Belitz v. Belitz

compensatory damages, if any, to be awarded under this por-
tion of the statute.
Remaining Assignments of Error.
[25] Given our resolution of the above assignment of error,
we need not address the Appellants’ remaining assignments of
error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analy-
sis which is not needed to adjudicate the controversy before it.
Papillion Rural Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Bellevue, 274 Neb.
214, 739 N.W.2d 162 (2007).
CONCLUSION
We affirm that portion of the judgment which found against
the Appellants on their defamation suit. We reverse the judg-
ment of the district court and remand for a new trial on the
counterclaim between Svoboda, Hamilton, and Fortkamp and
the Appellants, consistent with this opinion.
A ffirmed in pArt , And in pArt reversed
And remAnded for A new triAl .
KAthleen B elitz , now Known As KAthleen monAco ,
AppellAnt , v . J ohn f. B elitz , J r ., Appellee .
756 N.W.2d 172
Filed September 16, 2008. 	No. A-07-1172.
1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. It is the duty of an appellate court to settle
jurisdictional issues presented by a case.
2. ____: ____. A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual dispute is
determined by an appellate court as a matter of law.
3. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. For an appellate court to acquire
jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order entered by the court from
which the appeal is taken; conversely, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to
entertain appeals from nonfinal orders.
4. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Generally, when multiple issues are presented
to a trial court for simultaneous disposition in the same proceeding and the court
decides some of the issues, while reserving some issue or issues for later deter-
mination, the court’s determination of less than all the issues is an interlocutory
order and is not a final order for the purpose of an appeal.
5. Final Orders. When the substantial rights of the parties to an action remain
undetermined and the cause is retained for further action, the order is not final.
beLItz v. beLItz 	53
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 53
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:15 AM CST

6. Appeal and Error.t he trial court has no inherent power, directly or indirectly,
to extend time for taking appeal.
7. Divorce: Final Orders. A journal entry does not finally determine the rights of
the parties when it directed the parties to advise the court if any material issues
were not resolved and when it contemplated that the decree was to be prepared by
counsel for opposing counsel’s review and for later court signature and filing.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: J russell
derr, Judge. Order vacated in part, and appeal dismissed.
Kathleen Monaco, pro se.
Joan Watke Stacy for appellee.
sievers , moore, and cAssel, Judges.
sievers, Judge.
this appeal presents, among other jurisdictional issues, the
question of whether a trial court can extend the time in which
to appeal to this court beyond that time provided by Nebraska
statutes through a provision for such extension in its order.
PROCeDURALb ACKGROUND
this ongoing custody dispute now makes its third appear-
ance in this court. In Belitz v. Belitz, 8 Neb. App. 41, 587
N.W.2d 709 (1999), we affirmed the decree of dissolution of
the Douglas County District Court which awarded Kathleen
belitz, now known as Kathleen Monaco, custody of the parties’
three minor daughters and granted her permission to remove
the children to the State of Illinois.t hereafter, on a motion to
modify decided on July 18, 2002, the district court awarded
John F.b elitz, Jr., custody of the parties’ minor children
and the children were returned to the State of Nebraska. We
affirmed that decision. See Belitz v. Belitz, No. A-02-973, 2003
WL 21648118 (Neb. App. July 15, 2003) (not designated for
permanent publication).
the instant appeal is traced to January 12, 2005, when
Kathleen filed an application for modification requesting cus-
tody of the parties’ minor children. In an order signed on July
6, 2007, and file stamped on July 9 (July 9 order), the trial
court dismissed such application and assessed an attorney fee
of $10,000 against Kathleen. Next, on September 14, 2007, the
54 	17N ebRASKAAPP eLLAteR ePORtS

trial judge signed an order denominated as “order (visitAtion
time).”t his order made a finding that “exhibit 63 [John’s
proposed parenting plan] shall be the parenting plan” and
provided that “the court requests that the parties submit the
parenting plan which conforms to this order within 14 days of
the date of this order.”t he “order (visitAtion time)” was file
stamped by the clerk of the court on September 17 (September
17 order).
the September 17 order provided in its final paragraph as
follows: “this Order is incorporated into the Court’s Order
of July 6, 2007 [July 9 order], and the combined Orders
shall become a final Order for purposes of appeal effective
14 days from the date of this Order. DAteD this 14 day of
September, 2007.”
there were no motions filed to toll the time in which to
appeal. Kathleen filed her notice of appeal on November 1,
2007, and on April 4, 2008, John moved to dismiss the appeal
arguing that this court lacked jurisdiction because the appeal
was not timely and properly perfected. On May 7, we overruled
the motion to dismiss without prejudice to our further consid-
eration of such after completion of briefing and examination of
the bill of exceptions.t he parties have now completed brief-
ing, and we have the bill of exceptions. We have entered an
order dispensing with oral argument pursuant to our authority
under Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-111(b)(1).
FACtUALb ACKGROUND
the factual background of this protracted custody dispute
is extensively detailed in our two previous opinions referenced
above, and the reader is referred to those opinions. Additional
facts and evidence will be detailed as necessary in the analysis
section of our opinion.
PROCeDURALb ACKGROUND
ReGARDING JURISDICtION
Kathleen’s application for modification filed January 12,
2005, was tried before the district court for Douglas County,
Nebraska, on May 2, 3, and 9, 2007. Initially, we turn to the
argument and discussion among the trial judge and coun-
sel at the close of the trial on May 9. At the end of that
beLItz v. beLItz 	55
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 53

discussion, after the court asked counsel if there was “anything
else,” Kathleen’s lawyer mentioned the subject of a parenting
plan and the court immediately stated: “I’ll incorporate that.”
However, additional discussion followed, and it was agreed that
while the matter of the application for modification was under
submission, counsel for the parties would attempt to reach
agreement on as many of the visitation, telephone call, and
travel issues as they could, bearing in mind that the trial court
had not yet decided who would have custody and whether the
children would live in Illinois or Nebraska. We note that the
application for modification being tried specifically asked for
the implementation of “a detailed parenting plan.”
Any attempt to agree upon a parenting plan was unsuccess-
ful as evidenced by the bill of exceptions, which begins anew
with a hearing on July 6, 2007. At the beginning of the July 6
hearing, the court asked counsel for John: “And I believe this
is your hearing, correct?” Counsel answered in the affirmative,
stating that “the motion is based on post-closing arguments.”
We note that the motion referenced by counsel is not in our
transcript. However, given the May 9 discussion referenced
above and the exchange at the beginning of this July 6 proceed-
ing, it is evident that John’s counsel at some point after May
9 filed a motion for the court to adopt a parenting plan. John’s
counsel explained to the court that the parties were unable to
reach complete agreement about a parenting plan “[a]nd so we
decided to schedule this hearing today to submit two propos-
als and then leave it up to the Judge’s discretion . . . .” At this
point in the proceedings, Kathleen’s proposed parenting plan,
exhibit 65, was offered and received in evidence as was John’s
parenting plan, exhibit 63.t hen approximately 15 pages of
“back and forth” occurred between counsel and the court about
the various problems in agreeing on a parenting plan.t he trial
judge then injected the fact that he had drafted the decision
on the motion to modify and that while he had been unsure
whether it would be ready for the July 6 hearing, he now had
it and would be giving it to the parties.t he court then verbally
announced that there would be no modification of custody and
that the children would remain in Omaha in John’s custody.
56 	17N ebRASKAAPP eLLAteR ePORtS

the written order so concluding—the July 9 order—was signed
by the judge on July 6 and file stamped on July 9.
the court stated it would review the competing parenting
plans and make a decision, but counsel asked for clarification
as to whether the July 9 order “is the final order.”t he court
responded that it “was intended as a final order [but visitation]
issues . . . remain outstanding” and thus “[the July 9 order]
won’t be a final order and I’ll enter an order to that effect,
okay?”b efore the hearing was concluded, the trial judge again
iterated that he would enter an order “saying this is not a final
order and—because there’s still some visitation issues and I’ll
schedule another hearing in about three weeks, 30 days, I’ll
let you know when it is and that will keep that from a final
order.”b ut no further hearing occurred. Rather, the court
entered another order—what we have earlier referenced as the
September 17 order.t his order begins as follows:
tHIS MAtteR came before the Court on July 6,
2007, on the Court’s own motion to determine the terms
and conditions of the parenting plan between the parties.
Counsel for both parties appeared.t he Court previously
entered its Order on Plaintiff’s Application to Modify on
July 6, 2007, but the Court left unresolved the issue of
the parenting plan, and, thus, that Order was not a final
Order for purposes of appeal.t he Court ordered the par-
ties to try to resolve the issue of the parenting plan, and,
if they could not, this hearing would be held.t he par-
ties advised the Court that some, but not all, issues have
been resolved.
the court then found that exhibit 63, which it described as
John’s proposed parenting plan, “shall be the parenting plan,
with the addition . . . that [John] is awarded the legal and
physical custody of the minor children.”t he September 17
order then provided:
the Court requests that the parties submit the parenting
plan which conforms to this Order within 14 days of the
date of this Order.
this Order is incorporated into the Court’s Order of
July 6, 2007, and the combined Orders shall become a
beLItz v. beLItz 	57
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 53

final Order for purposes of appeal effective 14 days from
the date of this Order.
DAteD this 14 day of September, 2007.
On October 3, 2007, a document entitled “Parenting Plan”
was file stamped by the clerk of the district court, and on the
previous day, underneath the words “bYt He COURt,” the
trial judge had signed the same.t his 14-page document states
that it is “made and entered into between Kathleen . . . and
John.” On November 1, Kathleen filed her notice of appeal,
stating that she was appealing from the order entered on
October 2.
JURISDICtIONAL ANALYSIS
[1,2] It is the duty of an appellate court to settle jurisdic-
tional issues presented by a case. A jurisdictional question
which does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an
appellate court as a matter of law. State v. Cisneros, 14 Neb.
App. 112, 704 N.W.2d 550 (2005).t his court, on its own
motion, may examine and determine whether jurisdiction is
lacking as the result of a defect which prevents acquisition of
appellate jurisdiction. Hammond v. Hammond, 3 Neb. App.
536, 529 N.W.2d 542 (1995). Although the procedural history
leading to the jurisdictional issues certainly is complex, there
are no disputes of fact.
[3]t here is no more fundamental jurisdictional precept
than the doctrine that appeals can only be taken from final
orders. See In re Interest of Anthony R. et al., 264 Neb. 699,
651 N.W.2d 231 (2002) (for appellate court to acquire jurisdic-
tion of appeal, there must be final order entered by court from
which appeal is taken; conversely, appellate court is without
jurisdiction to entertain appeals from nonfinal orders).
Kathleen’s Appeal From Attorney Fee Assessment.
Kathleen’s first assignment of error is that the trial court
erred in assessing $10,000 against her for John’s counsel.t his
award is found in the July 9 order, but Kathleen’s notice of
appeal was not filed until November 1, 2007, nearly 90 days
thereafter.t he notice of appeal was filed well outside the
30-day timeframe for appealing to this court set forth in Neb.
58 	17N ebRASKAAPP eLLAteR ePORtS

Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006). If the July 9 order
was a final order, the appeal of the assessment of attorney fees
is obviously out of time.
[4] On the basis of Huffman v. Huffman, 236 Neb. 101, 459
N.W.2d 215 (1990), we find that the July 9 order was not a
final, appealable order. Huffman holds as follows:
Generally, when multiple issues are presented to a
trial court for simultaneous disposition in the same pro-
ceeding and the court decides some of the issues, while
reserving some issue or issues for later determination,
the court’s determination of less than all the issues is an
interlocutory order and is not a final order for the purpose
of an appeal.
236 Neb. at 105, 459 N.W.2d at 219.
the Supreme Court explained and applied this rule as
follows:
In the present case, there was a solitary pleading,
the application for modification of a dissolution decree.
the application requested that the dissolution decree be
modified to grant child custody tob ruce Huffman and
that a schedule of visitation rights be determined for the
noncustodial parent.t he tenor of the modification appli-
cation may be expressed in the alternative: a change in
custody or, if such change were denied, a new schedule of
visitation rights.t hus,b ruce Huffman’s application was
a solitary pleading which raised multiple issues, namely,
custody and visitation of children, which were determin-
able in one proceeding regarding modification of a prior
dissolution decree.t herefore, we hold that when an appli-
cation is filed to modify a decree in a marital dissolution
action, and the modification application pertains to more
than one issue involving children affected by the dissolu-
tion decree, a court’s resolution of one issue raised by the
modification application, but retention or reservation of
jurisdiction for disposition of another issue or other issues
raised by the modification application, does not consti-
tute a final judgment, order, or decree for the purpose
of an appeal. For that reason, this court has jurisdiction
beLItz v. beLItz 	59
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 53

to review the district court’s action onb ruce Huffman’s
modification application.
Id. at 106, 459 N.W.2d at 220.
[5] In the instant case, while the July 9 order did not specifi-
cally reserve the matter of the parenting plan for future deci-
sion, the order itself did not decide the matter, and the court
expressly reserved such for future determination in the discus-
sions on the record. Accordingly, we find that Huffman, supra,
is controlling and that the July 9 order was not a final order
because the matter of the parenting plan was unresolved and
reserved for future action. See, also, Lewis v. Craig, 236 Neb.
602, 463 N.W.2d 318 (1990) (when substantial rights of parties
to action remain undetermined and cause is retained for further
action, order is not final).
Can Trial Court Extend Time to Appeal Its
July 9 Order Assessing Attorney Fees?
[6]t he September 17 order said that it was “incorporated”
into the earlier July 9 order and that “the combined Orders shall
become a final Order for purposes of appeal effective 14 days
from the date of this Order.” In short, the trial court attempted
to determine the appeal time by tacking on an extra 14 days in
which to appeal.t his is outside of the authority and power of
the courts—and that has long been the applicable law. Morrill
County v. Bliss, 125 Neb. 97, 249 N.W. 98 (1933) (trial court
has no inherent power, directly or indirectly, to extend time for
taking appeal).t he trial court’s attempted 14-day extension of
the time in which to appeal was error as a matter of law and
is of no force and effect on the question of whether this court
has appellate jurisdiction. We vacate that portion of the district
court’s September 17 order.
Kathleen’s Attempted Appeal Regarding Parenting Plan.
Kathleen’s second assignment of error concerns three dis-
agreements that she has with the parenting plan, and again we
face a jurisdictional issue.t he trial court’s September 17 order
“finds thate xhibit 63 will be the parenting plan” with the
addition of the court’s earlier determination that John would
have legal and physical custody of the children.t he court’s
60 	17N ebRASKAAPP eLLAteR ePORtS

order then said, “the Court requests that the parties submit the
parenting plan which conforms to this Order within 14 days
of the date of this Order.” On October 2, 2007, the trial judge
signed a document entitled “Parenting Plan” which was then
file stamped by the clerk of the district court on October 3.
the notice of appeal filed November 1 is obviously out of time
from the September 17 order, given our holding above that the
trial court cannot extend the time in which to appeal.t hus,
unless the parenting plan file stamped October 3 is the final,
appealable order, which incidentally would encompass the July
9 order containing the attorney fee award about which Kathleen
complains in her first assignment of error, the notice of appeal
filed November 1 is out of time.
We make a number of observations about exhibit 63 and
the parenting plan file stamped October 3, 2007, having com-
pared the contents of the two documents.t hey are virtually
identical, as one would expect, given that the September 17
order makes exhibit 63 the operative parenting plan.t he only
changes are as follows: (1) the addition of a sentence providing
that John is the custodial parent, which is merely reflective of
both the July 9 order and the September 17 order, and (2) in
several places what was “his/her” in exhibit 63 is changed to
a definite “his” or “her” in accordance with the fact that John
would be the custodial parent.t herefore, the October 3 parent-
ing plan is merely a memorialization of what was decided in
the September 17 order. Additionally, the October 3 parenting
plan recites that it is a parenting plan “made and entered into”
between John and Kathleen, and the document contains no
order of the court that the parties do anything. In short, it is
the agreement of the two parties as to how they will parent the
children, which just happens to have the judge’s signature and
the clerk’s date stamp.t hus, while the parties had the court
decide between competing parenting plans, the fact is that
the operative decision was made in the September 17 order,
when the court designated exhibit 63 as the parenting plan. We
assume for purposes of discussion that a trial court’s choice of
competing parenting plans affects a parent’s substantial right
and is thus appealable. However, the decision about the opera-
tive plan was made in the court’s September 17 order. Granted,
beLItz v. beLItz 	61
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 53

the September 17 order requested later submission of the actual
parenting plan selected by the trial court; however, in our view,
that request does not mean that the September 17 order was not
a final, appealable order.
A similar situation was presented in City of Ashland v.
Ashland Salvage, 271 Neb. 362, 711 N.W.2d 861 (2006).t he
City of Ashland brought a declaratory judgment action against
appellants Ashland Salvage, Inc., and Arlo Remmen, “seek-
ing a declaration as to the existence and lawful boundaries of
certain public rights-of-way claimed by the city and further
seeking an injunction against appellants’ improper use of the
public rights-of-way.” Id. at 363, 711 N.W.2d at 864. Following
a trial, in a file-stamped journal entry dated November 22,
2004, the district court ruled in favor of the city in the declara-
tory judgment action, “declaring the boundaries of appellants’
property and the existence of the city’s public rights-of-way.
Specifically, in its journal entry, the district court stated that
‘a public right-of-way exists and its legal boundaries are as set
forth ine xhibit 14.’” Id. at 365, 711 N.W.2d at 866. Further,
in the journal entry, the district court “‘enjoined [appellants]
from any use of [the disputed] property inconsistent with
its use as a public right-of-way.’” Id.t he journal entry also
“directed the city to prepare an ‘injunction,’ and an ‘Order of
Permanent Injunction’ was subsequently filed on December
6.” Id. at 365-66, 711 N.W.2d at 866. On November 30, the
appellants filed their notice of appeal from the adverse ruling,
and the Nebraska Supreme Court considered whether appellate
jurisdiction existed in the case or whether notice of appeal was
premature.t he Nebraska Supreme Court concluded:
[t]he 	district 	court’s 	file-stamped 	journal 	entry 	of
November 22, 2004, found in favor of the city, declared
the boundaries of the rights-of-way, and enjoined appel-
lants from any use of the disputed property inconsistent
with the city’s rights-of-way.t his ruling resolved all
issues raised in the city’s declaratory action. Although the
November 22 journal entry also directed the city to pre-
pare an injunction, the November 22 ruling nevertheless
disposed of the whole merits of the case . . . .
62 	17N ebRASKAAPP eLLAteR ePORtS

Id. at 367, 711 N.W.2d at 867.t he Supreme Court therefore
determined that because the November 22 journal entry dis-
posed of all the claims, the appeal taken from the November 22
journal entry was timely.
We have great difficulty in distinguishing the present case
from City of Ashland, supra, which we think we would have to
do to find that the instant appeal was timely. In the September
17 order, the trial court selected the operative parenting plan,
exhibit 63. And the directive of the trial court to submit such to
the court, incorporating the fact that John would be the custo-
dial parent, seems to us to be indistinguishable from the direc-
tive to “prepare an injunction” in City of Ashland, supra. We
do note that the document states on the first page, “the Mother
and the Father wish to have this Plan and the terms and condi-
tions contained herein approved by the Court and incorporated
by the Court in the Decree of Dissolution to be entered in this
case.”b ut the decree was not modified to include the parent-
ing plan, and although the judge’s signature can be seen as
“approval,” the court’s decision as to which plan would control,
and the terms thereof, was made in the September 17 order, not
by the filing of October 3, 2007.
Additionally, two other cases need to be mentioned. In
Hosack v. Hosack, 267 Neb. 934, 678 N.W.2d 746 (2004), the
district court signed and filed a journal entry which indicated
that the court had considered all matters properly before it
and set forth its findings thereupon. However, that document
in Hosack contained a provision that counsel should “‘advise
the court . . . if the court failed to rule on any material issue
presented.’” 267 Neb. at 936, 678 N.W.2d at 750.t he journal
entry also specified that counsel was to “‘prepare the decree
and provide it to [opposing counsel] for review [and then
present it] to the Court for signature.’” Id. Counsel prepared a
decree in conformance with the journal entry, the court signed
the decree, it was file stamped, and an appeal was taken.
[7]t he Supreme Court in Hosack, supra, determined that
the journal entry did not finally determine the rights of the
parties because it directed the parties to advise the court if any
material issues were not resolved and because it “contemplated
that the decree was to be prepared” by counsel for opposing
beLItz v. beLItz 	63
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 53

counsel’s review and for later court signature and filing. Id. at
939, 678 N.W.2d at 752.t hus, the Supreme Court concluded
that the journal entry “was not the final determination of the
rights of the parties in [the] action.” Id. at 939-40, 678 N.W.2d
at 752. As such, the appeal from the actual decree, prepared in
accordance with the directions of the journal entry filed by the
court, was timely.
From our perspective, the present case seems dissimilar
from Hosack, supra, because here the parties were not to sub-
mit an agreed-upon decree as in Hosack, but, rather, a “plan”
that conformed to a specified exhibit, and no issue submitted
to the court remained to be resolved via the later submission.
Furthermore, the preparing party was not required to submit
the plan for opposing counsel’s review and for later court sig-
nature—although the court did sign the parties’ plan.
Finally, in our jurisdictional discussion, we come to the
recent decision of Wagner v. Wagner, 275 Neb. 693, 749
N.W.2d 137 (2008), in which the court once again addressed
the recurring problem of signed and file-stamped letters by
trial judges deciding cases and directing counsel to prepare a
decree. In Wagner v. Wagner, 16 Neb. App. 328, 743 N.W.2d
782 (2008), we found that such a letter from the trial judge had
started the running of the time in which to appeal, and thus
the appeal was out of time. Upon further review, the Supreme
Court found that the letter was not a final judgment, apparently
for two very different reasons: First, the letter did not find that
the marriage was irretrievably broken and order it dissolved,
and second, the letter directed counsel to prepare a decree
and submit it to opposing counsel for approval, and then to
the court. Although the Supreme Court’s opinion suggests that
the first reason alone would be enough to prevent the letter
from being a final, appealable order, the court left no doubt
that the second reason prevented the letter from operating as a
final, appealable order. With respect to this second reason, the
court said:
Here, the court’s direction to counsel to prepare a final
decree, and submit that decree for approval to opposing
counsel and then the court, clearly indicates that the let-
ter was not intended to be the court’s final adjudication
64 	17N ebRASKAAPP eLLAteR ePORtS

of the rights and liabilities of the parties. As in Hosack,
the court’s preliminary findings contemplated that the
decree was to be prepared for opposing counsel’s review
and were not the final determination of the rights of
the parties.
275 Neb. at 700, 749 N.W.2d at 142-43.
therefore, the question for us, after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Wagner, is whether the direction from the trial
judge in its September 17 order for the parties to “submit” the
plan, which the court had decided would be exhibit 63, delays
the beginning of the time in which to appeal until the plan is
submitted. And we quote from Wagner, supra, “but just as
important is the fact that, as in Hosack, the trial court’s letter
was written only in contemplation of a decree to be entered
later.” 275 Neb. at 699, 749 N.W.2d at 142.b ut here, there
were no preconditions set forth in the September 17 order
before exhibit 63 would be operative, such as approval by one
or both counsel or signature by the court. Rather, the trial court
merely requested the submission of the plan, and the court
could have simply been contemplating the submission of a
plan signed only by Kathleen and John evidencing the plan, or
not signed by either of them—because the September 17 order
contains nothing by which it can be said that such order was
entered “in contemplation of a decree” or some other further
action by the court. And it seems to us that a key component
of the delayed final order doctrine from Wagner, supra, is the
trial court’s contemplation that a decree will be later entered,
but we can find no such evidence of such an intent in the
present case.
We conclude that the request to submit the plan to the court
did not prevent the September 17 order from being the final,
appealable order because in contrast to Wagner v. Wagner,
275 Neb. 693, 749 N.W.2d 137 (2008), and Hosack v. Hosack,
267 Neb. 934, 678 N.W.2d 746 (2004), the directive did not
require signature or approval by counsel or signature by the
court in order for exhibit 63 to be the operative parenting plan.
And equally important, the September 17 order left nothing
unresolved. In short, the effectiveness of exhibit 63 was not
made contingent upon further action by the court and counsel
beLItz v. beLItz 	65
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 53

of the nature found crucial in Wagner and Hosack. Finally,
we are unable to distinguish the directive in City of Ashland
v. Ashland Salvage, 271 Neb. 362, 711 N.W.2d 861 (2006), to
prepare an injunction from the directive in this case to “submit
the plan.”
therefore, for these reasons, any appeal had to be taken
within 30 days of the September 17 order, which, incidentally,
was when the July 9 order on attorney fees, which Kathleen
seeks to address in her first assignment of error, also became
final.t herefore, we lack jurisdiction over Kathleen’s appeal.
CONCLUSION
While Nebraska jurisprudence on the subject of appellate
jurisdiction and final, appealable orders is undoubtedly diffi-
cult for a pro se litigant such as Kathleen to navigate, the trial
court’s procedure and orders made the jurisdictional shoals
rockier than usual.t hat said, Kathleen’s appeal was filed out
of time as explained above, and thus, we dismiss her appeal.
We also vacate that portion of the September 17 order attempt-
ing to extend the time in which to appeal.
order vAcAted in pArt , And AppeAl dismissed .
66 	17N ebRASKAAPP eLLAteR ePORtS