McClellan v. Board of Equal. of Douglas Cty.

weapon, reckless driving, and possession of marijuana. At sen-
tencing, the court explained that “[t]he information provided
by [Kinkennon] indicates that [he] is really not even coming
to the threshold of understanding or being of a mindset that
he really truly seeks a rehabilitative program.” We agree with
this assessment.
Possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver is a
Class II felony,28 punishable by a minimum of 1 year’s impris-
onment and a maximum of 50 years’ imprisonment.29 Possession
of cocaine is a Class IV felony,30 punishable by a maximum of
5 years’ imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both.31 The district
court reviewed the record, considered the appropriate sentenc-
ing factors, and imposed sentences within the statutory limits.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Kinkennon.
CONCLUSION
For each of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed.
A ffirmed .
28 § 28-416(2).
29 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
30 § 28-416(3).
31 § 28-105(1).
michAel d. mcclellAn et Al ., AppellAnts , v . the B oArd of
equAlizAtion of douglAs county , neBrAskA, And
intercessors of the lAmB, inc ., Appellees .
748 N.W.2d 66
Filed May 2, 2008. 	No. S-06-1072.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which an
appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
2. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Subject matter jurisdiction is a court’s power to
hear and determine a case in the general class or category to which the proceedings
in question belong and to deal with the general subject involved in the action before
the court and the particular question which it assumes to determine.
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582 	275 NeBRASKA RePORTS
3. Actions: Jurisdiction. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
time by any party or by the court sua sponte.
4. Standing: Jurisdiction: Justiciable Issues. As an aspect of jurisdiction and justi-
ciability, standing requires that a litigant have such a personal stake in the outcome
of a controversy as to warrant invocation of a court’s jurisdiction and justify the
exercise of the court’s remedial powers on the litigant’s behalf.
5. Standing: Municipal Corporations. generally, in order to have standing to bring
suit to restrain an act of a municipal body, the persons seeking such action must
show some special injury peculiar to themselves aside from a general injury to the
public, and it is not sufficient that they have merely a general interest common to
all members of the public.
6. Standing: Jurisdiction: Parties: Judgments: Appeal and Error. It is generally
the case that only parties to a judgment or their privies have standing to invoke a
higher court’s jurisdiction for review of the judgment.
7. Taxation: Appeal and Error. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-202.04 (Cum. Supp. 2006)
delineates who may appeal from the decision of the county board of equalization
on a tax exemption determination.
8. Appeal and Error: Words and Phrases. The word “appeal” is a word of general
application in the law. Ordinarily it refers to the removal of proceedings from one
court or tribunal to another for review.
9. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. The fundamental rule in construing statutes is that
they shall be construed in pari materia and from their language as a whole to deter-
mine the intent of the Legislature; all subordinate rules are mere aids in reaching
this fundamental determination.
10. Statutes. In the absence of a statutory indication to the contrary, words in a statute
will be given their ordinary meaning.
Appeal from the district Court for douglas County: J. michAel
coffey, Judge. Vacated and dismissed.
Michael d. McClellan, of gast & McClellan, for appellants.
Kristin M. Lynch, douglas County Attorney, for appellee
Board of equalization of douglas County.
gerard T. Forgét III, of Forgét Firm, and William e. Pfeiffer,
of Raynor, Rensch & Pfeiffer, for appellee Intercessors of the
Lamb, Inc.
heAvicAn , c.J., connolly , gerrArd , stephAn , mccormAck ,
and miller -lermAn , JJ.
mccormAck , J.
NATURe OF CASe
The 	appellants, 	taxpayers 	and 	homeowners 	in 	douglas
County, appeal from the denial of their petition in error to the

district court, which petition sought review of tax-exempt status
granted to three neighboring residential properties owned by
the Intercessors of the Lamb, Inc. (Intercessors). We determine
that the taxpayers lack standing to seek direct review of the
exempt status of another’s property and that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over appeals from tax exemp-
tions, which appeals should instead be lodged with the Tax
equalization and Review Commission (TeRC).
BACKgROUNd
The Intercessors are a Catholic religious organization formed
as a nonprofit corporation.1 The Archdiocese of Omaha describes
the Intercessors as a public association of approximately 40 lay-
persons conducting their activities under the authority of the
Archbishop of Omaha. The core group of laypersons have taken
hermit vows which are recognized by the Catholic Church. Four
priests are also affiliated with the association.
eleven residences and some real property owned by the
Intercessors in an area known as Ponca Hills have already been
deemed tax exempt and are not the subject of the current appeal.
The Intercessors acquired three additional residences in Ponca
Hills that, in 2005, they asked also to be designated as tax exempt
pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-202(1)(d) (Reissue 2003). each
of the three residences has a chapel, and the Intercessors living
there adhere to a schedule of approximately 10 hours a day of
prayer and ministry.
A public hearing before the douglas County Board of
equalization (Board) was held on the Intercessors’ request
to exempt the three properties from taxation. Michael d.
McClellan, a taxpayer in douglas County and an attorney for
a neighborhood association in Ponca Hills, along with several
residents and members of the Ponca Hills community, were
allowed to express their objections before the Board. The resi-
dents were concerned about the declining tax base of the area
which, they argued, increased the tax burden of the nonexempt
residents. In addition, one of the houses under consideration
1 See, generally, Latenser v. Intercessors of the Lamb, Inc., 250 Neb. 789, 553
N.W.2d 458 (1996).
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584 	275 NeBRASKA RePORTS
and two previously designated exempt residential properties are
located in a Sanitary Improvement district (SId). Members of
this SId raised concerns to the Board regarding the ability to
fund the SId, although there was evidence that the Intercessors
were voluntarily making SId payments for that property. The
Board ultimately granted the exemptions.
On September 7, 2005, McClellan and the other objectors
(hereinafter petitioners), filed a petition in error in the district
court contesting the Board’s grant of exempt status for the three
properties. The district court affirmed the decision of the Board,
and the petitioners appeal.
ASSIgNMeNTS OF eRROR
The petitioners assign that the district court erred in not over-
turning the decision of the Board, because (1) the Board did not
follow the applicable law, (2) there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding that the residences were used exclusively for
tax-exempt purposes, and (3) the court erroneously based its
ruling on a presumption that the Board faithfully performed its
official duties and acted upon sufficient competent evidence.
In addition, we entered an order to show cause directing the
parties to brief (1) whether neighboring taxpayers have standing
to bring a petition in error contesting a board of equalization’s
decision to grant a tax exemption to another and (2) whether
the TeRC has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving tax-
exempt status for real or personal property.
STANdARd OF ReVIeW
[1] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which an
appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.2
ANALySIS
[2,3] Two jurisdictional questions are raised by the petition-
ers’ action in seeking review of the Board’s decision by petition
in error to the district court: (1) who has standing to seek review
of the Board’s decision and (2) where any such review must
take place. Both issues concern the district court’s subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, which is a court’s power to hear and determine
2 Jones v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Cos., 274 Neb. 186, 738 N.W.2d 840 (2007).

a case in the general class or category to which the proceedings
in question belong and to deal with the general subject involved
in the action before the court and the particular question which
it assumes to determine.3 Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may
be raised at any time by any party or by the court sua sponte.4
[4-6] As an aspect of jurisdiction and justiciability, standing
requires that a litigant have such a personal stake in the outcome
of a controversy as to warrant invocation of a court’s jurisdic-
tion and justify the exercise of the court’s remedial powers on
the litigant’s behalf.5 generally, in order to have standing to
bring suit to restrain an act of a municipal body, the persons
seeking such action must show some special injury peculiar to
themselves aside from a general injury to the public, and it is not
sufficient that they have merely a general interest common to all
members of the public.6 It is also generally the case that only
parties to a judgment or their privies have standing to invoke a
higher court’s jurisdiction for review of the judgment.7
While there is an exception to the special injury rule for per-
sons objecting to an illegal expenditure of public funds or an
illegal increase in the burden of municipal taxation,8 there does
not appear to be any common-law right to seek direct review
of an order relating to the exemption of another taxpayer’s
3 Rozsnyai v. Svacek, 272 Neb. 567, 723 N.W.2d 329 (2006).
4 Betterman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 273 Neb. 178, 728 N.W.2d 570
(2007).
5 Chambers v. Lautenbaugh, 263 Neb. 920, 644 N.W.2d 540 (2002).
6 See Smith v. City of Papillion, 270 Neb. 607, 705 N.W.2d 584 (2005).
7 See, Rozmus v. Rozmus, 257 Neb. 142, 595 N.W.2d 893 (1999); Peterson v.
Martin, 60 Neb. 577, 83 N.W. 831 (1900).
8 Holland v. Brownville Grain Co., 174 Neb. 742, 119 N.W.2d 304 (1963).
See, also, Rath v. City of Sutton, 267 Neb. 265, 673 N.W.2d 869 (2004);
Chambers v. Lautenbaugh, supra note 5; Jacob v. State, 12 Neb. App. 696,
685 N.W.2d 88 (2004).
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586 	275 NeBRASKA RePORTS
property.9 Nor is there any constitutional right to lodge such an
appeal.10 Thus, as is generally the case regarding the right to
appeal,11 the question of whether a taxpayer may seek review
of the exempt status of another taxpayer’s property depends
on whether the Legislature conferred such a right. It is to that
analysis that we now turn.
In considering the legislation on this point, and, particularly,
in clarifying some confusion that has developed in this area, it
is helpful to review the historical evolution of the relevant statu-
tory provisions. Section 77-151012 has, since its enactment in
1903, provided a specific mode of direct appeal from any action
of a board of equalization.13 Until the creation of the TeRC,
such appeal was taken to the district courts. But the initial
inquiry concerns whom the statutes permit to appeal.
Section 77-1513,14 which was repealed in 2002, originally
indicated that an appeal under § 77-1510 could be made by “any
person . . . appeal[ing] from the assessment of another as fixed
by the County Board of equalization.”15 In State v. Drexel,16
we thus held that because there was “a plain adequate remedy
prescribed by the statute” for the taxpayer seeking review of
the board of equalization’s grant of exempt status to another
9 See, Colella v. Assessors of Cty. of Nassau, 95 N.y.2d 401, 741 N.e.2d 113,
718 N.y.S.2d 268 (2000); Clayton v. School Bd. of Volusia County, 696 So.
2d 1215 (Fla. App. 1997); Scott v. Harris Methodist HEB, 871 S.W.2d 548
(Tex. App. 1994); Highland Park Women’s Club v. Dep’t of Rev., 206 Ill.
App. 3d 447, 564 N.e.2d 890, 151 Ill. dec. 435 (1990); Kaup v. Department
of Revenue, 1996 WL 23500 (Or. Tax Jan. 5, 1996); Annot., 9 A.L.R.4th
428 (1981) (cases cited therein).
10 See, State v. Hess, 261 Neb. 368, 622 N.W.2d 891 (2001); State v. Schroder,
218 Neb. 860, 359 N.W.2d 799 (1984); Highland Park Women’s Club v.
Dep’t of Rev., supra note 9. See, also, Neb. Const. art. I, § 23 (limiting right
to appeal to aggrieved “party”).
11 See, e.g., Karnes v. Wilkinson Mfg., 220 Neb. 150, 368 N.W.2d 788
(1985).
12 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1510 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
13 Comp. Stat. § 5045 (1903), later § 77-1510 (1943).
14 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1513 (Reissue 1996).
15 Comp. Stat. § 5054 (1903), later § 77-1513 (1943).
16 State v. Drexel, 75 Neb. 751, 757, 107 N.W. 110, 113 (1906).

taxpayer’s property, the taxpayer did not have an action for writ
of mandamus to compel the county clerk to place such property
on the tax rolls.
[7] In 1963, however, the Legislature passed 1963 Neb.
Laws, ch. 441, § 4, p. 1461 (L.B. 386). In Bemis v. Board of
Equalization of Douglas County,17 we described L.B. 386 as
“a complete and comprehensive act dealing with the [specific]
matter of tax exemptions.” We further explained that Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 77-202.04 (Reissue 1976), enacted in L.B. 386, delin-
eated “who may appeal from the decision of the county board
of equalization on a tax exemption determination.”18
At the time that Bemis was decided, § 77-202.04 provided
for appeals by “[p]ersons, corporations, or organizations denied
exemption from taxation” and it made no provision for who
could appeal the grant of an exemption. We held in Bemis that
the county assessor, because he was not specified in § 77-202.04,
had no standing to appeal the grant of an exemption of a tax-
payer’s property. In so holding, we clarified that the more gen-
eral provisions of §§ 77-1510 through 77-1513 (Reissue 1976),
which described “any person” appealing the “assessment” of
another,19 were no longer applicable to exemptions.
After Bemis, § 77-202.04 was amended. At the time the
Intercessors’ exemptions were upheld by the Board in this case,
the statute stated:
Persons, corporations, or organizations may appeal denial
of an application for exemption by a county board of
equalization. Only the county assessor may appeal the
grant of such an exemption by a county board of equal-
ization. Appeals pursuant to this section shall be made to
the [TeRC]. The Property Tax Administrator may in his
or her discretion intervene in any such appeal pursuant to
this section.20
17 Bemis v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County, 197 Neb. 175, 177, 247
N.W.2d 447, 449 (1976).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 § 77-202.04(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006) (emphasis supplied).
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588 	275 NeBRASKA RePORTS
This leads to the second inquiry presented here: to what body
such appeals should be taken. As previously noted, until 1995,
appeals from the Board were taken to the district court. The
TeRC was created in 1995 by the Tax equalization and Review
Commission Act (TeRC Act). The TeRC Act provided that the
TeRC had “the power and duty to hear and determine appeals
of . . . (2) [d]ecisions of any county board of equalization grant-
ing or denying tax-exempt status for real or personal property.”21
To the extent that the TeRC Act contains any ambiguity as to
whether this power and duty is exclusive and no longer lies
with the district courts, the legislative history makes this clear.
The sponsor of the TeRC Act explained that the TeRC Act was
“replacing the district court with a body that does this full-time,
is more professional, [and] will give you better values.”22 The
bill’s statement of intent explains that the TeRC would
hear 	appeals 	of 	individual 	assessment 	and 	property
exemption disputes and hear appeals of the Property Tax
Administrator on tax issues. This Commission would
hear other taxation cases and appeals which currently
are now heard by the state’s district courts. The cre-
ation 	of 	an 	independent 	commission 	with 	taxation
expertise will result in streamlined taxation appeals and
equalization procedures.23
Rather than having valuation decisions lie with the myriad of
district courts, a single TeRC was intended to produce “fairer,”24
more “consistent” appeal results.25 According to the bill’s spon-
sor, “[T]his panel will get to see the entire state as a whole on
equalization across the entire state. That’s what’s so crucial,
you won’t get 50 different opinions as to what equalization
21 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-5007 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
22 Floor debate, L.B. 490, Revenue Committee, 94th Leg., 1st Sess. 5976
(May 3, 1995) (emphasis supplied).
23 Introducer’s Statement of Intent, L.B. 490, Revenue Committee, 94th Leg.,
1st Sess. (Feb. 9, 1995).
24 Floor debate, L.B. 490, Revenue Committee, 94th Leg., 1st Sess. 5989
(May 3, 1995).
25 Id. at 5977.

is. . . . And this is going to give better, better opinions.”26 The
TeRC was also intended to provide a less costly and speedier
appellate process.27
The most recent amendment to § 77-202.04 reiterates the
Legislature’s original intent, insofar as it states that “[a]ppeals
pursuant to this section shall be made to the [TeRC].”28 It is
also noteworthy, in considering the intent of the original TeRC
Act, that due to a recent amendment,29 the petition in error stat-
ute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1901 (Supp. 2007), now specifically
states that “the district court shall not have jurisdiction over . . .
(3) appeals within the jurisdiction of the [TeRC].” According
to its legislative history, § 25-1901 was amended in response
to a board of equalization decision that had been appealed
to a district court rather than to the TeRC. According to the
Revenue Committee, the amendment “simply clarifies” what
the Legislature had intended ever since the establishment of the
TeRC: that “district courts do not have jurisdiction over valua-
tion and issues within the purview of the TeRC.”30
With that explained, we consider the parties’ arguments con-
cerning the effect of these statutes. Based on the plain language
of the statutes, the Intercessors argue that § 77-202.04(1) (Cum.
Supp. 2006) limits standing for appeals from grants of exemp-
tions to “[o]nly the county assessor,” and that thus, the petition-
ers lack standing to seek review of the Intercessors’ exemptions
in this case. The Intercessors further argue that the TeRC has
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of decisions of any county
board of equalization granting or denying tax-exempt status for
real or personal property and that thus, the district court would
lack jurisdiction regardless of who was appealing.
But the petitioners argue that the statutory language regard-
ing who may “appeal,” and where this “appeal” may be lodged,
does not affect a right to file a “petition in error.” The petitioners
26 Id. at 5990.
27 See id. at 5976.
28 § 77-202.04(1) (Supp. 2007) (emphasis supplied).
29 See 2007 Neb. Laws, L.B. 167 (effective Feb. 10, 2007).
30 Committee Hearing, L.B. 167, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. 14 (Jan. 17, 2007).
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590 	275 NeBRASKA RePORTS
view a “petition in error” as a very distinct right predating
§ 77-202.04 and the TeRC, and they point out that neither
of these statutes explicitly abolishes their “right” to a petition
in error.
In support of this argument, petitioners rely on older cases
in which this court has distinguished between a “petition in
error” and an “appeal,” referring to them as “‘“independent
proceeding[s]”’” that are “‘distinctively different and dissimi-
lar.’”31 These cases, in fact, are generally limited to the narrower
distinction between “review on petition in error,” as described
by §§ 25-1901 through 25-1908,32 and “review on appeal,” as
described by §§ 25-1911 through 25-1937.33 Our purpose in
drawing the distinction between these two methods of review
has largely been to distinguish the method of perfecting each34
or to explain each method’s peculiar rules of joinder of parties. 35
We do not read these cases as establishing a “right” to a petition
in error that is independent of any statutory scheme.
The petitioners argue that a petition in error is significantly
different from an “appeal,” because a petition in error provides
a much more circumscribed scope of review. They argue that it
would not be inconsistent for § 77-202.04 and the TeRC Act to
leave this narrower form of relief intact for those taxpayers who
have no means to perfect a broader, direct “appeal” under these
provisions. But the petitioners’ underlying premise is incorrect.
The scope of review under a “petition in error” and under an
“appeal” to the TeRC under § 77-1510 (Cum. Supp. 2006), like
many other “appeals,”36 is the same. While sometimes worded
31 From v. Sutton, 156 Neb. 411, 416, 417, 56 N.W.2d 441, 444 (1953).
32 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1901 to 25-1908 (Reissue 1995).
33 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1911 to 25-1937 (Reissue 1995).
34 See, e.g., Harms v. County Board of Supervisors, 173 Neb. 687, 114 N.W.2d
713 (1962); Anania v. City of Omaha, 170 Neb. 160, 102 N.W.2d 49 (1960);
Consolidated Credit Corporation v. Berger, 141 Neb. 598, 4 N.W.2d 571
(1942).
35 See, e.g., Clausen v. School Dist. No. 33, 164 Neb. 78, 81 N.W.2d 822
(1957); Western Cornice & Mfg. Works v. Leavenworth, 52 Neb. 418, 72
N.W. 592 (1897); Polk v. Covell, 43 Neb. 884, 62 N.W. 240 (1895).
36 See, e.g., § 25-1911; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2733 (Reissue 1995).

in slightly different ways, essentially, in both review on petition
in error and in so-called “appeals,” the reviewing court may
reverse, vacate, or modify the lower judicial tribunal for error
on the record.37
[8] While certain procedural issues sometimes require that we
distinguish a petition in error from other statutory provisions for
appellate review, even in our earliest cases, we have described
the difference between an “appeal” and a “petition in error,”
as “exist[ing] in name, rather than in fact.”38 Accordingly, it is
now common for our courts to refer to an “appeal by petition in
error.”39 In Hooper Telephone Co. v. Nebraska Telephone Co.,40
we stated that the word “appeal” is a word of “general applica-
tion in the law. Ordinarily [it] refer[s] to the removal of proceed-
ings from one court or tribunal to another for review.”
[9,10] The fundamental rule in construing statutes is that they
shall be construed in pari materia and from their language as a
whole to determine the intent of the Legislature; all subordinate
rules are mere aids in reaching this fundamental determina-
tion.41 Furthermore, in the absence of a statutory indication
to the contrary, words in a statute will be given their ordinary
meaning.42 Viewing §§ 77-202.04 and 77-5007 in pari materia
37 See §§ 25-1901, 25-1911, and 25-2733. See, also, Falotico v. Grant Cty. Bd.
of Equal., 262 Neb. 292, 631 N.W.2d 492 (2001); US Ecology v. Boyd Cty.
Bd. of Equal., 256 Neb. 7, 588 N.W.2d 575 (1999); Clausen v. School Dist.
No. 33, supra note 35.
38 State, ex rel. McClosky, v. Doane, 35 Neb. 707, 709, 53 N.W. 611, 612
(1892). See, also, Western Cornice & Mfg. Works v. Leavenworth, supra
note 35.
39 See, Mogensen v. Board of Supervisors, 268 Neb. 26, 679 N.W.2d 413
(2004); Hooper v. City of Lincoln, 183 Neb. 591, 163 N.W.2d 117 (1968);
O’Grady v. Volcheck, 148 Neb. 431, 27 N.W.2d 689 (1947); Loup River
Public Power District v. County of Platte, 144 Neb. 600, 14 N.W.2d 210
(1944); Lee Sapp Leasing v. Ciao Caffe & Espresso, Inc., 10 Neb. App. 948,
640 N.W.2d 677 (2002); County of Douglas v. Burts, 2 Neb. App. 90, 507
N.W.2d 310 (1993).
40 Hooper Telephone Co. v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 96 Neb. 245, 255, 147
N.W. 674, 678 (1914).
41 Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 254 Neb. 64, 574 N.W.2d 498 (1998).
42 State v. Woods, 255 Neb. 755, 587 N.W.2d 122 (1998).
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592 	275 NeBRASKA RePORTS
and as a whole, we conclude that the Legislature intended to
use the term “appeal” in its general ordinary sense. The 2007
amendment to § 25-190143 only emphasizes what was estab-
lished by § 77-5007 when the TeRC Act was passed—that, for
decisions by a board of equalization,44 including “[d]ecisions
. . . granting or denying tax-exempt status for real or personal
property,”45 the “removal of [the] proceedings from one court or
tribunal to another for review”46 shall be made to the TeRC, and
not to any of the district courts of this state.
We do not find any preexisting “right to a petition in error.”
In fact, as already discussed, under common law, taxpayers do
not have standing to seek direct review of the tax-exempt sta-
tus of someone else’s property. Moreover, a “petition in error”
is simply a method of review, and it is not, as the petitioners
suggest, more akin to a right of action. Because there is no
preexisting common-law right to a petition in error under these
circumstances, we are not, as the petitioners suggest, subject
to the rule strictly construing against the abrogation of such
a right.47
In any event, that is a rule of statutory construction, and the
Legislature’s intent here was plain. The Legislature’s stated pur-
pose in the TeRC Act was to create an efficient mode of review
by a single body which would provide a more consistent review
of tax exemption and equalization decisions made by a board of
equalization. The language of § 77-202.04 very specifically lists
who may appeal from exemption decisions. The Legislature did
not see fit to allow every indirectly affected taxpayer to appeal
from the exemption status of someone else’s property. Instead,
the Legislature determined that giving standing to the county
assessor to appeal the grant of an exemption was sufficient
43 See § 25-1901 (Supp. 2007).
44 See, generally, § 77-5007.
45 § 77-5007(2).
46 Hooper Telephone Co. v. Nebraska Telephone Co., supra note 40, 96 Neb.
at 255, 147 N.W. at 678.
47 See, e.g., Tadros v. City of Omaha, 273 Neb. 935, 735 N.W.2d 377 (2007).

to protect the public’s general interest in what properties are
included on the tax rolls.
Ross v. The Governors of Knights of Ak-Sar-Ben,48 upon
which the petitioners rely to support their right to file a peti-
tion in error, has been abrogated by the legislation creating
the TeRC. Furthermore, we find no support for the notion,
expressed in dicta in Ross, that a taxpayer had a preexist-
ing right to seek review by petition in error of the exemp-
tion of another’s property, or that the term “appeal” found in
§ 77-202.04 was not used in its most common sense. Ross is
unpersuasive in light of subsequent statutory enactments, and to
the extent that it conflicts with this opinion, it is disapproved.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
petition in error that is the subject of this appeal. When a lower
court lacks the authority to exercise its subject matter jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate the merits of the claim, issue, or question,
an appellate court also lacks the power to determine the merits
of the claim, issue, or question presented to the lower court.49
However, when an appeal is dismissed because the lower court
lacked jurisdiction to enter the order appealed from, an appel-
late court may nevertheless enter an order vacating the order
issued by the lower court without jurisdiction.50 We therefore
vacate the order of the district court and dismiss the appeal.
vAcAted And dismissed .
W right, J., not participating.
48 Ross v. The Governors of Knights of Ak-Sar-Ben, 199 Neb. 513, 260 N.W.2d
202 (1977).
49 Kaplan v. McClurg, 271 Neb. 101, 710 N.W.2d 96 (2006).
50 See WBE Co. v. Papio-Missouri River Nat. Resources Dist., 247 Neb. 522,
529 N.W.2d 21 (1995).
McCLeLLAN v. BOARd OF eqUAL. OF dOUgLAS CTy. 	593
Cite as 275 Neb. 581