Teadtke v. Havranek

Willard TeadTke and lola TeadTke , husband and Wife ,
as TrusTees of The Willard and lola TeadTke TrusT,
appellees and cross -appellanTs , v. e.d. havranek , also
knoWn as eddie dean havranek , and karen k.
havranek , husband and Wife , appellanTs and
cross -appellees , and ToWn of lynch ,
boyd counTy, nebraska , also knoWn
as lynch ToWnship, eT al ., appellees.
777 N.W.2d 810
Filed January 22, 2010. 	No. S-09-165.
1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. When a jurisdictional question
does not involve a factual dispute, determination of a jurisdictional issue is a
matter of law which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent
from that of the trial court.
2. Easements: Adverse Possession: Equity: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A
suit to confirm a prescriptive easement is one grounded in the equitable juris-
diction of the district court and, on appeal, is reviewed de novo on the record,
subject to the rule that where credible evidence is in conflict on material issues
of fact, the appellate court will consider that the trial court observed the witnesses
and accepted one version of the facts over another.
3. Costs: Appeal and Error. The decision of a trial court regarding taxing of costs
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
4. Statutes: Equity: Jurisdiction. Where a statute provides an adequate remedy
at law, equity will not entertain jurisdiction, and the statutory remedy must be
exhausted before one may resort to equity.
5. Equity: Words and Phrases. An adequate remedy at law means a remedy which
is plain and complete and as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its
prompt administration as the remedy in equity.
6. Easements: Adverse Possession: Highways: Time. To establish a road or high-
way by prescription, there must be a use by the general public, under a claim of
right adverse to the owner of the land, of some particular or defined line of travel,
and the use must be uninterrupted and without substantial change for 10 years,
the period of time necessary to bar an action to recover the land.
7. Easements: Adverse Possession: Proof. To prove a prescriptive right to an ease-
ment, all the elements of prescriptive use must be generally established by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence.
8. Easements: Adverse Possession. The use and enjoyment which will give title by
prescription to an easement is substantially the same in quality and characteristics
as the adverse possession which will give title to real estate. Such use must be
adverse, under a claim of right, continuous and uninterrupted, open and notori-
ous, exclusive, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the servient
tenement, for the full prescriptive period.
9. Easements: Adverse Possession: Presumptions. Where a claimant has shown
open, visible, continuous, and unmolested use of land for a period of time
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Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:47 AM CST

sufficient to acquire an easement by adverse user, the use will be presumed to be
under claim of right.
10. Adverse Possession: Presumptions: Proof. If a person proves uninterrupted and
open use for the necessary period without evidence to explain how the use began,
the presumption is raised that the use is adverse and under claim of right, and the
burden is on the owner of the land to show that the use was by license, agree-
ment, or permission.
11. ____: ____: ____. The presumption of adverse use and claim of right, when
applicable, prevails unless it is overcome by a preponderance of the evidence.
12. Easements: Adverse Possession: Words and Phrases. The word “exclusive” in
reference to a prescriptive easement does not mean that there must be use only
by one person, but, rather, means that the use cannot be dependent upon a similar
right in others.
13. Easements: Highways: Abandonment. In the case of public roads, the fact that
only a few members of the public still use the road does not mean that the road
has been abandoned.
14. Easements: Proof. The nature and extent or scope of an easement must be
clearly established.
15. Easements: Adverse Possession: Highways. The extent and nature of an ease-
ment is determined from the use made of the property during the prescriptive
period. The width of a public highway acquired by prescription or dedication
must be determined as a question of fact by the character and extent of the use
or the amount dedicated to public use. If the public has acquired the right to a
highway by prescription, it is not limited in width to the actual beaten path, but
the right extends to such width as is reasonably necessary for public travel.
16. Equity: Costs. In equity actions, taxation of costs rests in the discretion of the
trial court.
Appeal from the District Court for boyd County: M ark d.
kozisek, Judge. Affirmed.
Shannon L. Doering for appellants.
Tom D. Hockabout, of egley, Fullner, Montag & Hockabout,
for appellees Willard Teadtke and Lola Teadtke.
heavican, 	c.J., 	WrighT, 	connolly, 	gerrard, 	sTephan,
MccorMack , and M iller-lerMan, JJ.
M iller-lerMan, J.
NATUre oF CASe
This case was initiated by appellees, Willard Teadtke and
Lola Teadtke, by the filing of a complaint seeking the dec-
laration of a roadway easement and injunctive relief. e.D.
Havranek and karen k. Havranek appeal from the orders of
TeADTke v. HAvrANek 	285
Cite as 279 Neb. 284

the district court for boyd County, which exercised its equity
jurisdiction and found that a public prescriptive easement
exists across the Havraneks’ property and defined the extent
and nature of the easement. The Havraneks assert that the
court erred by exercising its equity jurisdiction in this action,
because the Teadtkes failed to avail themselves of the statu-
tory remedy dealing with isolated land provided under Neb.
rev. Stat. §§ 39-1713 through 39-1719 (reissue 2008) prior to
filing this action. The Havraneks also appeal from the district
court’s decision on the merits. The Teadtkes cross-appeal the
denial of their request for the cost of their road survey. Finding
no error, we affirm.
STATeMeNT oF FACTS
The Havraneks and the Teadtkes own adjoining properties
located in boyd County, Nebraska. The Teadtkes’ 80-acre par-
cel is located directly south of the Havraneks’ land. The only
access to the Teadtkes’ property is a road that runs south across
the Havraneks’ property from Nebraska Highway 12.
on November 26, 2007, the Teadtkes filed a complaint
against the Havraneks and certain other parties. This appeal
involves only the Teadtkes and the Havraneks. The complaint
sought a declaration that there exists a public road across the
Havraneks’ property or a declaration that the Teadtkes own a
private easement over the Havraneks’ property from Highway
12 to the Teadtkes’ property. The Teadtkes also sought an
injunction preventing the Havraneks from obstructing the road
within its 40-foot width and requiring the Havraneks to remove
any 	existing 	obstructions. 	The 	Teadtkes 	asserted 	that 	the
Havraneks had encroached on the right-of-way by constructing
a fence that prevented the Teadtkes from moving implements
and machinery along the road.
In their response, the Havraneks asked the district court to
dismiss the Teadtkes’ complaint for the reason, inter alia, that
§§ 39-1713 through 39-1719 provide an adequate statutory
remedy for the Teadtkes’ alleged inadequate access to their
property. The Havraneks argued that the court lacked equity
jurisdiction because the Teadtkes failed to exhaust this statu-
tory remedy dealing with isolated land.
286 	279 NebrASkA reporTS

At trial, the Teadtkes presented the testimony of residents
of the area who testified regarding their recollections of the
use of the land now owned by the Teadtkes. one longtime
resident testified that the road that runs through the property
now owned by the Havraneks had been used to access lands
south of the Havraneks’ property as far back as the 1930’s and
continuing through the 1940’s. other residents testified that
at various times since the 1960’s, the road had been used to
access land south of the property for hunting, agricultural, and
construction purposes. The Teadtkes presented the testimony
of a member of the Lynch Township board. He testified that
he had been a member of the board since 1997 or 1998 and
that in that time, the board had authorized maintenance of
the road “once or twice a year” and had paid for a culvert to
be installed.
The Teadtkes testified regarding their personal use of the
road since the mid-1950’s to access their property, which
was then owned by Willard Teadtke’s father. The Teadtkes
have owned the land since 1993. They testified that other
people had also used the road for various purposes over the
years. Willard Teadtke testified that in order to accommo-
date the types of equipment that have traversed the road, the
road needed to be 35 to 40 feet wide. He also testified that
he paid a surveying firm $2,707.71 to perform a survey of
the road. The Teadtkes presented the testimony of the land
surveyor who had performed the survey. In connection with
the surveyor’s testimony, the court received into evidence the
surveyor’s drawing depicting an easement for the road with a
width of 40 feet.
After the Teadtkes presented their evidence, the court stated
that at the Teadtkes’ request, the court intended to “person-
ally view the property in question,” which would entail “just
driving down the road, making observations,” accompanied by
counsel for the parties. The court later noted for the record that
the court had “had an opportunity to go out and observe the
real estate in question.”
In the Havraneks’ defense, e.D. Havranek testified that
in 2006, he put up a gate at the Highway 12 entrance to the
road after obtaining the Teadtkes’ approval. After the gate was
TeADTke v. HAvrANek 	287
Cite as 279 Neb. 284

removed, e.D. Havranek began installing a fence along the
east side of the road in June 2007. e.D. Havranek testified that
the fence he constructed ran along only a part of the property
and that other fencing had been there since at least 1965. He
also testified that he had measured the width of the road as it
entered from Highway 12 and that the width from the outer
edges of the wheel tracks was 10 feet 6 inches.
Following trial, the court entered a decree on February 4,
2009. The court first rejected the Havraneks’ argument that
the court should not exercise its equity jurisdiction. The court
indicated that §§ 39-1713 through 39-1719 provide a remedy
for an owner of land that is “shut out from all public access”
and noted that such remedy exists so that the landowner may
petition the county board to establish and provide an access
road. The court stated that the purpose of the present action
as alleged by the Teadtkes was to determine whether the
Teadtkes had access to their land by an established public road
or by a prescriptive private easement. The court reasoned that
the statutory remedy was not appropriate unless and until it
was determined in this case that the land was shut out from
all public access. If the result of this action were adverse to
the Teadtkes, then they could allege that they have no pub-
lic access to their property and could seek redress from the
county board pursuant to §§ 39-1713 through 39-1719. If the
court in this action declared that a public road existed or that
the Teadtkes held a prescriptive easement, then the land would
not be shut out from all public access and there would be no
remedy under the statutes. The court therefore concluded that
the statutory remedy provided in §§ 39-1713 through 39-1719
did not prevent the court from exercising its equity jurisdiction
in this case.
The court then considered the substance of the complaint
to determine whether a prescriptive easement existed. The
court found the following from the evidence: As early as the
1930’s, the road was used to access properties to the south of
the Havraneks’ property. The Teadtkes began occupying their
property in the mid-1950’s and bought the property in 1993;
during that time, they had, for the most part, used the road
without restriction. During a period in 2006, the Havraneks
288 	279 NebrASkA reporTS

placed a gate across the road near Highway 12 during pasture
season, but the Havraneks sought the Teadtkes’ permission to
place the gate, which was removed when the need for its use
no longer existed.
The court concluded that the Teadtkes had established the
existence of a prescriptive easement by clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence. The court determined that the Teadtkes
and their predecessors in title had used and enjoyed the road
since at least the mid-1950’s. The court noted that because
use of the road was uninterrupted and open for the required
10-year period, the presumption was raised that the use was
adverse and under claim of right. The court further noted that
the Havraneks did not overcome that presumption, because
they adduced no evidence that the Teadtkes’ or the public’s use
of the road was by license, agreement, or permission.
referring to the evidence, the court further concluded that
the prescriptive easement was public in nature. The court
acknowledged that at the time of trial, use of the road was gen-
erally limited to the Teadtkes and their employees, contractors,
and business associates. However, the court noted considerable
evidence that from the 1930’s through the 1950’s, other per-
sons used the road to access property south of the Havraneks’
property because they lived on such property or they used the
property for agricultural or hunting purposes. The court further
noted that since at least 1997, the Lynch Township board annu-
ally authorized grading of the road and, in 1998, installed a
culvert under the road.
With regard to the extent of the easement, the court rejected
the Teadtkes’ request for an easement 40 feet in width along
the entire length of the road. The court noted that the evi-
dence established that the Teadtkes and others used a 35- to
40-foot-wide strip to negotiate the turn onto the road from
Highway 12 and the first two curves of the road south of
Highway 12; however, the court determined that the Teadtkes
failed to establish that the road was 40 feet wide throughout
its length.
Given the evidence, the court ordered and decreed that the
public held a public prescriptive easement for ingress and
egress over and across the Havraneks’ property. The easement
TeADTke v. HAvrANek 	289
Cite as 279 Neb. 284

was declared to be 40 feet wide at the entrance from Highway
12 and through the first two curves and 20 feet wide for the
remainder of the easement. The court entered an injunction
prohibiting the Havraneks from interfering with the public
easement and requiring them to remove any existing encroach-
ments they had placed on the property. The court taxed costs of
$201.39 to the Havraneks and ordered all parties to pay their
own remaining costs. The court overruled and denied any other
claims for relief by either party, including the Teadtkes’ request
to be awarded the cost of their road survey.
The Havraneks appeal, and the Teadtkes cross-appeal.
ASSIGNMeNTS oF error
The Havraneks assert that the district court erred when it
(1) exercised its equity jurisdiction in this action; (2) granted a
public prescriptive easement; and (3) defined the scope of the
easement, which exceeded the boundaries of what had been
used by the Teadtkes or their predecessors.
For their cross-appeal, the Teadtkes assert that the court
erred when it failed to tax as costs the expense they incurred
for a survey of the road.
STANDArDS oF revIeW
[1] When a jurisdictional question does not involve a factual
dispute, determination of a jurisdictional issue is a matter of
law which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion
independent from that of the trial court. Miller v. Regional West
Med. Ctr., 278 Neb. 676, 772 N.W.2d 872 (2009).
[2] A suit to confirm a prescriptive easement is one grounded
in the equitable jurisdiction of the district court and, on appeal
to this court, is reviewed de novo on the record, subject to
the rule that where credible evidence is in conflict on mate-
rial issues of fact, this court will consider that the trial court
observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts
over another. Gerberding v. Schnakenberg, 216 Neb. 200, 343
N.W.2d 62 (1984).
[3] The decision of a trial court regarding taxing of costs is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Hein v. M & N Feed
Yards, Inc., 205 Neb. 691, 289 N.W.2d 756 (1980).
290 	279 NebrASkA reporTS

ANALYSIS
Appeal: The District Court Properly Exercised
Its Equity Jurisdiction.
The Havraneks first assert that the district court improperly
exercised its equity jurisdiction in this case. They argue that the
Teadtkes had an adequate statutory remedy under §§ 39-1713
through 39-1719 but failed to avail themselves of such remedy
prior to seeking equitable relief. Given the allegations in the
complaint and the relief sought, we conclude that the court
properly exercised its equity jurisdiction.
In this action, the Teadtkes sought as relief a declaration that
a public road existed over the Havraneks’ property or a declara-
tion that the Teadtkes owned a prescriptive easement over the
property. The Teadtkes also sought injunctive relief to prevent
the Havraneks from encroaching upon the road and to require
the Havraneks to remove existing encroachments. An adjudi-
cation of rights with respect to an easement is an equitable
action, Homestead Estates Homeowners Assn. v. Jones, 278
Neb. 149, 768 N.W.2d 436 (2009), and an action for injunction
sounds in equity. Conley v. Brazer, 278 Neb. 508, 772 N.W.2d
545 (2009).
[4,5] Where a statute provides an adequate remedy at law,
equity will not entertain jurisdiction, and the statutory remedy
must be exhausted before one may resort to equity. V.C. v.
Casady, 262 Neb. 714, 634 N.W.2d 798 (2001). An adequate
remedy at law means a remedy which is plain and complete and
as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt
administration as the remedy in equity. Lambert v. Holmberg,
271 Neb. 443, 712 N.W.2d 268 (2006).
The Havraneks claim that the district court should not have
entertained this action in equity, because the Teadtkes did
not exhaust the statutory remedy under §§ 39-1713 through
39-1719. These statutes generally provide owners of isolated
land the right to obtain access to the land by an access road
or a public road. The owner of isolated land may apply to the
county board as set forth in § 39-1713. If the board finds that
certain conditions are present, the board is required to provide
an access road or a public road to the land; the board is also
required to appraise the damages to the owner of the land over
TeADTke v. HAvrANek 	291
Cite as 279 Neb. 284

which access is to be provided, and such damages are to be
paid by the person petitioning for access. See § 39-1716.
It 	is 	important 	to 	note 	that 	the 	relief 	available 	under
§§ 39-1713 through 39-1719 is limited to owners of “isolated”
lands. Under § 39-1713(1), a person seeking relief under the
statutes must allege, inter alia, that “such real estate is shut
out from all public access, other than a waterway, by being
surrounded on all sides by real estate belonging to other per-
sons, or by such real estate and by water.” Such an assertion
is inconsistent with the allegations made by the Teadtkes in
this case.
The Teadtkes did not allege that their land was shut out from
all public access; to the contrary, the gravamen of their com-
plaint was that a road existed over the Havraneks’ property and
that the road provided access to their property. The Teadtkes
sought a declaration that a public road existed and an injunc-
tion preventing the Havraneks from interfering with use of the
road. because the Teadtkes claimed the existence of a public
road that provided access to their property, it would have been
inconsistent for them to have alleged that their land was iso-
lated or “shut out from all public access,” as required for relief
under §§ 39-1713 through 39-1719. See Burton v. Annett, 215
Neb. 788, 789, 341 N.W.2d 318, 319 (1983) (noting that land-
owner in action under § 39-1713 had “unsuccessfully sought
judgment . . . for declaration of a prescriptive right-of-way”
prior to pursuing statutory remedy under § 39-1713).
because it was the Teadtkes’ position that a public road pro-
vided access to their land, the statutory remedy provided under
§§ 39-1713 through 39-1719 was not available to them and they
were not required to exhaust such remedy prior to bringing this
equitable action. We conclude that the district court’s analysis
to the same effect was correct and that the district court did not
err by exercising its equity jurisdiction in this case.
Appeal: The District Court Did Not Err by Granting
a Public Prescriptive Easement and
Defining the Scope Thereof.
The Havraneks next assert that the district court erred by
granting a public prescriptive easement. They argue as a general
292 	279 NebrASkA reporTS

matter that the Teadtkes failed to establish a prescriptive ease-
ment by clear and convincing evidence, and they argue in
particular that the Teatdtkes failed to establish or even allege
the existence of a public, as opposed to a private, easement.
The Havraneks further claim that the court erred by granting
an easement that exceeded in scope what had been used by the
Teadtkes or their predecessors.
We first address the Havraneks’ assertion that the Teadtkes
failed to allege the existence of a public, as opposed to a pri-
vate, easement. In their complaint, the Teadtkes alleged that a
road existed across the Havraneks’ property between Highway
12 and the Teadkes’ property and that “said road is a public
road used by [the Teadtkes and others] and the public in gen-
eral.” They also alleged that the road had been maintained by
the town of Lynch “for many years.” For their prayer for relief,
the Teadtkes asked that the court “declare there exists a pub-
lic road” across the Havraneks’ property or, in the alternative,
that the court declare that the Teadtkes owned a private ease-
ment over the Havraneks’ property. The Teadtkes did not fail
to allege the existence of a public easement, and we therefore
consider whether the evidence established the existence of such
public easement.
[6,7] To establish a road or highway by prescription, there
must be a use by the general public, under a claim of right
adverse to the owner of the land, of some particular or defined
line of travel, and the use must be uninterrupted and without
substantial change for 10 years, the period of time necessary
to bar an action to recover the land. Harders v. Odvody, 261
Neb. 887, 626 N.W.2d 568 (2001). To prove a prescriptive
right to an easement, all the elements of prescriptive use must
be generally established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence. Id.
[8] The use and enjoyment which will give title by prescrip-
tion to an easement is substantially the same in quality and
characteristics as the adverse possession which will give title
to real estate. Such use must be adverse, under a claim of right,
continuous and uninterrupted, open and notorious, exclusive,
with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the ser-
vient tenement, for the full prescriptive period. Id.
TeADTke v. HAvrANek 	293
Cite as 279 Neb. 284

The district court found that all the elements of a public pre-
scriptive easement existed. The court noted testimony regard-
ing use of the road as early as the 1930’s by prior landowners
and others to access both the land now owned by the Teadtkes
and other real estate. The court also noted testimony regarding
use of the road since the 1950’s by the Teadtkes and their asso-
ciates. Such use extended for a period exceeding the 10 years
required to establish a prescriptive easement.
[9-11] The prevailing rule is that where a claimant has
shown open, visible, continuous, and unmolested use of land
for a period of time sufficient to acquire an easement by
adverse user, the use will be presumed to be under claim of
right. Harders v. Odvody, supra. If a person proves uninter-
rupted and open use for the necessary period without evidence
to explain how the use began, the presumption is raised that
the use is adverse and under claim of right, and the burden is
on the owner of the land to show that the use was by license,
agreement, or permission. Id. The presumption of adverse use
and claim of right, when applicable, prevails unless it is over-
come by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The Havraneks
did not provide sufficient evidence to overcome the presump-
tion of adverse use and a claim of right.
[12] The word “exclusive” in reference to a prescriptive
easement does not mean that there must be use only by one
person, but, rather, means that the use cannot be dependent
upon a similar right in others. Werner v. Schardt, 222 Neb.
186, 382 N.W.2d 357 (1986). The Teadtkes showed that their
use of the property was not dependent on a similar right
in others.
[13] The evidence also established that the easement was
public. According to the record, the road had been used by
various persons for various purposes since the 1930’s. In more
recent years, the road had mainly been used by the Teadtkes
and their associates. However, in the case of public roads, the
fact that only a few members of the public still use the road
does not mean that the road has been abandoned. Sellentin v.
Terkildsen, 216 Neb. 284, 343 N.W.2d 895 (1984). The evi-
dence also showed that the Lynch Township board had autho-
rized maintenance of the road and had installed a culvert. In
294 	279 NebrASkA reporTS

view of the evidence, we conclude that the district court did not
err in concluding that the public held a prescriptive easement
over the Havraneks’ property.
With regard to the extent and scope of the easement, the
Havraneks argue that by declaring an easement that was 40 feet
wide in certain areas, the court exceeded the scope of actual
use that had been proved by the Teadtkes. The court ordered
that the easement was 20 feet wide through much of its length,
rather than the 40 feet requested by the Teadtkes for the entire
length of the easement. However, the court ordered that the
easement was 40 feet wide for a portion of the easement that
was near Highway 12. The court found that the additional
width was needed for the Teadtkes and others “to negotiate the
turn onto the road from Highway 12 and the first two curves
south of Highway 12.”
[14,15] The nature and extent or scope of an easement must
be clearly established. Werner v. Schardt, supra. The extent
and nature of an easement is determined from the use made
of the property during the prescriptive period. The width of a
public highway acquired by prescription or dedication must be
determined as a question of fact by the character and extent of
the use or the amount dedicated to public use. If the public has
acquired the right to a highway by prescription, it is not lim-
ited in width to the actual beaten path, but the right extends to
such width as is reasonably necessary for public travel. Smith
v. Bixby, 196 Neb. 235, 242 N.W.2d 115 (1976).
We conclude that the district court did not err in the widths
it assigned to the various portions of the easement. We note
that Willard Teadtke testified regarding the difficulties of nego-
tiating the turn from Highway 12 and the curves in the road
near Highway 12. Willard Teadtke also testified that the road
was used to transport farm machinery and other large equip-
ment for farming operations on the Teadtkes’ property. We
note further that the court in this case stated on the record that
it “had an opportunity to go out and observe the real estate
in question.” In determining that the court did not err in the
widths it assigned to the easement, we consider the fact that the
court actually observed the road and the surrounding area and
from such observation determined that a width of 40 feet was
TeADTke v. HAvrANek 	295
Cite as 279 Neb. 284

necessary in certain areas so that the Teadtkes and others could
transport machinery and equipment over the road.
We conclude that the district court did not err in concluding
that the public held a prescriptive easement over the Havraneks’
property and did not err in declaring the easement to have a
width of 40 feet in certain areas.
Cross-Appeal: The District Court Did Not Err
When It Declined to Tax as Costs the
Expense for the Road Survey.
In their cross-appeal, the Teadtkes assert that the district
court erred when it declined to tax as costs the expense they
incurred for a survey of the road. We conclude that the court
did not abuse its discretion by deciding not to tax as costs the
$2,707.71 the Teadtkes incurred for the survey.
[16] In equity actions, taxation of costs rests in the discre-
tion of the trial court. Hein v. M & N Feed Yards, Inc., 205
Neb. 691, 289 N.W.2d 756 (1980). The Teadtkes assert that
this action was necessitated by the Havraneks when they
encroached upon the Teadtkes’ use of the road and that there-
fore the Havraneks as the unsuccessful party should bear some
of the costs the Teadtkes incurred to help the court make an
accurate ruling.
In its order, the court taxed costs in the amount of $201.39
to the Havraneks and ordered that “each party shall pay their
remaining costs.” Given our standard of review, we determine
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the taxa-
tion of costs, and we reject the Teadtkes’ assignment of error
on cross-appeal.
CoNCLUSIoN
We conclude that the district court properly exercised its
equity jurisdiction in this case and that the court did not err
by declaring a public prescriptive easement and did not err in
determining the scope of the easement. We further conclude
that the court did not err when it declined to tax as costs to the
Havraneks the expense the Teadtkes incurred for a road survey.
We therefore affirm the orders of the district court.
affirMed.
296 	279 NebrASkA reporTS