Trimble v. State

James Russell Trimble v. State of Maryland, No. 1834, September Term 2022. Opinion by
Getty, Joseph M., J.
HEADNOTES:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – JUVENILE RESTORATION ACT – WEIGHT OF
FACTORS

When considering a motion for a reduction of sentence under the Juvenile Restoration Act,
Md. Code (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.), Crim. Proc. Art. § 8-110, a court is not
required to weigh any one of the factors enumerated in Section 8-110(d) more heavily than
the others. Rather, when deciding whether to reduce the sentence of an individual who was
convicted as a juvenile, a court should conduct a balancing test using the factors outlined
in the statute.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – JUVENILE RESTORATION ACT – AGE OF
DEFENDANT

The Juvenile Restoration Act does not require that a defendant’s age at the time of the
offense be used only as a mitigating factor. Given the broad discretion afforded to judges
in sentencing and the presence of age as a factor to consider under the Act, there is no
statutory prohibition on using the defendant’s age as a factor that weighs against reducing
their sentence.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 74841
REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 1834

September Term, 2022

______________________________________

JAMES RUSSELL TRIMBLE

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

______________________________________

Reed,
Beachley,
Getty, Joseph M.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.
______________________________________

Opinion by Getty, J.
______________________________________

Filed: August 1, 2024

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.

2024.08.01
14:49:54
-04'00'

Gregory Hilton, Clerk
This case asks us to review a motion for modification of sentence under the Juvenile

Restoration Act (“JUVRA”), which allows an individual “convicted as an adult for an

offense committed when the individual was a minor” to file a motion to reduce the duration

of their sentence if the individual was sentenced before October 1, 2021, and has been

imprisoned for at least 20 years for that offense. 2021 Md. Laws ch. 61; Md. Code (2001,

2018 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.), Crim. Proc. (“CP”) Art. § 8-110.

The Appellant, James Russell Trimble, was convicted and sentenced in 1982 for

crimes committed when he was a few months shy of his 18th birthday. In 2022, he filed a

Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to JUVRA in the Circuit Court for Baltimore

County, which was ultimately denied.

Trimble presents the following questions on appeal:

1. Did the circuit court misapply [JUVRA] when it denied Mr. Trimble’s
motion for reduction in sentence based primarily on the severity of the
offense without meaningful consideration of Mr. Trimble’s demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation?

2. Did the circuit court misapply the first statutory factor, “the individual’s
age at the time of the offense,” when it considered being 17 years and
approximately 8 months old at the time of the offense to be an aggravating
factor?

3. Did the circuit court fundamentally misunderstand the significance of the
decades-old diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder, and
erroneously assume that this was permanent and unremitting regardless
of the many positive things Mr. Trimble has done since?

For the following reasons, we answer each question in the negative and affirm the circuit

court’s denial of Trimble’s motion for reduction of sentence.
BACKGROUND

A. Trimble’s Conviction

Trimble was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree rape, two counts of first-

degree sexual offense, two counts of kidnapping, and one count of sexual assault in 1982.

In a prior appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland stated the facts underlying Trimble’s

convictions as follows:

On July 3, 1981, Melanie Rae Newsom and the murder victim, Nila Kay
Rogers, were invited by a friend from school to ride around in a van with
some of his friends. The two women entered the van with the friend, James
Hanna. Inside were Trimble, Terry Evans, Joseph Evans and Anthony
Kordell. The Evans brothers, Trimble and Kordell had earlier taken various
drugs and drunk beer.

After Newsom and Rogers entered the van, Trimble tried to kiss
Newsom. She resisted. He screamed and began to tear off her clothing.
Rogers tried to stop him, but Trimble punched her and threw her in the back
of the van. He then hit Newsom and forced her to commit fellatio. The two
women persuaded the men to stop the van. Hanna and Newsom went into a
cornfield. Back in the van Trimble and Joseph Evans raped Rogers. As
Kordell tried to pull Rogers out of the van, Trimble repeatedly struck her
with a baseball bat. Trimble then dragged her into the cornfield and slit her
throat from ear to ear. He left her body in the cornfield where she was later
pronounced dead. The cause of death was listed as severe head injuries from
a blunt object.

At trial, Trimble offered insanity as his only defense. A state’s expert
testified that Trimble suffered from antisocial personality and a history of
substance abuse but that Trimble was not insane because he did not lack
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law under the then prevailing
insanity standard of Maryland Code (1982) § 12–107 of the Health–General
Article. Another state expert concurred. The first expert further testified that
Trimble had a below normal I.Q. of 64 but that that factor did not impair his
sanity. The only defense witness testified that Trimble’s afflictions caused
him to lack substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the law, but the
doctor declined to state that conclusion with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty or probability.

2
The jury rejected Trimble’s insanity defense and found him guilty.
Trimble waived his right to be sentenced by a jury and was sentenced to death
by the trial judge.

Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248, 253–54 (1990) (footnote omitted).

The Supreme Court of Maryland upheld his conviction and sentence on direct

appeal, Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 (1984), but later vacated his death sentence after

concluding he was improperly advised of his right to be sentenced by a jury. Trimble, 321

Md. at 264. On remand, Trimble was resentenced to a consecutive life sentence that was

upheld on appeal. Trimble v. State, 90 Md. App. 705 (1992). At the time of the offense,

Trimble was approximately 17 years and 8 months old.

B. JUVRA Motion for Sentence Reduction

Trimble filed a motion for a reduction of sentence under JUVRA on February 8,

2022. 1 The circuit court held a hearing on the motion on October 27, 2022. Trimble

presented evidence of a 2020 psychological evaluation and testimony from a child forensic

psychiatry expert that explained antisocial personality disorder (“ASPD”), a diagnosis

Trimble had received when he was originally sentenced. Trimble also presented evidence

that, while in prison, he received his high school equivalency diploma and a bachelor’s

degree, worked in the prison library and as a tutor, and had not received an infraction in 20

years.

1
Trimble originally filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence under Maryland Rule
4-345(a) and Carter v. State, 461 Md. 295 (2018), in late 2019. The circuit court held a
hearing on this motion and took it under advisement. After JUVRA went into effect,
Trimble moved to withdraw his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence and pursued the
JUVRA motion at issue here. The circuit court reserved on the motion to withdraw.

3
The circuit court denied Trimble’s motion for sentence reduction on November 23,

2022, by written opinion as required by CP Section 8-110(e). The court considered all of

the evidence presented and assessed each factor required by Section 8-110(d) before

concluding that Trimble would present a substantial risk to the public if released and that

reducing his sentence would not serve the interests of justice.

Trimble timely appealed the denial to this Court. Further details of the hearing and

court’s order will be provided as needed.

DISCUSSION

In 2021, the General Assembly passed JUVRA in response to recent decisions by

the United States Supreme Court concerning the incarceration of juveniles who commit

crimes. In Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a sentence of life without

parole for nonhomicide crimes was unconstitutional for juvenile offenders. 560 U.S. 48,

82 (2010). In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that a mandatory life sentence without

parole was unconstitutional for juvenile offenders. 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). The U.S.

Supreme Court extended Miller’s holding in Montgomery v. Louisiana, concluding that

Miller applied retroactively and allowing states to remedy now-unconstitutional sentences

by offering the possibility of parole to people sentenced to life without parole as juveniles.

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016).

In response to these federal Supreme Court decisions, Senator Chris West

introduced Maryland’s JUVRA legislation (Senate Bill 494, 2021 Session) and submitted

written testimony stating that the bill

4
will provide an opportunity for people who have committed crimes when
they were 17 years old or younger and who have served most of their lives
behind bars to appear before the sentencing court and ask the court to
consider whether they have so reformed their lives that they should be
released from jail because their continued incarceration is no longer
necessary for the protection of the public. People can change. Redemption
is possible. When that happens, as a society we should rejoice. Keeping
someone in prison who committed a youthful crime and who has spent
decades in jail but has transformed [their] life and is no longer a threat to
society is hard to defend.

Senator Chris West, RE: S.B. 494 – Juveniles Convicted as Adults – Sentencing –

Limitations and Reduction (Juvenile Restoration Act), Hearing on Senate Bill 494 Before

the Jud. Proc. Comm. of the Senate, 2021 Leg., 442d Sess. (Md. 2021) (written testimony

of Senator Chris West) (hereinafter “Senator West Testimony”).

As the Maryland Supreme Court has explained, JUVRA brought Maryland into

compliance with these federal cases by “ma[king] three significant changes to Maryland’s

sentencing practices for juvenile offenders convicted as adults.” Malvo v. State, 481 Md.

72, 85 (2022). First, JUVRA “gave sentencing courts discretion to impose sentences less

than the minimum required by law.” Id. Second, it prospectively banned sentences of life

without the possibility of parole. Id. Third, JUVRA “authorized offenders sentenced

before October 1, 2021 who have spent more than 20 years in prison to file a motion to

reduce their remaining sentence.” Id. Only the final provision authorizing a motion to

reduce a sentence is relevant in this case.

CP Section 8-110(c) allows a court to “reduce the duration of a sentence imposed

on an individual for an offense committed when the individual was a minor,” provided that

the court determine that “the individual is not a danger to the public” and “the interests of

5
justice will be better served by a reduced sentence.” CP Section 8-110(d) requires a circuit

court to consider the following factors when ruling on a JUVRA motion to reduce a

sentence:

(1) the individual’s age at the time of the offense;
(2) the nature of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
individual;
(3) whether the individual has substantially complied with the rules of the
institution in which the individual has been confined;
(4) whether the individual has completed an educational, vocational, or
other program;
(5) whether the individual has demonstrated maturity, rehabilitation, and
fitness to reenter society sufficient to justify a sentence reduction;
(6) any statement offered by a victim or a victim’s representative;
(7) any report of a physical, mental, or behavioral examination of the
individual conducted by a health professional;
(8) the individual’s family and community circumstances at the time of the
offense, including any history of trauma, abuse, or involvement in the
child welfare system;
(9) the extent of the individual’s role in the offense and whether and to what
extent an adult was involved in the offense;
(10) the diminished culpability of a juvenile as compared to an adult,
including an inability to fully appreciate risks and consequences; and
(11) any other factor the court deems relevant.

“Under JUVRA, the decision to grant or deny a motion for reduction of sentence

under CP [Section] 8-110 generally rests in the discretion of the circuit court upon

consideration of the required factors.” Sexton v. State, 258 Md. App. 525, 541 (2023). The

circuit court abuses its discretion when it applies the incorrect legal standards. Id. at 541–

42. “Whether the circuit court properly construed and applied CP [Section] 8-110 is a

question of law that we review de novo.” Id. at 542. Thus, under Sexton, appellate review

of a grant or denial of a Section 8-110 motion for sentence reduction is based upon proper

application of the factors set forth in Section 8-110(d).

6
A. Weight of the CP Section 8-110 Factors

Trimble contends that the circuit court placed too much emphasis on the severity of

his crime and thus did not effectuate JUVRA’s purpose. In his view, the proper application

of CP Section 8-110 requires the circuit court to give the most weight to CP Section 8-

110(d)(5), “whether the individual has demonstrated maturity, rehabilitation, and fitness to

reenter society sufficient to justify a sentence reduction,” because JUVRA was enacted to

provide sentence reductions for rehabilitated juvenile defendants. Trimble points to

rejected amendments in the legislative history of JUVRA that would have prohibited

defendants convicted of certain serious crimes from seeking sentence reductions as

indication that the circuit court in his case gave improper weight to the severity of his

offense. The State avers that the circuit court properly weighed the various factors and that

its decision is entitled to deference.

Trimble’s argument that rehabilitation should be the primary focus of a JUVRA

motion is largely premised on the Maryland Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. State.

474 Md. 439 (2021). There, the Court considered CP Section 4-202, which governs

juvenile court and delinquency proceedings, determining that for a decision for a reverse

waiver 2 to a juvenile court, “the ultimate determinative factor that takes into account each

of the other four factors” in CP Section 4-202(d) is the juvenile’s amenability to treatment.

2
A “reverse waiver” or “reverse transfer” occurs when a circuit court with original
jurisdiction transfers jurisdiction to the juvenile court according to the process and
considerations outlined in CP Section 4-202. Rohrbaugh v. State, 257 Md. App. 638, 654
(2023). “[O]riginal jurisdiction over the juvenile lies in the [circuit] court” in cases where
the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction due to the juvenile’s age and the crime charged. Id.

7
Id. at 466. The Davis Court concluded that both CP Section 4-202(d) and Section 3-8A-06

of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings (“CJP”) Article of the Maryland Code (2006, 2020

Repl. Vol.) must be construed in light of the purposes of the juvenile justice system as

enumerated in CJP Section 3-8A-02. Id. at 462–63. Trimble likens CP Section 4-202(d)

to CP Section 8-110(d) because both attempt to provide additional protections to juvenile

offenders as being in the “interests of justice.” According to Trimble, because the Supreme

Court has held that amenability to treatment is the most important factor in CP Section

4-202(d) given the statutory purposes, the rehabilitation factor must be the most important

factor in CP Section 8-110(d) to effectuate JUVRA’s purpose.

While Trimble is correct that Maryland’s juvenile justice statutes have an

overarching philosophy of promoting amenability and rehabilitation, there is nothing in CP

Section 8-110 that indicates that rehabilitation should be given the most weight when

considering a motion for sentence reduction. Unlike CP Section 4-202(d) in conjunction

with CJP Section 3-8A-02, CP Section 8-110 does not have enumerated purposes by which

to determine how to weigh its factors. In the absence of such guidance, the General

Assembly has created a balancing test for JUVRA motions, requiring courts to consider

the eleven factors in CP Section 8-110(d) without any one factor receiving special weight.

The decision of whether to grant or deny a JUVRA motion for reduction of sentence

“generally rests in the discretion of the circuit court upon consideration of the required

factors.” Sexton, 258 Md. App. at 541. Absent a clear mandate from the General Assembly

that one factor is entitled to greater weight, we decline to disturb the circuit court’s broad

discretion in reducing sentences under JUVRA. See Thompson v. State, 412 Md. 497, 506

8
(2010) (“A court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not

evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute . . . .” (quoting Price v.

State, 378 Md. 378, 387 (2003))); cf. Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 507 (1993) (“The

statutory factors listed [for determining awards of marital property] are not prioritized in

any way, nor has the General Assembly mandated any particular weighing or balancing of

the factors.”); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 94339058, 120 Md. App. 88, 105 (1998)

(“[The statute governing termination of parental rights] does not require a trial court to

weigh any one statutory factor above all others. Rather, the court must review all relevant

factors and consider them together.”).

The comparison to Davis is also inexact. The Davis Court held that amenability

was the central consideration for determining whether a child “should be dealt with in the

juvenile or the adult system, and ultimately, that invokes the amenability to treatment in

the juvenile system.” 474 Md. at 465. The issue of amenability to treatment is purely

prospective and attempts to predict a juvenile’s responsiveness to the beneficial aspects of

the juvenile justice system compared to the adult system. It arises prior to a trial and

conviction and serves as a potential prerequisite for moving forward with a juvenile’s

charges. Conversely, a JUVRA motion is almost entirely retrospective, assessing what an

individual who has already been convicted has done between their sentencing and the time

of the motion. A JUVRA motion is not about whether a defendant is tried in the juvenile

court or the adult court but is instead about the sentence itself. CP § 8-110(b)(1) (“An

individual described in subsection (a) of this section may file a motion with the court to

reduce the duration of the sentence.” (Emphasis added.)); see Farmer v. State, 481 Md.

9
203, 231 n.24 (2022) (“A sponsor of the Senate bill that was enacted as JUVRA remarked

that the legislation would provide juvenile lifers an opportunity to be released from prison

by proving they have reformed their lives . . . .” (Emphasis added.)). As such, although

reverse waivers and JUVRA motions are both related to juvenile justice in some fashion, a

JUVRA motion is not in the same posture as a reverse waiver. Davis’s holding that reverse

waivers must be focused on amenability therefore does not require that JUVRA motions

be focused on rehabilitation.

Further, CP Section 8-110(c) requires a court to find two overriding factors before

it can reduce a sentence. First, it must determine that the individual is not a danger to the

public. CP § 8-110(c)(1). Second, it must determine that “the interests of justice will be

better served by a reduced sentence.” Id. § 8-110(c)(2). 3 The General Assembly provided

in CP Section 8-110(d) ten specific factors plus “any other factor the court deems relevant”

to guide the court’s determination on these two overarching considerations. Although an

individual’s rehabilitation is certainly a part of the equation for determining whether the

interests of justice are better served by a reduced sentence, rehabilitation is not the only

element of that consideration. Each of the remaining nine factors enumerated in CP Section

8-110(d) could contribute to the interests of justice determination in any given case, as

could any unenumerated factor a court deems relevant.

3
Senator West emphasized these two factors in his written testimony describing the
proposed legislation: “A judge may not modify the sentence unless the judge finds, after a
hearing, that ‘the individual is not a danger to the public’ and that ‘the interests of
justice will be better served by a reduced sentence.’” Senator West Testimony
(emphasis in original).

10
We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in this case. Section

8-110(d) requires that the circuit court “consider the following factors when determining

whether to reduce the duration of a sentence under this section.” Thus, all that is required

of a circuit court is that each factor is considered in the court’s decision and that its decision

is issued in writing. CP § 8-110(d)–(e). The court did so here by enumerating and

addressing each factor in CP Section 8-110(d) based upon the evidence presented. 4 It was

not required to weigh the rehabilitation factor more heavily than any other factor.

The court also did not abuse its discretion in considering the severity of Trimble’s

offense. Section 8-110(d)(2) requires that the circuit court consider the “nature of the

offense,” which by the plain language of the statute includes its severity. See Nature,

Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nature (last visited June

6, 2024) [https://perma.cc/5YME-DETT] (defining nature as “the inherent character or

basic constitution . . . of a person or thing” or “a kind or class usually distinguished by

fundamental or essential characteristics”); see also Sexton, 258 Md. at 537, 545–46

(commenting that the “circuit court should again weigh and address the factors” in CP

Section 8-110(d) after having previously considered that Sexton was convicted for first

degree premeditated murder, armed robbery, and use of a handgun in a crime of violence

(emphasis added)); In re Waters, 13 Md. App. 95, 104 (1971) (holding that the “nature of

the offense” factor in the statute governing waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction

“encompass[es] not only the type of crime but the circumstances surrounding its

4
For the reasons discussed in Section C, infra, Trimble’s arguments that the circuit court
did not properly consider his rehabilitation are unavailing.

11
commission. That a victim was beaten or shot during the course of a robbery in addition

to having his property stolen is certainly of probative value on the question of waiver.”).

Therefore, it could not be error for the circuit court to consider the severity and details of

Trimble’s offense in deciding the motion for reduction, as the court was in fact required to

consider the severity of the offense in ruling on Trimble’s JUVRA motion.

Trimble argues that the primary goal of JUVRA was to “provide a meaningful

opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”

According to Trimble, this meaningful opportunity for release “should be extended even

to those who are serving sentences for particularly serious, violent felonies.” In support,

Trimble points to rejected amendments that would have excluded people serving life

sentences without parole or those convicted of certain serious crimes from pursuing

sentence reductions under JUVRA. 5 Because the General Assembly rejected those

amendments, Trimble argues, it would be contrary to the legislature’s intent to deny a

JUVRA motion based primarily on the severity of the underlying crime.

Trimble places too much weight on rejected amendments. As the Supreme Court

has long held and recently reaffirmed, “legislative rejection is not an infallible indicator of

legislative intent.” Westminster Mgmt., LLC v. Smith, 486 Md. 616, 651 (2024) (quoting

City of Balt. Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 395 Md. 299, 329 (2006)). Accordingly,

5
Trimble’s motion for sentence reduction listed the categories of people that would have
been excluded from JUVRA under rejected amendments, which included those convicted
of: a crime of violence; murder of a minor or attempted first-degree rape; murder of a
vulnerable adult or first-degree rape of a vulnerable adult; multiple murders; murder of a
police officer; first-degree murder and a hate crime arising out of the same incident; and a
crime involving the possession or discharge of a firearm inside a school building.

12
rejected amendments are “a rather weak reed upon which to lean in ascertaining legislative

intent” because “the General Assembly may well have concluded that the rejected

amendment warranted further investigation before acting on it, or decided not to enact the

amendment for a myriad of other reasons.” Carmel Realty Assocs., 395 Md. at 329

(cleaned up). The legislature ultimately necessitated the consideration of the underlying

offense in reviewing JUVRA motions for sentence reduction without excluding any

category of crime from the relief afforded by JUVRA. Given the discretion afforded to

circuit courts in reviewing JUVRA motions and the requirement that courts consider the

nature of the offense, the circuit court was entitled to use its discretion in giving more

weight to the severity of Trimble’s underlying crimes.

B. Trimble’s Age at the Time of the Offense

The circuit court’s finding regarding Trimble’s age at the time of the offense reads:

“Trimble was three or four months shy of his 18th birthday at the time of the killing of Nila

Rogers. This factor weighs against reducing the sentence.”

Trimble argues that the circuit court misapplied 8-110(d)(1), “the individual’s age

at the time of the offense.” Trimble asserts that the legislative intent behind JUVRA

indicates that the defendant’s age can only be used as a mitigating factor, not as an

aggravating factor. Specifically, Trimble points to JUVRA’s goal of providing a class of

defendants—those who were convicted as adults while under the age of 18—the ability to

obtain release if they can demonstrate that they have been rehabilitated and will not pose a

threat to society. This purpose, Trimble argues, was ignored by the circuit court because

13
it penalized Trimble for being just under the age of 18, the characteristic that entitles him

to relief in the first instance.

In response, the State contends that allowing the age factor to serve only as a

mitigating factor reduces the circuit court’s discretion, which is contrary to the practice of

giving judges a high degree of discretion in sentencing matters. Additionally, the State

avers that age should be treated as a sliding scale, such that “the younger movant was at

the time of the offense, the heavier this factor can be weighed in the movant’s favor.” The

State likens the JUVRA sentence reduction factors to those in CP Section 4-202(d), which

govern the decision of whether to transfer a case to juvenile court. In those instances, age

is used for determining whether the defendant is eligible for transfer and considered “in

connection with public safety and amenability to treatment.” Davis, 474 Md. at 464–65.

The State asserts that Section 8-110(d) does not require that age be used as a mitigating

factor, just as Section 4-202(d) does not require age to be categorically mitigating.

We conclude that the circuit court did not misapply the “age at the time of the

offense” factor in Section 8-110(d)(1). Nothing in Section 8-110 indicates that a court

must only consider the movant’s age as a mitigating factor. Indeed, Section 8-110(d)

provides little guidance on how a court should consider each factor. As we have held

previously, the decision to grant or deny a motion for reduction of sentence under JUVRA

rests with the sound discretion of the circuit court so long as each enumerated factor is

considered and the correct legal standard is applied. Sexton, 258 Md. App. at 541.

This conclusion is furthered by the presence of age as a factor in Section 8-110(d).

Contrary to Trimble’s assertion that the circuit court used his eligibility for a sentence

14
reduction as weighing against him, the “age at the time of the offense” factor would be

superfluous if a circuit court could only use age as a mitigating factor. Whitley v. Md. State

Bd. of Elections, 429 Md. 132, 149 (2012) (statutes should be “read as a whole so that ‘no

word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or

nugatory’” (quoting Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 712 (2008))).

Section 8-110(a) establishes the requirements for eligibility for sentence reduction,

including that the individual be someone who “was convicted as an adult for an offense

committed when the individual was a minor.” CP § 8-110(a)(1).

By the time a circuit court is called upon to consider the factors in Section 8-110(d)

and decide whether a sentence should be reduced, it must have already determined that the

movant meets the requirements of Section 8-110(a). Given that the movant’s status as a

minor is a prerequisite for a motion to reduce their sentence, considering age as a factor

would be duplicative of the eligibility determination if the circuit court could not use its

full discretion to weigh age as either for or against sentence reduction.

C. Trimble’s Rehabilitation

The circuit court’s findings regarding Trimble’s rehabilitation were contained in

related findings under CP Sections 8-110(d)(5) and (7). As to Section 8-110(d)(5),

“whether the individual has demonstrated maturity, rehabilitation, and fitness to reenter

society sufficient to justify a sentence reduction,” the court concluded:

Trimble is not fit to reenter society. It is not logically possible to
conclude that someone diagnosed with Antisocial Personality Disorder, an
organic, lifelong, chronic disorder characterized by deceitfulness and lack of
remorse, has mystically gotten better over time.

15
What Trimble has “demonstrated”, by formally making the ghastly
request that Nila Rogers[’s] body be exhumed for DNA testing in 2002, is
that the symptoms of his disorder persist[—]that he lacks legitimate, sincere
remorse and fails to conform to social norms with respect to lawful
behaviors. See Factor 7, infra.

As to Section 8-110(d)(7), “any report of a physical, mental, or behavioral

examination of the individual conducted by a health professional,” the court stated:

“Trimble has been diagnosed by every psychiatrist involved in this case over the years as

having Antisocial Personality Disorder, previously referred to as psychopathy, sociopathy

or dissocial personality disorder, according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of

Mental Disorders (DSM-5-TR).” The court then quoted the diagnostic criteria of ASPD

contained within the DSM-5-TR, including, inter alia, deceitfulness, “reckless disregard

for safety of self or others,” and lack of remorse. “While studies suggest that remission of

[ASPD] conduct can occur as the person ages,” the court continued, “it would appear as

though even modern authorities agree . . . that this disorder is so deeply ingrained that

rehabilitation/remission does not ordinarily occur.” Based upon its assessment of the

evidence produced by the parties, the court was “not persuaded that Trimble’s disorder has

remitted significantly or that, if it has, the risk of extraordinary violence has been abated.

This factor weighs against the sentence modification.”

Trimble argues that the circuit court misunderstood his ASPD diagnosis.

Specifically, he asserts that the circuit court “erroneously assumed that [his ASPD] was

permanent and unremitting regardless of the many positive things Mr. Trimble has done.”

Trimble indicates that the court’s conclusion that his ASPD has not remitted directly

contradicts the scientific sources offered to the court as evidence and relied upon by the

16
court itself. The State contends that the court used its discretion to weigh conflicting

evidence regarding Trimble’s rehabilitation and fitness to reenter society, including

weighing contradictory scientific evidence about ASPD as a diagnosis.

The circuit court did not err in considering CP Sections 8-110(d)(5) and (7). The

circuit court’s written order made clear that it understood the legal standard required for

both of these factors. The court considered how Trimble’s ASPD diagnosis affected his

ability to reenter society, ultimately concluding that the diagnosis rendered his apparent

rehabilitation dubious. This was an appropriate application of CP Sections 8-110(d)(5) and

(7).

Trimble believes that the court reached an incorrect conclusion regarding his

rehabilitation and misunderstood his ASPD diagnosis. However, the circuit court has great

discretion in considering a JUVRA motion to reduce a sentence, particularly where there

is conflicting evidence. “Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflicts

in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder.” State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 533–34

(2003) (quoting State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750 (1998)). “We give ‘due regard to the

[fact finder’s] finding of facts, its resolution of conflicting evidence, and, significantly, its

opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of witnesses.’” Moye v. State, 369 Md. 2,

12 (2002) (quoting McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 474 (1997)).

Given the discretion owed to the circuit court in weighing conflicting evidence and

making findings of fact, we conclude the circuit court made no error in its consideration of

the evidence surrounding the demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation factor. The record

contains evidence of Trimble’s diagnosis, scientific studies about ASPD and its longevity,

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and how they relate to whether Trimble may be fit to reenter society. The circuit court was

entitled to weigh that evidence as it saw fit. Despite Trimble’s argument that the court did

not meaningfully consider Trimble’s rehabilitation, the court did consider the evidence

presented to it and decided that when viewed in conjunction with Trimble’s ASPD

diagnosis, the evidence of Trimble’s purported rehabilitation did not support reducing his

sentence.

D. State’s Motion to Dismiss

The State’s brief includes a motion to dismiss which asserts that a JUVRA motion

for sentence reduction is only reviewable if the circuit court denied the motion based upon

lack of authority to modify. Trimble responds that two recent cases from this Court,

Johnson v. State, 258 Md. App. 71 (2023), and Sexton v. State, 258 Md. App. 525 (2023),

allow review of JUVRA motions if the movant alleges that the circuit court committed an

error of law.

In Johnson, we stated that a sentence reduction motion under CP Section 8-110

“bears at least a superficial similarity to” a motion for modification of sentence under

Maryland Rule 4-345(e). 258 Md. App. at 87. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision

in Hoile v. State, 404 Md. 591 (2008), which held that a purely discretionary denial of a

Rule 4-345(e) motion to modify is generally not appealable, we concluded that the circuit

court in Johnson made legal determinations regarding Johnson’s eligibility to seek relief

which were reviewable as final judgments. Johnson, 258 Md. App. at 87. Sexton relied

on Hoile and Johnson to reach the same conclusion that only “denial of a motion ‘entirely’

within a sentence court’s discretion is barred” from appeal and thus allowed an appeal

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asserting legal errors to proceed. Sexton, 258 Md. App. at 540–41 (quoting Hoile, 404 Md.

at 617).

Here, Trimble’s primary allegations are that the circuit court improperly interpreted

and applied CP Section 8-110. Thus, under our precedent, the circuit court’s denial of the

JUVRA motion is an appealable final order because it was based upon an alleged error of

law. The State’s motion to dismiss the appeal is therefore denied.

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
DENIED. JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.

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