St. Monica's v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal.

jurisdictions, the DMV was unable to estimate Anderson’s Irp
liability. Therefore, Irp allowed an assessment against Anderson
of 100-percent registration fees for Nebraska. The district court
did not err in affirming the DMV’s 100-percent assessment
against Anderson.
A ffirmed .
mccormAck, J., participating on briefs.
heAvicAN, C.J., not participating.
ST. MoNICA’S v. LANCASTer CTY. BD. oF eqUAL. 	999
Cite as 275 Neb. 999
sT. moNicA’ s , AppellANT, v .
lANcAsTer couNTy boArd
of equAlizATioN, Appellee .
751 N.W.2d 604
Filed June 27, 2008. 	No. S-07-1031.
1. Taxation: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Decisions rendered by the Tax
equalization and review Commission shall be reviewed by an appellate court for
errors appearing on the record of the commission.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing
on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the decision conforms to
the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious,
nor unreasonable.
3. Taxation: Appeal and Error. questions of law arising during appellate review
of Tax equalization and review Commission decisions are reviewed de novo on
the record.
4. Taxation: Charities. Neb. rev. Stat. § 77-202(1)(d) (reissue 2003) requires
(1) the property be owned by an educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery
organization and (2) the property be used exclusively for educational, religious,
charitable, or cemetery purposes.
5. Taxation: Time. Neb. rev. Stat. § 77-202.03(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2006) provides
that the exempt use be determined as of the date of application for exemption.
6. Taxation: Property: Intent. The intention to use property in the future for an
exempt purpose is not a use of the property for exempt purposes.
7. Taxation: Property. The ownership of property is not evidence of use under Neb.
rev. Stat. § 77-202(1)(d) (reissue 2003).
Appeal from the Tax equalization and review Commission.
Affirmed.
William e. peters, of peters & Chunka, p.C., L.L.o., for
appellant.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:54 AM CST

1000 	275 NeBrASKA reporTS
gary Lacey, Lancaster County Attorney, Michael e. Thew,
and ryan M. Mick, Senior Certified Law Student, for appellee.
heAvicAN, 	C.J., 	wrighT, 	coNNolly, 	gerrArd, 	sTephAN,
mccormAck, and miller -lermAN, JJ.
heAvicAN, C.J.
INTroDUCTIoN
The Tax equalization and review Commission (TerC) upheld
the decision of the Lancaster County Board of equalization (the
Board) denying application for property tax exemption filed by
St. Monica’s. We affirm.
FACTS
St. Monica’s provides substance abuse and mental health
treatment for women on a charitable basis. St. Monica’s is a
Nebraska nonprofit corporation that holds a 501(c)(3) exemp-
tion designation from the Internal revenue Service as a religious
charitable organization.
on March 15, 2005, St. Monica’s purchased real property
located in Lincoln, Nebraska, to convert into a short-term resi-
dential therapeutic community, an outpatient facility, and admin-
istrative offices. on March 28, an application for a property
tax exemption was filed. on or about May 5, St. Monica’s was
notified that the Lancaster County assessor’s office had recom-
mended denial of the application. A hearing before the Board
regarding the application was scheduled for May 24.
After St. Monica’s received the notification, but before the
Board’s hearing, a representative of the organization contacted
the county assessor’s office. During that conversation, the rep-
resentative was informed that the basis for the recommendation
was that St. Monica’s was not yet using the subject property for
exempt purposes; however, once building permits were issued,
the county assessor would consider the property to be devoted
to an exempt use. The representative from St. Monica’s was
notified that the organization could reapply for the exemption by
August 1, 2005, for the 2005 tax year.
Following the hearing on May 24, 2005, and based upon the
county assessor’s recommendation, the Board voted to deny St.
Monica’s the exemption. St. Monica’s applied for the proper

building permits on July 21. The property was remodeled, and
St. Monica’s began occupying it in october. There is nothing in
the record that suggests that St. Monica’s reapplied at any time
for a property tax exemption for the 2005 tax year.
on December 22, 2005, St. Monica’s petitioned TerC to
reverse the decision of the Board and grant its exemption.
Initially, the petition of St. Monica’s was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction on December 14, 2006. That dismissal was appealed
and docketed with the Court of Appeals on January 12, 2007, as
case No. A-07-050.
The parties filed a joint stipulation for summary reversal on
May 4, 2007, which was granted by the Court of Appeals on
June 7. The petition was then submitted to TerC without a
hearing. on September 12, TerC upheld the Board’s decision,
and St. Monica’s appeals.
ASSIgNMeNT oF error
on appeal, St. Monica’s assigns that TerC erred in denying
its application for a property tax exemption.
STANDArD oF reVIeW
[1,2] Decisions rendered by TerC shall be reviewed by the
court for errors appearing on the record of the commission.1
When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record,
an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the decision conforms
to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither
arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.2
[3] questions of law arising during appellate review of TerC
decisions are reviewed de novo on the record.3
ANALYSIS
The sole issue presented by this case is whether TerC erred
in upholding the denial of application for property tax exemption
filed by St. Monica’s.
1 Neb. rev. Stat. § 77-5019(5) (Cum. Supp. 2006); City of York v. York Cty.
Bd. of Equal., 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003).
2 City of York v. York Cty. Bd. of Equal., supra note 1.
3 Id.
ST. MoNICA’S v. LANCASTer CTY. BD. oF eqUAL. 	1001
Cite as 275 Neb. 999

1002 	275 NeBrASKA reporTS
[4,5] 	Neb. 	rev. 	Stat. 	§ 	77-202(1) 	(reissue 	2003) 	pro-
vides that
[t]he following property shall be exempt from prop-
erty taxes:
. . . .
(d) 	property 	owned 	by 	[an] 	educational, 	religious,
charitable, or cemetery organization[], or any organiza-
tion for the exclusive benefit of any such educational,
religious, charitable, or cemetery organization, and used
exclusively for educational, religious, charitable, or cem-
etery purposes . . . .
The statute thus requires (1) the property be owned by an
educational, 	religious, 	charitable, 	or 	cemetery 	organiza-
tion and (2) the property be used exclusively for educational,
religious, charitable, or cemetery purposes.4 And Neb. rev.
Stat. § 77-202.03(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2006) provides that “the
exempt use shall be determined as of the date of application”
for exemption.
We turn first to the issue of whether the subject property was
being “used exclusively” for an exempt purpose as of the date of
application, March 28, 2005.
In its brief, St. Monica’s argues that its “intent . . . when
purchasing the property was to use the property in its charitable
work by converting [the property] into a short-term residential
therapeutic community, an outpatient facility and administrative
offices to provide substance abuse and mental health treatment
for women on a charitable basis.”5 St. Monica’s does not dispute
that the property was not actually being occupied for such a
purpose at the time it filed its application.
[6,7] This court has consistently held that the “intention to use
property in the future for an exempt purpose is not a use of the
4 See Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 237 Neb. 1,
465 N.W.2d 111 (1991).
5 Brief for appellant at 8.

property for [exempt] purposes.”6 These historic principles are
equally applicable under the current statutory scheme regard-
ing exemptions. Because at most St. Monica’s expressed an
intent to use the property in an exempt manner in the future, we
determine that the conclusion reached below that St. Monica’s
was not entitled to its requested property tax exemption for the
2005 tax year was not error. We also reject the assertion made by
St. Monica’s at oral argument that its purchase of the property
showed that it had more than intent to use the property for an
exempt purpose. The ownership of property is not evidence of
use under the statute.7
St. Monica’s also contends that because it was qualified for
the exemption, it was unnecessary for it to reapply by August
1, 2005, in order to obtain such exemption. The basis for this
argument is that as of July 21, St. Monica’s had obtained the
necessary building permits, and in accordance with the county
assessor’s policy, the subject property was considered to be
devoted to an exempt purpose.
We 	also 	reject 	this 	contention. 	As 	is 	noted 	above,
§ 77-202.03(3)(a) requires a property owner seeking an exemp-
tion to file for that exemption and further states that “the exempt
use shall be determined as of the date of application.” The record
demonstrates that St. Monica’s applied for an exemption on
March 28, 2005, at a time when, as demonstrated above, it was
not using the property for an exempt purpose. even assuming
that St. Monica’s thereafter began to use the property for an
exempt purpose, it was required under § 77-202.03 to reapply
for the exemption and allow the county assessor and the Board
to consider any possible exemption of the property anew.
Because St. Monica’s was not using the property for an
exempt purpose as of the date of its application, it was not
6 United Way v. Douglas Co. Bd. of Equal., 215 Neb. 1, 6-7, 337 N.W.2d 103,
107 (1983). See, Y. M. C. A. of Omaha v. Douglas County, 60 Neb. 642,
83 N.W. 924 (1900); Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Irey, 51 Neb. 755, 71
N.W. 752 (1897); First Christian Church of Beatrice v. City of Beatrice, 39
Neb. 432, 58 N.W. 166 (1894).
7 See Y. M. C. A. of Omaha v. Douglas County, supra note 6.
ST. MoNICA’S v. LANCASTer CTY. BD. oF eqUAL. 	1003
Cite as 275 Neb. 999

1004 	275 NeBrASKA reporTS
entitled to an exemption. The sole assignment of error by St.
Monica’s is without merit.
CoNCLUSIoN
We affirm the denial of application for property tax exemp-
tion filed by St. Monica’s.
A ffirmed .
iN re A pplicATioN of dAvid w. doeriNg for
A dmissioN To The N ebrAskA sTATe bAr .
751 N.W.2d 123
Filed June 27, 2008. 	No. S-34-070004.
1. Rules of the Supreme Court: Attorneys at Law: Appeal and Error. The
Nebraska Supreme Court will consider the appeal of an applicant from a final
adverse ruling of the Nebraska State Bar Commission de novo on the record made
at the hearing before the commission.
2. Rules of the Supreme Court: Attorneys at Law. The Nebraska Supreme Court is
vested with the sole power to admit persons to the practice of law in this state and
to fix qualifications for admission to the Nebraska bar.
3. Rules of the Supreme Court: Attorneys at Law: Waiver. The Nebraska Supreme
Court has the power, under appropriate circumstances, to waive the application of
its own rules regarding the admission of attorneys to the Nebraska bar.
4. Rules of the Supreme Court: Attorneys at Law: Intent. The Nebraska Supreme
Court rules for Admission of Attorneys are intended to weed out unqualified appli-
cants, not to prevent qualified applicants from taking the bar.
5. Rules of the Supreme Court: Attorneys at Law: Waiver. exceptions to the
Nebraska Supreme Court rules for Admission of Attorneys should be recognized
and waivers granted whenever it can be demonstrated that the rules operate in such
a manner as to deny admission to a petitioner arbitrarily and for a reason unrelated
to the essential purpose of the rule.
6. Rules of the Supreme Court: Attorneys at Law. While a strict application of
Neb. Ct. r. for Adm. of Attys. 5C (rev. 2005) may not always be appropriate for
those who attended law school outside the United States, a strict application of rule
5C is appropriate for graduates of nonaccredited United States law schools.
original action. Denial of application affirmed.
robert F. Bartle, of Bartle & geier Law Firm, for applicant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney general, and Tom Stine for Nebraska
State Bar Commission.