Gonzales v. Sweetser

STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS & CONSUMER DOCKET
CUMBERLAND, ss. DOCKET NO. BCD-CV-20-21

LISA GONZALES, on behalf of herself )
and all others similarly situated, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) ORDER GRANTING SWEETSER’S
v. ) MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
) CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
SWEETSER, )
)
Defendant. )
)

Plaintiff Lisa Gonzales on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated (“Gonzales”)

brought a seven count Class Action Complaint against Defendant Sweetser (“Sweetser”) stemming

from a phishing attack.1 Gonzales alleges inter alia that she is now faced with a future risk of

harm, and so the case presents the question of whether future risk of harm constitutes a legally

cognizable injury. In response to the Class Action Complaint, Sweetser filed a Motion to Dismiss

contending Gonzales has not pled actual harm, and thus the entire action should be dismissed. The

Court agrees, and for the reasons discussed below, grants Sweetser’s Motion to Dismiss.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts “consider the facts in the

complaint as if they were admitted.” Bonney v. Stephens Mem. Hosp., 2011 ME 46, ¶ 16, 17 A.3d

123. The complaint is viewed “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it

sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief

1
The seven counts are as follows: Court I: Negligence; Count II: Intrusion Upon Seclusion/Invasion of Privacy;
Count III: Breach of Express Contract; Count IV: Breach of Implied Contract; Count V: Negligence per se; Count
VI: Breach of Fiduciary Duties; and Count VII: Violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act. Gonzales has since
abandoned her Count V, Negligence per se claim. Pl.’s Br. at 13, n. 5.

1
pursuant to some legal theory.” Id. (quoting Saunders v. Tisher, 2006 ME 94, ¶ 8, 902 A.2d 830).

“Dismissal is warranted when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief

under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim.” Id. However, although Maine’s

notice pleading requirements are forgiving, Desjardins v. Reynolds, 2017 Me 99, ¶ 17, 162 A.3d

228, conclusory statements are legally deficient to ward off dismissal if a plaintiff fails to allege

sufficient facts. Carey v. Bd. of Overseers of Bar, 2018 ME 119, ¶ 23, 192 A.3d 589, as corrected

(October 11, 2018). Further, a court is not bound to accept legal conclusions. Carey, 2018 ME

119, ¶ 23, 192 A.3d 589. A complaint must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that a plaintiff

has been injured in a legally cognizable way. America v. Sunspray Condo. Ass’n, 2013 ME 19, ¶

20, 61 A.3d 1249 (quoting Burns v. Architectural Doors & Windows, 2011 ME 61, ¶ 17, 19 A.3d

823).

FACTS

The operative pleading in this matter is the Class Action Complaint dated April 2, 2020,

and docketed April 6, 2020 (the “Complaint”). Sweetser is a corporation that provides mental and

behavioral health services through a statewide network of care. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 1 & 15-16.)

According to the Complaint, on June 24, 2019, Sweetser learned that an unauthorized person or

persons gained access to a Sweetser employee’s email account. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 24.) Upon

investigation, Sweetser learned that the breach affected other employee accounts as well, all of

which were accessed between June 18 and June 27, 2019. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 25.) The compromised

email account or accounts contained messages and email attachments that included the personally

identifiable information (“PII”) and protected health information (“PHI”) (collectively, the

“Private Information”) of at least 22,000 patients. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 27-28.)

2
According to the Complaint, Sweetser wrongfully failed to safeguard the email accounts

and embedded Private Information from unauthorized access. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 4-6.) As a direct

and proximate result of Sweetser’s conduct, Gonzales (and those similarly situated) have “been

placed at an imminent, immediate, and continuing increased risk of harm from fraud and identity

theft” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 58); “been forced to expend time dealing with the effects of the Data Breach”

(Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 59); “face substantial risk of out-of-pocket fraud losses” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 60); “face

substantial risk of being targeted for future phishing, data intrusion, and other illegal schemes”

(Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 61); “may also incur out-of-pocket costs for protective measures such as credit

monitoring fees” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 62); “suffered a loss of value of their Private Information” (Pl.’s

Compl. ¶ 63); did not receive the “benefit-of-the-bargain” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 64); “have spent and

will continue to spend significant amounts of time to monitor” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 65); suffered “out-

of-pocket expenses and the value of their time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate the effects

of the Data Breach” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 66); are forced to “live with anxiety” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 68);

“suffered a loss of privacy” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 69); and “are at imminent and increased risk of future

harm (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 69).2

DISCUSSION

Sweetser argues that Gonzales fails to allege any actual harm, and thus all counts of the

Complaint must necessarily fail. 3 Gonzales responds that based on the evolving law of

jurisdictions outside of Maine, the manner in which harm is pled in the Complaint should be

2
Plaintiff’s alleged damages are set forth in Paragraphs 55 – 69 of the Complaint. The Complaint alleges damages
in other paragraphs, see Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 101, 116, 118, 158, 170, but these further allegations of damages are
essentially a reprise of the damages claimed in Paragraphs 55 – 69.
3
Sweetser also contends that Gonzales has failed to satisfy various other pleading requirements specific to
each count. The Court has reviewed these other arguments, and concludes that but for the failure to plead
legally cognizable, actual injury, each of the counts in the Complaint (not including Count V) would otherwise
survive Sweetser’s Motion to Dismiss. Count V sets forth a claim for negligence per se, which is not
recognized in Maine as a cause of action. As noted earlier, Gonzales has abandoned her claim of negligence
per se, and Count V is dismissed.

3
sufficient to allow Gonzales to proceed to discovery. According to Gonzales, as emphasized at

oral argument, her core argument is that there should be no functional difference between

accessing emails to which private information is attached, and actually acquiring and wrongfully

using the information. This action, however, is governed by Maine law.4 Even in the face of a

phishing attack by unknown data thieves which creates a future risk of identity theft, Maine law

requires alleging facts sufficient to plead legally cognizable injury. As discussed below, Gonzales’

Complaint fails to cross this essential threshold, and thus must be dismissed.

I. The Complaint Fails to Allege Facts Sufficient to Establish Actual Injury.

Legally cognizable, actual injury is a necessary element of each of the claims Gonzales is

pursuing against Sweetser. See Bell ex rel. Bell v. Dawson, 2013 ME 108, ¶ 17, 82 A.3d 827

(negligence); Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Me. 1977) (privacy); Tobin v. Barter,

2014 ME 51, ¶ 10, 89 A.3d 1088 (contract); In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach

Litig., 2010 ME 93, ¶ 16, 4 A.3d 492 (implied contract); Byran R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract

Soc. of New York, Inc., 1999 ME 144, ¶ 12, 738 A.2d 839 (fiduciary duty); Noveletsky v. Metro.

Life Ins. Co., 49 F. Supp. 3d 123, 151 (D. Me. 2014) (Unfair Trade Practices Act). In this case,

although Gonzales “believes her Private Information was stolen and subsequently sold,” Pl.’s

Compl. ¶ 29, the Complaint fails to describe even a single incident in which her Private Information

was actually used, viewed, stolen, or sold by an unauthorized person or persons, leading to

fraudulent charges or other forms of identity theft. Absent any such factual allegations, the

question becomes whether Gonzales was harmed by the phishing attack in a manner that is legally

cognizable.5

4
Both parties cite interesting case law from other jurisdictions to make or buttress their arguments, but Maine law
appears up to the task of resolving the issues in this case.
5
That question underscores the larger question about why Gonzales choose to bring her case now, before she
experienced any actual harm. She is not facing any imminent statute of limitations. She could engage in credit

4
In In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2010 ME 93, 4 A.3d 492,

the Law Court addressed a similar situation. Data thieves breached Hannaford’s computer system

and stole a vast quantity of financial and other personal identity information pertaining to

customers. Id. ¶ 2. A group of plaintiffs brought a complaint in federal district court against

Hannaford seeking damages for the expenditure of time and effort to remedy the disruption of their

financial affairs, and for various fees, charges, and lost reward points. Id. ¶ 4. The plaintiffs

consisted of two groups6: those who had never experienced a fraudulent charge as a result of

Hannaford’s computer system being breached, and those who had experienced fraudulent charges

that had been reversed. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7. The federal district court certified the question of whether,

under the circumstances, time and effort to avoid or remediate reasonably foreseeable harm

constitutes a cognizable injury for which damages can be recovered under the Maine law of

negligence or implied contract. Id. ¶ 1.

The Law Court began its analysis by noting that the plaintiffs, including those who had

actually experienced fraudulent charges (that were reversed), “have suffered no physical harm,

economic loss, or identity theft.” Id. ¶ 8. The Court next confirmed the requirement of Maine law

that “actual injury or damage” is an element of both negligence and contract claims. Id. ¶ 8. The

Court then explained that a plaintiff is only entitled to damages for time and effort to monitor,

remediate, and mitigate future harm, when there is actual injury or damage. 7 Id. ¶¶ 9-16. Since

monitoring and other protective measures, and then seek recovery for unreimbursed mitigation costs in the
event of any actual harm. The Court is not persuaded there is a reason sufficient to upend the normal rule
applicable to the causes of action pled in this case that a plaintiff initiates an action for damages after injury
has occurred, not before. At oral argument, Plaintiff’s Counsel pointed out the Complaint also seeks equitable
relief, but equitable relief of the nature sought must be premised on the existence of actual injury.
6
In the federal case, there was a third class of plaintiff consisting of a single plaintiff who still had outstanding
fraudulent charges. Id. at ¶ 6. However, the plaintiff’s charges were eventually reimbursed, reducing the number of
plaintiff classes to two. Id. at ¶ 7.
7
At oral argument, Gonzales argued In re Hannaford Bros. Co. was inapposite, because the plaintiffs in that
case did not incur monitoring fees, unlike the Plaintiff in this case. The Court disagrees, for three reasons.
First, in addition to time and effort, the plaintiffs in In re Hannaford Bros. Co. did incur “various fees,

5
none of the plaintiffs had experienced actual injury or damage, the Court held that their time and

effort expended to avoid reasonably foreseeable harm was not a cognizable injury under the Maine

law of negligence or implied contract. 8 Id. ¶¶ 14, 16.

The Hannaford decision disposes of most, if not all, of the types of injuries claimed by

Gonzales in this case. Unlike at least some of the plaintiffs in Hannaford, in this case Gonzales

has not experienced any fraud, improper charges, or identity theft. Accordingly, there is even less

basis to claim time and effort spent in remediation as a compensable injury. Hence, the following

allegations of harm do not constitute legally cognizable injuries: “been forced to expend time

dealing with the effects of the Data Breach” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 59); “may also incur out-of-pocket

costs for protective measures such as credit monitoring fees” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 62); “have spent and

will continue to spend significant amounts of time to monitor” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 65); and, suffered

“out-of-pocket expenses and the value of their time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate the

effects of the Data Breach”( Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 66).

It follows as a necessary corollary of the Hannaford holding, that the risk of future harm is

also not a legally cognizable injury. Indeed, the whole premise of the Law Court’s reasoning in

Hannaford is that none of the plaintiffs, including those in the first group who only experienced a

“risk of injury,” had suffered actual injury or damage. Hannaford, 2010 ME 93, ¶¶ 6, 8. If the

time and effort actually incurred to avoid risk of future harm fails as a cognizable injury, even after

sensitive customer financial data is exposed to data thieves who hacked into a computer system,

charges.” Id. ¶ 4. Second, the allegation in this case is that Gonzales “may” incur out-of-pocket expenses
such as credit monitoring fees, not that she actually had incurred such expenses. Pl.’s Comp. ¶ 62. Third, to
the extent Gonzales has actually incurred out-of-pocket expenses as part of her mitigation efforts, which is
unclear from the Complaint, see Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 66, those expenses are not compensable as damages unless a
plaintiff has suffered a legally cognizable injury. In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 2010 ME 93, ¶¶ 9-14, 4 A.3d
492.
8
The holding in In re Hannaford Bros. Co. applies equally as well to the additional causes of action brought in
this case, i.e. Invasion of Privacy, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act,
since each of those actions also require the existence of legally cognizable injury.

6
then the risk of future harm itself fails as a cognizable injury. See Bernier v. Raymark Industries,

Inc., 516 A.2d 534, 543 (Me. 1986) (exposure to asbestos is not itself actual injury; a judicially

cognizable injury does not occur until there has been a manifestation of physical injury to a person

resulting from the exposure); see also Michaud v. Steckino, 390 A.2d 524, 530 (Me. 1978) (“a

mere possibility” of future pain or suffering or some later injury not sufficient to warrant damages).

The following allegations of harm, therefore, do not constitute legally cognizable injuries: “been

placed at an imminent, immediate, and continued increased risk of harm from fraud and identity

theft” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶58); “face substantial risk of out-of-pocket fraud losses” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 60);

“face substantial risk of being targeted for future phishing” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 61); “may also incur

out-of-pocket costs for protective measures such as credit monitoring fees” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 62);

are forced to “live with anxiety” about the future risk (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 68); and “are at imminent

and increased risk of future harm (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 69).

The only allegations of harm that remain, are Gonzales’ claims that her Private Information

has lost value; she did not receive the benefit of the bargain; and she suffered a loss of privacy.

Under Maine law, however, none of these allegations amount to legally cognizable, actual injury.

First, the allegations primarily constitute conclusions of law. It is a legal conclusion that Gonzales’

private information lost value. Similarly, the allegations that Gonzales did not receive the benefit

of her contractual bargain, and that she suffered a loss of privacy are both legal conclusions. The

Court is not bound at the motion to dismiss stage to accept conclusions of law as admissions,

Seacoast Hangar Condo. II Ass’n v. Martel, 2001 ME 112, ¶ 16, 775 A.2d 1166, and therefore the

allegations fail to satisfy the requirement for pleading legally cognizable, actual injury.

Second, to the extent the allegations constitute mixed conclusions of law and statements of

fact, the factual components of the allegations are vague, uncertain, and contingent. For instance,

7
there are no factual details pled as to the monetary worth of the Private Information, when the

Private Information was actually viewed, or when and how it led to fraudulent charges or identity

theft. “Damages must be grounded on established positive facts or on evidence from which their

existence and amount may be determined to a probability.” Michaud, 390 A.2d at 530. In Maine,

damages are not recoverable when uncertain, contingent, or speculative. Id.; Wood v. Bell, 2006

ME 98, ¶ 21, 902 A.2d 843; Snow v. Villacci, 2000 ME 127, ¶ 13, 754 A.2d 360; Gottesman &

Co. v. Portland Terminal Co., 27 A.2d 394, 395 (Me. 1942). The following allegations of harm,

therefore, do not constitute legally cognizable injuries: “suffered a loss of value of their Private

Information” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 63); did not receive the “benefit-of-the-bargain” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 64);

“suffered a loss of privacy” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 69). There are no further types of harm claimed, and

thus the Complaint fails to allege any legally cognizable, actual injury.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Sweetser’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED on all counts,

and the action is dismissed with prejudice.

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk is instructed to incorporate this Order by reference

on the docket for this case.

So Ordered.

Dated:_October 13, 2020___ _______/s_____________________
Michael A. Duddy
Judge, Business and Consumer Docket

8
BCD-CV-2020-21

LISA GONZALES

v.

SWEETSER

Plaintiff Counsel: Peter Murray, Esq.
Alison Tozier, Esq.
Peter Murray Law
75 Pearl Street
Portland, ME 04101

Defendant Counsel: John Aromando, Esq.
Sara Murphy, Esq.
Pierce Atwood
Merrills Wharf
254 Commercial St.
Portland, ME 04101