State v. Sosnowski

State of NebraSka , appellee , v.
tiNa r. SoSNowSki , appellaNt.
764 N.W.2d 153
Filed March 31, 2009. 	No. A-08-586.
1. Motor Vehicles: Theft: Proof. Proof of theft under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-511(4)
(Reissue 2008) requires the State to demonstrate that (1) the defendant rented the
vehicle pursuant to a written rental agreement, (2) the written agreement specified
the time and place for the return of the vehicle, (3) written demand for return of
the vehicle was made upon the defendant by certified mail, and (4) the defendant
failed to return the vehicle within 72 hours of such demand.
2. Contracts: Motor Vehicles. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-511(4) (Reissue 2008) specifi-
cally requires that the written rental agreement for rental of a vehicle specify the
time and place for the return of the vehicle.
3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law
and an appellate court must reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective
of the determination made by the court below.
4. Statutes. If the language of a statute is clear, the words of such statute are the end
of any judicial inquiry regarding its meaning.
5. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordi-
nary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain
the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.
Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: M ax
kelch, Judge. Reversed.
Thomas J. Garvey for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and George R. Love for
appellee.
iNbody, Chief Judge, and irwiN and SieverS, Judges.
irwiN, Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tina R. Sosnowski appeals her conviction and sentence on
a charge of theft of a rented or leased vehicle pursuant to Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 28-511(4) (Reissue 2008). On appeal, Sosnowski
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
conviction and challenges the sentence imposed by the dis-
trict court for Sarpy County, Nebraska. We find the evidence
insufficient to support a conviction under § 28-511(4), and
we reverse.
480 	17 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:14 AM CST

II. BACkGROUND
This 	case 	arises 	from 	the 	circumstances 	surrounding
Sosnowski’s renting of a car from a company known as Rent
4 Less in the Omaha, Nebraska, area in September 2006. The
evidence adduced at trial indicates that Rent 4 Less is a local
business that rents used cars from three service stations in the
Omaha area. employees of the service station are responsible
for the actual rental transaction. One of the three Rent 4 Less
locations is at a service station named “Yeck’s Auto Repair” in
Bellevue, Nebraska.
On September 18, 2006, Sosnowski went to Yeck’s Auto
Repair to rent a vehicle from Rent 4 Less. That rental was pur-
suant to a rental agreement. The rental agreement included the
designation “Rent 4 Less” at the top, with “Omaha, Nebraska,”
and “402-399-0600” below. The rental agreement also included
an address for the “Corporate Office.” The rental agreement
indicates that the car was due to be returned on September 20.
The rental agreement also indicates on the front that the vehicle
is “presumed embezzled if not returned when due and subject
to additional fee if not returned to above location” and indi-
cates on the back that the renter agrees to return the vehicle “to
the place” and specifies penalties if the vehicle is not returned
“to the renting office specified on the [front] side.” The undis-
puted testimony at trial, and a review of the rental agreement
itself, demonstrates that the rental agreement does not include
the addresses for any of the Rent 4 Less locations, does not
include the address for Yeck’s Auto Repair, and includes the
address for only the Rent 4 Less corporate office. Additionally,
the undisputed testimony at trial indicated that Rent 4 Less
does not accept vehicle returns at the corporate office and that
vehicles are not to be returned to the corporate office address
included on the rental agreement.
The Yeck’s Auto Repair employee who rented the vehicle to
Sosnowski testified that he discussed the details of the rental
agreement with her, including the date the vehicle was due
back and specifically that it was to be returned to “Rent 4
Less.” The undisputed testimony at trial was that Sosnowski
returned to Yeck’s Auto Repair on September 20, 2006, the
date the vehicle was due, with the rental vehicle. Sosnowski
STATe v. SOSNOWSkI 	481
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 480

indicated to the employee that she needed the vehicle for an
additional day. According to the employee, he extended the
rental for an additional day, but did so without any written
agreement of extension; he testified that extensions are typi-
cally done on a “verbal” basis.
Sosnowski did not return the vehicle on September 21, 2006.
The Yeck’s Auto Repair employee who had rented the vehicle
to Sosnowski made several attempts to contact her about return-
ing the vehicle, all without success. eventually, the owner of
Rent 4 Less was notified of the situation. He testified that Rent
4 Less mailed a certified letter to Sosnowski at the address
she had provided when renting the vehicle. When no response
was received from Sosnowski, he notified the Bellevue Police
Department. The vehicle was eventually located approximately
6 months later, and the testimony indicates that the vehicle was
recovered in good condition.
On February 8, 2007, the State charged Sosnowski by com-
plaint with theft of a rented or leased vehicle pursuant to
§ 28-511(4). In the complaint, the State both specifically cited
§ 28-511(4) and quoted § 28-511(4) in its entirety in setting
out the charge against Sosnowski. On July 13, the State filed
an information in the district court charging Sosnowski with
theft of a rented or leased vehicle pursuant to § 28-511(4). In
the information, the State both specifically cited § 28-511(4)
and quoted § 28-511(4) in its entirety in setting out the charge
against Sosnowski.
At the conclusion of trial, a jury returned a verdict of guilty.
The district court sentenced Sosnowski to a term of 15 to 15
months’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
III. ASSIGNMeNTS OF eRROR
Sosnowski asserts on appeal that there was insufficient evi-
dence to support a verdict of guilty and that the district court
abused its discretion in sentencing Sosnowski.
IV. ANALYSIS
1. SufficieNcy of evideNce
Sosnowski asserts that the evidence adduced by the State
was insufficient to prove the statutory elements required by
482 	17 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

§ 28-511(4) to support a conviction for theft of a rented or
leased vehicle. Specifically, Sosnowski challenges the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to demonstrate that she had the vehicle
pursuant to a written rental contract at the time it was not
returned, the sufficiency of the evidence to demonstrate that the
contract at issue specified the date and time for return of the
vehicle, and the sufficiency of the evidence to demonstrate that
written demand for return of the vehicle was made by certified
mail. We focus on Sosnowski’s assertion regarding the contract
specifying the location for return of the vehicle and conclude
that the evidence was not sufficient.
[1] Section 28-511(4) specifies:
A person is guilty of theft if he or she (a) rents or leases
a motor vehicle under a written lease or rental agreement
specifying the time and place for the return of the vehicle
and fails to return the vehicle within seventy-two hours of
written demand for return of the vehicle made upon him
or her by certified mail to the address given by him or her
for such purpose . . . .
Pursuant to the statute, and relevant to this appeal, proof of this
offense requires the State to demonstrate that (1) Sosnowski
rented the vehicle pursuant to a written rental agreement, (2)
the written agreement specified the time and place for the
return of the vehicle, (3) written demand for return of the
vehicle was made upon her by certified mail, and (4) she failed
to return the vehicle within 72 hours of such demand.
Sosnowski first challenges the sufficiency of the State’s evi-
dence that she rented the vehicle pursuant to a written rental
contract. The undisputed evidence at trial indicates that she
rented a vehicle on September 18, 2006, pursuant to a writ-
ten contract that specified that the vehicle was to be returned
on September 20. As Sosnowski argues, the undisputed evi-
dence demonstrates that she returned to Yeck’s Auto Repair on
September 20, with the rented vehicle. On that date, the Yeck’s
Auto Repair employee responsible for renting Rent 4 Less
vehicles orally agreed to allow Sosnowski to keep the vehicle
for another day. Sosnowski argues that this oral agreement
is not sufficient to serve as the basis for a conviction under
§ 28-511(4).
STATe v. SOSNOWSkI 	483
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 480

Although we agree with Sosnowski that the undisputed evi-
dence demonstrates that she returned with the vehicle on the
date specified in the lease, we decline to determine whether
the oral extension constituted a new agreement entirely, such
that her possession of the vehicle was not pursuant to a writ-
ten rental agreement, or constituted merely an amendment to
the existing written rental agreement. We similarly decline
to address the issues of whether the written rental agreement
could properly be extended orally or whether such extension
was impermissible because of the written agreement’s contain-
ing language specifying that all changes had to be in writing,
or the legal ramifications raised by such issue.
[2] even assuming for the sake of argument that we conclude
the evidence was sufficient legally to establish that Sosnowski
possessed the vehicle pursuant to a written rental agreement, an
issue we expressly do not decide, we conclude that the written
rental agreement itself was insufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of § 28-511(4) because it did not specify the place for
the return of the vehicle. As noted above, § 28-511(4) spe-
cifically requires that the written rental agreement specify “the
time and place for the return of the vehicle.”
[3-5] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
State v. Mastne, 15 Neb. App. 280, 725 N.W.2d 862 (2006).
When an appeal calls for statutory interpretation or presents
questions of law, an appellate court must reach an independent,
correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by
the court below. Id. In the absence of ambiguity, courts must
give effect to the statutes as they are written. Id. If the lan-
guage of a statute is clear, the words of such statute are the
end of any judicial inquiry regarding its meaning. Id. Statutory
language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an
appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the
meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unam-
biguous. Id.
It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning
into a statute that is not warranted by the language; neither is
it within the province of a court to read anything plain, direct,
or unambiguous out of a statute. Id. In construing a statute, a
court must attempt to give effect to all of its parts, and if it
484 	17 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected
as superfluous or meaningless. Id. Likewise, it is not for the
courts to supply missing words or sentences to a statute to
make clear that which is indefinite, or to supply that which is
not there. Id.
Because § 28-511(4) specifically requires that the written
rental agreement forming the basis of Sosnowski’s prosecution
must specify the time and place for the return of the vehicle,
the evidence adduced by the State must demonstrate that the
agreement specified the place for the return of the vehicle. It
does not. A review of the written rental agreement makes it
clear that there is no reference to Yeck’s Auto Repair, the place
where the vehicle was to be returned. There is no address for
Yeck’s Auto Repair. There is no address for any of the three
rental locations for Rent 4 Less. The rental agreement itself
indicates that the vehicle is considered “embezzled” if not
returned to “the above location,” but does not include any
“above location.”
The only address included on the written rental agreement
is the corporate address for Rent 4 Less. Despite the State’s
reliance on appeal on that address as sufficient to satisfy
§ 28-511(4), that address is not the place to which the vehicle
was to be returned. Indeed, the undisputed evidence at trial was
that vehicles cannot be returned to that location.
We do not accept the State’s assertion on appeal that
Sosnowski knew where the vehicle was to be returned. Section
28-511(4) requires that the written rental agreement specify the
place for the return of the vehicle, not that Sosnowski know
or be aware of such location. To construe the plain and unam-
biguous language of § 28-511(4) as being satisfied if the renter
“knows” where the vehicle is to be returned would be to write
additional language into the statute that could easily have been
included had the Legislature so intended.
As it is, the evidence presented indicates that the closest the
written rental agreement comes to specifying the place for the
return of the vehicle is that the top of the agreement includes
“Rent 4 Less” on one line; “Omaha, Nebraska,” on another line;
and a telephone number on a third line. Rent 4 Less has corpo-
rate offices in Omaha. Rent 4 Less has three different locations
STATe v. SOSNOWSkI 	485
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 480

in the metropolitan area from which vehicles are rented. The
specific location from which Sosnowski rented, however, is not
in Omaha; Yeck’s Auto Repair is in Bellevue. As such, there is
nothing anywhere on the written rental agreement to indicate
that the vehicle was to be returned to the Bellevue location or
where in “Omaha” the vehicle could be returned. For this rea-
son, the written agreement failed to satisfy the plain language
of § 28-511(4).
Because the State failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove one of the necessary statutory elements of the crime with
which Sosnowski was charged, the district court erred in find-
ing sufficient evidence to support the conviction and in overrul-
ing Sosnowski’s motion for directed verdict. We do not suggest
that Sosnowski was free of wrongdoing in this case, because
the vehicle was not timely returned. Nonetheless, Sosnowski
was charged with a specific crime which required specific
statutory elements be proven, and the State failed to prove all
of the elements. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment against
Sosnowski.
2. exceSSive SeNteNce
Our disposition of the sufficiency of the evidence issue in
this case makes it unnecessary for us to further address the
alleged excessiveness of the sentence.
V. CONCLUSION
We find the evidence was insufficient to prove a neces-
sary element of § 28-511(4). We reverse the judgment against
Sosnowski.
reverSed.
486 	17 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS