In the Matter of Ludwig, Robert v.

Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 466721V
UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 508
September Term, 2025
______________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF ROBERT LUDWIG
______________________________________
Nazarian,
Arthur,
Shaw,
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Nazarian, J.
______________________________________
Filed: October 9, 2026
* This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule
of stare decisis. It may be cited for persuasive value only if the citation conforms to
Maryland Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

—Unreported Opinion—
This appeal is the 	culmination 	of 	nine 	years of 	litigation 	over a series 	of
landlord-tenant disputes originating in the Montgomery County Office of Landlord-Tenant
Affairs 	(the 	“Office”). 	In 	June 	2015, 	attorney-landlord 	Robert 	Ludwig 	leased 	a
single-family residence in Bethesda to Dr. Thomas Hearty and Jaime Salay (the “Tenants”)
for a two-year term beginning on August 1, 2015. In 2017, the Tenants filed two complaints
against Mr. Ludwig with the Office. Their first complaint sought reimbursement from him
for the cost of replacing the home’s sump pump, and their second requested an order for
Mr. Ludwig to return portions of their security deposit that they alleged he withheld
unlawfully. In response, Mr. Ludwig raised a counterclaim against the Tenants for alleged
unpaid rent and late fees. In 2019, after a hearing on the parties’ claims, the Montgomery
County Commission on Landlord-Tenant Affairs (the “Commission”) issued an order and
opinion that granted the Tenants’ requests for relief but didn’t resolve Mr. Ludwig’s
counterclaim. Mr. Ludwig petitioned for judicial review with the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, which affirmed the Commission’s decisions. He appealed, and this
Court dismissed his appeal and remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to
remand 	to 	the 	Commission 	to 	adjudicate 	his 	counterclaim 	and 	resolve 	any 	other
outstanding issues.
On remand, after a hearing on Mr. Ludwig’s counterclaim, the Commission issued
an order and opinion in 2024 dismissing the counterclaim and reaffirming the conclusions
in its 2019 order. Mr. Ludwig again petitioned for judicial review, the circuit court
affirmed, and he appeals several issues now. First, he challenges the validity of both

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2
Commission orders on procedural grounds. Second, he asserts that the Commission’s
decisions granting the Tenants’ requests for relief and dismissing his counterclaim were
arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence in the administrative
record. Finally, he asks us to vacate the circuit court’s order that he pay the Tenants’
attorney’s 	fees 	incurred 	during 	the 	judicial 	review 	proceedings. 	We 	affirm 	the
Commission’s conclusions as to all claims raised by the parties, vacate the circuit court’s
order awarding the Tenants attorney’s fees, and remand to the circuit court for the limited
purpose of allowing the court to explain the basis for the fee award.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In June 2015, Mr. Ludwig and the Tenants entered a two-year lease agreement that
began on August 1, 2015. The lease required monthly rental payments of $3,850.00 for the
first year and $3,950.00 for the second year. Under the lease, the Tenants also paid a
$3,850.00 security deposit and a $3,850.00 pet deposit.
Several other lease provisions are relevant to this appeal. Paragraph 2 of the lease
provided that rental payments “received after the fifth day of each month shall incur a late
payment fee of $100.00 which, if not included in the payments, [would] be deducted from
[the] Tenants’ security deposit.” Paragraph 9 required Mr. Ludwig to “make any and all
repairs over $300.00” to the leased premises. Paragraph 11 required the Tenants to waive
their right to a trial by jury in any legal proceeding Mr. Ludwig brought against them for
possession or rent under the lease.
In March 2016, Mr. Ludwig paid to replace the property’s sump pump after it failed

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3
for the first time during the tenancy. In early 2017, the sump pump failed for a second time.
After the second failure, Mr. Ludwig informed the Tenants that they would be responsible
for the cost of another replacement. The Tenants paid Mr. Ludwig’s plumber $365.00 to
replace the pump and on April 20, 2017, they asked him to deduct that amount from the
rent due for May 2017. On April 27, they sent him a second email asking to deduct the
amount from their May 2017 rent payment on account of the repair. Then on April 28,
2017, they filed a complaint with the Office seeking reimbursement of the sump pump
replacement cost. The Commission assigned the complaint Case No. 36508. In anticipation
of their lease ending on July 31, 2017, the Tenants deducted the replacement cost amount
from their July 2017 rent payment.
After the lease ended, on August 22, 2017, Mr. Ludwig emailed the Tenants an
itemized list of deductions from their deposits for claimed damages to the property. The
deductions totaled $1,930.60 and included the cost of refinishing the floors ($382.50),
removing a stain from the floor by the fireplace ($150.00), repainting several walls
($1,350.00), and cleaning the gutters ($48.10), as well as a water bill ($284.92) that Mr.
Ludwig labeled as “past due.” Mr. Ludwig did not send the itemized list by first-class mail.
The Tenants responded two days later that they weren’t responsible for the wall repainting
or gutter cleaning costs and had paid the water bill already. They asked Mr. Ludwig to send
them the interest accrued on the security deposit during their lease term, which they
calculated to be $221.51. On August 25, Mr. Ludwig mailed the Tenants a check for
$5,769.40, the remaining balance of their deposits after his $1,930.60 in deductions.

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On September 5, the Tenants filed a second complaint with the Office, challenging
Mr. Ludwig’s security deposit deductions and failure to return the interest accrued on their
deposits and seeking recovery of $1,904.53. The Commission assigned this complaint Case
No. 36732. After further exchanges with the Tenants, Mr. Ludwig credited their water bill
payment but claimed an additional $382.50 deduction for damage to the stairs. He stated
that after subtracting the $284.92 water bill from the total deductions and adding the
$382.50 cost of refinishing the staircase, the Tenants owed him $97.58. He then sent the
Tenants an additional check, dated October 4, 2017, for $123.53 (an amount close but not
equal to the $123.93 difference between the $221.51 in interest calculated by the Tenants
minus the $97.58 he claimed the Tenants still owed him).
The investigator assigned to Case Nos. 36508 and 36732 notified the parties on June
20, 2018, that the Office had scheduled a conciliation conference for June 28. Mr. Ludwig
objected to the conference date for lacking proper notice. The investigator rescheduled the
conference for July 10, 2018, and notified the parties of the new date on June 28. Mr.
Ludwig filed a motion to stay the proceedings on July 9, the day before the new conference
date. The Office denied the motion and informed the parties that it would proceed with the
conference as scheduled. Mr. Ludwig did not attend the July 10 conference.
The Commission held a hearing on the Tenants’ complaints on November 19, 2018,
with a panel of three commissioners presiding. That same day, Mr. Ludwig filed a Hearing
Submission with the Commission in which he asserted a counterclaim against Tenants
seeking $945.00 in unpaid rent and late fees as well as attorney’s fees. In April 2019, the

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Commission issued decisions in Case Nos. 36508 and 36732 in the Tenants’ favor. The
Commission concluded that the Tenants were entitled to reimbursement for the $365.00
they paid to replace the second sump pump and that their $365.00 deduction from the July
2017 rent satisfied that reimbursement. With respect to the security deposit complaint, the
Commission concluded that Mr. Ludwig had violated Maryland Code (1974, 2015 Repl.
Vol.), § 8-203 of the Real Property Article (“RP”), the version of the statute in effect at
that time, by failing to send the itemized damages list by first-class mail, failing to calculate
the accrued interest on the security deposit correctly, and failing to return the security
deposit 	plus 	accrued 	interest 	within 	forty-five 	days 	after 	the 	tenancy 	ended. 	The
Commission found also that Mr. Ludwig’s conduct rose “to the level of bad faith and
egregiousness” and imposed a penalty of $2,160.97. The Commission ordered Mr. Ludwig
to pay the Tenants a total of $4,321.94 (the $7,700.00 they paid in deposits plus $230.37
in accrued interest and the $2,160.97 penalty, minus the $5,769.40 that he had refunded
them already). The Commission didn’t resolve Mr. Ludwig’s counterclaim.
Mr. Ludwig filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County seeking
judicial review of the Commission’s decision. The circuit court affirmed the Commission’s
decision and order and Mr. Ludwig appealed to this Court. We dismissed the appeal for
lack of a final judgment, vacated the circuit court’s judgment affirming the Commission’s
decision, and remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to remand the matter
to the Commission to adjudicate Mr. Ludwig’s counterclaim and any other unresolved
claims necessary for entry of a final judgment. Order, Ludwig v. Hearty, No. 1938, Sept.

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6
Term 2019 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 2, 2020).
On remand, the Commission assigned Mr. Ludwig’s counterclaim Case No. 47763.
It held a hearing on Case No. 47763 on May 10, 2023, then continued that hearing on June
28, 2023. Only one member of the 2018 panel for Case Nos. 36508 and 36732 served on
the three-commissioner panel for Case No. 47763. The record reflects that one of the other
two commissioners from that panel had left the Commission and that the other was in the
process of vacating his position. Mr. Ludwig moved to strike the two new commissioners,
arguing that § 29-14(b) of the Montgomery County Code (“MCC”) required the original
panel members to hear the counterclaim. The Commission denied his motion. On January
4, 2024, the Commission dismissed Mr. Ludwig’s counterclaim and concluded that its
decisions resolving Case Nos. 36508 and 36732 remained unchanged.
Mr. Ludwig filed a petition for judicial review of the Commission’s decision and
order in Case No. 47763 in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The Tenants,
represented by counsel for the first time, filed a memorandum opposing Mr. Ludwig’s
petition. The circuit court held a hearing on March 7, 2025, and affirmed the decision of
the Commission in Case No. 47763.
After the circuit court affirmed the Commission’s decision and order, the Tenants
filed a post-judgment motion seeking $11,333.00 in attorney’s fees under RP § 8-203(e)(4)
or, in the alternative, under Maryland Rule 1-341. On May 28, 2025, the circuit court
granted the Tenants’ motion and entered judgment against Mr. Ludwig in favor of the
Tenants for $11,333.00 in attorney’s fees.

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7
This timely appeal followed. We supply additional facts in our discussion as
necessary.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Mr. Ludwig presents six questions for our review, which we consolidate into four
and rephrase:
1. 	Did the Office satisfy its obligation under MCC § 29-41 to conciliate the
Tenants’ complaints?
2. 	Was the three-commissioner panel that decided Mr. Ludwig’s counterclaim
constituted properly under MCC § 29-14(b)?
3. 	Were the Commission’s decisions in Case Nos. 36508, 36732, and 47763
supported by substantial evidence in the record?
4. 	Did the circuit court err in awarding the Tenants $11,333.00 in attorney’s
fees? 1
1 Mr. Ludwig phrased his Questions Presented as follows:
1. 	Did the agency’s failures to attempt conciliation of any claim within 30 days, a
statutory condition precedent to administrative action, and subsequent refusals
to conciliate without prejudice and in good faith, invalidate its proceedings and
decisions, and require dismissal?
2. 	Is the remand decision by a statutorily unqualified panel and without a valid
quorum void, precluding a final decision in this case, further warranting
dismissal?
3. 	Are the agency’s forfeiture of damages and enhanced penalty in Case 36732
reversible error as “specious,” arbitrary and capricious?
4. 	Was the agency’s conclusion in Case 36509, ignoring Tenants’ testimony the
second pump was new when installed and admission of not clearing drains
through two pump failures, that Tenants were not responsible for the cost of a
third, unsupported by material evidence, unreasoning, arbitrary and capricious?
5. 	Was the agency’s denial on remand of Landlord’s counterclaim for unpaid rent,
late fees and costs, clearly erroneous arbitrary and capricious?
Continued . . .

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8
First, we hold that the Office satisfied its obligation to conciliate the Tenants’
complaints when it held a properly noticed conciliation conference that Mr. Ludwig failed
to attend. Second, we hold that the three-commissioner panel that decided Mr. Ludwig’s
counterclaim on remand was constituted properly under MCC § 29-14(b) because all three
commissioners attended both sessions of the hearing on Case No. 47763. Third, we hold
that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission’s decisions
concerning the Tenants’ sump pump replacement in Case No. 36508, the security deposit
in Case No. 36732, and Mr. Ludwig’s counterclaim in Case No. 47763. Fourth and finally,
we vacate the attorney’s fee award and remand for the circuit court to state the basis for its
decision to award the Tenants attorney’s fees, as required under Maryland Rule 2-703(g).
Because the first three issues arise from administrative proceedings, we apply the
standards governing judicial review of administrative agency decisions. “When reviewing
an administrative agency’s decision, ‘this Court reviews the agency’s decision, not the
circuit court’s decision.’” Baltimore City Police Dep’t v. Robinson, 247 Md. App. 652, 670
(2020) (quoting Belfiore v. Merch. Link, LLC, 236 Md. App. 32, 43 (2018)). The first and
second issues present questions of law, which we review de novo. See Secretary, Dep't of
Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Fenton, 491 Md. 305, 323 (2025) (“‘Generally, we review
6. 	Was the circuit court’s arbitrary fee award, unsupported by any stated basis,
findings, or exercise of discretion, reversible error?
The Tenants, in turn, phrased their Questions Presented as:
1. 	Is there substantial evidence in the record to support COLTA’s decisions?
2. 	Did the circuit court err in awarding attorneys’ fees to Tenants?

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legal determinations without deference to the views of the . . . administrative agency.’”
(quoting McDonell v. Harford Cnty. Hous. Agency, 462 Md. 586, 605 (2019))). An
appellate court “‘will not uphold an agency action that is based on an erroneous legal
conclusion.’” Concerned Citizens of Cloverly v. Montgomery Cnty. Plan. Bd., 254 Md.
App. 575, 598 (2022) (quoting Maryland Dep’t of the Env’t v. Cnty. Comm’rs, 465 Md.
169, 203 (2019)).
As for the third issue, we review the Commission’s factual findings under the
“substantial evidence” standard, “defer[ring] to the facts found and inferences drawn by
the agency when the record supports those findings and inferences.” Cnty. Comm’rs, 465
Md. at 201. Under this standard, we uphold an agency’s factual findings if, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to it, “‘a reasoning mind reasonably could have
reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.’” Miller v. City of Annapolis Hist. Pres.
Comm’n, 200 Md. App. 612, 632 (2011) (quoting Montgomery Cnty. v. Longo, 187 Md.
App. 25, 49 (2009)).
Finally, we review the circuit court’s decision to award attorneys’ fees for abuse of
discretion. Lockett v. Blue Ocean Bristol, LLC, 446 Md. 397, 414 (2016). But “‘the
standard that a trial court applies in evaluating whether to award attorneys’ fees and costs
is a legal decision’ that we review without deference.” Id. at 414 (quoting Ocean City
Chamber of Com. Inc. v. Barufaldi, 434 Md. 381, 391 (2013)).

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A. 	The Office Satisfied The Conciliation Requirement Under MCC
§ 29-41 By Holding A Properly Noticed Conciliation Conference
That Mr. Ludwig Failed To Attend.
First, Mr. Ludwig argues that the Office failed to satisfy its obligation under MCC
§ 29-41 to hold a properly noticed conciliation conference before the Commission could
act on the Tenants’ complaints. He contends that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to
hear the Tenants’ complaints as a result and asks us to dismiss the administrative claims
and vacate the Commission’s attorney’s fees award. The Tenants respond that Mr. Ludwig
received proper notice of the July 10, 2018 conciliation conference but chose not to attend,
and that his failure to attend the conference resulted in the satisfaction of the conciliation
requirement under the plain language of MCC § 29-41(c). We agree with the Tenants.
If the Director of the Department of Housing and Community Affairs, after
investigating a landlord-tenant complaint, finds reasonable grounds to believe that a party
has violated the MCC’s provisions on landlord-tenant relations, the Director or their
designee must “attempt to conciliate the matter by initial conference and persuasion with
all interested parties and their representatives” within thirty days of the complaint’s filing.
MCC § 29-41(a)–(b); see also MCC § 29-1 (defining “Director” as “[t]he Director of the
Department of Housing and Community Affairs or the Director’s designee”). Section
29-41(c) 	of 	the 	MCC 	provides 	that 	“[t]he 	Director’s 	obligation 	to 	conciliate 	a
complaint . . . is satisfied if either party does not appear at a scheduled conference after
receiving at least 10 days’ notice.” Id. If conciliation efforts fail, the Director or their

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designee must notify the Commission immediately. MCC § 29-43. From there, the
Commission may schedule a hearing to determine whether a violation has occurred. Id.
The conciliation requirement was satisfied in this case. After Mr. Ludwig objected
to 	the 	first 	conciliation 	conference 	date, 	the 	Office’s 	investigator 	rescheduled 	the
conference for July 10, 2018 and notified the parties of the new date on June 28, 2018,
more than ten days in advance. Although Mr. Ludwig filed a motion to stay proceedings
with the Office on the evening before the conference, the Commission informed the parties
that it would hold the conference on July 10 as scheduled. The Tenants attended the
conference and Mr. Ludwig didn’t. That was his choice. Because Mr. Ludwig failed to
attend the scheduled conference after receiving the required notice, his failure to appear
satisfied the Office’s obligation to conciliate the Tenants’ complaints under the plain
language of MCC § 29-41(c).
B. 	The Panel That Decided Mr. Ludwig’s Counterclaim, Case No.
47763, Was Constituted Properly Under MCC § 29-14 Because
The Same Three Commissioners Attended Each Hearing Session.
Second, 	Mr. 	Ludwig 	argues 	that 	the 	Commission 	panel 	that 	decided 	his
counterclaim was improper because two of the three commissioners hadn’t participated in
the 2018 hearing on the Tenants’ complaints in Case Nos. 36508 and 36732. He contends
that MCC § 29-14(b) required the same commissioners who heard the Tenants’ complaints
to hear his counterclaim in Case No. 47763 and asks this Court to remand the case with
directions to dismiss all charges. The Tenants respond that the three commissioners who
decided Mr. Ludwig’s counterclaim in Case No. 47763 attended each session of the hearing

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on 	that 	case 	and 	had 	full 	authority 	under 	MCC 	§ 29-14(b) 	to 	participate 	in 	the
Commission’s final decision. The Tenants are correct.
Section 29-14(b) of the MCC provides that “any panel member must not participate
in the [panel’s] final decision” on a complaint “if the member has not attended each session
of the hearing” on that complaint and that the vote of at least two panel members is required
for a panel to take any official action on behalf of the Commission. MCC § 29-14(b). The
panel that decided Mr. Ludwig’s counterclaim satisfied these requirements. On remand
from this Court, the Commission assigned Mr. Ludwig’s counterclaim Case No. 47763 and
adjudicated that matter. The remand panel didn’t reopen or alter the Commission’s
decisions in Case Nos. 36508 and 36732. Instead, it admitted the record from the 2018
proceedings into evidence, without objection from Mr. Ludwig, and adjudicated his
unresolved counterclaim. The same three commissioners attended both hearing sessions
for Case No. 47763 on May 10, 2023 and June 28, 2023 before participating in the
Commission’s January 4, 2024 decision.
Mr. Ludwig argues that the Commission should have included at least one additional
member of the 2018 panel that heard Case Nos. 36508 and 36732, one of whom was still
with the Commission despite being “in the process of vacating his position.” His argument
fails, though, because it asks us to read a requirement into MCC § 29-14(b) that the statute
doesn’t contain. The statute requires only that every commissioner who participates in the
panel’s final decision on a complaint attend each session of the hearing on that matter.
MCC § 29-14(b). Because the same three commissioners attended every hearing session

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for Case No. 47763—a matter related to but separate from those resolved by the
Commission in Case Nos. 36508 and 36732—before participating in the Commission’s
January 4, 2024 decision, the Commission complied with MCC § 29-14(b).
C. 	There Was Substantial Evidence In The Record To Support The
Commission’s Decisions In Case Nos. 36508, 36732, And 47763.
Third, Mr. Ludwig challenges the Commission’s decisions on the merits in Case
Nos. 36508, 36732, and 47763. He contends first that the Commission’s forfeiture ruling
and enhanced penalty in Case No. 36732 were arbitrary and capricious and constitute
reversible error. He argues next that the Commission’s findings in Case No. 36508
concerning the sump pump issue were unsupported by substantial evidence and must be
reversed as well. Finally, he contends that the Commission erred in dismissing his
counterclaim in Case No. 47763. The Tenants respond that there was substantial evidence
in the record to support each of the Commission’s decisions. We address each decision in
turn and agree with the Tenants on all three counts.
1. 	The Commission’s decision in Case No. 36508 concerning the
sump pump is supported by substantial evidence.
In April 2017, the Tenants filed a complaint with the Office seeking reimbursement
for the $365.00 cost of replacing the sump pump in the home’s garage. They alleged that
the pump wasn’t working properly, that they’d needed to operate it manually during four
storms, and that they’d needed to replace it to prevent the basement from flooding.
At the November 2018 hearing on the Tenants’ complaints, Dr. Hearty testified that
Mr. Ludwig replaced the sump pump once during their first year in the home after the float
switch malfunctioned. According to Dr. Hearty, the new pump began to malfunction

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similarly in 2017, and he and Ms. Salay emailed Mr. Ludwig to inform him of the
malfunction. Dr. Hearty stated that they sent Mr. Ludwig several more emails about the
sump pump issues and a video of the problem, but that Mr. Ludwig had refused to take
responsibility for the repair. He played the video for the Commission and explained that
the sump pump malfunctioned even though the drains were clear of debris. He stated
further that although Mr. Ludwig had never shown him how to clear the driveway drains
properly, he blew debris out of them with a leaf blower “on a regular basis.” Eventually,
Dr. Hearty said, he and Ms. Salay were forced to replace the pump at their own expense to
prevent the basement from flooding and they deducted $365.00 from their July 2017 rent
check to cover the cost of the repair after Mr. Ludwig refused to reimburse them. Finally,
he testified that on the sales receipt for the replacement service, the plumber noted that the
pump Mr. Ludwig had installed in 2016 after the first malfunction was manufactured in
2008, “that the float was sticking and the sump pump was clear of all debris,” and that there
was “no obstruction to the flow switch.” During questioning by one of the commissioners,
Dr. Hearty explained that the pump installed in 2016 was a “back-up” sump pump that Mr.
Ludwig had in the house already but was “in good condition” and “in a box,” and that the
pump installed by the plumber in 2017 was “brand new.” All emails referenced by Dr.
Hearty and the plumber’s sales receipt were included in the administrative record.
Mr. Ludwig testified that the sump pump he had installed in 2016 was “new in the
box.” Referring to an email Ms. Salay sent him in April 2017 after she spoke to a customer
service representative for the pump’s manufacturer, Mr. Ludwig stated that even though

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that pump was manufactured in 2008, it had “a life expectancy of seven to ten years” and
had been in use for only eight months before it malfunctioned. He stated that he had shown
the tenants how to remove the drain covers to clear out the driveway drains properly, that
they “hadn’t cleared the drains once” between August 2015 and December 2016, and that
he learned via an email from the Tenants in December 2016 that they had been clearing
debris from the opening of the drain pipe with a leaf blower instead of clearing inside the
pipes as he’d instructed them to do. He testified that his plumber noted on the receipt for
the 2016 pump replacement that he’d needed to “[c]lear [the] trench drain in the driveway.”
Mr. Ludwig suspected that a buildup of leaves in the drain lines caused the sump pump to
malfunction. All emails referenced by Mr. Ludwig and the receipt for the 2016 sump pump
replacement were included in the administrative record.
The Commission, in its April 2019 opinion resolving the Tenants’ complaints, found
as a matter of fact that the home’s sump pump malfunctioned in 2016 and that Mr. Ludwig
replaced that pump with one “that he had stored in the basement.” The Commission didn’t
find credible Mr. Ludwig’s testimony “that the replacement sump pump was brand new
when it was installed.” It did find credible the plumber’s statements in the 2017 sales
receipt that the pump installed in 2016 was manufactured in 2008, that the sump pit was
clear of debris when he installed the new pump in 2017, and that the float switch was
unobstructed. Finally, it found that the Tenants had deducted $365.00 from their July 2017
rent payment to cover the cost of the pump replacement and that Mr. Ludwig had refused
to reimburse them. Based on its findings, the Commission concluded that Mr. Ludwig had

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replaced the sump pump after it malfunctioned in 2016 as required by RP § 8-208(c)(2)
(requiring a residential lease to include “[t]he landlord’s and the tenant’s specific
obligations as to . . . repair of the premises”), and MCC § 29-30(a)(3) (requiring a landlord
to “[m]ake all repairs and arrangements necessary to put and keep the dwelling unit and
the appurtenances in as good a condition as they were, or should by law or agreement have
been, when the tenancy began”), but that “he replaced the defective sump pump with an
old sump pump which failed less than a year later.” The Commission concluded that the
failure of the second sump pump wasn’t the Tenants’ responsibility and that they were
entitled to deduct the cost of the replacement from their rent payment. After we remanded
this case for the Commission to adjudicate any unresolved claims, the panel that
adjudicated Mr. Ludwig’s counterclaim concluded that the previous panel had resolved
Case No. 36508 and stated that that panel’s decision “remain[ed] unchanged.”
On appeal, Mr. Ludwig challenges the 2018 panel’s credibility determinations. He
challenges the panel’s finding discrediting his testimony that the sump pump installed in
2016 was “new” as arbitrary and capricious, asserting that it was “immaterial” when the
pump was manufactured because both he and the Tenants testified at the hearing that it was
“new in a box” and was rated for seven to ten years of “normal wear and tear.” He argues
as well that the plumber’s statement that the drain lines were clear and unobstructed when
he 	replaced 	the 	replacement 	pump 	in 	2017 	was 	“immaterial” 	because 	“the 	pump
malfunctioned months before.” Finally, Mr. Ludwig asserts that the panel disregarded
“undisputed evidence” that the Tenants had failed to clear the driveway drains properly

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until 	after 	the 	replacement 	pump 	malfunctioned. 	We 	hold 	that 	the 	Commission’s
conclusions regarding the sump pump issue were supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
“Administrative credibility findings are . . . entitled to great deference on judicial
review.” Kim v. Md. State Bd. of Physicians, 196 Md. App. 362, 370 (2010). In fact, the
“[c]redibility findings of hearing officers who themselves have personally observed the
witnesses ‘have almost conclusive force.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
330 Md. 187, 217 (1993)). Here, after hearing testimony from Dr. Hearty and Mr. Ludwig
and reviewing the email communications, receipts, and other evidence put forward by both
parties, the 2018 panel discredited Mr. Ludwig’s testimony that the sump pump he installed
in 2016 was “new” and any evidence that the pump malfunctioned because of the Tenants’
failure to clear the driveway drains. The panel concluded instead that the pump wasn’t new,
that it malfunctioned due to age, and that the Tenants weren’t responsible for the
malfunction. Those conclusions were supported by Dr. Hearty’s testimony that the pump
installed in 2016, while “in good condition” and “in a box,” was a “back-up” sump pump
Mr. Ludwig had been storing in the home. The Commission’s conclusions were supported
also by the plumber’s written statements—about which Mr. Hearty testified and which it
found credible—that the pump installed in 2016 was manufactured in 2008 and that when
he replaced that pump, it was clear of debris and the float switch was unobstructed.
Deferring, as we must, “to the facts found and inferences drawn by the [Commission],”
Cnty. Comm’rs, 465 Md. at 201, and to its credibility determinations, Kim, 196 Md. App.

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at 370, we hold that “‘a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual
conclusion 	the 	[Commission] 	reached’” 	regarding 	the 	cause 	of 	the 	sump 	pump’s
malfunction. Miller, 200 Md. App. at 632 (quoting Longo, 187 Md. App. 25, 49 (2009)).
2. 	The Commission’s decision in Case No. 36732 concerning the
security deposit is supported by substantial evidence.
In its April 2019 order and opinion resolving the Tenants’ security deposit claims,
the Commission found Mr. Ludwig in violation of several provisions of Maryland Code
(1974, 2015 Repl. Vol.), § 8-203, as amended by 2016 Md. Laws, Chap. 643 (“RP 2016”),
the version of the statute in effect at that time. Before addressing Mr. Ludwig’s claims of
error on appeal, we explain the relevant sections of the statute, the events leading up to the
Tenants’ filing of their security deposit complaint, and the proceedings before the
Commission in Case No. 36732.
At the time of the administrative proceedings, a landlord who collected a security
deposit was required by law to return the deposit and the “simple interest” that had accrued
on it to the tenant within forty-five days after the end of the tenancy. RP 2016 § 8-203(e)(1).
The landlord was entitled to withhold from the deposit any unpaid rent or damage to the
leased 	property 	caused 	by 	the 	tenant 	“in 	excess 	of 	ordinary 	wear 	and 	tear.” 	Id.
§ 8-203(f)(1)(i). If the landlord withheld any portion of the security deposit, though, they
needed to send to the tenant, within forty-five days of the end of the tenancy and by
first-class mail, “a written list of the damages claimed . . . [and] a statement of the cost

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19
actually incurred” to repair the claimed damages. Id. § 8-203(g)(1). 2 If the landlord failed
to return the deposit plus the accrued interest to the tenant within the forty-five-day period
“without a reasonable basis,” the tenant had “an action of up to threefold the withheld
amount, plus reasonable attorney’s fees. Id. § 8-203(e)(4). If the landlord failed to mail a
list of claimed damages to the tenant within the forty-five-day period, the landlord
“forfeit[ed] the right to withhold any part of the security deposit for damages.” Id.
§ 8-203(f)(2). The statute provided that no provision of § 8-203 could “be waived in any
lease.” Id. § 8-203(j).
In addition, a landlord who collected a security deposit had to provide the tenant
with a receipt for the deposit. Id. § 8-203(c)(1). The receipt had to notify the tenant of their
rights under RP 2016 § 8-203(f)(1). Id. § 8-203.1(a). The receipt needed to notify the tenant
to be present for (1) a pre-occupancy inspection to create a written list of existing damages
and (2) a post-occupancy inspection to determine if the tenant caused any damage to the
leased property; the landlord’s obligations to (3) conduct the post-occupancy inspection
within five days before or after the tenant’s stated move out date and (4) notify the tenant
in writing of the inspection date; (5) the tenant’s right to receive a written list of charges
claimed by the landlord against their security deposit within forty-five days after the
2 In 2022, the General Assembly amended RP § 8-203 to remove the requirement for a
landlord to provide a statement of “costs actually incurred” to repair claimed damages
and replacing it with a requirement that the landlord provide “an itemized statement of
the costs incurred” to repair claimed damages. 2022 Md. Laws, Chap. 34; see RP
§ 8-203(j)(1) (1974, 2023 Repl. Vol.). The amended statute allows a landlord to satisfy
the statement of costs requirement by providing an “estimate” of the cost to be incurred
to repair claimed damages. RP § 8-203(j)(2) (1974, 2023 Repl. Vol.).

—Unreported Opinion—
20
termination of the tenancy; (6) the landlord’s obligation to return “any unused portion of
the security deposit” by first-class mail within forty-five days after the termination of the
tenancy; and (7) a statement that the landlord’s failure to comply with the security deposit
law “may result in the landlord being liable to the tenant for a penalty of up to [three] times
the security deposit withheld, plus reasonable attorney’s fees.” Id.
The Tenants’ lease ended on July 31, 2017. The parties conducted a joint inspection
of the home on August 6, and on August 22, Mr. Ludwig sent the Tenants, by email, a list
of damages that he intended to withhold from their security deposit and estimates of the
cost to repair those damages. The damages included an estimated $382.50 for refinishing
the floors in the living room and on the first and second floor landings; an estimated
$150.00 for “correcting [a] deep stain by [the] fireplace”; an estimated $1,350.00 for
repainting several walls and removing bolts and screws from those walls; $284.92 for an
allegedly past due water bill; and $48.18 for a “[p]artial gutter cleaning” that Mr. Ludwig
had paid for and for which he provided an invoice. Mr. Ludwig stated in his email that he
would not withhold from the security deposit the cost of refinishing the staircase. He
calculated the total damages to be $1,930.60 and stated that he would return $5,769.40 of
the Tenants’ $7,700.00 security deposit “[i]f acceptable.”
The Tenants responded the next day. They accepted responsibility for the cost of
refinishing the floors and correcting the stain by the fireplace but did not accept
responsibility for the cost of the wall repainting, asserting that the walls were not “newly
painted” prior to their tenancy and exhibited nail holes and minor marks and scratches

—Unreported Opinion—
21
when they moved in. They asserted that they had pointed the existing marks out to Mr.
Ludwig in an August 2015 email and that, regardless, the marks constituted “[o]rdinary
wear and tear” for which they weren’t responsible. “[A]s a compromise,” they offered Mr.
Ludwig $100.00 for the cost of removing drywall anchors they had installed. The Tenants
stated also that they’d paid the alleged outstanding water bill already and that the Office
had resolved the dispute over the gutter cleaning cost in a prior case and concluded that it
was not the Tenants’ responsibility. They attached confirmation of the water bill payment
to their email. Finally, they noted that Mr. Ludwig was required by law to return to them
the interest accrued on their security deposit during their lease term. They calculated the
total damages for which they were responsible to be $632.50, estimated the total accrued
interest to be $221.51, and requested a return of $7,289.01 from their security deposit. Mr.
Ludwig did not respond to the Tenants’ email and on August 25, sent them a check for
$5,769.40.
On September 3, 2017, The Tenants filed a second landlord-tenant complaint with
the Office contesting the withholdings for the wall repainting, gutter cleaning, and water
bill. They requested an additional return of $1,904.53 from Mr. Ludwig. On October 3,
2017, a month after the Tenants informed him of their complaint, Mr. Ludwig responded
to their August 23 email. He acknowledged that they had paid the water bill and stated that,
accordingly, he would “not continue to withhold [the $284.92] amount from the deposit.”
He maintained that all other costs were withheld properly, asserted that the Office’s
decision regarding the gutter costs was invalid, and claimed an additional $382.50 in

—Unreported Opinion—
22
estimated damages after “withdraw[ing] his offer” not to withhold the cost of refinishing
the staircase. He concluded that the Tenants owed him an additional $97.58 (the difference
between the $382.50 estimate for refinishing the stairs and the “credit” for the $284.92
water bill). The next day, he sent the Tenants an additional check for $123.53, which he
claimed in a later email to “represent[] the $221.51 security deposit interest less [the]
$97.58 owed per [his] [October 3] email.”
At the November 2018 hearing, Dr. Hearty testified that he and Ms. Salay had paid
Mr. Ludwig a $7,700.00 combined security and pet deposit. He stated that they “never
actually received a written receipt of the security deposit separate from the lease” that
advised them of their rights, that Mr. Ludwig hadn’t provided “accurate accounting of [the]
interest accrued” on the deposit, and that Mr. Ludwig hadn’t returned the full amount of
the interest accrued on the deposit. Dr. Hearty testified further that Mr. Ludwig sent the
second check more than forty-five days after the end of the lease and that, accordingly,
neither the security deposit nor the interest was returned to he and Ms. Salay within the
legally mandated timeframe. According to Dr. Hearty, Mr. Ludwig never sent them a list
of damages by first-class mail as required, and the list he sent them by email included only
estimates of the cost to repair the claimed damages rather than costs actually incurred for
repairs. Finally, Dr. Hearty testified that Mr. Ludwig had charged costs against their
security deposit “not in excess of normal wear and tear.” He informed the Commission of
Mr. Ludwig’s August 22, 2017 email listing the claimed damages, their August 23, 2017
response, Mr. Ludwig’s October 3, 2017 reply to their response, the checks Mr. Ludwig

—Unreported Opinion—
23
sent them on August 25 and October 4, 2017, and their August 2015 email to Mr. Ludwig
about existing damage to the walls, all of which were included in the administrative record
along with a copy of the lease. Also included in the record was a copy of the Office’s letter
to Mr. Ludwig regarding the gutter case, which stated that the Tenants weren’t responsible
for the cost of the cleaning.
Mr. Ludwig stated at the hearing that he had been a landlord for forty years. During
questioning by the commissioners, he testified that he had been using the same standard
form lease, without any updates, since the 1980s and since 2008 for the property leased by
the Tenants. He admitted that he didn’t follow the law requiring him to send the statement
of damages claimed by first-class mail because he “wasn’t aware of that requirement” and
that, aside from the invoice for the gutter cleaning, he had provided estimates of the cost
to repair the claimed damages to the home rather than the costs actually incurred to repair
them.
The Commission, in its April 2019 opinion and order, found as fact that the Tenants
paid Mr. Ludwig a $7,700.00 security deposit; that Mr. Ludwig had acknowledged receipt
of the deposit in an August 2017 email; and that neither the lease agreement nor Mr.
Ludwig’s email confirming receipt of the deposit contained any of the disclosures required
under RP 2016 §§ 8-203(f)(1) and 8-203.1 except the Tenants’ right to be present at the
post-occupancy inspection. The Commission found as well that the Tenants vacated the
home on July 31, 2017, and that Mr. Ludwig sent them an itemized list of damages by
email on August 22, 2017, which he later amended “to account for $221.31 [in] interest

—Unreported Opinion—
24
and deducted additional costs.”
Based on its findings, the panel concluded that Mr. Ludwig had violated RP 2016
§ 8-203(g)(1)–(2) by failing to send the tenants, by first-class mail within forty-five days
of the end of their tenancy, an itemized list of damages claimed against their security
deposit and a statement of the costs actually incurred to repair those damages. Thus, under
RP 2016 § 8-203(g)(2), the panel decided, Mr. Ludwig had forfeited his right to withhold
any part of the Tenants’ security deposit. The panel concluded also that Mr. Ludwig had
failed to return the security deposit plus the accrued interest (which the panel calculated to
be $230.37) within forty-five days of the end of the tenancy as required under RP 2016
§ 8-203(e)(1). 	Because 	the 	Commission 	determined 	that 	Mr. 	Ludwig’s 	conduct 	in
wrongfully withholding a portion of the Tenants’ security deposit “[rose] to the level of
bad faith and egregiousness,” it awarded the Tenants a onefold penalty under RP 2016
§ 8-203(e)(4) in the amount of $2,160.97. The Commission ordered Mr. Ludwig to pay the
Tenants a total of $4,321.94 (the $7,700.00 security deposit plus the $230.37 in interest
accrued on the deposit and the $2,160.97 penalty, minus the $5,769.40 that Mr. Ludwig
had refunded the Tenants already).
On appeal, Mr. Ludwig argues first that the Commission’s conclusion that he had
forfeited the right to withhold any portion of the Tenants’ security deposit under RP 2016
§ 8-203(g)(2) was arbitrary and capricious. He concedes, as he did at the administrative
hearing, that he sent the Tenants a written list of damages claimed by email rather than by
first-class 	mail 	as 	RP 	2016 	§ 8-203(g)(1) 	requires, 	and 	he 	doesn’t 	challenge 	the

—Unreported Opinion—
25
Commission’s finding that he provided estimates of the cost of repairing the majority of
the claimed damages rather than the required “statement of the cost actually incurred” to
repair those damages. Rather, he seems to assert that the Tenants somehow waived the
requirement that he send the list of damages claimed by first-class mail by “acting upon”
the emailed list “without claiming a notice defect” and “insist[ing]” that he respond to their
August 23, 2017 email addressing the emailed list. We can dispense with this issue quickly.
As the Tenants point out correctly, none of the security deposit provisions under RP 2016
§ 8-203 were waivable, see id. § 8-203(j), and Mr. Ludwig’s admissions constituted
substantial evidence supporting the Commission’s conclusion that he had violated the
provisions of RP 2016 § 8-203(g)(1) and forfeited his right to withhold any part of the
Tenants’ security deposit under RP 2016 § 8-203(g)(2).
Mr. Ludwig challenges next the Commission’s conclusion that he violated RP 2016
§ 8-203(e)(1) by failing to return the security deposit and the proper amount of accrued
interest within forty-five days of the termination of the tenancy. He doesn’t contest the
Commission’s finding that he “incorrectly credited” the Tenants’ estimation of the accrued
interest, and he concedes that he sent the portion of the interest that he did return to them
“two weeks later” than the statutory deadline. Rather, he describes the approximately $9.00
difference between the interest he returned and the interest calculated by the Commission
as “paltry” and the two-week delay in returning it as “insignificant.” We hold again that
the Commission’s conclusion was supported by substantial evidence in the administrative
record. The lease agreement, which was included in the record, listed the termination date

—Unreported Opinion—
26
as July 31, 2017. Dr. Hearty testified at the hearing that Mr. Ludwig did not return any of
the interest accrued on the security deposit to the Tenants until October 4, 2017, more than
forty-five days after the lease terminated. A copy of the October 4 check and of Mr.
Ludwig’s email explaining that he intended that check to serve as his return of the interest
accrued on the security deposit were both included in the administrative record. Mr.
Ludwig’s email about the check indicated also that he had credited the Tenants’ $221.51
interest estimate. This evidence supported the Commission’s conclusion that Mr. Ludwig
violated RP 2016 § 8-203(e)(1) both by returning insufficient interest and by sending the
interest he did return late.
Finally, Mr. Ludwig challenges the Commission’s decision to award the Tenants a
onefold penalty under RP 2016 § 8-203(e)(4) based on its conclusion that his failure to
return timely the deposit and interest was “without a reasonable basis.” Relying on our
Supreme Court’s decision in Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern, 305 Md. 443 (1986), he argues
that the Commission failed to make prerequisite factual findings before awarding the
Tenants the onefold penalty. We disagree.
Before awarding a penalty for a violation of the security deposit statute, the trier of
fact “must make two distinct determinations: whether the landlord withheld more of the
security deposit than that to which he was entitled; and, if so, whether any part of this
excess was withheld without a reasonable basis.” Rohrbaugh, 305 Md. at 451. The punitive
damages awarded based on a landlord’s unlawful withholding of a security deposit “may
not exceed threefold the amount of the security deposit withheld [by the landlord] without

—Unreported Opinion—
27
a reasonable basis.” Id. at 450.
In this case, the Commission made both prerequisite findings before awarding the
onefold penalty. First, the Commission concluded that Mr. Ludwig wasn’t entitled to
withhold any of the $2,160.97 that he had withheld from the Tenants’ security deposit
because he’d forfeited the right to do so under RP 2016 § 8-203(g)(2) by failing to comply
with RP 2016 § 8-203(g)(1). Second, although the Commission didn’t use the exact
language of Rohrbaugh and RP 2016 § 8-203(e)(4), its conclusion that his actions in
withholding $2,160.97 from the security deposit after forfeiting his right to do so “[rose]
to the level of bad faith in egregious conduct” was equivalent to a finding that he withheld
that entire amount “without a reasonable basis.” Rohrbaugh, 305 Md. at 450–51. “‘[A]
reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion[s] the [Commission]
reached’” regarding its decision to assess a onefold penalty against Mr. Ludwig for
withholding all $2,160.97 he withheld from the Tenants’ security deposit improperly.
Miller, 200 Md. App. at 632 (quoting Longo, 187 Md. App. at 49).
3. 	The Commission’s decision to dismiss Case No. 47763, Mr.
Ludwig’s 	counterclaim, 	was 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence.
Lastly, Mr. Ludwig challenges the Commission’s dismissal of his counterclaim on
remand. In his hearing submission, filed with the Commission the day of the November
2018 hearing, Mr. Ludwig included a counterclaim against the Tenants for alleged unpaid
rent and late fees. He sought an order from the Commission requiring the Tenants to pay
him the $365.00 cost of replacing the sump pump, which they withheld from their July

—Unreported Opinion—
28
2017 rent; a $100.00 late fee for the withheld portion of their July 2017 rent; $100.00 to
correct an “underpayment” of their August 2016 rent; and a $100.00 late fee for the
Tenants’ failure to pay that $100.00 timely—a total of $665.00—plus costs and legal fees. 3
To support his request for the $200.00 in late fees, he relied on Paragraph 2 of the lease,
which provided that Tenants would pay rent on time “without demand or deduction” and
that “[p]ayments received after the fifth day of each month [would] incur a late payment
charge of $100.00.” As stated above, the Commission didn’t resolve Mr. Ludwig’s
counterclaim in its April 2019 opinion and order, and upon dismissal of Mr. Ludwig’s
appeal from the circuit court’s decision affirming that order, we remanded the case to the
circuit court with instructions to remand to the Commission so that it could adjudicate the
counterclaim “and any other outstanding and unresolved claims necessary for entry of a
final judgment.” Order, Ludwig v. Hearty, No. 1938, Sept. Term 2019 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
Nov. 2, 2020)
The Commission held a hearing on the counterclaim on May 10, 2023 and June 28,
2023. On the first day of the hearing, the Commission entered the materials in the record
from Case Nos. 36508 and 36732 into the record for Case No. 47763 without any objection
from 	either 	party. 	Mr. 	Ludwig 	testified 	about 	the 	payments 	he 	requested 	in 	his
counterclaim. He directed the Commission’s attention to Dr. Hearty’s testimony at the
3 In his counterclaim and at the 2023 hearings on that claim, Mr. Ludwig requested an
additional $280.00 reimbursement: $180.00 for rent withheld to treat a pest infestation
and an associated $100.00 late fee. However, on appeal, he doesn’t challenge the
Commission’s dismissal of that part of his counterclaim.

—Unreported Opinion—
29
November 2018 hearing, in which he accepted responsibility for missing the $100.00 rent
increase for the second year of the lease that kicked in beginning in August 2016 and
expressed his willingness to pay that $100.00 and the associated late fee. He testified about
the Tenants’ withholding of rent for the cost of the sump pump replacement and challenged
the Commission’s April 2019 decision on the sump pump issue as erroneous and about an
instance in which the Tenants had “threatened” to withhold $100.00 from their rent to pay
for electrical work.
Finally, Mr. Ludwig asked the panel to resolve a “new claim” for costs he stated
were recoverable as “additional rent” under Paragraph 10 of the lease, which reads:
“Payment of such reasonable sums, or expenses of prosecuting or defending any matter or
action, by reason of Tenants’ default . . . shall be deemed additional rent and due from
Tenants to Landlord.” He asked the panel to order the Tenants to pay him a total of “roughly
$2,018.58” in “additional rent,” to include $152.21 in transcription costs, a $90.00 bank
fee for and official check to pay an appeal bond, and $1,733.88 in additional costs, such as
filing fees.
Dr. Hearty presented his case on the second day of the hearing. In January 2024, the
Commission issued its decision and order resolving Case No. 47763. As relevant to the
counterclaim, the panel noted the lease’s late fee provision and its provision requiring the
Tenants to reimburse Mr. Ludwig for all costs and attorney’s fees he incurred in the event
that he instituted legal proceedings against them for a default under the lease. It found as
well that the Tenants withheld $100.00 from their August 2016 rent, “a payment they made

—Unreported Opinion—
30
directly to a contractor for electrical work,” and that they had done so after reaching a
“verbal agreement” with Mr. Ludwig. The panel noted also the Tenants’ withholding of
the $365.00 sump pump replacement cost from their July 2017 rent.
The Commission concluded that the lease’s late fee provision, which kicked in only
five days after the payment deadline, violated MCC § 29-27’s requirement for a residential
lease to “[r]equire a minimum of [ten] days before late fees may be charged.” MCC
§ 29-27(l). Accordingly, it concluded that the late fee provision was unenforceable and that
Mr. Ludwig wasn’t entitled to any payments under that provision. The Commission
concluded that not only had the parties agreed verbally to the withholding of the $100.00
from their August 2016 rent, but also that Mr. Ludwig’s attempts to collect that money
were retaliatory. Specifically, the Commission concluded that Mr. Ludwig “made no effort
to collect the [$100.00] until after the tenancy was terminated and the [Tenants’] previous
complaints against [him] had been filed, thereby raising the specter of retaliation.” Thus,
the Commission determined that Mr. Ludwig had forfeited the right to collect that money.
For the reasons stated above, the Commission dismissed Mr. Ludwig’s counterclaim.
In this Court, Mr. Ludwig challenges first the Commission’s findings that the parties
agreed to the $100.00 deduction from the Tenants’ August 2016 rent payment and that the
Tenants withheld that money to cover the cost of electrical work. He contends that there
was no evidence in the record to support either finding and directs our attention to Dr.
Hearty’s testimony at the November 2018 hearing about the missed rent increase and the
Tenants’ willingness to pay it.

—Unreported Opinion—
31
We agree that these findings by the Commission about the $100.00 rent deduction
weren’t supported by substantial evidence in the record. The record did contain an October
28, 2016 email from the Tenants stating that they intended to withhold $100.00 from their
November rent to cover the cost of electrical repairs, but this would have been well after
the Tenants paid their August 2016 rent and there was no evidence to show that they ever
actually withheld that amount from their November 2016 rent. Although the Tenants
testified that they reached a verbal agreement with Mr. Ludwig to withhold certain pest
control costs from their November 2016 rent, they never testified to having reached any
such agreement for the electrical costs. Finally, the 2023 record contained the transcript
from the 2018 hearing, at which Dr. Hearty testified that the $100.00 deduction from the
Tenants’ August 2016 rent was due to a second-year rent increase that he missed in the
lease and would be willing to pay.
Nevertheless, the Commission’s conclusion that Mr. Ludwig wasn’t entitled to
recover that $100.00 rested on independent grounds unrelated to these erroneous factual
findings. The Commission concluded as well that Mr. Ludwig’s attempt to recover that
money only after the Tenants filed their complaints against him in 2017 constituted
retaliation and that by taking impermissible retaliatory action against the Tenants, he had
forfeited his right to recover the $100.00 August 2016 rent deduction. Mr. Ludwig doesn’t
challenge the panel’s finding of retaliation, which is prohibited under the Montgomery
County Code. See MMC § 29-32(b) (“A landlord must not . . . take any . . . retaliatory
action against any tenant who exercises any rights conferred upon the tenant by [Chapter

—Unreported Opinion—
32
29]” of the Montgomery County Code.). The record reveals that Mr. Ludwig first requested
that the tenants pay him $100.00 for the “underpayment of rent in [their] August 2016 rent
payment” in an October 2017 email, after the Tenants filed their complaints against him in
April and September of that same year. We affirm.
Next, Mr. Ludwig contests the Commission’s finding that the late fee provision in
the lease violated MCC § 29-27(l). However, he both concedes that the lease imposed late
fees for rent payments made as early as five days late and acknowledges that MCC
§ 29-27(l) 	requires 	“[ten] 	days 	before 	late 	fees 	may 	be 	charged.” 	We 	affirm 	the
Commission’s conclusion that Mr. Ludwig wasn’t entitled to the $200.00 he claimed in
late fees.
Third, Mr. Ludwig challenges the Commission’s decision not to order the Tenants
to pay him the $365.00 they withheld from their July 2017 rent to cover the cost of the
sump pump replacement. We can dispense quickly with this issue too. Because we affirm
the Commission’s conclusion in Case No. 36508 that the Tenants’ withholding of the sump
pump replacement cost was proper, we affirm as well its decision not to order the Tenants
to pay Mr. Ludwig that cost in Case No. 47763.
Finally, Mr. Ludwig argues that the Commission failed to resolve his claim that he
was entitled to the payment of certain court costs that qualified as “additional rent” under
Paragraph 10 of the lease. To the extent that this “new claim,” raised by Mr. Ludwig for
the first time on remand, qualified as one of the “other outstanding and unresolved claims
necessary for final judgment” that we instructed the agency to resolve in our 2020 order,

—Unreported Opinion—
33
we hold that it has been resolved. By its terms, Paragraph 10 required the Tenants to
reimburse Mr. Ludwig for expenses incurred in prosecuting or defending any action “by
reason of the Tenants’ default.” Because the Commission made no determination that the
Tenants were in default of any of their obligations under the lease, Paragraph 10 did not
apply, and Mr. Ludwig wasn’t entitled to recover any of his claimed court costs as
“additional rent” under that paragraph.
D. 	The Circuit Court Failed To Identify The Basis For Its Award Of
Attorney’s Fees As Required Under Maryland Rule 2-703(g).
Fourth and finally, Mr. Ludwig challenges the circuit court’s May 28, 2025 order
awarding the Tenants $11,333.00 in attorneys’ fees. 4
On February 2, 2024, Mr. Ludwig filed a petition with the circuit court seeking
judicial review of the Commission’s order dismissing his counterclaim and reaffirming its
decisions in Case Nos. 36508 and 36732. The Tenants, now represented by counsel,
responded to the petition on May 30 and expressed their intent to participate in the judicial
review proceedings. Mr. Ludwig filed a memorandum in support of his petition for judicial
review on July 27, and the Tenants filed an opposing memorandum on August 26. In their
memorandum, the Tenants asked the court to award them reasonable attorney’s fees
4 The Tenants ask us to dismiss Mr. Ludwig’s appeal as it pertains to the attorney’s fee
award on the ground that Mr. Ludwig failed to include their motion for attorney’s fees
or his opposition to that motion in his record extract. Although the Tenants are correct
that Maryland Rule 8-501 grants us the discretion to dismiss an appeal for failure to file
a record extract that contains “all parts of the record that are reasonably necessary for
the determination of the questions presented by the appeal,” Md. Rule 8-501(a), (c),
(m), we decline to exercise our discretion in that manner here.

—Unreported Opinion—
34
“pursuant to RP § 8-203.”
The circuit court held a judicial review hearing on March 7, 2025 but didn’t address
the Tenants’ request for attorney’s fees at that hearing. That same day, the court entered an
order affirming the order of the Commission. Mr. Ludwig filed two subsequent motions to
reconsider, both of which the court denied. On May 8, 2025, the Tenants filed a motion for
attorney’s fees, asserting their entitlement under RP § 8-203(e)(4) to their “reasonable
attorney’s fees” incurred while litigating the judicial review action. To support their
assertion, they relied on our Supreme Court’s holding in Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315
(2003), that the “reasonable attorney’s fees” recoverable under RP § 8-203(e)(4) in an
action to recover a security deposit wrongfully withheld by a landlord include “fees for
post-judgment motions necessitated by the landlord’s refusal to satisfy [a] judgment”
against them. Id. at 329.
In Pak, after the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the tenants on their RP
§ 8-203(e) claim for the return of their security deposit, the tenants filed post-judgment
discovery motions to aid in their recovery of the judgment against the landlord. Id. at 318–
19. The landlord failed to respond to their motions, and the circuit court granted their
subsequent motion to compel. Id. at 319. The landlord failed to comply with the court’s
order granting the motion to compel, and the tenants filed a petition for contempt. Id.
Eventually, the circuit court found the landlord in civil contempt. Id. The tenants then filed
a motion seeking to recover the attorney’s fees they incurred during the post-judgment
proceedings under RP § 8-203(e)(4). Id. The circuit court denied the motion and the

—Unreported Opinion—
35
Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 320, 336. The Supreme Court noted that “in many
cases . . . a landlord could delay, impede and actively thwart the collection of the judgment
until it is no longer cost effective for the tenant to pursue collection of a judgment.” Id. at
329. In addition, the Court reasoned that RP § 8-203(e) “allows for ‘reasonable attorney’s
fees’ incurred in an action for a return, i.e., actual collection, of security deposits” and that
“[u]ntil a security deposit, including attorney’s fees, is actually returned it is still in the
process of being collected.” Id. The Court concluded that “[c]onsidering the costs of the
appellate process, precluding, categorically, the recovery of [post-judgment] attorney’s
fees” under RP § 8-203(e)(4) “might effectively render meaningless the remedy created by
the Legislature.” Id.
In their motion, the Tenants explained that Mr. Ludwig still had not returned their
security deposit. They argued that the litigation in connection with Mr. Ludwig’s petition
for judicial review and his post-judgment motions for reconsideration of the circuit court’s
order affirming the Commission’s January 2024 order “are the types of proceedings that
the Supreme Court confirmed [in Pak] are appropriate for an award of attorney’s fees”
under RP § 8-203(e)(4). In the alternative, they argued that Mr. Ludwig had litigated the
judicial review proceedings in bad faith and without substantial justification and that an
award of attorney’s fees under Maryland Rule 1-341 was thus appropriate. They asked the
circuit court to award them $11,333.00 in attorney’s fees.
On May 28, 2025, the circuit court entered an order granting the Tenants’ motion:
UPON 	CONSIDERATION 	of 	[the 	Tenants’] 	Motion 	for
Award of Attorneys’ Fees, any Opposition thereto, and the

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36
record as a whole, it is this day of 05/28/2025, by the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, ORDERED, that
[the Tenants’] Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees be, and
same is hereby, GRANTED; and it is further, ORDERED, that
[Mr.] Ludwig shall pay $11,333.00 to [the Tenants]; and it is
further, 	ORDERED, 	that 	JUDGMENT 	in 	the 	amount 	of
$11,333.00 is entered against [Mr.] Ludwig and in favor of [the
Tenants].
On appeal, Mr. Ludwig challenges the circuit court’s fee award on two grounds. He
argues that the Tenants waived any statutory fee claim under RP § 8-203 by failing to plead
it and that the circuit court’s order failed to state any basis or make the findings required to
support a fee award under either RP § 8-203 or Maryland Rule 1-341. We hold first that
the Tenants didn’t waive their claim for attorney’s fees. Second, we vacate the circuit
court’s order awarding attorney’s fees to the Tenants and remand for limited purpose of
allowing the court to explain the basis for the fee award as Maryland Rule 2-703 requires.
We turn first to Mr. Ludwig’s argument that the Tenants waived their attorney’s
fees claim under RP § 8-203 by failing to raise it in a pleading. He relies on Maryland Rule
2-703, which requires a party seeking attorney’s fees allowable by law in the circuit court
to “include a claim for such fees in the party’s initial pleading or, if the grounds for such a
claim arise after the initial pleading is filed, in an amended pleading filed promptly after
the grounds for the claim arose.” Md. Rule 2-703(a)–(b). In essence, Mr. Ludwig seems to
argue that the Tenants, who were not represented by counsel when they filed their security
deposit complaint with the Office in 2017, waived their right to claim attorney’s fees under
RP § 8-203 by failing to make a fee request in that complaint. We disagree.
To explain the basis for our disagreement, we must provide a brief explanation of

—Unreported Opinion—
37
the initial stages of the judicial review process. A person seeking judicial review of an
agency action must file a petition with the circuit court that (A) requests judicial review,
(B) identifies the order or action that they are asking the court to review, and (C) states
whether the petitioner was a party to the administrative proceeding or, if not, the basis for
their standing to seek judicial review of the agency action. Md. Rule 7-202(a), (c)(1). If
any party files a timely petition, any other person may file a petition within ten days after
the agency mails notice of the first petition. Md. Rule 7-203(b). After the party seeking
judicial review files their petition, “[a]ny person . . . who is entitled by law to be a party
and who wishes to participate as a party” in the judicial review proceedings must file a
response to the petition that states their intent to participate as a party. Md. Rule 7-204(a)
“No other allegations are necessary.” Id. After the administrative record is filed with the
circuit court, the parties then file memoranda “setting forth a concise statement of the
questions presented for review, a statement of facts material to those questions, and
argument on each question.” Md. Rule 7-207(a).
The Tenants included a request for attorney’s fees under RP § 8-203 in their
memorandum opposing Mr. Ludwig’s petition for judicial review—their first substantive
filing after retaining counsel. True, that filing wasn’t a “pleading” in the most basic sense,
but the Tenants did make their fee request “promptly after the grounds for the claim arose.”
Md. Rule 2-703(b). In any case, the purpose of a pleading is to provide notice to a party of
the claims against them, see Ledvinka v. Ledvinka, 154 Md. App. 420, 429 (2003), and the
Tenants’ memorandum put Mr. Ludwig on notice of their request for attorney’s fees.

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38
We turn next to Mr. Ludwig’s contention that the circuit court’s award of attorney’s
fees to the Tenants must be reversed because the court failed to state the basis for its award.
RP § 8-203 provides that “[i]f [a] landlord, without a reasonable basis, fails to return any
part of the [tenant’s] security deposit, plus accrued interest, within [forty-five] days after
the termination of the tenancy, the tenant has an action of up to threefold of the withheld
amount, plus reasonable attorney’s fees.” RP § 8-203(e)(4). Under Maryland Rule 1-341,
“[i]n any civil action, if the court finds that the conduct of any party in maintaining or
defending the proceeding was in bad faith or without substantial justification,” the court
may, on an adverse party’s motion, require the offending party to pay the costs and
reasonable expenses incurred by the adverse party during the litigation, “including
reasonable attorney[’s] fees.” Md. Rule 1-341(a). Maryland Rule 2-703 requires the circuit
court, either on the record or in a separate memorandum, to “state . . . the basis for its grant
or denial of an award” of attorney’s fees. Md. Rule 2-703(g). Otherwise, it is impossible
for an appellate court to review the reasons for its grant or denial. See Lockett, 446 Md. at
425–26.
Here, the circuit court didn’t address the Tenants’ request for attorney’s fees at the
March 2025 judicial review hearing, nor did it hold a separate hearing on the motion. The
circuit court’s order granting the Tenants’ motion for attorney’s fees, for which it entered
no accompanying memorandum, contains the entirety of the court’s reasoning. The order
doesn’t state any basis for the fee award or indicate if the circuit court awarded fees under
RP § 8-203(e)(4), Maryland Rule 1-341, or both. Each of these alternative grounds relied

—Unreported Opinion—
39
on by the Tenants to support their attorney’s fees request imposes different requirements,
each of which the circuit court could plausibly have found to be met here. To enter an
award of attorney’s fees under RP § 8-203(e)(4), the circuit court would need to conclude
(1) that the Tenants’ security deposit complaint with the Office was an “action” for the
return of their security deposit under the statute and (2) that the judicial review proceedings
on the Commission’s 2024 order—which reaffirmed its 2019 security deposit decision—
were, in effect, post-judgment proceedings “necessitated by [Mr. Ludwig’s] refusal to
satisfy [a] judgment” requiring him to return the Tenants’ security deposit. Pak, 378 Md.
at 329. To enter an award of attorney’s fees under Rule 1-341, the circuit court would need
to find, as the Tenants alleged in their post-judgment motion, that Mr. Ludwig’s actions in
maintaining the judicial review proceedings were “in bad faith or without substantial
justification.” Md. Rule 1-341(a). Without knowing the authority on which the circuit court
relied, however, we aren’t able to determine whether it applied the correct legal framework
or abused its discretion in granting the Tenants’ fee request.

—Unreported Opinion—
40
We vacate the attorneys’ fee award and order a narrow remand solely for the purpose
of allowing the circuit court to identify the legal authority supporting its grant of the award
and to state the basis for its decision as Maryland Rule 2-703(g) requires.
DECISION 	OF 	THE 	MONTGOMERY
COUNTY COMMISSION ON LANDLORD-
TENANT 	AFFAIRS 	AFFIRMED.
ATTORNEY’S 	FEE 	AWARD 	OF 	THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY
COUNTY 	VACATED 	AND 	REMANDED
FOR 	FURTHER 	PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT 	WITH 	THIS 	OPINION.
APPELLANT TO PAY 90% OF COSTS.
APPELLEES TO PAY 10% OF COSTS.