitigate potential jury confusion, . . . judges need only divorce the two
functions—that of advocate and witness—at the trial itself.” Id. at 967 (citations
omitted).
Similarly, in People v. Ehrnstein, 417 P.3d 813, 817 (Colo. 2018), the court
concluded that the Colorado version of Rule 3.7(a) is “directed at the lawyer’s courtroom
activity, preventing the lawyer from acting as an ‘advocate at trial.’” Id. at 817 (citation
and quotation marks omitted). The court reasoned that, although “an attorney who is also
a necessary witness should not participate in activities that would reveal the attorney’s
dual role to a jury[,]” those “concerns are generally not implicated . . . in the context of
pre- and post-trial litigation in front of a judge.” Id.; see also Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d
1268, 1276 (Colo. 2005) (stating that courts “generally permit” an attorney disqualified
based on the attorney’s status as a witness “to participate fully in pretrial litigation
activities such as strategy sessions, pretrial hearings, mediation conferences, motions
practice and written discovery”).
Maryland courts have not directly addressed whether Md. Rule 19-303.7(a)

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prohibits an attorney-witness from acting as an advocate outside of a trial. As we see it,
any analysis of that issue must account for the Supreme Court’s statement that “the
advocate-witness rule itself has nothing to say about whether an attorney witness can
participate in litigation behind the scenes.” State v. Houston, 493 Md. at 308. At a
minimum, this statement suggests that, where Rule 19-303.7(a) prohibits an attorney
from serving as an advocate at trial, the Rule does not automatically prohibit the attorney
from serving as an advocate outside of trial. Stated differently, disqualification of an
attorney under Md. Rule 19-303.7(a) “generally . . . extends only to representation at
trial.” Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App. 179, 211 n.6 (1999).
This Court has held that, at least in some circumstances, it may be appropriate for
a trial court to disqualify an attorney-witness from participating in discovery or other
aspects of a case. In an unusual case that this Court described as “litigation about
litigation[,]” this Court reviewed a trial court’s decision to disqualify an attorney under
the predecessor to Rule 19-303.7(a). Abrishamian v. Washington Med. Group, P.C., 216
Md. App. 386, 393 (2014). In that case, a medical care provider sued a patient for
violating an agreement to pay medical bills out of proceeds recovered from a personal
injury action. Id. at 394. The patient counterclaimed, alleging that a physician, acting on
behalf of the medical care provider, had breached an agreement to testify as an expert
witness in that personal injury action. Id. at 396. The medical care provider moved to
disqualify the patient’s attorney, arguing that “the core dispute in the case . . . centered
around a conversation between [the physician] and [the patient’s attorney] about whether
[the physician] had agreed unequivocally to testify.” Id. at 397.

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The trial court granted the motion to disqualify the patient’s attorney from acting
as counsel of record in the action. Id. Despite the disqualification order, the attorney
continued to act as counsel for the patient, by purporting to note a deposition of the
physician. Id. The medical care provider moved to strike the notice of deposition, and
the court partially granted the motion. Id. at 397-98. At the same time, the court
“clarified the scope” of the disqualification order, by specifying that its order prohibited
the attorney from acting as counsel in all stages of the case, not merely at trial. Id. at 398.
On appeal, the patient contended “that the scope of disqualification was too broad
and that the court should have permitted [the attorney] to continue representing [the
patient] in non-trial matters.” Id. at 406. This Court rejected that contention, stating:
“Disqualification of counsel at the trial level can extend to any aspect of the litigation the
circuit court deems appropriate under the circumstances[.]” Id. at 408. Under the facts
presented, this Court determined that the trial court “properly prohibited [the attorney’s]
involvement in discovery as well as at trial in th[e] case.” Id.
With little elaboration, Dr. Houston asserts that the Abrishamian Court’s “holding
regarding the extent of disqualification applies with equal force” to the present case. We
find this attempted analogy to be unconvincing. The Abrishamian opinion does not
endorse any “bright-line rule” that an attorney who will be a witness in a case “must be
walled off from any other involvement in that prosecution simply by virtue of being a
witness.” State v. Houston, 493 Md. at 307. The Abrishamian Court merely recognized
that, in appropriate circumstances, an order disqualifying trial counsel “can extend” to
discovery and other aspects of the litigation. Abrishamian v. Washington Med. Group,

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P.C., 216 Md. App. at 408. 11
Unlike the order in Abrishamian, which disqualified a private attorney from
participating in a civil case, “an order that bars an elected State’s Attorney from
communicating with her deputies and supervising litigation” in a criminal prosecution
implicates “important separation of powers concerns.” State v. Houston, 493 Md. at 306.
Despite these concerns, the circuit court’s “complete and absolute firewall” mandate goes
far beyond merely prohibiting the State’s Attorney from acting as counsel for the purpose
of discovery, motions, and the like. Subject to only a few extremely narrow exceptions,
the firewall order prohibits all communication about the case between the State’s
Attorney and her staff. It further prohibits the State’s Attorney from accessing any case-
related information in the possession of her office. The order prohibits every manner of
participation or oversight by the State’s Attorney, purportedly based on a rule that “has
nothing to say about whether an attorney witness can participate in litigation behind the
scenes.” Id. at 308. We conclude that the Abrishamian opinion provides no basis to
uphold the firewall order.
11 Under the facts of that case, the trial court had valid reasons to prohibit the
disqualified attorney from conducting discovery. Although the claims turned on a
conversation between the attorney and a physician who acted on behalf of the opposing
party, the attorney attempted to depose the same physician. Abrishamian v. Washington
Med. Group, P.C., 216 Md. App. at 397. If the court permitted the disqualified attorney
to conduct discovery, testimony from the depositions conducted by that attorney might
have been offered at trial in which the same attorney served as a central fact witness. See
Md. Rule 2-419(a) (allowing for the use of deposition testimony at trial for various
purposes). “Trial courts retain discretion . . . to preclude an attorney from playing ‘a role
in the presentation short of trial’ when [the attorney’s] activity could be admissible at trial
and would therefore ‘reveal the attorney’s dual role to the jury[.]’” People v. Ehrnstein,
417 P.3d at 817 (quoting Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d at 1276-77).

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In his appellate brief, Dr. Houston cites no authority supporting the court’s
decision to preclude the State’s Attorney from every manner of participation in the case
on the ground that she is a necessary witness. Perhaps recognizing that the advocate-
witness rule, by itself, cannot justify the firewall order, Dr. Houston disputes the assertion
that the advocate-witness rule “motivated” the court’s decision to impose the firewall. In
his brief, Dr. Houston asserts that he “does not contend that the firewall was justified
under the advocate-witness rule[.]” Dr. Houston asserts that the circuit court “did not
impose the firewall solely pursuant to the advocate-witness rule, as the State contends,
nor as a discovery sanction.”
In an attempt to defend the firewall order, Dr. Houston proposes alternative
grounds for the decision. Dr. Houston calls attention to various comments that the court
made throughout the multi-day “fact-finding mission.” In Dr. Houston’s view, the court
“registered a litany of concerns” about Ms. Leitess’s “conduct,” which, he says, “required
the firewall.”
Specifically, Dr. Houston asserts that certain “actions” by Ms. Leitess “caused the
court, reasonably, to fear for the integrity or the trial itself.” Dr. Houston observes that,
in addition to deciding that Mr. Leitess was a necessary witness, the court found that she
failed to disclose exculpatory information obtained from interviewing a witness. Dr.
Houston asserts that Ms. Leitess “appeared to have berated and ‘coached’ that same
witness” and “testified about her work with the detectives on the case in ways that led the
court to suspect she or they—or both—were being untruthful.” Dr. Houston
acknowledges that, when the court imposed the firewall, the court made no “definitive

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finding” that “misconduct had occurred.” Dr. Houston nevertheless theorizes that the
court’s evident “concerns” about Ms. Leitess’s “conduct” justified imposing the firewall,
as an exercise of the court’s “inherent authority to regulate litigation and protect the
integrity of trial proceedings.”
The main difficulty with Dr. Houston’s argument is that the circuit court
unmistakably pointed to its determination that Mr. Leitess was a necessary witness as the
basis for both the disqualification order and the firewall order. At the hearing on May 6,
2025, the court expressly cited Maryland Rule 19-303.7, the advocate-witness rule, when
explaining its decision to disqualify Ms. Leitess. The court announced its conclusion that
“the State’s Attorney ha[d] irreparably made herself a witness in her own case[,]” as the
basis for its “order[] that the State’s Attorney be removed as counsel” in the case. Other
than its conclusion that Ms. Leitess “ha[d] made herself a witness in her own case[,]” the
court offered no independent explanation of its decision to impose “a complete and
absolute firewall” between Ms. Leitess and the attorneys prosecuting the case.
If the basis for the firewall order might not have been entirely clear on May 6,
2025, the circuit court made the basis for that order explicit three days later. At the
“immediate ad hoc hearing” on May 9, 2025, the court clarified the basis for the “firewall
mandate[.]” The court explained that it had ruled that “Ms. Leitess had made herself
unequivocally a witness in her own case for myriad reasons.” The court stated: “[T]he
minute you become a witness in your own case that truly is the hat that you wear. You
are truly a witness[.]” The court added: “And having made herself a witness in the case
the minute that happens it’s almost like a transmogrification happens right away.” The

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court stated that “it was absolutely incumbent that related to that decision that she had
made herself a witness in her case that she be firewalled for those obvious reasons.” The
court continued:
. . . Ms. Leitess made herself a witness in her own case through her own
actions. I’m not even ascribing fault. I mean fault in the actual sense but
not mens rea fault. I’m ascribing just actual, de facto actions that she took
and omissions that happened that made herself a witness in her case. And,
therefore, having concluded she is a witness she has to be a witness for all
purposes. It can’t be in half-measures.
The court ruled that “the State’s Attorney’s Office internally has to treat her like a
witness.” The court continued: “[s]he has to be treated like a witness in every way.” The
court further reasoned that it could not communicate its orders directly to the State’s
Attorney because the court also needed “to treat her as [a witness].” The court directed
Assistant State’s Attorney Russell to instruct the State’s Attorney to “adopt a role that she
is obligated now to adopt, which is that of exclusively a witness.” The court
summarized: “Ms. Leitess is a witness. And that just means everything flows from that.”
The statements that the circuit court made on May 9, 2025, leave no doubt that the
court imposed the firewall for one reason alone: its determination that Ms. Leitess was a
necessary witness. The court expressly and repeatedly emphasized the direct connection
between its premise that she was a necessary witness and its conclusion that she must be
firewalled from the case. The court disclaimed any notion that misconduct might be the
basis for the firewall order, when the court stated that it was “not even ascribing fault” for
the “actions that she took and omissions that happened that made herself a witness in her
case.” This record does not fairly support the conclusion that the court imposed the

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firewall for reasons other than those actually stated. See Medley v. State, 386 Md. 3, 10
(2005) (explaining that, “[t]ypically,” an appellate court “will not attribute to the words
of a [trial] court’s opinion or order a sense beyond the plain meaning of language
appearing in the record, unless the context supports a different reading”).
It is not surprising that, in its opinion in this case, the Supreme Court of Maryland
identified the advocate-witness rule as the basis for the firewall order. According to the
Court: “[t]he circuit court’s basis for ordering the firewall was that once it concluded that
the State’s Attorney had made herself a witness, ‘she ha[d] to be treated like a witness in
every way[.]’” State v. Houston, 493 Md. at 307. The Court wrote: “According to the
[circuit] court, the fact that the State’s Attorney would be a witness required the court to
order that she ‘remove herself from [being] an active participant in this case and adopt a
role that she is obligated now to adopt, which is that of exclusively a witness.’” Id.
(emphasis added). The Court stated that the circuit court “articulated a bright-line rule
that a prosecutor who will be a witness in a prosecution must be walled off from any
other involvement in that prosecution simply by virtue of being a witness.” Id. (emphasis
added). In other words, the Court stated, the circuit court “believed that the firewall order
was compelled by the fact of the State’s Attorney’s status as a witness in the case.” Id. at
308 (emphasis added). There is no reason to disagree with the Court’s analysis of the
basis for the firewall order.
It is true that, during the same proceedings in which the circuit court found that
State’s Attorney Leitess was a necessary witness, the court also found that the State
violated its discovery obligations by failing to make timely disclosure of exculpatory

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46
information. Nevertheless, the court did not mention the discovery violation as a
potential ground for the disqualification order or the firewall order. Ultimately, the court
addressed the discovery violation at a subsequent hearing on May 14, 2025. At that time,
the court employed the established framework for deciding the appropriate remedy for a
violation of the State’s discovery obligations. See generally Williams v. State, 416 Md.
698-99 (2010). The court declined to dismiss the charges, but ruled that, at trial, the
defense will be entitled to a stipulation informing the jury that “the State’s Attorney
willfully withheld evidence” to the effect that Dr. Houston previously claimed that Ms.
Houston had pulled a knife on him.
In his appellate brief, Dr. Houston invokes various authorities concerning what he
describes as a “trial court’s authority to protect the integrity of the proceedings before it.”
For instance, Dr. Houston cites United States v. Omni International Corp., 634 F. Supp.
1414, 1440-41 (D. Md. 1986), in which a federal trial court dismissed an indictment and
disqualified certain prosecutors and investigators from any further participation in the
prosecution in the event of a reindictment. The trial court made those rulings based on
findings of “repeated misconduct” by the government personnel (id. at 1438), including
“the alteration and creation of documents, false and incorrect testimony, and a lack of
candor in colloquies with and testimony before the [c]ourt[.]” Id. at 1436. Dr. Houston
also cites Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 340 (2003), in which the Court determined that a
defendant was entitled to a new trial based on “improper contact between a State’s
witness and a juror during the trial[.]” Id. at 288.
The authorities cited by Dr. Houston offer no adequate support for the firewall

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decision. At the time of the disqualification order and firewall order, the circuit court
made no finding that Ms. Leitess engaged in the type of misconduct at issue in the cases
cited by Dr. Houston. A collection of “concerns” about Ms. Leitess’s “conduct” is not
the equivalent of an affirmative finding of prosecutorial misconduct. The court found
that Ms. Leitess was a necessary witness and, on that basis, disqualified her from
prosecuting the case and imposed a firewall between her and any other prosecutors. The
court did not ground the disqualification order or firewall order on any express or implied
finding of misconduct. To the extent that the court found a discovery violation, the court
addressed that issue separately and, eventually, decided the appropriate remedies at a
later hearing.
In a few sentences of his brief, Dr. Houston asserts that any issue concerning the
propriety of the firewall order is now “moot” because, he tells us, “another State’s
Attorney’s Office is assuming the prosecution of this case.” Dr. Houston asserts that this
case is “set to be assumed by prosecutors from the Montgomery [County] State’s
Attorney’s Office[,]” who are not subject to the supervision of the State’s Attorney for
Anne Arundel County. 12
In support of his theory of mootness, Dr. Houston cites the transcript of a bail
review hearing that occurred on April 24, 2026, shortly after the Supreme Court of
Maryland reinstated this appeal. At that time, Assistant State’s Attorney Russell told the
12 At oral argument, Dr. Houston clarified that he does not contend that the State’s
challenge to the firewall order is entirely moot. Rather, Dr. Houston argues that the
appointment of a special prosecutor would eliminate the separation-of-powers problems
identified by the State.

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court that, after the resolution of the appeal, he expected that the State would seek the
appointment of special prosecutors from Montgomery County to try the case. Mr.
Russell stated that it was his “understanding” that a reassignment was “going to happen”
in that scenario, but no prosecutor had entered an appearance yet. Mr. Russell explained
that the State had decided to continue pursuing its challenge to the firewall order because,
even if the State were “going to bring in Montgomery County prosecutors, . . . there
would still be a situation where [Ms. Leitess] would talk to them about the case[.]”
The cited statements from the bail review hearing fail to establish that this appeal
has become moot. Contrary to Dr. Houston’s suggestion, this case has not yet been
assigned to prosecutors outside of Anne Arundel County. Mr. Russell’s statements
described nothing more than his understanding of what future actions the State might take
after the resolution of this appeal. Even if the State had already obtained an order
appointing a special prosecutor from another county, which it has not, its challenge to the
firewall order would not be moot. By its terms, the firewall order applies to
communications between State’s Attorney Leitess and any attorneys prosecuting the case,
not simply attorneys from Anne Arundel County. Moreover, the firewall order continues
to prohibit the State’s Attorney from accessing information related to the case.
Consequently, the firewall order would remain in effect even if prosecutors from another
county took over the case.
As an alternative basis for challenging the judgment, the State argues that, to the
extent that the circuit court may have had some “sound basis to preclude State’s Attorney
Leitess from communicating with the prosecutors who would try the case,” the exclusive

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49
means to do so would be to appoint a special prosecutor. The State refers to section 2-
102(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which “grant[s] the courts the
power to appoint a Special Prosecutor or assistant counsel for the State ‘[i]f advisable in a
specific proceeding.’” Reddick v. State, 263 Md. App. 562, 571 (2004). The State cites
Lykins v. State, 288 Md. 71, 85-86 (1980), in which the Court stated that the “proper
action to be taken” when a trial court disqualifies a prosecutor based on a conflict of
interest “is to supplant the prosecutor” by exercising the court’s statutory authority to
appoint a special prosecutor. The State theorizes that this mechanism is the only
permissible method by which a court can “require the State’s Attorney to be walled off
from the prosecutors trying the case, . . . consistent with the separation of powers.”
From the record, we can find no indication that the State raised the issue of
whether the circuit court should appoint a special prosecutor upon disqualification of the
State’s Attorney. Despite ample opportunity to argue that the circuit court should appoint
a special prosecutor upon the contemplated disqualification, the State failed to make that
argument. Because the issue of appointment of a special prosecutor was not “raised in or
decided by the trial court” (Md. Rule 8-131(a)) at the time of the firewall order or its
clarification, we decline to decide that issue for the first time on appeal. See Elliott v.
State, 417 Md. 413, 442-43 (2010); Martin v. State, 267 Md. App. 556, 582-83 (2025).
On remand, the State will be free to request the appointment of a special
prosecutor. In that event, the circuit court may exercise its discretion to appoint a special
prosecutor if it determines that the appointment is “advisable in [this] specific
proceeding[.]” Md. Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), § 2-102(a) of the Courts & Judicial

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50
Proceedings Article. 13
CONCLUSION
As explained previously, the limited purpose of this interlocutory review is to
evaluate the circuit court’s conclusion “that the firewall order was compelled by the fact
of the State’s Attorney’s status as a witness in the case.” State v. Houston, 493 Md. 279,
308 (2026). We conclude that the circuit court erred when it adopted a “bright-line rule”
under which “a prosecutor who will be a witness in a prosecution must be walled off
from any other involvement in that prosecution simply by virtue of being a witness.” Id.
at 307. Dr. Houston has provided virtually no defense of the circuit court’s own
explanation for its firewall order. We are unconvinced by his contentions that the basis
for the firewall order was something other than the circuit court’s stated rationale that,
because “the State’s Attorney had made herself a witness, ‘she ha[d] to be treated like a
witness in every way[.]’” Id.
We reverse the order of May 6, 2025, by which the circuit court imposed a
“complete and absolute firewall” that prohibits the disqualified State’s Attorney from any
communication with the attorneys prosecuting the case and any other form of
involvement in the case. To the extent that the court modified or renewed its firewall
order on other occasions, such as the hearing on May 9, 2025, we reverse those rulings as
well. The basis for the firewall order, the court’s determination that the State’s Attorney
13 At oral argument, the State asked us to order that the case be assigned to another
judge on remand. Because the State’s brief contains no argument in support of that
contention, we do not consider it. See Md. Rule 8-504(a)(6).

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51
was a necessary witness in the case, neither compelled nor justified the order.
ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY REVERSED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.