State v. Vasquez-Arenivar

Contrary to the implication in In re Interest of M.M., C.M.,
and D.M., there are circumstances, such as those present in this
case, where a parent is not prejudiced by the failure to appoint
a guardian ad litem. Here, Crystal was represented by com-
petent counsel throughout the court proceedings. In addition,
she submitted to a competency evaluation which revealed that
she was fully capable of understanding the legal proceedings
and the ultimate implication of those proceedings. Under the
circumstances of this case, there is no indication that Crystal
would have benefited in any way by the appointment of a
guardian ad litem.
While I do not agree that the failure to appoint a guardian ad
litem constitutes prejudice per se or that Crystal was prejudiced
in this case, I join in the majority’s opinion because of the
principle of vertical stare decisis, which compels lower courts
to follow strictly the decisions rendered by higher courts within
the same judicial system. See State v. Hausmann, 277 Neb.
819, 765 N.W.2d 219 (2009).
State of NebraSka , appellee , v. luiS CarloS
vaSquez-areNivar , appellaNt.
779 N.W.2d 117
Filed February 16, 2010. 	No. A-09-437.
1. Motions to Suppress: Probable Cause: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a trial
court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the ultimate determination of
probable cause de novo and review the findings of fact made by the trial court
for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by the
trial court.
2. Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Probable Cause. A traffic violation, no
matter how minor, creates probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.
3. Investigative Stops: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Probable Cause: Warrantless
Searches: Weapons. In addition to an investigatory stop pursuant to Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), an officer is entitled,
for the protection of himself or herself and others in the area, to conduct a care-
fully limited search of the outer clothing of persons stopped on Terry grounds to
discover weapons which might be used to assault the officer.
StAtE v. vASqUEz-ArENIvAr 	265
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 265
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:12 AM CST

4. Investigative Stops: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Probable Cause. In deter-
mining whether an officer acted reasonably, it is not the officer’s inchoate or
unparticularized suspicion or hunch that is given due weight, but the specific
reasonable inferences which the officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light
of his or her experience.
5. ____: ____: ____. Whether a police officer has a reasonable suspicion based
on sufficient articulable facts requires taking into account the totality of the
circumstances.
6. ____: ____: ____. As part of the totality of the circumstances, a court can con-
sider an officer’s knowledge of a defendant’s drug-related criminal history.
7. Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Probable
Cause. A fellow passenger’s prior drug, weapon, or criminal history may prop-
erly be considered in the totality of the circumstances of whether reasonable
suspicion existed to conduct a pat-down search of a defendant for weapons.
8. Controlled Substances: Search and Seizure. Drugs which are abandoned by a
defendant prior to being seized by law enforcement may be lawfully recovered.
9. Search and Seizure. When individuals voluntarily abandon property, they forfeit
any expectation of privacy in the property that they might otherwise have had.
10. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. the Fourth Amendment does not
protect voluntarily abandoned property.
11. ____: ____. A warrantless search or seizure of abandoned property does not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment.
12. Controlled Substances: Search and Seizure. When a defendant has been legally
detained prior to voluntarily abandoning drugs or other property, the drugs or
property may be lawfully recovered.
13. Evidence: Police Officers and Sheriffs. When a defendant merely drops, throws
down, or abandons evidence in the presence of law enforcement, such conduct
will not sustain a conviction for tampering with physical evidence.
14. Criminal Law: Convictions: Evidence: Trial. When the evidence adduced at
trial is legally insufficient to sustain the conviction, a criminal charge may not be
retried, but must be dismissed.
Appeal from the District Court for Hall County: JameS D.
liviNgStoN, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part vacated.
Jeff E. Loeffler, Deputy Hall County Public Defender, for
appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and George r. Love for
appellee.
iNboDy, Chief Judge, and irwiN and CaSSel, Judges.
iNboDy, Chief Judge.
INtrODUCtION
A jury convicted Luis Carlos vasquez-Arenivar of posses-
sion of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute and
266 	18 NEBrASkA APPELLAtE rEPOrtS

tampering with physical evidence. Following his sentencing,
vasquez-Arenivar appealed to this court alleging that the dis-
trict court erred in denying his motion to suppress on the basis
that he was subjected to an unconstitutional pat-down search
for weapons. We disagree with vasquez-Arenivar, finding that
the pat-down search of his person was constitutional and that
vasquez-Arenivar, who was being legally detained, abandoned
a bag of drugs in the presence of an officer. We find that
although insufficient evidence was not assigned as error by
vasquez-Arenivar, the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of
law, to support vasquez-Arenivar’s conviction for tampering
with physical evidence.
StAtEMENt OF FACtS
vasquez-Arenivar was one of two passengers in a vehicle
stopped for driving the wrong way down a one-way street. the
driver admitted to consuming alcohol, and the investigating
officer conducted an investigation to determine if the driver
was driving while intoxicated, while Sgt. tony keiper and two
officers arrived to assist. the officers were concerned because
the other passenger, Lisia Pacheco, had been implicated in
the distribution of methamphetamine and had been convicted
on firearm charges and because the vehicle had an extremely
dark tint on the windows, making it difficult to see inside the
vehicle. vasquez-Arenivar, who was able to speak English, told
keiper he was on the way to meet his wife, he was getting
a ride, and he worked for a construction company. However,
when keiper asked vasquez-Arenivar about drugs and firearms,
vasquez-Arenivar looked away and delayed his responses, and
the issue arose of whether vasquez-Arenivar could understand
keiper’s questions.
keiper asked vasquez-Arenivar and Pacheco to exit the
vehicle and conducted a pat-down search for weapons of both
passengers for officer safety; however, prior to conducting the
pat-down search of vasquez-Arenivar, keiper noticed a large
bulge in vasquez-Arenivar’s left front pocket. keiper testified
that as he conducted the pat-down search, the bulge felt like “a
larger, soft cylinder-shaped bunch” and felt “slightly mushy.”
the pat-down search confirmed that vasquez-Arenivar was not
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Cite as 18 Neb. App. 265

concealing any weapons on his person, so keiper had vasquez-
Arenivar sit on the curb near Pacheco. However, since keiper
suspected that the bulge was drugs, he requested consent to
search vasquez-Arenivar’s person, which request was refused.
keiper then conferred with one of the officers, and while the
officers were talking, vasquez-Arenivar stood up and turned his
left side away from the officers, putting himself between the
officers and Pacheco. the officers then saw what appeared to
be a large ziploc bag lying on the ground between Pacheco’s
feet. keiper knew the area of the curb where Pacheco and
vasquez-Arenivar were sitting was clear of objects prior to the
two individuals’ sitting down, and Pacheco denied knowing
anything about the bag.
keiper conducted another pat-down search of vasquez-
Arenivar, which search confirmed that the bulge was no
longer present. Upon examination of the ziploc bag, it was
determined that the bag contained controlled substances, and
vasquez-Arenivar was arrested. During booking, another offi-
cer informed vasquez-Arenivar that he was going to be sub-
jected to a search, at which point vasquez-Arenivar pointed to
his pocket and said, “[t]hat is all I have, it’s in here.” the offi-
cer looked in the coin pocket of vasquez-Arenivar’s pants and
found a sandwich bag containing what appeared to be metham-
phetamine. vasquez-Arenivar then stated that “he was stupid,
he made a mistake, that it was the first time, and he needed
the money.” the contents of the bags were tested and found to
contain a total of 53.74 grams, or approximately 1.9 ounces,
of methamphetamine, with a street retail value of $5,300. the
ziploc bag seized at the scene contained four knotted plastic
baggies each containing between 13.02 and 13.30 grams of
methamphetamine. the knotted plastic bag found on vasquez-
Arenivar’s person contained 1.28 grams of methamphetamine.
keiper testified that both the amount of methamphetamine
seized and the manner in which the drugs were packaged indi-
cated that the methamphetamine was intended for resale, not
personal use.
vasquez-Arenivar was charged with possession of a con-
trolled substance (methamphetamine) with the intent to distrib-
ute and tampering with physical evidence. vasquez-Arenivar
268 	18 NEBrASkA APPELLAtE rEPOrtS

filed a motion to suppress, contending that his arrest, search,
seizure, and questioning were in violation of his constitutional
rights and that thus, all evidence obtained as a result thereof
should be suppressed, which motion was denied. A jury trial
was held, and the jury convicted vasquez-Arenivar of the
charged offenses. Following his sentencing, vasquez-Arenivar
appealed to this court, alleging that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress.
ASSIGNMENt OF ErrOr
vasquez-Arenivar’s sole assignment of error is that the dis-
trict court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
StANDArD OF rEvIEW
[1] In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to sup-
press, we review the ultimate determination of probable cause
de novo and review the findings of fact made by the trial court
for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences drawn from
those facts by the trial court. State v. Wenke, 276 Neb. 901, 758
N.W.2d 405 (2008).
ANALYSIS
Denial of Motion to Suppress.
vasquez-Arenivar’s sole assignment of error is that the
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress which
asserted the pat-down search for weapons was unconstitutional
for the reason that the officer did not have reasonable suspi-
cion, based on articulable facts, that vasquez-Arenivar was
armed and dangerous.
[2] vasquez-Arenivar does not contest the initial stop of
the vehicle in this case. the stop, for driving the wrong way
down a one-way street, clearly was proper. See Neb. rev. Stat.
§ 60-6,138 (reissue 2004). A traffic violation, no matter how
minor, creates probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.
State v. Royer, 276 Neb. 173, 753 N.W.2d 333 (2008). Officers
could also clearly order vasquez-Arenivar out of the vehicle
pending completion of the stop. See State v. Gutierrez, 9 Neb.
App. 325, 611 N.W.2d 853 (2000) (officer making traffic stop
may order driver and passengers to get out of vehicle, pending
completion of stop). See, also, Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S.
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408, 117 S. Ct. 882, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997). this brings us
to the question posed by vasquez-Arenivar: Did the officer
who conducted the pat-down search of vasquez-Arenivar have
reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that vasquez-
Arenivar was armed and dangerous?
[3-5] In addition to an investigatory stop pursuant to Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968),
an officer is entitled, for the protection of himself or herself
and others in the area, to conduct a carefully limited search
of the outer clothing of persons stopped on Terry grounds to
discover weapons which might be used to assault the officer.
State v. Coleman, 10 Neb. App. 337, 630 N.W.2d 686 (2001);
State v. Gutierrez, supra. In determining whether an officer
acted reasonably, it is not the officer’s inchoate or unparticu-
larized suspicion or hunch that is given due weight, but the
specific reasonable inferences which the officer is entitled to
draw from the facts in light of his or her experience. State
v. Ellington, 242 Neb. 554, 495 N.W.2d 915 (1993); State v.
Coleman, supra. Whether a police officer has a reasonable sus-
picion based on sufficient articulable facts requires taking into
account the totality of the circumstances. State v. Ellington,
supra; State v. Coleman, supra.
[6] the law is well settled in Nebraska that, as part of the
totality of the circumstances, a court can consider an officer’s
knowledge of the defendant’s drug-related criminal history.
See, State v. Draganescu, 276 Neb. 448, 755 N.W.2d 57
(2008); State v. Lee, 265 Neb. 663, 658 N.W.2d 669 (2003).
However, we have not directly considered whether an officer’s
knowledge of another passenger’s drug- or weapon-related
criminal history may be considered as part of the totality of the
circumstances justifying a pat-down search of the defendant.
In State v. Coleman, supra, we did cite with approval to U.S.
v. Menard, 898 F. Supp. 1317 (N.D. Iowa 1995), which was
subsequently affirmed by the Eighth Circuit at U.S. v. Menard,
95 F.3d 9 (8th Cir. 1996). the Eighth Circuit held that, in con-
sidering the totality of the circumstances of whether reasonable
suspicion existed to pat down a back seat passenger, the trial
court could consider an officer’s reminder to a fellow officer of
the “‘Officer Safety Warning’” posted at the police department
270 	18 NEBrASkA APPELLAtE rEPOrtS

which specifically stated the front seat passenger was believed
to be armed with an automatic pistol. U.S. v. Menard, 95 F.3d
at 10.
Other courts have likewise held that a fellow passenger’s
criminal history is a valid factor to be considered as part of
the totality of the circumstances in assessing reasonable sus-
picion. See, U.S. v. Mathurin, 561 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2009)
(defendant acknowledged that codefendant’s criminal history,
involving arrests for possession of drugs, aggravated assault,
and another arrest resulting in seizure of large sums of cash
from his person, was valid factor for court to consider, under
totality of circumstances, when it assessed reasonable suspi-
cion that defendant had been engaged in criminal activity);
State v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613 (1997) (fellow passenger’s
previous criminal record was factor to be considered in totality
of circumstances to support reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity); State v. Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1
(2004) (fellow passenger’s volunteered statement that he was
on probation for drug-related offenses was properly considered
in totality of circumstances analysis regarding whether trooper
had reasonable suspicion that occupants of vehicle, including
defendant, were involved in illegal conduct involving narcot-
ics); Powell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 369 (tex. App. 1999) (fellow
passenger’s prior drug possession offense was factor consid-
ered in determining whether defendant’s postcitation detention
was reasonable). Cf., State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 846 A.2d
569 (2004) (accomplice’s drug convictions were factor that
could be considered in totality of circumstances for probable
cause to issue search warrant of residence and its occupants);
State v. Gray, 307 Mont. 124, 38 P.3d 775 (2001) (criminal
history of defendant’s brother, involving illegal drugs, was one
factor that could be considered in totality of circumstances for
probable cause to issue search warrant).
[7] We agree that a fellow passenger’s criminal history is a
valid factor to be considered as part of the totality of the cir-
cumstances in assessing reasonable suspicion, especially since
the relationship between the occupants of a house or a car dif-
fers from that of persons in a public place. See U.S. v. Menard,
supra. therefore, we hold that a fellow passenger’s prior drug,
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weapon, or criminal history may properly be considered in the
totality of the circumstances of whether reasonable suspicion
existed to conduct a pat-down search of a defendant for weap-
ons. thus, keiper’s knowledge of Pacheco’s weapons convic-
tion and implication in drug distribution was within the totality
of the circumstances that could be considered in determining
whether reasonable suspicion existed to support a pat-down
search of vasquez-Arenivar for weapons.
Prior 	to 	conducting 	the 	pat-down 	search 	of 	vasquez-
Arenivar, keiper knew that the stopped vehicle had darkly
tinted windows. then, when asked about drugs and firearms,
vasquez-Arenivar looked away and delayed his responses,
and the issue arose of whether vasquez-Arenivar could under-
stand keiper’s questions, even though vasquez-Arenivar could
converse in English immediately prior. keiper also noticed a
large bulge in vasquez-Arenivar’s left front pocket, and keiper
knew that Pacheco had been implicated in the distribution of
methamphetamine and had been convicted on firearm charges.
Based upon the totality of these circumstances, keiper had
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts to justify a
pat-down search of vasquez-Arenivar for weapons. Although
the pat-down search of vasquez-Arenivar for officer safety
was constitutional, officers did not seize, and could not have
seized, the suspected drugs on vasquez-Arenivar’s person dur-
ing the pat-down search for weapons; the drugs were recovered
on the ground by officers after vasquez-Arenivar abandoned
the bag.
[8] this court has considered whether drugs which are
abandoned by a defendant may be lawfully recovered. In
State v. Cronin, 2 Neb. App. 368, 509 N.W.2d 673 (1993),
the defendant was being chased by the police when he dis-
carded a bag of cocaine which the police recovered and used
as a basis for a criminal charge. the issue presented in that
case was whether the defendant was illegally seized prior to
discarding the drugs he was carrying. We concluded that the
defendant was not seized before he discarded the drugs and
found that drugs which are abandoned by a defendant prior to
being seized by law enforcement may be lawfully recovered.
See id.
272 	18 NEBrASkA APPELLAtE rEPOrtS

the instant case presents a different factual situation in that
vasquez-Arenivar was legally seized prior to his abandonment
of the drugs on the side of a public street. However, we do not
consider this distinction to be determinative. Other courts have
upheld a defendant’s voluntary abandonment of property after
the defendant’s lawful seizure by law enforcement. For exam-
ple, abandonment has been found in the following situations:
where a defendant discarded drugs on the hood of a police
cruiser after a lawful investigatory stop and just before officers
were about to conduct a lawful frisk, State v. Sam, 988 So. 2d
765 (La. App. 2008); where, after his lawful arrest, a defendant
dropped drugs in the presence of an officer, State v. Mitchell,
722 So. 2d 814 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); where a defendant
tossed drugs to the floor while officers were lawfully searching
his mouth for contraband, State v. Dupree, 319 S.C. 454, 462
S.E.2d 279 (1995); where a defendant threw a pouch contain-
ing crack cocaine over a fence following his legal arrest, State
v. Bumpus, 459 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1990); where a defendant
abandoned drugs by dropping them out the window of the
vehicle on the roadside of a public street after the lawful stop
of vehicle in which he was a passenger, Morrison v. State, 71
S.W.3d 821 (tex. App. 2002); and where a defendant dropped
cocaine during a valid investigatory stop, State v. Abdullah, 730
A.2d 1074 (r.I. 1999).
[9-12] When individuals voluntarily abandon property, they
forfeit any expectation of privacy in it that they might other-
wise have had. U.S. v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
U.S. v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169 (10th Cir. 1983). the Fourth
Amendment does not protect property that has been volun-
tarily abandoned. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.
Ct. 683, 4 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1960); State v. Grant, 614 N.W.2d
848 (Iowa App. 2000). thus, a warrantless search or seizure of
abandoned property does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
U.S. v. Thomas, supra. thus, we hold that when a defendant
has been legally detained prior to voluntarily abandoning
drugs or other property, the drugs or property may be law-
fully recovered.
Since vasquez-Arenivar was legally detained prior to dis-
carding the drugs, he voluntarily abandoned the bag of drugs,
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thereby forfeiting any expectation of privacy that he may have
had in it, and the resulting seizure and search of the bag did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
Tampering With Physical Evidence Conviction.
Although 	the 	district 	court 	properly 	denied 	vasquez-
Arenivar’s motion to suppress, the State confessed at oral argu-
ments, and our review of the record confirms, that the evidence
is insufficient to support vasquez-Arenivar’s conviction for
tampering with physical evidence as a matter of law. vasquez-
Arenivar was convicted by a jury of tampering with physical
evidence. this means that the jury determined that vasquez-
Arenivar, believing that an official proceeding was pending or
about to be instituted and acting without legal right or author-
ity, destroyed, mutilated, concealed, removed, or altered physi-
cal evidence with the intent to impair its verity or availability
in the pending or prospective official proceeding. See Neb.
rev. Stat. § 28-922(1)(a) (reissue 2008).
During the pendency of this appeal, the Nebraska Supreme
Court decided State v. Lasu, 278 Neb. 180, 768 N.W.2d 447
(2009), wherein the court considered whether an individual
commits the offense of tampering with physical evidence if he
discards contraband without making an active attempt to con-
ceal or destroy it. In Lasu, the defendant, in the vicinity of a
police officer, threw a bag of marijuana into a large cardboard
bin of snack foods, where it landed on top and was likely to
be discovered. the defendant did not remove the drugs from
the scene of the possessory offense or attempt to conceal the
bag and actually placed the evidence where it was quite likely
to be discovered, even if he hoped that the drugs might be less
associated with him.
[13] In considering the issue of whether the defendant in
Lasu had committed the offense of tampering with evidence,
the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that other courts had drawn
a distinction between concealing evidence and merely aban-
doning it and that those courts that had considered “effectively
identical statutory language . . . uniformly concluded that when
a defendant merely drops, throws down, or abandons evidence
in the presence of law enforcement, such conduct will not
274 	18 NEBrASkA APPELLAtE rEPOrtS

sustain a conviction for tampering with physical evidence.” 278
Neb. at 184, 768 N.W.2d at 451. the court declined to extend
the language of Nebraska’s tampering with physical evidence
statute regarding concealing or removing physical evidence
to cover circumstances where the evidence at issue was made
more apparent, not less, holding that the offense “does not
include mere abandonment of physical evidence in the pres-
ence of law enforcement.” Id. at 185, 768 N.W.2d at 451. See
§ 28-922(1)(a).
Applying the dictates set forth in State v. Lasu, supra, to the
instant case, we find similar facts presented. the evidence in
support of vasquez-Arenivar’s conviction is that he discarded
a ziploc bag containing methamphetamine on the ground with
several police officers in close proximity. there is no question
that vasquez-Arenivar was without legal right or authority to
dispose of physical evidence and that the methamphetamine was
physical evidence within the meaning of § 28-922(1)(a). there
also is no question that vasquez-Arenivar did not destroy, muti-
late, or alter the evidence when he discarded it, or otherwise do
anything that would affect the veracity of the evidence. Like
the defendant in Lasu, vasquez-Arenivar “may have abandoned
physical evidence, intending to prevent it from being found on
his person—but he neither concealed nor removed it from the
scene of the crime, nor did he do anything that would prevent
its recovery.” 278 Neb. at 186, 768 N.W.2d at 452.
[14] therefore, the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of
law, to support vasquez-Arenivar’s conviction for tampering
with physical evidence. When the evidence adduced at trial is
legally insufficient to sustain the conviction, a criminal charge
may not be retried, but must be dismissed. State v. Garza,
256 Neb. 752, 592 N.W.2d 485 (1999); State v. Jimenez, 248
Neb. 255, 533 N.W.2d 913 (1995). Consequently, we vacate
vasquez-Arenivar’s conviction and sentence for tampering with
physical evidence.
CONCLUSION
We find that the district court properly denied vasquez-
Arenivar’s motion to suppress; however, the evidence was
insufficient, as a matter of law, to support his conviction
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Cite as 18 Neb. App. 265

for tampering with physical evidence. therefore, we affirm
vasquez-Arenivar’s conviction and sentence for possession of
a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, and we
vacate his conviction and sentence for tampering with physi-
cal evidence.
affirmeD iN part, aND iN part vaCateD.
iN re iNtereSt of C hriStiaN l.,
a ChilD uNDer 18 yearS of age .
State of NebraSka , appellee ,
v. peggy l., appellaNt.
780 N.W.2d 39
Filed February 16, 2010. 	No. A-09-670.
1. Parental Rights: Constitutional Law: Due Process. In the context of both
adjudication and termination of parental rights hearings, procedural due process
includes notice to the person whose right is affected by the proceeding; reason-
able opportunity to refute or defend against the charge or accusation; reasonable
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and present evi-
dence on the charge or accusation; representation by counsel, when such rep-
resentation is required by the Constitution or statutes; and a hearing before an
impartial decisionmaker.
2. Juvenile Courts: Trial: Proof. An adjudication hearing is the trial stage of a
juvenile proceeding, in which the State must prove its allegations in the petition
by a preponderance of the evidence.
3. Parental Rights. Adjudication is a crucial step in proceedings possibly leading to
the termination of parental rights.
4. Parental Rights: Constitutional Law: Due Process. Parents have a fundamental
liberty interest at stake, and the State cannot adjudicate a child except by pro-
cedures which meet the requisites of the Due Process Clause.
5. Parental Rights. Courts should be reluctant to accept any finding of a fact which
is based upon the premise that if a person suffers from recognized medical condi-
tions, such as manic depression, major depression, and seizures, then that parent
is not going to give his or her children proper care.
Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County:
elizabeth C rNkoviCh, Judge. reversed and remanded with
directions to dismiss.
Julie A. 	Frank, 	of 	Frank 	& 	Gryva, 	P.C., 	L.L.O., 	for
appellant.
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