In re Interest of Sir Messiah T. et al.

argument that the court’s summary judgment can be affirmed
based on that reasoning.
ConClusion
The record establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether it was understood thatl yle would retain possession
and enjoyment of, and income from, the Properties, despite
transferring them to his children. And the record does not
establish as a matter of law that Margaret consented in writing
tol yle’s transfer of the Properties to his children. Therefore,
the county court erred in entering summary judgment and
dismissing Margaret’s petition for an elective share ofl yle’s
augmented estate. We reverse the judgment of the county court
and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
R eveRsed and Remanded with diRections.
in Re inteRest of siR messiah t., also known as
siR messiah m., et al ., childRen undeR 18 yeaRs of age .
state of nebRaska , appellee , v.
yolanda a., appellant.
782n .W.2d 320
Filed May 21, 2010.n 	o.s -09-749.
1. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. Whether a statute is constitu-
tional is a question of law; accordingly, then ebraskas upreme Court is obligated
to reach a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the trial court.
2. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the
record, and an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion independent of the
juvenile court’s findings.
3. Evidence: Appeal and Error. When the evidence is in conflict, an appellate
court may consider and give weight to the fact that the trial court observed the
witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over the other.
4. Constitutional Law: Due Process. Procedural due process includes notice to
the person whose right is affected by the proceeding; reasonable opportunity
to refute or defend against the charge or accusation; reasonable opportunity to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and present evidence on the charge
or accusation; representation by counsel, when such representation is required by
the Constitution or statutes; and a hearing before an impartial decisionmaker.
5. Parental Rights: Proof.i nn ebraska statutes, the bases for termination of paren-
tal rights are codified inn eb. Rev.s tat. § 43-292 (supp. 2009).s ection 43-292
900 	279 nebRAskAR ePoRTs
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:47 AM CST

provides 11 separate conditions, any one of which can serve as the basis for the
termination of parental rights when coupled with evidence that termination is in
the best interests of the child.
6. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights. A juvenile’s best interests are a primary
consideration in determining whether parental rights should be terminated as
authorized by then ebraska Juvenile Code.
7. Parental Rights. Past neglect, along with facts relating to current family circum-
stances which go to best interests, are all properly considered in a parental rights
termination case undern eb. Rev.s tat. § 43-292(2) (supp. 2009).
Appeal from thes eparate Juvenile Court of Douglas County:
chRistopheR kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
Christine P. Costantakos for appellant.
Donald W.k leine, Douglas County Attorney, and Amy
schuchman for appellee.
Thomask . Harmon, of Thel awo ffices of Thomask .
Harmon, guardian ad litem.
heavican, 	c.J., 	wRight, 	connolly, 	geRRaRd, 	stephan,
mccoRmack, and milleR-leRman, JJ.
milleR-leRman, J.
nATuReo F THe CAse
on June 30, 2009, the separate juvenile court of Douglas
County terminated Yolanda A.’s parental rights to her four chil-
dren,s ir Messiah T., also known ass ir Messiah M.; Mirage T.,
also known as Mirage M.; Carlieon T.; and Crystasia T., under
neb. Rev.s tat. § 43-292(2) and (6) (Reissue 2008).s ection
43-292(2) generally provides for termination of parental rights
when the parent has neglected and refused to give the nec-
essary care to the juvenile or a sibling of the juvenile.s ection
43-292(6) generally provides for termination of parental rights
after a failure of efforts to preserve and reunify the family.
Yolanda appeals.
Yolanda challenges the constitutionality of § 43-292(2).
Yolanda also claims, inter alia, that, even if § 43-292(2) is
constitutional, thes tate ofn ebraska did not meet its burden of
proof to establish the termination of her parental rights based on
either § 43-292(2) or § 43-292(6) and further failed to establish
inR e inTeResT oF siRM essiAHT . eTA l. 	901
Cite as 279n eb. 900

that termination was in the best interests of the minor children.
because we conclude that § 43-292(2) is constitutional and that
Yolanda’s parental rights were properly terminated under this
section, we affirm.
sTATeMenTo F THe FACTs
on May 5, 2003, the separate juvenile court of Douglas
County terminated Yolanda’s parental rights to her three older
children pursuant to § 43-292(2). The termination of parental
rights as to these three children was based on neglect, not a
relinquishment by Yolanda.s ir Messiah and Mirage, two of
the children involved in this current case, had been born, but
Yolanda’s parental rights to these two children were not termi-
nated in the 2003 proceeding.
ons eptember 9, 2007, the police arrested Yolanda for slash-
ing the tires on a car belonging to a friend of her ex-boyfriend.
After Yolanda’s arrest, the police discovered that the four chil-
dren involved in the current case had been left at home alone
with a knife wedged in the door so they could not escape the
home. The four children were all under the age of 9. The dates
of birth of the children ares ir Messiah, born in July 1999;
Mirage, born in December 2000; Crystasia, born in February
2005; and Carlieon, born in April 2006. After this incident,
the children were removed from the home and placed in fos-
ter care. During the pendency of this case, the children have
remained in foster care and Yolanda’s contact with the children
has been limited to supervised visitation.
onn ovember 1, 2007, the children were adjudicated as being
within the meaning ofn eb. Rev.s tat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Cum.
supp. 2006). After that determination, the parties attended
multiple court hearings. Various plans of rehabilitation with
the intent to preserve and reunify the family were filed on:
January 7, March 14, May 28, and August 27, 2008. After these
reasonable efforts had been made, thes tate filed a motion to
terminate Yolanda’s parental rights to her four children based
on § 43-292(2) and (6). The motion was filed ono ctober 2 in
the separate juvenile court of Douglas County.
The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on April 27,
2009. The evidence established that Yolanda had been through
902 	279 nebRAskAR ePoRTs

three chemical dependency programs since 2007 and has had
five documented uses of alcohol since March 2008. Further, the
evidence showed that it was likely that contrary to Yolanda’s
self-report, she had used alcohol as recently as January 2009,
according to the testimony of the case manager of then ebraska
Department of Health and Humans ervices. The evidence
shows that under the various rehabilitation plans, Yolanda was
required to submit to random urinalysis but that Yolanda had
missed many of these tests. According to the record, Yolanda
was largely unavailable in person or on the telephone for the
administration of these tests. Yolanda evidently “made up”
these tests at a time of her choosing.
Yolanda’s rehabilitation plans also required her to attend
therapy, which she has attended with some regularity. However,
it was shown that Yolanda withheld information from her
therapist for approximately 6 months with respect to reporting
a driving under the influence of alcohol charge that she experi-
enced in May 2008. Yolanda’s therapist testified that she would
have expected her clients to be forthcoming sooner with this
type of information.
Testimony at trial showed that two of Yolanda’s minor
children,s ir Messiah and Mirage, are high-needs children
and that based on those needs,s ir Messiah has been placed
in treatment-based foster care and Mirage has been placed in
agency-based foster care.s ir Messiah has indicated to his thera-
pist that he wishes to stay in his foster care placement, and
Mirage stated to her therapist, ins eptember ando ctober 2008,
that she “wants a new mom.”b oth children have been engaged
in ongoing therapy and have made progress in dealing with
their emotional and behavioral issues.b oth children’s thera-
pists testified that during the course of their therapy, the chil-
dren stated that Yolanda had physically abused them. Mirage’s
therapist further testified that Mirage indicated thats ir Messiah
and Mirage had kissed and touched each other inappropriately
at Yolanda’s home.
There was testimony at trial that Yolanda had an ongoing
relationship with Carl T., the father of Carlieon and Crystasia.
on February 13, 2009, Carl voluntarily relinquished his rights
to these two children. Testimony at the hearing on Yolanda’s
inR e inTeResT oF siRM essiAHT . eTA l. 	903
Cite as 279n eb. 900

termination of parental rights revealed that Carl engaged in
domestic violence with Yolanda in the presence of the minor
children and that the children have been negatively affected
by these experiences. Yolanda’s ongoing relationship with Carl
allows him to enter the home and have telephone contact with
the minor children.
both Mirage’s therapist and a specialist who worked with
sir Messiah testified at the hearing.e ach testified that it was
not in the children’s best interests to be left in foster care long
term. Furthermore, each testified thats ir Messiah and Mirage
both needed specialized care and a structured, stable, and per-
manent home environment due to their special needs. Yolanda’s
case manager testified that in her view, termination was proper,
because Yolanda was making limited progress in achieving the
goals set for her. There was other testimony regarding all four
children, not repeated here, all of which went to the needs and
best interests of each child.
A family support worker who supervised Yolanda’s visits
with her children testified that Yolanda continued to struggle
with parenting effectively and consistently for a 3-hour time-
span. Further, there was testimony that in August 2008, during
a supervised visit with her children, Yolanda was intoxicated
and acted out to the extent that the police were called to inter-
vene in the visit.
A witness was called on Yolanda’s behalf. However, upon
further examination, the witness acknowledged that Yolanda
did not have the ability to handle the children and that it was
unrealistic to believe that Yolanda could parent all four children
at this time.
based on this evidence, in an order filed June 30, 2009, the
juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the
children were within the meaning of § 43-292(2) and (6) and
that it was in their best interests that Yolanda’s parental rights
be terminated. Yolanda appeals.
AssiGnMenTso Fe RRoR
Yolanda assigns numerous errors. Yolanda claims, restated
and summarized, that the juvenile court erred (1) in overrul-
ing her motion for judgment on the pleadings in which she
904 	279 nebRAskAR ePoRTs

challenged the constitutionality of § 43-292(2); (2) in ter-
minating her parental rights under § 43-292(2), because the
state’s evidence failed to clearly and convincingly establish
the existence of this statutory ground; and (3) in finding that
the evidence clearly and convincingly established that termina-
tion of Yolanda’s parental rights is in the best interests of the
minor children.b ecause our resolution of these assignments
of error resolves the case, we do not recite or reach Yolanda’s
remaining assignments of error.
sTAnDARDso F ReVieW
[1] Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law;
accordingly, then ebraskas upreme Court is obligated to reach
a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the trial
court. Garey v. Nebraska Dept. of Nat. Resources, 277n eb.
149, 759n .W.2d 919 (2009).
[2,3] Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the record, and
an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion indepen-
dent of the juvenile court’s findings. In re Interest of Hope L.
et al., 278n eb. 869, 775n .W.2d 384 (2009). However, when
the evidence is in conflict, an appellate court may consider
and give weight to the fact that the trial court observed the
witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over the
other. Id.
AnAlYsis
Section 43-292(2) Does Not Violate Yolanda’s
Constitutional Right to Due Process.
Yolanda makes numerous arguments challenging the con-
stitutionality of § 43-292(2) all to the effect that § 43-292(2)
denies her procedural due process. Yolanda raised her constitu-
tional objection to § 43-292(2) prior to the termination hearing
in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court rejected
her claim. As Yolanda reads § 43-292(2), prior neglect of a sib-
ling without more can result in termination of parental rights
in the present case.u nder Yolanda’s reading of § 43-292(2),
she is denied procedural due process because she is denied an
opportunity to present evidence of current circumstances. We
determine that Yolanda misreads § 43-292(2) and conclude that
inR e inTeResT oF siRM essiAHT . eTA l. 	905
Cite as 279n eb. 900

§ 43-292(2) is not unconstitutional. Thus, the juvenile court did
not err in its ruling.
section 43-292 states:
The court may terminate all parental rights between
the parents or the mother of a juvenile born out of wed-
lock and such juvenile when the court finds such action
to be in the best interests of the juvenile and it appears
by the evidence that one or more of the following condi-
tions exist:
. . . .
(2) The parents have substantially and continuously
or repeatedly neglected and refused to give the juve-
nile or a sibling of the juvenile necessary parental care
and protection.
Yolanda’s overall claim is that § 43-292(2) of the parental
rights termination statutes is unconstitutional because it allows
thes tate to terminate parental rights based solely upon a find-
ing that a parent has previously neglected and refused to care
for a sibling. We logically read “sibling” to include a child
of the parent under review, regardless of whether the parental
rights to that sibling have been terminated. Yolanda claims that
if her reading is correct, § 43-292(2) violates her rights under
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to theu .s.
Constitution, because it fails to afford her an opportunity to
present evidence showing that her current circumstances do
not warrant termination. Yolanda misreads § 43-292(2), and we
reject her argument.
[4] Yolanda correctly asserts that she is entitled to proce-
dural due process in connection with these termination of
parental rights proceedings.i n the context of both adjudication
and termination hearings, this court has stated that
“‘[p]rocedural due process includes notice to the person
whose right is affected by the proceeding; reasonable
opportunity to refute or defend against the charge or
accusation; reasonable opportunity to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses and present evidence on the
charge or accusation; representation by counsel, when
such representation is required by the Constitution or stat-
utes; and a hearing before an impartial decisionmaker.’”
906 	279 nebRAskAR ePoRTs

In re Interest of Mainor T. & Estela T., 267n eb. 232, 247-48,
674n .W.2d 442, 457 (2004).
[5]i nn ebraska statutes, the bases for termination of paren-
tal rights are codified in § 43-292.s ection 43-292 (supp. 2009)
currently provides 11 separate conditions, any one of which can
serve as the basis for the termination of parental rights when
coupled with evidence that termination is in the best interests
of the child.s ection 43-292, which is applicable to each of the
11 bases, states:
The court may terminate all parental rights between
the parents or the mother of a juvenile born out of wed-
lock and such juvenile when the court finds such action
to be in the best interests of the juvenile and it appears
by the evidence that one or more of the following condi-
tions exist[.]
basis number two, § 43-292(2), is at issue in this assign-
ment of error and states that termination is authorized where
“[t]he parents have substantially and continuously or repeat-
edly neglected and refused to give the juvenile or a sibling of
the juvenile necessary parental care and protection.”
[6]b y its terms, § 43-292 requires a showing of best
interests plus 1 of the 11 statutory bases for termination.s ee
In re Interest of Walter W., 274n eb. 859, 744n .W.2d 55
(2008).s ection 43-292(2) involves the neglect of the child
or a sibling of the child at issue.u nlike the reading urged by
Yolanda, § 43-292(2) does not dictate that whenever a par-
ent has neglected a sibling in the past, parental rights to any
future children will automatically be terminated without giv-
ing the parent an opportunity to present evidence of current
circumstances.i nstead, the statute as a whole states that prior
neglect can be a basis for termination only in conjunction with
proof by thes tate which establishes that termination is in the
best interests of the minor children involved in the current
proceedings.i ndeed, as we have emphasized, and we take this
opportunity to repeat, a juvenile’s best interests are a primary
consideration in determining whether parental rights should be
terminated as authorized by then ebraska Juvenile Code. In re
Interest of DeWayne G., 263n eb. 43, 638n .W.2d 510 (2002).
in deciding best interests, the court is obligated to review the
inR e inTeResT oF siRM essiAHT . eTA l. 	907
Cite as 279n eb. 900

evidence presented by all parties relative to the parent’s current
circumstances and determine if termination is in the best inter-
ests of the minor children based on those circumstances.
For completeness, we note that at trial and on appeal, Yolanda
has suggested what may be characterized as a substantive due
process claim. Yolanda effectively claims that the neglect of
a sibling as provided for in § 43-292(2) is not a proper fact
for consideration in the current proceeding as it bears on her
fitness and that such consideration automatically results in ter-
mination and prevents her from receiving due process. Yolanda
suggests that due to the termination of parental rights as to her
three older children, she should be given a “clean slate” with
respect to the four juveniles now under consideration, and that
prior neglect should be ignored. The intermediate appellate
court of this state rejected a similar argument in In re Interest
of Andrew S., 14n eb. App. 739, 714n .W.2d 762 (2006), and
we reject it in the instant case.
in In re Interest of Andrew S., then ebraska Court of
Appeals considered prior relinquishments as they related to the
adjudication then at issue. The Court of Appeals stated that the
previous relinquishments
do not bode well for [the parents’] stability and ability as
parents, and they serve to convince us that [the current
juvenile] is at risk. The fact that a parent has previously
relinquished an adjudicated child is relevant evidence in
an adjudication proceeding concerning a child born soon
thereafter.i n short, given the purpose of the juvenile
code, one’s history as a parent is a permanent record and
may serve as a basis for adjudication depending on the
circumstances. Relinquishments of parental rights are not
any sort of “pardon,” which is how [the parents] would
have us treat the relinquishments they made. They cite
no authority on point for such notion, and while we have
found none either, we suggest that one’s history as a par-
ent speaks to one’s future as a parent.
Id. at 749, 714n .W.2d at 769-70.
[7] Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly reasoned in
related contexts.i n State ex rel. Children, Youth v. Amy B.,
133n .M. 136, 141, 61 P.3d 845, 850 (n.M. App. 2002), the
908 	279 nebRAskAR ePoRTs

court in a juvenile matter reviewed the jurisprudence in this
area and stated that “in most of the reported cases, there is a
very real relationship between the past conduct and the current
abilities.”i n a juvenile case considering the prospects of future
success as a parent, the California Court of Appeals stated,
“experience has shown that with certain parents . . . the risk
of recidivism is a very real concern. Therefore, when another
child of that same parent is adjudged a dependent child, it is
not unreasonable to assume [that future parenting] efforts will
be unsuccessful.” In re Baby Boy H., 63 Cal. App. 4th 470,
478, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 799 (1998). We agree with this rea-
soning which recognizes that one’s history as a parent speaks
to one’s future as a parent and reject Yolanda’s suggestion that
past parenting outcomes should be ignored. Along with other
courts, we believe that neglect of a prior sibling is relevant to
the current inquiry and that past neglect, along with facts relat-
ing to current family circumstances which go to best interests,
are all properly considered in a parental rights termination case
under § 43-292(2).
Focusing on the procedural due process Yolanda was accorded
herein, the record shows that Yolanda was adequately notified
in the “Motion for Termination of Parental Rights andn otice
of Hearing” that thes tate sought to terminate her parental
rights to the four children in question on the basis, inter alia, of
§ 43-292(2) and that the factual basis alleged under § 43-292(2)
was prior neglect, i.e., the involuntary termination of parental
rights for the neglect of three siblings. Pursuant to the statute,
Yolanda was accorded a full evidentiary hearing, at which hear-
ing she was represented by counsel and had the opportunity
to present evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, and the
state was required to present clear and convincing evidence
of neglect of prior siblings and current best interests. The
earlier termination of parental rights to the three siblings for
neglect was readily established. With respect to best interests,
the evidence showed the needs of the four children involved.
The evidence also showed that Yolanda was offered numerous
reunification plans, and there was ample current evidence that
she was not successful in rehabilitation and reunification. This
evidence went to present circumstances.
inR e inTeResT oF siRM essiAHT . eTA l. 	909
Cite as 279n eb. 900

As thes upreme Court of Montana noted in a similar context
under a statute with comparable features, “[t]he statutes . . . do
not limit the decision to the facts of the prior [neglect]. The
district court also considers any available evidence relating to
present family circumstances and the specific child at issue.” In
re Custody and Parental Rights of A.P., 340 Mont. 39, 46, 172
P.3d 105, 109 (2007).l ike the Montana statute,n ebraska’s
§ 43-292(2) requires proof of both best interests and neglect of
either the child at issue or a sibling.u nlike Yolanda’s reading
of § 43-292(2), termination of parental rights under this section
is not based exclusively on neglect of another sibling. Proof of
best interests is also required. Thes tate proffered evidence of
both, and Yolanda presented evidence on her own behalf. Given
the terms of the statute and the scope and safeguards of the
evidentiary hearing which were accorded Yolanda, we reject
Yolanda’s constitutional challenge to § 43-292(2).
The State Provided Sufficient Evidence to Warrant
Termination Under § 43-292(2).
Yolanda also claims that thes tate failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights
was appropriate under § 43-292(2). We consider this juvenile
appeal de novo on the record. In re Interest of Hope L. et
al., 278n eb. 869, 775n .W.2d 384 (2009).b ecause we con-
clude that the evidence is sufficient, we reject this assignment
of error.
in order to terminate an individual’s parental rights, the
state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that one of
the statutory grounds enumerated in § 43-292 exists and that
termination is in the children’s best interests. In re Interest
of Walter W., 274n eb. 859, 744n .W.2d 55 (2008). The
state sought to terminate Yolanda’s parental rights under
§ 43-292(2). At trial, thes tate showed without contradiction
that Yolanda’s parental rights to her three older children were
terminated by reason of neglect. With respect to the children
currently under consideration, thes tate also presented suffi-
cient evidence of their neglect recited above, including, but not
limited to, the physical abuse reported by the children, their
exposure to the domestic turmoil occasioned by Yolanda’s
910 	279 nebRAskAR ePoRTs

continued relationship with Carl, and Yolanda’s inability to
care and provide for her children.b ecause thes tate met its
burden with respect to neglect, we turn to whether thes tate
established by clear and convincing evidence that termination
was in the best interests of the minor children.
The evidence related to best interests of the children was
voluminous and was largely derived from the history associ-
ated with the various rehabilitative and reunification services
which had been accorded to Yolanda and her children. The
record shows that the four children have remained in foster
care with only limited supervised visitation with Yolanda since
september 9, 2007. The needs of the children were described at
length, and the testimony showed that Yolanda cannot meet her
children’s needs.e ach of the service providers involved with
the family agreed that Yolanda is unable to parent all four of
these children on a regular basis, particularly given the special
needs required to care fors ir Messiah and Mirage.
The record also shows that Yolanda has had a long history
of alcohol abuse and has continued to struggle with abstain-
ing from alcohol use throughout the attempted reunification
process. Yolanda was cited for driving under the influence of
alcohol in May 2008, which she did not report to her thera-
pist. According to the record, Yolanda was drinking at one of
her visitations with her children and had to be removed from
the visit by law enforcement.i ndeed, although Yolanda has
submitted to random urinalysis tests, she has been absent for
many of these tests. The tests have been rescheduled at her
convenience, effectively eliminating the random nature of the
alcohol testing.
While we agree with the juvenile court that the record shows
that Yolanda has made recent progress in achieving the goals
set forth in the rehabilitation plans, these efforts have largely
come after thes tate filed the petition to terminate her parental
rights.e ven taking these efforts into account, Yolanda has been
unable to keep a job, abstain from alcohol, or successfully
parent her children unsupervised. We must agree with the testi-
mony of the service providers involved with this family that
indefinite foster care is not advisable for these children.b ased
on the record, thes tate established by clear and convincing
inR e inTeResT oF siRM essiAHT . eTA l. 	911
Cite as 279n eb. 900

evidence that it is in the best interests of the four minor chil-
dren that Yolanda’s parental rights be terminated. Given the
evidence, we reject Yolanda’s assignment of error in which
she claimed that the evidence was insufficient to terminate her
parental rights under § 43-292(2).
ConClusion
We reject Yolanda’s constitutional challenge to § 43-292(2)
and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to terminate
Yolanda’s parental rights to the four children at issue under
§ 43-292(2). We therefore affirm the order of the juvenile court
terminating the parental rights of Yolanda to the four children
in this case.
affiRmed.
in Re petition of anonymous 3, a minoR.
782n .W.2d 591
Filed May 21, 2010.n 	o.s -33-100006.
1. Abortion: Minors: Judgments: Appeal and Error.n eb. Rev.s tat. § 71-6904(6)
(Reissue 2009) provides that thes upreme Court hears this appeal de novo on the
record. Accordingly, the court reappraises the evidence as presented by the record
and reaches its own independent conclusions with respect to the matters at issue.
2. Abortion: Minors: Notice: Waiver.n eb. Rev.s tat. § 71-6903 (Reissue 2009)
may authorize a waiver of the parental notification requirement if the court
determines that the “pregnant woman” is mature and capable of giving informed
consent to the proposed abortion or if it determines that the performance of an
abortion without notification would be in her best interests.
3. Abortion: Minors: Proof.i n a proceeding brought under the provisions ofn eb.
Rev.s tat. § 71-6901 et seq. (Reissue 2009), the burden of proof on all issues rests
with the petitioner, and such burden must be established by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.
4. Minors: Emancipation: Words and Phrases.e mancipation means the freeing
of the child from the care, custody, control, and service of his or her parents.
5. Minors: Emancipation: Proof. The emancipation of a minor may be proved by
circumstantial evidence or may be implied from the conduct of the parties.
6. Minors: Emancipation.e ither acts solely initiated and performed by a minor
child or acts of a parent inconsistent with the performance of parental obligations
may effectuate a minor’s emancipation.
7. ____: ____. Where a minor is emancipated, the parental notification statutes
are inapplicable.
912 	279 nebRAskAR ePoRTs