In re Zianna G. et al. — 2017 ME 226

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 	Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 	2017 ME 226
Docket: 	Pen-17-290
Submitted
On Briefs: November 29, 2017
Decided: 	December 7, 2017
Panel: 	SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE ZIANNA G. et al.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] 	The mother of Zianna G. and Lucas G. appeals from a judgment of
the District Court (Bangor, Campbell, J.) terminating her parental rights to the
children pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (b)(ii)
(2016).1 She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s
finding 	of 	parental 	unfitness 	and 	the 	court’s 	finding 	and 	discretionary
determination that termination is in the best interests of the children. 	See id.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2). 	Because the evidence supports the court’s findings and
discretionary determination, we affirm the judgment.
[¶2] A court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if the court finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, at least one ground of parental unfitness
and that termination is in the children’s best interests. 	In re Caleb M.,
1 	On April 24, 2017, the District Court (Bangor, Jordan, J.) held a separate hearing on
termination of the father’s parental rights. The father did not appear at the hearing, and the court
entered a judgment terminating his parental rights. The father does not appeal from that judgment.

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2017 ME 66, 	¶ 	27, 	159 	A.3d 	345; 	see 	also 	22 	M.R.S. 	§ 	4055(1)(B)(2).
“We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and will reverse a
finding only if there is no competent evidence in the record to support it, if the
fact-finder clearly misapprehends the meaning of the evidence, or if the
finding is so contrary to the credible evidence that it does not represent the
truth 	and 	right 	of 	the 	case.” 	In 	re 	Cameron 	B., 	2017 	ME 	18, 	¶ 	10,
154 A.3d 1199 (quotation marks omitted). “The weight and credibility of the
testimony and other evidence . . . are for the fact-finder’s determination.” Id.
[¶3] The trial court may presume that a parent is unfit when
[t]he child has been placed in the legal custody or care of the
department, the parent has a chronic substance abuse problem,
and the parent’s prognosis indicates that the child will not be able
to return to the custody of the parent within a reasonable period
of time, considering the child’s age and the need for a permanent
home. The fact that a parent has been unable to provide safe care
of a child for a period of 9 months due to substance abuse
constitutes a chronic substance abuse problem.
22 	M.R.S. 	§ 	4055(1-A)(C) 	(2016); 	In 	re 	Caleb 	M., 	2017 	ME 	66, 	¶ 	28,
159 A.3d 345; see In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 182, ¶¶ 29-31, 169 A.3d 914
(discussing the application of section 4055(1-A) in a hearing on a petition to
terminate parental rights).
[¶4] 	Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found by
clear and convincing evidence that the mother was unwilling or unable to

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protect the children from jeopardy and to take responsibility for the children
within a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs. The court based this
determination on the following supported factual findings:
Mother has a chronic substance abuse problem. 	The children
have been in the custody of DHHS since November 30, 2015,
almost one and a half years. Mother has only attended 62% of her
counseling appointments with [her substance abuse counselor].
Mother is in a contemplative state regarding her sobriety. Mother
has not made a full commitment to maintaining sobriety. 	Mother
has not cooperated with DHHS to be tested for drugs. 	She has
admitted to drinking and using illegal drugs. There is no reason to
believe that Mother is any closer to maintaining sobriety than she
was at the beginning of this case. Mother still has a lot of work to
do 	if 	she 	is 	serious 	about 	addressing 	her 	substance 	abuse
problem. Unfortunately, she is out of time.
. . . .
Mother 	has 	been 	inconsistent 	in 	virtually 	all 	aspects 	of
reunification. 	Mother did not follow through with her case
manager, who was trying to help Mother access services. 	Mother
has been inconsistent attending counseling. 	Mother has refused
to cooperate with drug screening. 	Mother has been inconsistent
with visitation.
. . . .
Mother 	is 	often 	late 	for 	visitation 	or 	cancels 	visitation
appointments. This is very upsetting for the children, particularly
Lucas. It makes Lucas feel as though he is not loved.
[¶5] 	Given 	the 	mother’s 	untreated 	and 	ongoing 	substance 	abuse
problem and her irregular efforts to engage in reunification services, the court

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rationally found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother was
unable to protect Zianna and Lucas from jeopardy or take responsibility for
them in a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs. 	Contrary to the
mother’s contention, the mother’s testimony—that she has been opiate free
since 	December 	2015, 	that 	she 	has 	not 	used 	amphetamines 	since
Christmastime 2016, and that she believes that she no longer has a substance
abuse problem—did not compel the court to find that her substance abuse
problem is “distant enough that it [does] not pose jeopardy to her children.”
See In re I.S., 2015 ME 100, ¶ 11, 121 A.3d 105.
[¶6] 	The court did not clearly err in its finding that termination of the
mother’s parental rights, with a permanency plan of adoption, was in the
children’s best interests. 	Nor did it abuse its discretion in its ultimate
conclusion 	that 	termination 	of 	parental 	rights 	is 	in 	the 	children’s 	best
interests. 	See In re M.B., 2013 ME 46, ¶ 37, 65 A.3d 1260; In re Thomas H.,
2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.

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Randy G. Day, Esq., Garland, for appellant mother
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Bangor District Court docket number PC-2015-39
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY