State v. Wollam

The CCEA also relies on this court’s decision in Hyannis
Ed. Assn. v. Grant Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 38-0011.11 I also find
that unpersuasive. This court concluded in Hyannis Ed. Assn.
that a deviation clause allowing the district to deviate from the
bargained-for salary schedule affected wages and that thus, it
was within the CIR’s authority to include such a term in the
parties’ agreement. But because the issue in Hyannis Ed. Assn.
was a deviation from the salary schedule, it had a direct impact
on wages. Such is distinguishable from the contract continua-
tion language at issue in this case.
I would conclude that the inclusion of a contract continua-
tion clause by the CIR is akin to an order to enter into a con-
tract, is contrary to the parties’ right to bargain, and was a vio-
lation of § 48-810.01. And because I believe the CIR violated
§ 48-810.01, I would also conclude that the CIR exceeded its
authority when it ordered a contract continuation clause to be
included in the parties’ agreement.
C onnolly, J., joins in this concurrence and dissent.
11 Hyannis Ed. Assn. v. Grant Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 38-0011, 269 Neb. 956, 698
N.W.2d 45 (2005).
STATE v. WollAm 	43
Cite as 280 Neb. 43
State of nebraSka , appellee , v.
Jon D. Wollam , appellant.
783 N.W.2d 612
Filed June 18, 2010. 	No. S-09-768.
1. Courts: Appeal and Error. Both the district court and the Nebraska Supreme
Court generally review appeals from the county court for error appearing on
the record.
2. Criminal Law: Courts: Appeal and Error. In an appeal of a criminal case from
the county court, the district court acts as an intermediate court of appeal, and as
such, its review is limited to an examination of the county court record for error
or abuse of discretion.
3. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress: Appeal and
Error. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress based on a
claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, an appellate court applies a two-part
standard of review. Regarding historical facts, the appellate court reviews the trial
court’s findings for clear error. But whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:46 AM CST

Amendment protections is a question of law that the appellate court reviews inde-
pendently of the trial court’s determination.
4. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. The Fourth Amendment guarantees
the right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure.
5. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Investigative Stops: Search and Seizure. An
investigative stop is limited to brief, nonintrusive detention during a frisk for
weapons or preliminary questioning.
6. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Investigative Stops: Probable Cause. An investi-
gatory stop must be justified by objective manifestation that the person stopped
is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. In determining what
cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, the totality of the circum-
stances—the whole picture—must be taken into account.
7. Criminal Law: Eyewitnesses: Presumptions. A citizen informant who has per-
sonally observed the commission of a crime is presumptively reliable.
8. Criminal Law: Eyewitnesses: Words and Phrases. A citizen informant is a citi-
zen who purports to have been the witness to a crime who is motivated by good
citizenship and acts openly in aid of law enforcement.
9. Criminal Law: Eyewitnesses: Search and Seizure. Information from a reliable
citizen informant may be accepted as true in order to justify a brief detention to
determine whether or not a crime has been committed, is being committed, or is
about to be committed.
10. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Investigative Stops: Probable Cause. An investi-
gative stop, like probable cause, is to be evaluated by the collective information
of the police engaged in a common investigation.
11. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Eyewitnesses: Probable Cause. A third-party
report of suspected criminal activity must possess sufficient indicia of reliability
to form the basis of an officer’s reasonable suspicion.
12. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Arrests: Probable Cause. The existence of prob-
able cause justifying a warrantless arrest is tested by the collective information
possessed by all the officers engaged in a common investigation.
13. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Investigative Stops: Probable Cause. Under the
collective- or imputed-knowledge doctrine, information known to all of the police
officers acting in concert can be examined when determining whether the officer
initiating the stop had reasonable suspicion to justify a stop pursuant to Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 l. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
Appeal from the District Court for Saline County, viCky
l. JohnSon, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court
for Saline County, J. patriCk mCarDle, Judge. Judgment of
District Court affirmed.
Kirk E. Naylor, Jr., for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Kimberly A. Klein for
appellee.
44 	280 NEBRASKA REpoRTS

heaviCan, 	C.J., 	Wright, 	C onnolly, 	gerrarD, 	Stephan,
mCC ormaCk, and miller-lerman, JJ.
Wright, J.
NATURE oF CASE
Jon D. Wollam was charged with driving under the influence
of alcohol (second offense), refusal to submit to a preliminary
breath test, refusal to submit to a chemical test, child abuse,
and having an open container of alcohol in a vehicle. He
moved to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop, alleging
that the stop was not supported by a reasonable suspicion. The
Saline County Court overruled the motion. Wollam was subse-
quently convicted of refusal to submit to a preliminary breath
test and refusal to submit to a chemical test. He appealed to the
Saline County District Court, which affirmed his convictions
and sentences.
SCopE oF REVIEW
[1,2] Both the district court and the Nebraska Supreme
Court generally review appeals from the county court for error
appearing on the record. State v. Royer, 276 Neb. 173, 753
N.W.2d 333 (2008). In an appeal of a criminal case from the
county court, the district court acts as an intermediate court of
appeal, and as such, its review is limited to an examination of
the county court record for error or abuse of discretion. Id.
[3] In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to sup-
press based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment,
we apply a two-part standard of review. Regarding historical
facts, we review the trial court’s findings for clear error. But
whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment pro-
tections is a question of law that we review independently of
the trial court’s determination. State v. Nuss, 279 Neb. 648, 781
N.W.2d 60 (2010).
FACTS
on march 7, 2008, the lancaster County emergency dis-
patch center telephoned the emergency dispatch center in Crete,
Nebraska, to relay information received about a drunk driver.
The call was answered by Dawn Edmonds, an officer with the
Crete police Department. The lancaster County dispatcher
STATE v. WollAm 	45
Cite as 280 Neb. 43

stated that she had received a report from a woman that her
husband was driving drunk. The dispatcher said the driver had
left Hallam, Nebraska, 30 minutes earlier and was on his way
to Crete High School to pick up his children. The dispatcher
described the vehicle as a white “dually” pickup with signs on
the sides that said “JW Electric.” It was believed that the driver
would travel on Highway 33.
As a result of the call, Edmonds and officer Brian Stork
drove toward Crete High School, and on their way, they
observed a vehicle matching the description received earlier.
Stork made a U-turn to follow the truck and activated the patrol
car’s overhead emergency lights to stop the truck.
Stork approached the driver and asked him to get out of the
vehicle and move to the rear of the truck. The driver was iden-
tified as Wollam, and his two sons were in the vehicle. Both
Stork and Edmonds reported noticing an odor of alcohol emit-
ting from Wollam’s person. Stork administered the horizontal
gaze nystagmus field sobriety test. Based on the report from
the lancaster County dispatch center, observation of the odor
of alcohol, and indicators of impairment on the field sobriety
test, Stork believed Wollam was under the influence of alcohol.
Wollam refused to submit to a preliminary breath test. He was
read the postarrest chemical test advisement and asked to pro-
vide a blood sample. He refused and was arrested.
Wollam was charged with driving under the influence of
alcohol (second offense), refusal to submit to a preliminary
breath test, refusal to submit to a chemical test, child abuse,
and possessing an open alcoholic beverage container. He
moved to suppress any evidence gathered as a result of the
stop, arguing that the stop was not supported by a reason-
able suspicion, based upon articulable facts, that the motor
vehicle was being operated in violation of the law. Wollam
claimed the stop violated his rights under the 4th and 14th
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the
Nebraska Constitution.
During the suppression hearing, the State offered exhibit 1,
which is a recording of the call from the lancaster County dis-
patch center to the Crete dispatch center. Wollam had no objec-
tion, and the trial court received the exhibit. After testimony
46 	280 NEBRASKA REpoRTS

from Edmonds and Stork, Wollam offered exhibit 2 into evi-
dence, which is a recording of the call from Wollam’s wife to
the lancaster County dispatch center. The parties stipulated
to the authenticity of the recording. The State objected to the
relevance of the recording, and the court received the exhibit
“subject to relevancy.”
The trial court overruled the motion to suppress. It found
that the officers, relying on a report relayed to them by the
lancaster County dispatch center, located Wollam’s vehicle
near the location mentioned in the report. The description of
the vehicle was consistent with the report. The court found that
the officers received what they believed to be a valid report
upon which they should act and did so. The court concluded
the officers had a sufficient articulable reason to effectuate
a stop.
At trial, the State offered exhibits 1 and 2, along with exhibit
3, which was Stork’s police report of the incident. Wollam stip-
ulated that the police report accurately reflected what Stork’s
testimony would be at trial. Wollam stated that the stipulation
was subject to his objection that the traffic stop was illegal.
The trial court received exhibits 1, 2, and 3 without objection.
The court noted that Wollam had preserved his objection to the
traffic stop.
Wollam was found guilty of refusal to submit to a prelimi-
nary breath test and refusal to submit to a chemical test. He
was ordered to pay fines totaling $500 and was placed on pro-
bation for 12 months.
Wollam appealed his convictions and sentences to the dis-
trict court. He alleged the county court erred in overruling his
motion to suppress. The district court remanded the cause to
the county court to determine whether the county court had
taken exhibit 2 into consideration in its ruling on Wollam’s
motion to suppress. Exhibit 2 had been received at the suppres-
sion hearing subject to the State’s objection based on relevancy.
The record did not indicate whether the county court ruled
on the relevancy objection. However, exhibit 2 was admitted
at trial without objection. In response to the district court’s
request, the county court stated that exhibit 2 was irrelevant
for purposes of the motion to suppress and that, therefore,
STATE v. WollAm 	47
Cite as 280 Neb. 43

the county court had not considered it in ruling on the motion
to suppress.
The district court found that the initial telephone call about
the drunk driver was not anonymous, because it came from
Wollam’s wife and she was accountable for her report. She
described the vehicle in detail and reported where the vehicle
could be found. The description of the vehicle was verified by
law enforcement.
The district court concluded that the most important indi-
cia of reliability was the motivation the informant had to tell
the truth to protect her children from harm should they get in
the vehicle with a potentially drunk driver. The court found,
based on the totality of the circumstances, that there was suf-
ficient reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of
Wollam’s vehicle. The district court affirmed the judgment and
sentences of the county court. Wollam appeals.
ASSIGNmENT oF ERRoR
Wollam asserts, summarized and restated, that the district
court erred in affirming the county court’s order overruling his
motion to suppress.
ANAlYSIS
[4] The issue framed by the district court was whether the
telephone call from Wollam’s wife to the lancaster County
dispatch center was sufficient to allow the officers to effectuate
a stop within the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The
Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of unrea-
sonable search and seizure. State v. Royer, 276 Neb. 173, 753
N.W.2d 333 (2008). This guarantee requires that an arrest be
based upon probable cause and limits investigatory stops to
those made upon an articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Id., citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 l. Ed.
2d 889 (1968).
Wollam argues that the evidence obtained from the stop of
his vehicle should have been suppressed because the officers
did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to sup-
press based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment,
48 	280 NEBRASKA REpoRTS

we apply a two-part standard of review. Regarding historical
facts, we review the trial court’s findings for clear error. But
whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment pro-
tections is a question of law that we review independently of
the trial court’s determination. State v. Nuss, 279 Neb. 648, 781
N.W.2d 60 (2010).
The record before us contains recordings of the call to the
lancaster County dispatch center (exhibit 2) and the call to the
Crete dispatch center (exhibit 1). These exhibits were offered
and received at trial without objection. Both are relevant to our
determination whether the police had a reasonable suspicion to
stop Wollam’s vehicle. We therefore summarize the important
parts of each call.
In exhibit 2, the caller to the lancaster County dispatch
center identified herself by name and as Wollam’s wife. She
stated that her husband had “just left here” and was “incred-
ibly drunk.” She added, “We’re in the middle of a divorce.”
She stated that her husband was driving a white GmC dually
pickup truck and that he was going to pick up their children
at the Crete High School. She did not know the license plate
number but knew that the truck had “JW Electric” on its sides.
She described the route Wollam would take, and she provided
her telephone number. In exhibit 1, the lancaster County dis-
patch center then called the Crete dispatch center to advise of
the report from a woman who stated that her husband was driv-
ing drunk. The dispatcher relayed the description of the truck
and the route it would be traveling.
The Crete police officers did not observe any illegal activ-
ity on Wollam’s part. They were acting solely on the report
from the lancaster County dispatch center that a white dually
pickup was being driven to Crete High School by a driver who
was intoxicated.
The issue is whether the calls described in exhibits 1 and 2
provided sufficient foundation to give the officers reasonable
suspicion to stop the vehicle. Wollam argues that an anony-
mous report of a drunk driver, including a description of the
vehicle, is not sufficient to justify a stop of the vehicle unless
the investigating officer observes independent evidence to sug-
gest that the driver is impaired.
STATE v. WollAm 	49
Cite as 280 Neb. 43

[5,6] An investigative stop is “‘limited to brief, non-intrusive
detention during a frisk for weapons or preliminary question-
ing.’” State v. Van Ackeren, 242 Neb. 479, 486, 495 N.W.2d
630, 636 (1993), quoting United States v. Armstrong, 722 F.2d
681 (11th Cir. 1984). While this type of encounter is consid-
ered a “seizure” and invokes Fourth Amendment safeguards,
“‘because of its less intrusive character [it] requires only that
the stopping officer have specific and articulable facts suf-
ficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion that a person has
committed or is committing a crime.’” Van Ackeren, 242 Neb.
at 486, 495 N.W.2d at 636.
“‘“[A]n investigatory stop must be justified by objective
manifestation that the person stopped is, has been, or is
about to be engaged in criminal activity. In determining
what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a per-
son, the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture
— must be taken into account. . . .”’”
Id. at 497, 495 N.W.2d at 642. “‘“‘The assessment of the total-
ity of circumstances includes all of the objective observations
and considerations, as well as the suspicion drawn by a trained
and experienced police officer by inference and deduction that
the individual stopped is or has been or is about to be engaged
in criminal behavior. . . .’”’” Id. (emphasis omitted). An officer
is not required to wait until a crime has occurred before mak-
ing an investigative stop. Id.
[7] We have held that the factual basis for a stop “need
not arise from the officer’s personal observation, but may be
supplied by information acquired from another person. When
the factual basis is supplied by another, the information must
contain sufficient indicia of reliability. A citizen informant who
has personally observed the commission of a crime is pre-
sumptively reliable.” State v. Bowley, 232 Neb. 771, 773, 442
N.W.2d 215, 217 (1989).
In the case at bar, the information came from a reliable
citizen informant. The call came from the wife of the person
driving the vehicle. The caller gave her name, identified her-
self as Wollam’s wife, and provided her telephone number.
She reported that her husband was “incredibly drunk,” and she
50 	280 NEBRASKA REpoRTS

described his truck and the route he would take to get to Crete
High School.
[8] A “citizen informant” is “a citizen who purports to
have been the witness to a crime who is motivated by good
citizenship and acts openly in aid of law enforcement.” State v.
Lammers, 267 Neb. 679, 686, 676 N.W.2d 716, 724 (2004).
Unlike the police tipster who acts for money, leniency, or
some other selfish purpose, the citizen informant’s only
motive is to help law officers in the suppression of crime.
. . . Unlike the informant who acts out of self-interest, the
citizen informant is without motive to exaggerate, falsify,
or distort the facts to serve his or her own ends.
Id. at 687, 676 N.W.2d at 724.
In Bowley, supra, a police officer was flagged down by two
people on a motorcycle who reported that a pickup behind
them had attempted to force them off the road. The motorcycle
riders identified the pickup as it drove past while they were
talking to the officer. The driver of the pickup was arrested for
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. He sought to sup-
press the evidence obtained as a result of the stop.
We held in Bowley, supra, that while the informants were
unidentified until after the driver was stopped, the informa-
tion from the motorcycle riders was presumptively reliable.
We stated that the court balances several factors in determin-
ing whether an investigatory stop is reasonable. These factors
include the reliability and credibility of the informant, the
description of the vehicle, the officer’s observation of traf-
fic violations, and the timelag between the report of criminal
activity and the stop.
This court had previously considered similar factors in State
v. Ege, 227 Neb. 824, 420 N.W.2d 305 (1988). An employee of
a service station approached a police officer parked next to the
station. The employee pointed to a vehicle in a nearby park-
ing lot and told the officer that the driver had driven over the
curb near the front door of the station. The employee reported
that the driver had come into the station to purchase chew-
ing gum and that he smelled strongly of alcohol. The police
officer observed the vehicle start and stop three or four times
STATE v. WollAm 	51
Cite as 280 Neb. 43

in the parking lot and followed it for a short distance, but did
not observe any moving violations. on stopping the vehicle,
the officer noted slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol
on the driver’s breath. on appeal, the driver claimed the initial
stop was illegal.
We stated:
“The reliability of the informant varies from an anony-
mous telephone tipster to a known citizen’s face-to-face
meeting with police officers. The vehicle description var-
ies from minimal to very detailed. The reported location
of the vehicle varies from pinpoint accuracy to a general
direction of travel. The observation of traffic violations
ranges from none to several. The shorter the time lag, the
more likely the stop is valid.”
Id. at 827, 420 N.W.2d at 308 (emphasis supplied), quoting
State v. Warren, 404 N.W.2d 895 (minn. App. 1987).
In Ege, supra, there was a face-to-face conversation between
the informant and the officer and the informant identified
himself by name. The informant’s knowledge was based on
his observation of the defendant’s driving and an in-person
encounter with the defendant. We stated that the informant was
“of the most reliable type.” Id. at 827, 420 N.W.2d at 308.
We stated in State v. Bridge, 234 Neb. 781, 452 N.W.2d 542
(1990), that an investigatory stop may be justified even if the
law enforcement officer does not observe any erratic driving
or other traffic violations. In that case, the defendant went
to the police station to look for his dog. An officer directed
the defendant to pick up the dog from the pound. The officer
informed another officer that the defendant might be driv-
ing while under the influence and provided a description of
the defendant, his vehicle, and the license plate number. The
second officer drove to the pound, saw the defendant drive
into the parking lot, and questioned him when he came out of
the pound. The officer could smell alcohol on the defendant’s
breath and administered field sobriety tests. As a result of
the tests, the officer determined that the defendant was under
the influence of alcohol and arrested him. The defendant
challenged the stop and sought to suppress the results of his
urine test.
52 	280 NEBRASKA REpoRTS

on appeal, we found that the evidence established the arrest-
ing officer had a reasonable basis supported by sufficient facts
to justify his investigatory stop even though neither officer
observed any erratic driving or other traffic violations.
Because the purpose of an investigative stop “is to clarify
ambiguous situations, ‘even if it was equally probable that
the vehicle or its occupants were innocent of any wrong-
doing, police must be permitted to act before their reason-
able belief is verified by escape or fruition of the harm it
was their duty to prevent.’”
Id. at 784, 452 N.W.2d at 545, quoting 1 Wayne R. laFave
& Jerold H. Israel, Criminal procedure § 3.8 (West 1984).
“The State’s interest in preserving evidence and prevention of
crime in a case such as this outweighs the defendant’s [F]ourth
[A]mendment interests.” Bridge, 234 Neb. at 784, 452 N.W.2d
at 545, citing Wibben v. N.D. State Highway Com’r, 413
N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 1987).
[9] Information from a reliable citizen informant “may be
accepted as true in order to justify a brief detention to deter-
mine whether or not a crime has been committed, is being
committed, or is about to be committed.” Bridge, 234 Neb.
at 785, 452 N.W.2d at 546, citing People v. Willard, 183 Cal.
App. 3d Supp. 5, 228 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1986). In Willard, the
California court stated:
“The possibility of an innocent explanation does not
deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a reason-
able suspicion of criminal conduct. Indeed, the principal
function of his investigation is to resolve that very ambi-
guity and establish whether the activity is in fact legal
or illegal—to ‘enable the police to quickly determine
whether they should allow the suspect to go about his
business or hold him to answer charges.’”
183 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 10, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 898, quoting
In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 p.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr.
366 (1978).
Wollam claims that his wife had an ulterior motive in calling
law enforcement because they were in the process of getting a
divorce. This information was given to the lancaster County
dispatch center but was not conveyed to the Crete police
STATE v. WollAm 	53
Cite as 280 Neb. 43

officers. The officers knew only that the report of a drunk
driver came from a wife about her husband and that he was on
his way to pick up their children.
Wollam argues that the recording of the call from his wife to
the lancaster County dispatch center was improperly received
into evidence and that only the call from lancaster County to
Crete should have been considered. We disagree. Both calls
may be considered. Although Wollam offered the recording of
the call to lancaster County into evidence at the hearing on the
motion to suppress, and the State objected, it makes no differ-
ence in the result. Both calls are relevant to our analysis. At
trial, the State offered both recordings into evidence. Wollam
did not object but stated that the recordings were subject to his
claim that “this evidence” was illegally seized as a result of an
improper traffic stop. The trial court then received exhibits 1,
2, and 3.
In the case at bar, neither party objected to the recording
from Wollam’s wife to lancaster County when it was offered
at trial. The parties cannot now object to use of the recordings
to determine whether there was reasonable suspicion for the
traffic stop.
Wollam seems to argue that the information received by the
lancaster County dispatch center should not have been relied
on by the Crete police Department. We have held that “‘[a]
reasonably founded suspicion to stop a vehicle cannot be based
solely on the receipt by the stopping officer of a radio dispatch
to stop the described vehicle without any proof of the factual
foundation for the relayed message.’” State v. Soukharith, 253
Neb. 310, 321, 570 N.W.2d 344, 354 (1997), quoting State v.
Benson, 198 Neb. 14, 251 N.W.2d 659 (1977).
However, “if a flyer or bulletin has been issued on the
basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspi-
cion that the wanted person has committed an offense,
then reliance on that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to
check identification, to pose questions to the person, or
to detain the person briefly while attempting to obtain
further information.”
Soukharith, 253 Neb. at 321-22, 570 N.W.2d at 354, quoting
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 l.
Ed. 2d 604 (1985).
54 	280 NEBRASKA REpoRTS

[10] “Thus, it is irrelevant whether an officer making a stop
in reliance on a radio bulletin is aware of the factual founda-
tion for the bulletin, so long as the factual foundation is suffi-
cient to support a reasonable suspicion.” Soukharith, 253 Neb.
at 322, 570 N.W.2d at 354. We stated that if officers placing
information into a national computer system had articulable
facts sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion, an officer
making a stop can rely upon the computer report as the basis
for the stop. We held that “[a]n investigative stop, like prob-
able cause, is to be ‘evaluated by the collective information of
the police engaged in a common investigation.’” Id., quoting
State v. Van Ackeren, 242 Neb. 479, 495 N.W.2d 630 (1993).
See, also, Nauenburg v. Lewis, 265 Neb. 89, 655 N.W.2d
19 (2003).
In Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232, the Court stated, “The law
enforcement interests promoted by allowing one department
to make investigatory stops based upon another department’s
bulletins or flyers are considerable, while the intrusion on per-
sonal security is minimal.”
If a 911 emergency dispatch call has sufficient indicia of
reliability, it can supply the necessary objective basis for sus-
pecting criminal conduct. U.S. v. Cutchin, 956 F.2d 1216 (D.C.
Cir. 1992). In such a case, a dispatcher may alert other officers
by radio, and those officers may rely on the report, even though
they cannot vouch for it. Id. See, also, U.S. v. Kaplansky, 42
F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 1994) (officers could rely on dispatcher’s
conclusion about suspicious activity without inquiring into
basis of dispatcher’s knowledge).
[11] A third-party report of suspected criminal activity must
possess sufficient indicia of reliability to form the basis of
an officer’s reasonable suspicion. U.S. v. Fernandez-Castillo,
324 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003). A dispatcher’s knowledge
may be properly considered as part of the analysis of reason-
able suspicion. Id. In Fernandez-Castillo, a highway patrol
dispatcher who received a report of erratic driving from two
transportation department employees radioed the report to a
law enforcement officer. The officer stopped the vehicle even
though he did not personally observe any traffic violation. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the
STATE v. WollAm 	55
Cite as 280 Neb. 43

initial report possessed indicia of reliability to be taken into
consideration to determine whether the officer had reasonable
suspicion to stop the vehicle: The report described the suspect
car in detail, the officer met the car in exactly the place it
would be expected to travel based on the description given in
the report, and the officer could have reasonably concluded
that the report was based on observations made contemporane-
ously to the dispatch.
[12] The collective knowledge of a police officer has also
been applied to the determination of probable cause. “The exis-
tence of probable cause justifying a warrantless arrest, how-
ever, is tested by the collective information possessed by all the
officers engaged in a common investigation.” State v. Wegener,
239 Neb. 946, 949, 479 N.W.2d 783, 786 (1992). “Under this
‘collective knowledge’ doctrine, an officer who does not have
personal knowledge of any of the facts establishing probable
cause for the arrest may nevertheless make the arrest if the
arresting officer is merely carrying out directions of another
officer who does have probable cause.” Id.
In Wegener, supra, an officer was dispatched to a one-car
accident and suspected the driver had been drinking. The driver
was transported to a hospital. The officer investigated the acci-
dent and radioed the dispatcher to request that a second officer
go to the hospital to obtain a blood sample from the driver.
The second officer caused a sample of the driver’s blood to be
drawn and then arrested him for driving under the influence.
We held that “only an imprudent person could conclude other
than that [the driver] probably had been driving while under the
influence of alcohol,” based on the information obtained by the
two officers. Id. at 950, 479 N.W.2d at 786.
other courts have also adopted the imputed or collective
knowledge doctrine. Relying on United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 l. Ed. 2d 604 (1985), the Idaho
Court of Appeals stated, “An officer receiving a radio dispatch
may be expected to take the message at face value and act upon
it.” Wilson v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 136 Idaho 270, 275, 32 p.3d
164, 169 (Idaho App. 2001). “Whether the officer had the req-
uisite reasonable suspicion to detain a citizen is determined on
the basis of the totality of the circumstances, i.e., the collective
56 	280 NEBRASKA REpoRTS

knowledge of all those officers and dispatchers involved.” Id.
at 276, 32 p.3d at 170. See, also, State v. Carr, 123 Idaho
127, 844 p.2d 1377 (Idaho App. 1992) (collective knowledge
of police officers involved in investigation, including dispatch
personnel, may support finding of probable cause).
The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed whether a
dispatcher’s knowledge of the identity of an informant may be
imputed to the investigating officer. State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d
638 (N.D. 1994). The court held, “Where one officer relays
a directive or request for action to another officer without
relaying the underlying facts and circumstances, the directing
officer’s knowledge is imputed to the acting officer.” Id. at 643.
“Thus, an officer, who is unaware of the factual basis for prob-
able cause, may make an arrest upon a directive.” Id.
[13] “Under the ‘collective- or imputed-knowledge’ doc-
trine, information known to all of the police officers acting in
concert can be examined when determining whether the officer
initiating the stop had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry
stop.” People v. Ewing, 377 Ill. App. 3d 585, 593, 880 N.E.2d
587, 595, 316 Ill. Dec. 851, 859 (2007). “[I]f the officer initiat-
ing the stop relies on a dispatch, the officer who directed the
dispatch must have possessed sufficient facts to establish prob-
able cause to make the arrest.” Id. at 594, 880 N.E.2d at 595,
316 Ill. Dec. at 859.
In Ewing, supra, the dispatcher gave the officers the make,
model, color, and license plate of the vehicle; told the officers
that the vehicle contained two male occupants; and told the
officers the direction the vehicle would be traveling. The court
stated, “[C]alls made to a police emergency number are con-
sidered more reliable than other calls because the police have
enough information to identify the caller even if the caller does
not give his or her name.” Id. at 595, 880 N.E.2d at 596, 316
Ill. Dec. at 860.
Where a nonanonymous caller reports a reckless, erratic,
or drunk driver, the police must be permitted to stop the
reported vehicle without having to question the caller
about the specific details that led him or her to call
so long as the nonanonymous tip has a sufficient indi-
cia of reliability. Reckless and erratic drivers are likely
STATE v. WollAm 	57
Cite as 280 Neb. 43

impaired, and such drivers present an imminent danger to
other motorists. A police officer should not have to wait
to observe such driver commit a traffic violation or obtain
specific details supporting the caller’s conclusion before
stopping the reported vehicle.
Id. at 597, 880 N.E.2d at 597-98, 316 Ill. Dec. at 861-62.
The investigatory stop in this case was based on a report
from an emergency dispatch center to another law enforcement
agency. The dispatcher conveyed that a woman had reported
her husband was driving under the influence of alcohol. The
husband was on his way to pick up their children. The woman
was concerned for the children’s safety. She provided the
lancaster County dispatch center with her name and telephone
number, a detailed description of the truck, and the direction in
which it was traveling.
The lancaster County dispatch center relayed all the infor-
mation to the Crete police officers, except that the caller
and the driver were in the middle of a divorce. The Crete
police officers had sufficient information and were within their
authority to rely on it and take action. The officers were not
required to personally observe erratic driving by Wollam. The
information from the lancaster County dispatch center could
be imputed to the Crete police Department, even though every
detail was not conveyed.
The information had sufficient indicia of reliability. Although
the Crete police officers did not observe any traffic violation,
such observation is not required when the totality of the cir-
cumstances is taken into consideration.
We find no error on the record of the county court. Its order
overruling Wollam’s motion to suppress was correct. The inves-
tigatory stop did not violate Wollam’s constitutional rights. our
independent review confirms that the district court was correct
in affirming the county court’s judgment.
CoNClUSIoN
The judgment of the district court, which affirmed the judg-
ment of the county court, is affirmed.
affirmeD.
58 	280 NEBRASKA REpoRTS