Murray, Darryl v. State

Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 124093005
UNREPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 154
September Term, 2025
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DARRYL MURRAY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
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Graeff,
Ripken,
Eyler, Deborah S.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
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PER CURIAM
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Filed: October 14, 2026
*This is a per curiam opinion. Under Rule 1-104, the opinion is not precedent within the
rule of stare decisis, nor may it be cited as persuasive authority.

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Convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of illegal possession of
a regulated firearm and illegal possession of ammunition, Darryl Murray, appellant,
presents for our review two issues: 	whether the court “fail[ed] to properly exercise
discretion, or abuse[d] its discretion, in permitting the State to impeach [Mr. Murray’s]
credibility with a prior conviction,” and whether the court “commit[ted] plain error in
admitting [certain] evidence.” For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgments
of the circuit court.
Mr. Murray was charged by indictment with illegal possession of a regulated
firearm, illegal possession of ammunition, and wearing, carrying, and transporting a loaded
handgun in a vehicle. 	At trial, the State produced evidence that on October 26, 2023,
Baltimore Police Sergeant Giusseppe Polanco was in the 5300 block of Sinclair Lane when
he saw Mr. Murray, who was in the driver’s seat of a car, speaking to another individual.
When Sergeant Polanco rolled his window down, Mr. Murray exited the car, jumped back
into the car, and “tr[ied] to do some movement.” 	After the sergeant made a U-turn and
exited his vehicle, Mr. Murray “started engaging” him and “asking [him] questions.”
Sergeant Polanco “called for more units,” and Baltimore City Detective Reynardo Gomez
subsequently arrived. 	Detective Gomez looked inside Mr. Murray’s vehicle and saw “a
digital scale” and “open sandwich box with clear bags,” which are “indicative of packaging
controlled dangerous substance.” After the “vehicle was towed to Northeast,” the detective
searched the vehicle and discovered, in the pocket of a jacket, a loaded handgun. Detective
Gomez “[a]lso recovered from the vehicle . . . a wallet with [Mr. Murray’s] ID, and . . .
debit cards with [Mr. Murray’s] name on them.”

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Mr. Murray first contends that the court “failed to properly exercise discretion and
abused its discretion in permitting the State to impeach [his] credibility with a prior
conviction for possession with intent to distribute.” Following the close of the State’s case,
defense counsel advised Mr. Murray of his “right to testify or . . . remain silent.” Defense
counsel also advised Mr. Murray that he has “a conviction for one of those crimes that . . .
the law says is a crime that the State could ask [him] about,” and if he “decide[d] to testify,
. . . the State [could] inquire of [him] about that conviction.” The prosecutor subsequently
“request[ed] the ability to be able to . . . introduce [Mr. Murray’s] prior conviction, which
is possession with intent to distribute, which is from 2022.” 	Defense counsel replied:
“Judge, I’ll make my general motion and ask the Court to deny it, but I understand what
the law says in regards to the State’s ability to inquire into that conviction. I’ve put it on
the record that it’s within 15 years and it is a crime that the law says they could in fact
inquire into, but I’ll make a motion generally and submit on that.”
Following argument, the court stated:
I think first of all it is relatively recent. 	The – in fact, it was, if I count
correctly, 19 months before the date of this alleged offense occurred. So it’s
very recent in the context of this case even if you focus on the present date
of the trial, January 13, 2025. And it is clearly a crime which the appellate
courts have determined is one that would potentially adversely affect the
credibility of a defendant. And in particular the nature of that offense is not
such that it would prejudice the nature of the charges which are in this case,
which are all gun charges. So . . . the Motion of in Limine would be granted
to permit any examination by the State of Mr. Murray with regard to that
issue.
Mr. Murray subsequently testified that he “was driving down Radecke Ave[nue]”
when he saw his friend Broderick, who was wearing a leather jacket. Mr. Murray testified

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that he “wasn’t wearing the jacket,” and “didn’t come out with a jacket on.” Mr. Murray
gave Broderick a ride to an apartment complex, where they were subsequently approached
by Sergeant Polanco. 	During cross-examination, Mr. Murray confirmed that he was
“convicted of possession with intent to distribute in 2022.”
Mr. Murray contends that the court “failed to properly exercise discretion and
abused its discretion” in admitting the prior conviction, because it failed to determine
“whether the probative value of the prior conviction outweigh[ed] the potential for unfair
prejudice,” and “the potential for unfair prejudice clearly outweighed the probative value.”
The State counters that Mr. Murray’s contention “is unpreserved,” because defense counsel
“essentially conceded that the evidence was admissible,” “interposed no objection” at the
time of the court’s ruling, and “failed to object when the evidence was thereafter actually
offered.” 	Alternatively, 	the 	State 	contends 	that 	the 	“court 	properly 	exercised 	its
discretion.”
We first note that defense counsel did not lodge a contemporaneous objection to the
introduction of the prior conviction during cross-examination of Mr. Murray, and hence,
his contention is not preserved for our review. See Reed v. State, 353 Md. 628, 638 (1999)
(“[w]hen the evidence, the admissibility of which has been contested previously in a
motion in limine, is offered at trial, a contemporaneous objection generally must be made
pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-323(a) in order for that issue of admissibility to be preserved
for the purpose of appeal”). 	Even if the contention was preserved for our review, Mr.
Murray would not prevail. 	The Supreme Court of Maryland has stated that “[t]he five
factors relevant to assessing whether probative value outweighs prejudicial impact include:

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(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) the point in time of the conviction and
the witness’[s] subsequent history; (3) the similarity between the past crime and the
charged crime; (4) the importance of the witness’[s] testimony; and (5) the centrality of the
witness’[s] credibility.” 	Rosales v. State, 463 Md. 552, 580 (2019) (internal citations,
quotations, and brackets omitted). 	Here, the impeachment value of the prior crime was
high, because as the Supreme Court of Maryland has long stated, a “narcotics trafficker
lives a life of secrecy and dissembling in the course of that activity, being prepared to say
whatever is required by the demands of the moment, whether the truth or a lie.” 	State v.
Woodland, 337 Md. 519, 523 (1995) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The prior
conviction occurred approximately nineteen months before the charged crimes arose, and
the charged crimes had no similarity to the prior crime. 	Finally, Mr. Murray insinuated
during his testimony that the handgun discovered by Detective Gomez belonged to
Broderick. This testimony was important to Mr. Murray’s case and rendered his credibility
a central issue, and hence, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior
conviction.
Mr. Murray next contends that the court erred “in admitting drug-related evidence
where [he] was on trial for weapons-related offenses.” 	Mr. Murray contends that such
evidence includes evidence “that [Sergeant] Polanco and Detective Gomez had a great deal
of training and experience in dealing with CDS crimes; that drug paraphernalia was found
in close proximity to [Mr. Murray’s] identifying documents, located in his vehicle; that a
trained K-9 unit was called to [the] scene and ‘alerted’ to the presence of CDS; and that
the geographic area was known for heavy drug activity.” 	Acknowledging “that no

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objection was lodged,” Mr. Murray “invokes [our] discretion under the plain error
doctrine.”
We decline to exercise such discretion. Although this Court has discretion to review
unpreserved errors pursuant to Rule 8-131(a) (“[o]rdinarily, an appellate court will not
decide any . . . issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided
by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide
the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal”), the Supreme Court of
Maryland has emphasized that appellate courts should “rarely exercise” that discretion,
because “considerations of both fairness and judicial efficiency ordinarily require that all
challenges that a party desires to make to a trial court’s ruling, action, or conduct be
presented in the first instance to the trial court[.]” 	Ray v. State, 435 Md. 1, 23
(2013) (internal citation omitted). 	Therefore, plain error review “is reserved for those
errors that are compelling, extraordinary, exceptional[,] or fundamental to assure the
defendant of a fair trial.” Savoy v. State, 218 Md. App. 130, 145 (2014) (internal citation
and quotations omitted). Under the circumstances presented here, we decline to overlook
the lack of preservation, and do not exercise our discretion to engage in plain error
review. See Morris v. State, 153 Md. App. 480, 506-07 (2003) (noting that the words “[w]e
decline to do so” are “all that need be said, for the exercise of our unfettered discretion in
not taking notice of plain error requires neither justification nor explanation” (emphasis
and footnote omitted)).
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR 	BALTIMORE 	CITY 	AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.