In re Interest of Anaya

Assuming without deciding that the same principle would
apply where conviction is the result of a guilty or no contest
plea, the critical question of fact is whether Amaya directed
his counsel to file a direct appeal on his behalf. After review-
ing the evidence received at the postconviction hearing, the
district court concluded that he did not. As noted above, the
final letter which counsel sent to Amaya specifically requested
that Amaya notify him if he wished to file an appeal. After
receiving conflicting evidence, the district court found that
counsel “never heard again” from Amaya and that Amaya’s
statements to the contrary were not credible. Based upon
our review of the record, we conclude these findings are not
clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, we conclude that the district
court did not err in denying Amaya’s motion for postconviction
relief, and we affirm its judgment.
AFFirMed.
in re interest oF Joel A nAyA, A cHild under
18 yeArs oF Age .
stAte oF neBrAskA, Appellee , v. Josue A nAyA
And MAry A nAyA, AppellAnts.
758 N.W.2d 10
Filed December 5, 2008. 	No. S-07-1136.
1. Moot Question: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. mootness does not prevent
appellate jurisdiction.
2. ____: ____: ____. Because mootness is a justiciability doctrine that operates
to prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction, an appellate court reviews moot-
ness determinations under the same standard of review as other jurisdictional
questions. When a jurisdictional question does not involve a factual dispute, its
determination is a matter of law, which requires an appellate court to reach a
conclusion independent of the decisions made by the lower courts.
3. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. Whether a statute is constitu-
tional is a question of law; accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court is obligated
to reach a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the court below.
4. Courts: Jurisdiction. Although not a constitutional prerequisite for jurisdiction,
an actual case or controversy is necessary for the exercise of judicial power.
IN rE INTErEST OF ANAYA 	825
Cite as 276 Neb. 825
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:53 AM CST

5. Moot Question: Words and Phrases. A case becomes moot when the issues
initially presented in the litigation cease to exist, when the litigants lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome of litigation, or when the litigants seek to
determine a question which does not rest upon existing facts or rights, in which
the issues presented are no longer alive.
6. Moot Question: Appeal and Error. Under the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine, a court may review an otherwise moot case if it involves a
matter affecting the public interest or when other rights or liabilities may be
affected by its determination.
7. ____: ____. When determining whether a case involves a matter of public inter-
est, an appellate court considers (1) the public or private nature of the question
presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative adjudication for future guidance
of public officials, and (3) the likelihood of future recurrence of the same or a
similar problem.
8. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Presumptions. A statute is presumed to
be constitutional, and all reasonable doubts will be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.
9. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Proof. The burden of establishing the unconstitu-
tionality of a statute is on the one attacking its validity.
10. Constitutional Law. Both the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and
article I, § 4, of the Nebraska Constitution protect religious freedom and prohibit
interference therewith.
11. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. When reviewing the con-
stitutionality of a law that is challenged based on the Free Exercise Clause, the
question is whether the law is neutral and has a general application.
12. Civil Rights: Statutes. A law is neutral and of general applicability if it does not
aim to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation and
if it does not in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by
religious belief.
13. ____: ____. A neutral law of general applicability need not be supported by a
compelling governmental interest even though it may have an incidental effect of
burdening religion.
14. Statutes: Appeal and Error. When engaging in statutory interpretation, an
appellate court’s objective is to harmonize the language of conflicting statutes.
15. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Proof. At the adjudication stage, in order for
a juvenile court to assume jurisdiction of a minor child under Neb. rev. Stat.
§ 43-247(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2006), the State must prove the allegations of the
petition by a preponderance of the evidence.
16. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. To obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile, the court’s
only concern is whether the conditions in which the juvenile presently finds him-
self or herself fit within the asserted subsection of Neb. rev. Stat. § 43-247 (Cum.
Supp. 2006).
17. ____: ____. If the pleadings and evidence at the adjudication hearing do not
justify a juvenile court’s acquiring jurisdiction of a child, then the juvenile court
has no jurisdiction and any subsequent orders of the court are a nullity.
Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County:
elizABetH crnkovicH, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
826 	276 NEBrASkA rEPOrTS

Jefferson Downing and Joel Bacon, of keating, O’Gara,
Nedved & Peter, P.C., L.L.O., for appellants.
Donald W. kleine, Douglas County Attorney, and Nicole
Brundo Goaley for appellee.
wrigHt, connolly, gerrArd, stepHAn, MccorMAck , and
M iller-lerMAn, JJ., and sievers , Judge.
M iller-lerMAn, J.
NATUrE OF CASE
In this appeal, appellants Josue Anaya and mary Anaya
claim that the newborn screening statutes, Neb. rev. Stat.
§§ 71-519 to 71-524 (Supp. 2007), violate the free exercise
of religion provisions found at article I, § 4, of the Nebraska
Constitution. The Anayas also assert that the separate juvenile
court of Douglas County erred in ordering that their son, Joel
Anaya, be tested pursuant to those statutes and remain in the
custody of the State of Nebraska pending the results of the
testing. We conclude that the screening statutes are constitu-
tional, and we further conclude that due to insufficient proof,
the separate juvenile court did not have jurisdiction under Neb.
rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2006) and its orders
were a nullity. However, because we conclude that the instant
appeal is moot and because the above-stated determination is
based on the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine,
we dismiss the present appeal.
STATEmENT OF FACTS
The Anayas object to the State’s enforcement of the newborn
screening statutes with respect to their son, Joel. The newborn
screening statutes require that every newborn in Nebraska have
a blood test. See §§ 71-519 to 71-524. The screening test is
administered to advise parents and physicians whether an infant
suffers from any of the following eight metabolic and genetic
disorders: congenital primary hypothyroidism, hemoglobinop-
athies, biotinidase deficiency, congenital adrenal hyperplasia,
cystic fibrosis, phenylketonuria, medium-chain acyl co-a dehy-
drogenase (mCAD) deficiency, and galactosemia. 181 Neb.
Admin. Code, ch. 2, § 003 (2005). The conditions are serious
IN rE INTErEST OF ANAYA 	827
Cite as 276 Neb. 825

and, if untreated, could lead to mental disabilities, loss of hear-
ing, loss of vision, irreversible brain damage, or death. The
test involves obtaining a specimen of the infant’s blood via a
prick to the heel. Pursuant to the regulations established by the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the test
is to be performed within 24 to 48 hours of the infant’s birth.
181 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 2, §§ 005.04 and 008 (2005). The
evidence indicates that the goal of the screening program is to
have every child tested and treated within the first week of his
or her life.
Joel was born at home on September 2, 2007. DHHS’
newborn screening program staff was alerted to Joel’s birth
by reviewing registered birth certificates. Once alerted to an
out-of-hospital birth, it is the practice of the newborn screen-
ing program staff to check the newborn screening data system
to determine whether the child has been screened. Although
it is not clear from the record when the newborn screening
program staff learned of Joel’s birth, the record shows that
krystal Baumert, a member of that staff, did such a check on
Joel. When she determined that Joel had not been screened, she
sent the Anayas a certified letter on September 18 notifying
them of the requirement to have Joel submit to the newborn
screening test. The letter stated that if the newborn screen-
ing program staff did not hear from the Anayas by September
21, it “[would] presume the screening has not been done, and
must notify the County Attorney to initiate action pursuant to
Nebraska revised Statute §71-524.” Also on September 18,
Baumert followed up the mailing with a telephone call to mary
inquiring whether the Anayas planned to have the screening
test performed. mary informed Baumert that they would not
have Joel tested.
The newborn screening program staff notified the State that
the Anayas refused to have Joel tested. On October 10, 2007,
the State filed a petition for adjudication in the separate juve-
nile court of Douglas County under § 43-247(3)(a), alleging
that Joel lacked proper parental care by reason of the faults or
habits of his parents, the Anayas. The petition alleged that the
Anayas’ failure to submit Joel for the newborn screening test
828 	276 NEBrASkA rEPOrTS

placed him at risk for harm. On that same date, the State also
filed a motion for temporary custody pending a hearing on the
petition and asked that Joel be placed in the custody of DHHS.
Also on that same date, the court issued an ex parte order for
immediate custody, finding that there was an immediate and
urgent need for out-of-home placement of Joel for his protec-
tion and that DHHS had made reasonable efforts to prevent his
removal from the family home. On October 11, when Joel was
about 5 weeks old, he was removed from the family home and
taken into the custody of DHHS.
The court held a formal hearing on October 12, 2007. At
the hearing, the court received into evidence, inter alia, an
affidavit in support of temporary custody of Joel sworn to by
an employee of DHHS, the September 18 letter sent to the
Anayas by Baumert, and a report from two DHHS employees
to a deputy Douglas County Attorney; the report stated that
after observing the Anayas’ home environment, the DHHS
employees had concluded that Joel appeared to be a healthy
6-week-old infant, and it recommended that Joel be returned to
the Anayas’ care pending the resolution of the newborn screen-
ing issue. The court also heard testimony from Dr. richard
E. Lutz, former chairman of the State of Nebraska Newborn
Screening Advisory Committee; one of the DHHS employees
who wrote the above-mentioned report; and the Anayas. Dr.
Lutz testified that the testing of a child could still be relevant
at 6 weeks of age because “[s]ome of these ailments don’t
become clinically relevant for weeks or months.” Dr. Lutz
cited mCAD deficiency as an example, stating that a patient
may not “present” with that disease until he or she is 2, 6, or 9
months or 2 or 4 years of age. During the hearing, the Anayas
stated that the taking of a blood sample from Joel was contrary
to their sincerely held religious beliefs, and they unsuccess-
fully challenged the newborn screening statutes as violative of
their right to the free exercise of religion under Neb. Const.
art. I, § 4.
At the conclusion of the October 12, 2007, hearing, the
court effectively found that Joel was a child as described
under § 43-247(3)(a) and determined that Joel was at risk of
IN rE INTErEST OF ANAYA 	829
Cite as 276 Neb. 825

harm and that it was necessary the newborn screening test
be administered immediately. The court directed that Joel be
tested and further directed that he remain in the custody of
DHHS until the results of the blood test were known. The
court later entered a written order memorializing its October
12 oral rulings.
There seems to be no dispute that on October 16, 2007,
the results of the test came back negative and that Joel was
returned to the Anayas’ custody on that same day. The State
moved to dismiss the case. On October 17, the court filed an
order dismissing the case. The Anayas appeal.
ASSIGNmENTS OF ErrOr
The Anayas assign numerous errors. Our disposition of the
following two claimed errors resolves the case. The Anayas
claim that the separate juvenile court erred when it (1) rejected
their claim that the newborn screening statutes infringed
upon their rights to the free exercise of religion under Neb.
Const. art. I, § 4, and (2) found that the evidence was suf-
ficient to adjudicate Joel as a child under § 43-247(3)(a) and
ordered his continued detention after the blood specimen had
been obtained.
STANDArDS OF rEVIEW
[1,2] 	mootness 	does 	not 	prevent 	appellate 	jurisdiction.
BryanLGH v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs.,
ante p. 596, 755 N.W.2d 807 (2008). But, because mootness
is a justiciability doctrine that operates to prevent courts from
exercising jurisdiction, we have reviewed mootness determina-
tions under the same standard of review as other jurisdictional
questions. Id. When a jurisdictional question does not involve
a factual dispute, its determination is a matter of law, which
requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent
of the decisions made by the lower courts. In re Interest of
Jedidiah P., 267 Neb. 258, 673 N.W.2d 553 (2004).
[3] Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law;
accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court is obligated to reach
a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the court
below. Stenger v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 274 Neb. 819,
743 N.W.2d 758 (2008).
830 	276 NEBrASkA rEPOrTS

ANALYSIS
This Appeal Will Be Considered Under the Public
Interest Exception to the Mootness Doctrine.
Before reaching the legal issues presented, we address the
justiciability issue raised by the State. Prior to oral argu-
ment, the State moved for summary dismissal of this case
on the basis that the case is moot. The State contended that
because the screening testing had been accomplished and the
separate juvenile court had dismissed the petition, there was
no longer a case or controversy for this court to review. The
Anayas opposed the State’s motion and claimed that the matter
remained reviewable because it fell within the public inter-
est exception to the mootness doctrine. We agreed with the
Anayas, and we denied the motion.
[4,5] Although not a constitutional prerequisite for juris-
diction, an actual case or controversy is necessary for the
exercise of judicial power. BryanLGH v. Nebraska Dept. of
Health & Human Servs., supra. A case becomes moot when
the issues initially presented in the litigation cease to exist,
when the litigants lack a legally cognizable interest in the out-
come of litigation, or when the litigants seek to determine a
question which does not rest upon existing facts or rights, in
which the issues presented are no longer alive. Orchard Hill
Neighborhood v. Orchard Hill Mercantile, 274 Neb. 154, 738
N.W.2d 820 (2007).
[6,7] Although the Anayas concede that the underlying facts
are moot, they nevertheless argue that the case should be
reviewed because it falls within the public interest exception to
the mootness doctrine. Under the public interest exception to
the mootness doctrine, a court may review an otherwise moot
case if it involves a matter affecting the public interest or when
other rights or liabilities may be affected by its determination.
Green v. Lore, 263 Neb. 496, 640 N.W.2d 673 (2002). When
determining whether a case involves a matter of public inter-
est, we consider (1) the public or private nature of the question
presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative adjudication
for future guidance of public officials, and (3) the likelihood
of future recurrence of the same or a similar problem. Id. After
IN rE INTErEST OF ANAYA 	831
Cite as 276 Neb. 825

considering these factors, we conclude that this case meets this
standard and merits review.
The validity of the newborn screening statutes and the proper
statutory method of enforcing the statutes fall squarely within
the public interest. resolution of these issues involves the
health and welfare of all children born in the state, an issue of
paramount importance to the citizens of this state. Furthermore,
this court’s resolution of the constitutional and statutory issues
in this case will provide guidance for state officials and the
juvenile courts on the validity of the newborn screening stat-
utes and the proper method of enforcing these statutes. Finally,
the appellants in this case are of childbearing age, so the issues
presented in this appeal are capable of recurring in the future,
and in addition, similar cases are likely to arise.
Constitutional Question: The Newborn Screening
Statutes Do Not Violate Neb. Const. Art. I, § 4.
[8,9] The Anayas claim that the newborn screening statutes
violate their rights to the free exercise of religion under article
I, § 4, of the Nebraska Constitution. Article I, § 4, provides:
“No person shall be compelled to attend, erect or support	o person shall be compelled to attend, erect or support
any place of worship against his consent, and no preference
shall be given by law to any religious society, nor shall any
interference with the rights of conscience be permitted.” A	A
statute is presumed to be constitutional, and all reasonable
doubts will be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. Stenger
v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 274 Neb. 819, 743 N.W.2d 758
(2008). The burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a
statute is on the one attacking its validity. Id. Whether a statute
is constitutional is a question of law; accordingly, the Nebraska
Supreme Court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent
of the decision reached by the court below. Id.
The newborn screening statute § 71-519, challenged by the
Anayas, provides:
(1) All infants born in the State of Nebraska shall be
screened for phenylketonuria, primary hypothyroidism,
biotinidase deficiency, galactosemia, hemoglobinopathies,
[mCAD] deficiency, and such other metabolic diseases as
[DHHS] may from time to time specify. . . .
832 	276 NEBrASkA rEPOrTS

(2) . . . If a birth is not attended by a physician and the
infant does not have a physician, the person registering
the birth shall cause such tests to be performed within the
period and in the manner prescribed by [DHHS].
In Douglas Cty. v. Anaya, 269 Neb. 552, 694 N.W.2d 601
(2005) (Anaya I), this court addressed and rejected the Anayas’
challenge to the newborn screening statutes under the Free
Exercise Clause of the federal Constitution. The Anayas argue
that the analysis in Anaya I wherein we employed a rational
basis review does not control this case. The Anayas rely on
Nebraska case law and the Nebraska Constitution in support
of their argument. The Anayas direct us to Palmer v. Palmer,
249 Neb. 814, 545 N.W.2d 751 (1996), in which we examined
a free exercise issue under the higher “compelling state inter-
est” standard, and to the language of the free exercise provi-
sions of the Nebraska Constitution, both of which the Anayas
claim require us to review their state constitutional challenge
under a higher degree of scrutiny than challenges under the
Free Exercise Clause of the federal Constitution. We are not
persuaded by these arguments.
With respect to Palmer, the Anayas rely on our statement
therein in which we observed that where the Free Exercise
Clause is involved, “a state may abridge religious practices
upon a demonstration that some compelling state interest out-
weighs a complainant’s interests in religious freedom.” 249
Neb. at 818, 545 N.W.2d at 755. The Anayas assert that Palmer
established that the State must demonstrate a higher “compel-
ling interest” before it can interfere with the exercise of reli-
gion and that we are bound to follow this standard. The Anayas
misperceive the significance of this case.
Our comment in Palmer was a correct statement of the law
when made, but is no longer the standard in Nebraska under
the free exercise provisions of the Nebraska Constitution.
Palmer was filed April 12, 1996. At that time, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (1994) of the religious Freedom restoration Act
was in effect, which legislation purported to restore the “com-
pelling state interest” test after Employment Div., Ore. Dept.
of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595,
108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990), had previously announced the
IN rE INTErEST OF ANAYA 	833
Cite as 276 Neb. 825

“rational basis review” test. However, the religious Freedom
restoration Act was found unconstitutional in 1997 in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L. Ed.
2d 624 (1997), the year after we decided Palmer. Following
City of Boerne, the rational basis review standard again con-
trolled. Thus, subsequent to Palmer, the rational basis review
standard described in Smith once again became applicable and
we applied it in Anaya I.
[10] With respect to the textual argument, we recognize
that the language of the state and federal provisions at issue
differs; however, we are not prepared to accord these textual
differences weight in terms of their constitutional significance.
Both the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and article
I, § 4, of the Nebraska Constitution protect religious freedom
and prohibit interference therewith. See, U.S. Const. amend. I
(“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”); Neb. Const.
art. I, § 4 (“[n]o person shall be compelled to attend, erect or
support any place of worship against his consent, and no pref-
erence shall be given by law to any religious society, nor shall
any interference with the rights of conscience be permitted”);
Palmer v. Palmer, supra. See, also, Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1213 (1940)
(stating that “[t]he First Amendment declares that Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof”). Where state and federal
constitutional provisions contain similar language and protect
similar rights, we may conclude and indeed have concluded
that they should be interpreted in congruence. For example,
in State v. Senters, 270 Neb. 19, 699 N.W.2d 810 (2005), we
stated that the due process clause of the Nebraska Constitution
does not contain a right of privacy broader than that recognized
under the federal Constitution. Similarly, in Hamit v. Hamit,
271 Neb. 659, 715 N.W.2d 512 (2006), we extended this prin-
ciple of congruence to the context of a parent’s substantive
due process rights because the federal and state Constitutions
contain similar due process language and both provide that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. Accordingly, because the free exercise
834 	276 NEBrASkA rEPOrTS

provisions of the Nebraska Constitution protect the same rights
as the Free Exercise Clause of the federal Constitution, we will
review the newborn screening statutes under the same stan-
dard—and that standard, rational basis review, was recently
applied in Anaya I.
[11-13] As we explained in Anaya I, when reviewing the
constitutionality of a law that is challenged based on the Free
Exercise Clause, the question is whether the law is neutral and
has a general application. See, also, Employment Div., Ore.
Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595,
108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990). A law is neutral and of general
applicability “if it does not aim to ‘infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious motivation,’ and if it does
not ‘in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct
motivated by religious belief.’” San Jose Christian College
v. Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004), quoting
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993). A neutral law of
general applicability need not be supported by a compelling
governmental interest even though it may have an incidental
effect of burdening religion. See Employment Div., Ore. Dept.
of Human Res. v. Smith, supra.
In Anaya I, we concluded that § 71-519 was a neutral law of
general applicability, noting that because “[§] 71-519 does not
contain a system of particularized exemptions that allow some
children to be excused from testing . . . [, t]he statute does not
unlawfully burden the Anayas’ right to freely exercise their
religion, nor does it unlawfully burden their parental rights.”
269 Neb. at 560, 694 N.W.2d at 608. We further concluded
in Anaya I that § 71-519 could not be construed as regulating
religious-based conduct and that there was no evidence the
State had an antireligious purpose in enforcing the law.
After concluding in Anaya I that § 71-519 was a neutral
law of general applicability, this court reviewed the evidence
presented in the district court to determine whether there was
a rational basis for the law. Because the State has an interest
in the health and welfare of all children born in Nebraska and
the purpose of § 71-519 is to protect such health and welfare,
we concluded in Anaya I that this interest is a rational basis
IN rE INTErEST OF ANAYA 	835
Cite as 276 Neb. 825

for the law and that therefore, § 71-519 does not violate the
federal Constitution. The record supports, and we apply, a
similar analysis in the instant case. Based on this analysis, we
conclude that the newborn screening statutes do not violate the
free exercise provisions of the Nebraska Constitution.
Enforcement of the Newborn Screening Statutes
Under the Juvenile Code Was Not Warranted,
for Lack of Proof of Neglect.
We now turn to the enforcement of the newborn screen-
ing statutes in this case. The juvenile code and the newborn
screening statutes are relevant to our consideration of this
appeal. Section 71-524 contains the procedure in district court
for the enforcement of the newborn screening statutes. Section
71-524 states:
In addition to any other remedies which may be avail-
able by law, a civil proceeding to enforce section 71-519
may be brought in the district court of the county where
the infant is domiciled or found. The attending physi-
cian, the hospital or other birthing facility, the Attorney
General, or the county attorney of the county where the
infant is domiciled or found may institute such proceed-
ings as are necessary to enforce such section. . . . A hear-
ing on any action brought pursuant to this section shall be
held within seventy-two hours of the filing of such action,
and a decision shall be rendered by the court within
twenty-four hours of the close of the hearing.
As provided for by the Legislature, § 71-524 is the primary
method for enforcing the newborn screening statutes via a civil
proceeding in district court. In this case, however, the State
enforced the newborn screening statutes in the separate juve-
nile court through § 43-247(3)(a) of the juvenile code. Section
43-247 states:
The juvenile court shall have exclusive original juris-
diction as to[:]
. . . .
(3) [a]ny juvenile (a) . . . who lacks proper parental
care by reason of the fault or habits of his or her par-
ent, guardian, or custodian; whose parent, guardian, or
836 	276 NEBrASkA rEPOrTS

custodian neglects or refuses to provide proper or neces-
sary subsistence, education, or other care necessary for
the health, morals, or well-being of such juvenile; whose
parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to provide or
neglects or refuses to provide special care made neces-
sary by the mental condition of the juvenile; or who is
in a situation or engages in an occupation dangerous to
life or limb or injurious to the health or morals of such
juvenile . . . .
[14] Although there is tension between the language of
§ 71-524, which instructs that enforcement of the newborn
screening statutes be sought in district court, and the exclu-
sivity provision of § 43-247(3)(a), regarding juvenile court
jurisdiction, we determine that both statutes are relevant
to the enforcement of the newborn screening scheme. In
this regard, we have stated that when engaging in statutory
interpretation, our objective is to harmonize the language of
conflicting statutes. See Hoeings v. County of Adams, 254
Neb. 64, 574 N.W.2d 498 (1998) (stating that where it is pos-
sible to harmonize apparently conflicting statutes, such is to
be done).
By its terms, in addition to the specific and therefore pre-
ferred remedy in district court, § 71-524 states that the new-
born screening statutes may also be enforced through “other
remedies which may be available by law.” Under the proper
set of proven facts, enforcement through the neglect provi-
sions of the juvenile code may be one such “other remedy.”
The goals of the juvenile code are to ensure the rights of all
juveniles, to provide them a safe and stable living environ-
ment, and to develop their capacities for a healthy person-
ality, physical well-being, and useful citizenship. See Neb.
rev. Stat. § 43-246 (reissue 2004). A proceeding brought
under the juvenile code alleging and establishing a failure to
test along with other indicators of neglect may be warranted
and would be compatible with § 71-524. Here, however, the
State did not meet its burden of proof to acquire jurisdiction
to proceed in juvenile court under § 43-247(3)(a), and thus,
its enforcement effort under the juvenile code ought not to
have succeeded.
IN rE INTErEST OF ANAYA 	837
Cite as 276 Neb. 825

[15-17] At the adjudication stage, in order for a juve-
nile court to assume jurisdiction of minor children under
§ 43-247(3)(a), the State must prove the allegations of the
petition by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Interest
of Heather R. et al., 269 Neb. 653, 694 N.W.2d 659 (2005).
The court’s only concern is whether the conditions in which
the juvenile presently finds himself or herself fit within the
asserted subsection of § 43-247. In re Interest of Brian B. et
al., 268 Neb. 870, 689 N.W.2d 184 (2004). If the pleadings
and evidence at the adjudication hearing do not justify a juve-
nile court’s acquiring jurisdiction of a child, then the juvenile
court has no jurisdiction and any subsequent orders of the court
are a nullity. See, In re Interest of D.M.B., 240 Neb. 349, 481
N.W.2d 905 (1992); In re Interest of Joelyann H., 6 Neb. App.
472, 574 N.W.2d 185 (1998).
While the State need not prove that the juvenile has actu-
ally suffered physical harm, our cases make clear that at a
minimum, the State must establish that without intervention,
there is a definite risk of future harm. See, e.g., In re Interest
of Brianna B. & Shelby B., 9 Neb. App. 529, 614 N.W.2d 790
(2000) (holding that parent’s alleged alcoholism was not suffi-
cient evidence for adjudication under § 43-247(3)(a) when there
was no evidence that such drinking caused harm or resulted in
improper care of children). Here, the State did not meet its
burden of proof as required under § 43-247(3)(a). Nothing
presented at the October 12, 2007, hearing was tantamount to
proof that the Anayas had neglected Joel. On the contrary, the
evidence at the October 12 hearing established that during a
DHHS home visit, the staff observed that Joel’s needs were
being met and that he was a healthy 6-week-old baby. Although
failure to comply with the newborn screening statutes may be
relevant, along with other facts, to a determination that a child
was neglected as that term is understood under § 43-247(3)(a),
the fact of failure to test under the newborn screening statutes,
standing alone, does not establish neglect.
Our review of the record convinces us that the State failed to
establish that this was an emergency situation, that harm was
imminent, or that continued detention of Joel was warranted.
At 5 weeks old, Joel was well past the first 24- to 48-hour
838 	276 NEBrASkA rEPOrTS

emergency time period set forth in the newborn screening
statutes and regulations. The only evidence presented at the
hearing with respect to the need for testing at 5 or 6 weeks of
age was the testimony of Dr. Lutz to the effect that the testing
was still relevant for a 6-week-old infant because some of the
conditions can still be detected. The record suggests that test-
ing can still identify beneficial information after the first week
of life; however, this fact alone does not prove that without
immediate testing, a 5-week-old infant is at immediate risk
of harm warranting jurisdiction under § 43-247(3)(a) or that
such an infant’s continued detention after a blood specimen
is obtained is necessary. There simply was no legal, factual,
or logical basis to keep Joel in State custody after the blood
sample was taken.
Because the State failed to meet its burden of proof under
§ 43-247(3)(a), the separate juvenile court did not acquire
jurisdiction over Joel and all orders entered by the separate
juvenile court were a nullity.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the newborn screening statutes do not vio-
late Nebraska’s free exercise of religion provisions under Neb.
Const. art. I, § 4. With respect to enforcement, we conclude that
the State did not meet its burden of proof under § 43-247(3)(a),
that the juvenile court did not acquire jurisdiction over Joel,
and that its orders for testing and continued detention were a
nullity. However, because we have concluded that the instant
appeal is moot and because the above-stated determinations are
made based on the public interest exception to the mootness
doctrine, we dismiss the present appeal.
A ppeAl disMissed.
H eAvicAn, C.J., not participating.
IN rE INTErEST OF ANAYA 	839
Cite as 276 Neb. 825