Pittman v. Western Engineering Co.

DaviD P ittman, aPPellant, v. Western engineering
C omPany, inC., anD evert Falkena , aPPellees.
813 N.W.2d 487
Filed May 25, 2012. 	No. S-11-584.
1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will affirm a lower
court’s granting of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or as to the ultimate
inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. ____: ____. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was
granted, and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible
from the evidence.
3. Statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
4. Appeal and Error. An appellate court resolves questions of law independently of
the trial court.
5. Statutes: Appeal and Error. In examining the language of a statute, its language
is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not
resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are
plain, direct, and unambiguous.
6. ____: ____. The rules of statutory interpretation require an appellate court to give
effect to the entire language of a statute, and to reconcile different provisions of
the statute so that they are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.
7. Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Error. In construing a statute, an
appellate court’s objective is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent
of the enactment.
8. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Components of a series or collection of statutes
pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and should be conjunc-
tively considered and construed to determine the intent of the Legislature, so that
different provisions are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.
9. Statutes: Legislature: Presumptions: Judicial Construction. In determining
the meaning of a statute, the applicable rule is that when the Legislature enacts a
law affecting an area which is already the subject of other statutes, it is presumed
that it did so with full knowledge of the preexisting legislation and the decisions
of the Supreme Court construing and applying that legislation.
Appeal from the District Court for Lincoln County: D onalD
e. roWlanDs, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert O. Hippe, of Robert Pahlke Law Group, P.C., L.L.O.,
for appellant.
Dean J. Sitzmann and Krista M. Carlson, of Wolfe, Snowden,
Hurd, Luers & Ahl, L.L.P., for appellees.
PITTMAN v. WeSTeRN eNGINeeRING CO. 	913
Cite as 283 Neb. 913
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:43 AM CST

H eaviCan, C.J., WrigHt, C onnolly, stePHan, mCC ormaCk ,
and miller-lerman, JJ.
miller-lerman, J.
NATURe OF CASe
David Pittman, the appellant, brought a negligence action
against Western engineering Company, Inc. (Western), and
evert Falkena (collectively, the appellees) in the district court
for Lincoln County. The case stems from the death of David’s
wife, Robin Pittman, who died in a work-related accident while
working for Western on a road construction crew. David’s sole
theory of liability is bystander negligent infliction of emotional
distress. In considering the appellees’ motion for summary
judgment, the district court determined, inter alia, that David’s
action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Nebraska
Workers’ Compensation Act and dismissed David’s complaint
with prejudice. David appeals.
We conclude that David’s negligence action is barred by the
exclusivity provisions of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation
Act. David accepted payment, thereby releasing Western, and
his action against Western is barred by operation of Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 48-148 (Reissue 2010); this employer immunity extends
to Falkena, a fellow employee of Robin, under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 48-111 (Reissue 2010). We affirm the district court’s order
which granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees and
dismissed the action.
STATeMeNT OF FACTS
On September 8, 2009, Robin was working as an employee
of Western doing road construction on a project resurfac-
ing Interstate 80 near Chappell, Nebraska. One of Western’s
semi-trailer trucks was hauling material for work on the proj-
ect, when the left dual wheels of the sixth axle on the trailer
broke loose from the left back axle of the trailer. The dual
wheels rolled down the center median of the Interstate, where
they struck and killed Robin. Falkena worked for Western
and is alleged to have negligently maintained the semi-trailer
truck. The parties agree that at the time of her death, Robin
was acting in the scope of her employment, and that Robin’s
914 	283 NebRASKA RePORTS

death arose out of, and in the course of, her employment
with Western.
David was located less than a mile away when he was noti-
fied to go to the scene of the accident. David also worked for
Western. David arrived at the scene shortly after the accident
and saw that Robin was dead. In his complaint, David alleges
that the fatal injuries to Robin caused immediate and extreme
mental anguish and shock to David and caused emotional dis-
tress to David so severe that no reasonable person should be
expected to endure it.
David accepted workers’ compensation payments as Robin’s
surviving spouse and dependent. Western and its insurance
carrier paid David, as Robin’s dependent, weekly death ben-
efits of $602.32. Western also paid $6,000 in burial expenses.
After David had received death benefits for approximately
38 weeks, Western, Western’s insurer, and David filed in the
Workers’ Compensation Court an “Application for an Order
Approving Lump Sum Settlement and Release.” The applica-
tion stated that Western and its insurer would pay a lump sum
of $400,000 to David and that David would no longer receive
workers’ compensation death benefits by reason of the death
of Robin. The application further stated that David could
decline the settlement and proceed to trial. The application
stated that upon payment of the $400,000, the parties agreed
Western and its insurer would be “fully discharged from all
further liability under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation
laws, as amended[,] on account of the fatal accident of
9/8/2009 to Robin . . . , and shall be entitled to a duly exe-
cuted release.”
In 	its 	June 	28, 	2010, 	order, 	the 	Nebraska 	Workers’
Compensation Court approved the parties’ application, find-
ing that the application was in conformity with the Nebraska
Workers’ Compensation Act. The court stated that Western
and its insurer were to pay David $400,000, as described in
the application, and that Western and its insurer were ordered
“discharged from all further liability on account of the accident
and injuries of 9/8/2009.”
David subsequently brought this negligence case against
the appellees in district court. He alleged bystander negligent
PITTMAN v. WeSTeRN eNGINeeRING CO. 	915
Cite as 283 Neb. 913

infliction of emotional distress against Western, based upon his
shock upon arrival at the scene of the accident, where he saw
Robin’s body. See Catron v. Lewis, 271 Neb. 416, 712 N.W.2d
245 (2006) (describing bystander negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress). David sought damages for emotional injuries
from Western; he also alleged that Falkena was negligent in
relation to the accident and sought damages therefor. David did
not allege that he suffered any physical injury. David asks for
no damages for loss of financial support, services, comfort, or
companionship due to the death of Robin. The sole basis for
his claim is common-law negligence.
The appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, and a
hearing was held on June 6, 2011. In its “Journal entry and
Order” filed June 13, from which this appeal is taken, the
district court determined that the cause of action set forth in
the complaint was barred by the exclusivity provisions in the
Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act. Accordingly, the district
court dismissed David’s complaint with prejudice.
The district court also stated that the lump-sum settle-
ment which David entered into with Western and its insurer
constituted a full and final release of all claims or causes
of action which David sustained by reason of the death of
Robin. Therefore, the court additionally determined that the
“Settlement and Release” barred David’s claim. The court again
determined to dismiss David’s complaint with prejudice.
The district court also commented on whether David’s claim
was derivative of Robin’s injuries and indicated that
[i]f [the] Court is incorrect in its analysis of the exclu-
sivity rule under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation
Act, or the release and lump sum settlement filed by
[David] in the Workers’ Compensation Court, then there
is still the issue of whether the fellow servant rule bars
the cause of action alleged by [David and] there are gen-
uine issues of material fact [regarding the source of duty
owed David].
Given these comments, the court stated that if it was incor-
rect in its conclusion that David’s action was barred by the
exclusivity provisions of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation
Act, speaking hypothetically, it would not be able to enter
916 	283 NebRASKA RePORTS

summary judgment in favor of the appellees and against David.
Nevertheless, the action was dismissed.
David appeals.
ASSIGNMeNTS OF eRROR
David generally claims, restated and summarized, that the
district court erred when it sustained the appellees’ motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
David claims in particular that the district court erred when
it concluded that the exclusivity provisions of the Nebraska
Workers’ Compensation Act bar David’s negligence claim filed
in district court and when it additionally determined that David
released the appellees from his negligence claim of bystander
negligent infliction of emotional distress when he accepted the
lump-sum settlement representing the dependent’s benefits from
the death of Robin under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation
Act. David also assigns error to the district court’s further
comments in which it considered whether bystander negligent
infliction of emotional distress is derivative of the claim of the
person seriously injured or killed and whether David’s claim
against Falkena is barred by the fellow-servant rule.
because there is no merit to David’s initial and controlling
assignment of error and we conclude that the district court cor-
rectly concluded that David’s claim was barred by the exclu-
sivity provisions of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act,
we do not address David’s additional assignments of error
regarding the district court’s comments regarding the deriva-
tive or nonderivative nature of his claim and issues related to
the fellow-servant rule. See In re Trust Created by Hansen,
281 Neb. 693, 798 N.W.2d 398 (2011) (stating that appel-
late court is not obligated to engage in analysis that is not
necessary to adjudicate case and controversy before it, and
thus need not address issue that is not material to disposition
of appeal).
STANDARDS OF ReVIeW
[1,2] An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s grant-
ing of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evi-
dence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from
PITTMAN v. WeSTeRN eNGINeeRING CO. 	917
Cite as 283 Neb. 913

those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Doe v. Board of Regents, ante p. 303, 809
N.W.2d 263 (2012). In reviewing a summary judgment, an
appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable
to the party against whom the judgment was granted, and gives
that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible
from the evidence. Id.
[3,4] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
Downey v. Western Comm. College Area, 282 Neb. 970, 808
N.W.2d 839 (2012). An appellate court resolves questions of
law independently of the trial court. Id.
ANALYSIS
Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act
and Claims of the Parties.
The district court concluded in its order filed June 13,
2011, that the exclusivity provisions of the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Act barred David’s claim and dismissed the case
with prejudice. Although unnecessary to the disposition of the
case, it further commented that if the case was not barred and
its dismissal was in error, then there were questions of fact
regarding the details of various matters which could preclude
summary judgment. because we conclude that the exclusivity
provisions of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act bar
David’s claims, the district court correctly dismissed the action
and we affirm.
The initial issue before the district court was whether
David’s claims were barred. David contends for a variety of
reasons that his claims against the appellees in district court
are not barred and that therefore the dismissal by the district
court was error. He points out that with the exception of first
responders such as firefighters, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-101.01
(Reissue 2010), purely psychological damages are not recover-
able under the definition of “injury” in the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-151(4) (Reissue 2010).
See Zach v. Nebraska State Patrol, 273 Neb. 1, 727 N.W.2d
206 (2007) (determining that work-related injury caused by
mental stimulus was not compensable under Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Act, because injury caused by mental stimulus
918 	283 NebRASKA RePORTS

does not meet statutory requirement that compensable injury
involve violence to physical structure of body). David asserts
that his claim in district court is limited to emotional injuries,
which are not covered by the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation
Act, and asserts that “[s]ince emotional distress is not covered,
the . . . exclusivity provisions do not bar an employee’s tort
suit against his/her employer for bystander negligent infliction
of emotional distress.” brief for appellant at 7. This argument
suggests that David is suing Western as an employee. David
further contends that the injuries he claims did not arise from
the injuries suffered by Robin, but instead arose separately
and resulted solely from his shock of encountering the scene
of Robin’s death. He asserts that his negligence claim for
bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress is not deriv-
ative of Robin’s injuries. He contends that he has a freestand-
ing claim which he can bring in district court regardless of
whether he received a workers’ compensation recovery based
on Robin’s employment. He acknowledges that the payment
in the workers’ compensation case was made without regard
to negligence and that he would have to establish, inter alia,
a breach of a duty owed by the appellees to him to establish
negligence, were his bystander case to proceed.
The appellees claim that because David accepted payments
under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act, the district
court correctly concluded that David’s case was barred by
operation of the statutory exclusivity provisions of the act.
See §§ 48-111 and 48-148. They also note that David signed
a release in connection with his acceptance of the lump-sum
settlement and assert that subsequent lawsuits arising from
Robin’s accident are prohibited. The appellees contend that
David’s claims in district court are derivative of Robin’s and
barred by the exclusivity rule. The appellees sometimes empha-
size that David is an “employee” of Western and contend that
because he recovered money from his employer not based in
negligence, he cannot also seek a second recovery from his
employer in another forum based on negligence.
In their arguments, both parties sometimes refer to David’s
status as an “employee” of Western. Contrary to various argu-
ments asserted by both David and the appellees, we make clear
PITTMAN v. WeSTeRN eNGINeeRING CO. 	919
Cite as 283 Neb. 913

at this point in our analysis that David’s status as an employee
of Western is not relevant to the disposition of the exclusivity
issue before us.
We have previously determined that an individual can be
an employee of an entity but nevertheless sue that entity in
district court where the particular facts show that the suit in
district court is not covered under or barred by the Nebraska
Workers’ Compensation Act. See Skinner v. Ogallala Pub. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 262 Neb. 387, 631 N.W.2d 510 (2001) (noting that
event in question did not arise in course of employment). Here,
however, Robin’s death arose out of and in the course of her
employment, and David accepted payment under the Nebraska
Workers’ Compensation Act as her dependent. As explained
more fully below, it is David’s status as “surviving spouse”
and “dependent” who has accepted compensation and payment
under the act that bars him from pursuing the instant case in
the district court. His status as an “employee” of Western has
no bearing on the outcome of this case.
Our 	analysis 	is 	guided 	by 	the 	Nebraska 	Workers’
Compensation Act and jurisprudence thereunder. Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 48-110 (Reissue 2010) provides:
When employer and employee shall by agreement,
express or implied, or otherwise as provided in section
48-112 accept the provisions of the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Act, compensation shall be made for per-
sonal injuries to or for the death of such employee by
accident arising out of and in the course of his or her
employment, without regard to the negligence of the
employer, according to the schedule provided in such act,
in all cases except when the injury or death is caused by
willful negligence on the part of the employee. The bur-
den of proof of such fact shall be upon the employer.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-112 (Reissue 2010) provides that “all
contracts of employment shall be presumed to have been
made with reference and subject to the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Act. every such employer and every employee
is presumed to accept and come under such sections.”
In the present case, the outcome is controlled by §§ 48-111
and 48-148. These statutes are referred to as the “exclusivity”
920 	283 NebRASKA RePORTS

provisions of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act. See
Bennett v. Saint Elizabeth Health Sys., 273 Neb. 300, 729
N.W.2d 80 (2007).
Section 48-111 provides:
Such agreement or the election provided for in sec-
tion 48-112 shall be a surrender by the parties thereto
of their rights to any other method, form, or amount of
compensation or determination thereof than as provided
in the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act, and an
acceptance of all the provisions of such act, and shall
bind the employee himself or herself, and for compensa-
tion for his or her death shall bind his or her legal rep-
resentatives, his or her surviving spouse and next of kin,
as well as the employer, and the legal representatives of
a deceased employer, and those conducting the business
of the employer during bankruptcy or insolvency. For the
purpose of this section, if the employer carries a policy
of workers’ compensation insurance, the term employer
shall also include the insurer. The exemption from liabil-
ity given an employer and insurer by this section shall
also extend to all employees, officers, or directors of
such employer or insurer, but such exemption given an
employee, officer, or director of an employer or insurer
shall not apply in any case when the injury or death is
proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physi-
cal aggression of such employee, officer, or director.
Section 48-148 provides:
If any employee, or his or her dependents in case of
death, of any employer subject to the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Act files any claim with, or accepts any
payment from such employer, or from any insurance com-
pany carrying such risk, on account of personal injury,
or makes any agreement, or submits any question to the
Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court under such act,
such action shall constitute a release to such employer
of all claims or demands at law, if any, arising from
such injury.
We have previously explained that workers’ compensation
laws reflect a compromise between employers and employees.
PITTMAN v. WeSTeRN eNGINeeRING CO. 	921
Cite as 283 Neb. 913

Bassinger v. Nebraska Heart Hosp., 282 Neb. 835, 806 N.W.2d
395 (2011). Under these statutes, employees give up the com-
plete compensation that they might recover under tort law
in exchange for no-fault benefits that they quickly receive
for most economic losses from work-related injuries. Id. The
employer receives immunity from common-law suit. See id.
Quoting 	a 	treatise 	on 	workers’ compensation 	law, 	we
have noted:
“‘The reason for the employer’s immunity is the quid pro
quo by which the employer gives up his normal defenses
and assumes automatic liability, while the employee
gives up his right to commonlaw verdicts. This reason-
ing can be extended to the tortfeasor co-employee; he,
too, is involved in a compromise of rights. . . . [O]ne
of the things he is entitled to expect in return for what
he has given up is the freedom [from] the commonlaw
suits based on industrial accidents in which he is at
fault.’ . . .”
Peterson v. Cisper, 231 Neb. 450, 455-56, 436 N.W.2d 533,
536 (1989). See 6 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Workers’
Compensation Law § 111.03[2] (2011). It is within this statu-
tory and jurisprudential framework that we examine the appli-
cation of the exclusivity provisions of the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Act to the present case.
David’s Claim Against Western Is Barred.
Upon accepting payment as a dependent, by operation of
§ 48-148 of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act, David
released Robin’s employer, Western, from further claims aris-
ing from Robin’s injury. David signed a “Settlement and
Release” to the same effect. David’s action against Western
in district court is barred by employer immunity found in
§ 48-148.
Section 48-148 quoted earlier in this opinion refers to “depen-
dents” who accept payment from the employer. Dependent is
defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-124 (Reissue 2010), which
states, “The following persons shall be conclusively presumed
to be dependent for support upon a deceased employee: . . . a
husband upon a wife with whom he is living or upon whom
922 	283 NebRASKA RePORTS

he is actually dependent at the time of her injury or death
. . . .” Section 48-124 further provides, “When used as a
noun, the word dependent shall mean any person entitled to
death benefits.”
In this case, David is Robin’s only dependent under § 48-124.
As a dependent, David received weekly death benefits for
approximately 38 weeks from Western and its insurer. David
also entered into a “Lump Sum Settlement and Release” with
Western and its insurer. In the “Application for an Order
Approving Lump Sum Settlement and Release,” David states
that he understands that upon payment of the lump sum, “the
employer and its insurer . . . are fully discharged from all fur-
ther liability under the Nebraska Worker’s Compensation laws,
as amended[,] on account of the fatal accident on 9/8/2009 to
Robin.” The Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court’s order
of approval directed Western and its insurer to pay $400,000
to David. The order further stated that Western and its insurer
were discharged from all further liability on account of the
accident and injuries of September 8, 2009. Given the stat-
ute and his agreement, David is subject to the terms of the
Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act.
We 	have 	previously 	discussed 	the 	release 	afforded 	the
employer in § 48-148 of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation
Act in Edelman v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing, Inc., 189
Neb. 763, 205 N.W.2d 340 (1973). In Edelman, the plain-
tiff employee sustained personal injuries in the course of his
employment and received compensation benefits. Considering
a similar predecessor version of § 48-148, we noted that
§ 48-148 “is effective whether the Workmen’s Compensation
Act is voluntary, semi-voluntary, or compulsory.” 189 Neb. at
765, 205 N.W.2d at 341. In considering the “release” language
in § 48-148, we stated, “The payment of benefits and medical
expenses by statute released [the employer] from the present
claim [filed in district court].” 189 Neb. at 765, 205 N.W.2d at
341. As determined in Edelman, under § 48-148, the payment
and acceptance of benefits form a release.
In the present case, by virtue of the provisions of § 48-148
and the jurisprudence thereunder, as well as the settlement
and release, David “released” Western from the present claim.
PITTMAN v. WeSTeRN eNGINeeRING CO. 	923
Cite as 283 Neb. 913

David elected to accept benefits under the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Act. David signed a settlement and release which
incorporated Nebraska’s workers’ compensation laws. even
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to David, see
Doe v. Board of Regents, ante p. 303, 809 N.W.2d 263 (2012),
David has released Western.
Our conclusion that David has “released” Western and is
precluded from bringing the instant case under § 48-148 is
consistent with other authorities decided under similar stat-
utes. For example, in Phillips v. Unijax, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 942
(S.D. Ala. 1978), reversed on other grounds 625 F.2d 54 (5th
Cir. 1980), a widow brought a wrongful death action against
her deceased husband’s employer as a result of her husband’s
work-related death. Following her husband’s death, the widow
applied for and accepted workers’ compensation benefits. Id.
The court recognized that there was a factual issue of whether
the death of the employee arose out of and in the course of his
employment and that thus, the widow arguably had a choice
of remedies. Id. Whether the wrongful death claim was deriva-
tive was not discussed. However, the court determined that
because the widow chose to accept and retain benefits under
Alabama’s workers’ compensation act, she was bound by
the election and the act’s exclusivity provision precluded the
widow’s separate cause of action for wrongful death against
the employer. Id.
The terms found in § 48-148 are important for our analy-
sis. Section 48-148 applies to “any employee, or his or her
dependents in case of death, of any employer subject to the
Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act.” In this case, § 48-148
applies to David because Robin was an employee who died in
the course of her employment, David is Robin’s “dependent,”
and Western is an “employer” under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-106
(Reissue 2010). Section 48-148 goes on to provide that if
the dependent “accepts any payment from such employer” or
“makes any agreement,” then “such action shall constitute a
release to such employer of all claims or demands at law, if
any, arising from such injury.” David, as a dependent, accepted
“payment” from Western and its insurer. David’s tort action for
bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress is a “claim
924 	283 NebRASKA RePORTS

or demand at law.” David fits the preceding terms of a § 48-148
release. However, in an effort to avoid the employer immunity
effects of § 48-148, David contends that his present case did
not “arise” from Robin’s injuries as “arise” is used in § 48-148.
We disagree.
[5,6] We examine whether David’s claim for bystander negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress “aris[es] from such injury”
as that phrase is used in § 48-148, i.e., whether David’s claim
arose from Robin’s injury and is therefore barred by statute. In
examining the language of a statute, its language is to be given
its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will
not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statu-
tory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. AT&T
Communications v. Nebraska Public Serv. Comm., ante p. 204,
811 N.W.2d 666 (2012). The rules of statutory interpretation
require this court to give effect to the entire language of a stat-
ute, and to reconcile different provisions of the statute so that
they are consistent, harmonious, and sensible. Id. We conclude
that David’s claim arises from Robin’s injury and is barred by
the plain language of § 48-148.
Other courts construing similar statutes have concluded that
emotional distress claims brought by an injured employee’s
family member “arose” from the employee’s injury and are
therefore barred. In McLaughlin v. Stackpole Fibers Co., 403
Mass. 360, 530 N.e.2d 157 (1988), a widow brought a claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress against her deceased
husband’s employer after her husband had died in the course of
his employment. After her husband’s death, the widow applied
for and began to receive weekly compensation benefits under
the provisions of Massachusetts’ workers’ compensation act.
Id. The applicable Massachusetts statute, which is similar to
§ 48-148, provided:
“If an employee files any claim for, or accepts payment
of, compensation on account of personal injury under this
chapter, or makes any agreement, or submits to a hearing
before a member of the division under section eight, such
action shall constitute a release to the insured [employer]
or self-insurer of all claims or demands at law, if any,
arising from the injury.”
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Cite as 283 Neb. 913

403 Mass. at 361-62 n.3, 530 N.e.2d at 158-59 n.3. Another
Massachusetts statute provided, “‘Any reference to an employee
who has been injured shall, when the employee is dead, also
include his legal representatives, dependents and other persons
to whom compensation may be payable.’” Id. at 362 n.4, 530
N.e.2d at 159 n.4.
In McLaughlin, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
determined that it was clear that once the widow filed a claim
and received compensation under the act, “she was barred from
recovering in any actions against the employer for common
law claims arising from her husband’s injury.” 403 Mass. at
362, 530 N.e.2d at 159. In determining that the lower court
correctly dismissed the widow’s claim under the statute, the
court specifically stated that the widow’s common-law neg-
ligence “allegations of emotional distress arose from [her
husband’s] injury and ultimate death, and are therefore barred.”
Id. (emphasis supplied).
In Maney v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 303 Mont. 398, 15 P.3d
962 (2000), the Montana Supreme Court considered the con-
nection between the employee’s injury and the close relative’s
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Maney,
the mother of a deceased employee brought, inter alia, claims
for negligent infliction of emotional distress against her son’s
employer. The applicable Montana statute containing an exclu-
sive remedy provision stated:
“For all employments covered under the . . . Act . . .
the provisions of this chapter are exclusive. except as
provided in part 5 of this chapter for uninsured employ-
ers and except as otherwise provided in the . . . Act, an
employer is not subject to any liability whatever for the
death of or personal injury to an employee covered by
the . . . Act or for any claims for contribution or indem-
nity asserted by a third person from whom damages are
sought on account of such injuries or death. The . . . Act
binds the employee himself, and in case of death binds
his personal representative and all persons having any
right or claim to compensation for his injury or death, as
well as the employer and the servants and employees of
926 	283 NebRASKA RePORTS

such employer and those conducting his business during
liquidation, bankruptcy, or insolvency.”
303 Mont. at 402, 15 P.3d at 965 (emphasis supplied).
The Montana Supreme Court was asked to consider the
scope of the employer immunity from claims “‘on account
of such injuries or death [of the employee],’” under the just-
quoted statute. Id. The Montana Supreme Court stated that the
inquiry to be made in analyzing whether a third-party claim
for emotional distress was barred by the exclusivity provision
of Montana’s workers’ compensation act was whether it was
a claim for compensation “‘as a result of’” or “‘concern-
ing’” the employee’s death as those concepts are understood
under the immunity statute. 303 Mont. at 406, 15 P.3d at 968.
Thus, the court asked whether there was some “rational nexus”
between the mother’s claim and the injury to or death of the
employee son. Id.
In determining that there was a rational nexus between the
mother’s claim and her son’s death, the Montana Supreme
Court observed that whether the mother’s claim was indepen-
dent or derivative of her son’s injury was “not pertinent” to a
determination of whether her action was barred by the statutory
exclusive remedy provision. 303 Mont. at 405, 15 P.3d at 967.
The Montana Supreme Court stated that the mother’s claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress was
logically related to the underlying injury to, and death
of, [the employee]. In other words, had [the employee’s]
injury and death not occurred, [the mother’s] emotional
distress claims would not have arisen. Thus, her claims
arose as a result of—and directly concern—[the employ-
ee’s] compensable injury and death. . . . There is a clear
nexus between the injury to, and death of, [the employee]
and [the mother’s] emotional distress claim.
303 	Mont. 	at 	406, 	15 	P.2d 	at 	968 	(emphasis 	supplied).
Accordingly, the Montana Supreme Court found that the moth-
er’s claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of
Montana’s workers’ compensation act, and therefore affirmed
the district court’s decision which granted summary judgment
in favor of the employer. Maney, supra.
PITTMAN v. WeSTeRN eNGINeeRING CO. 	927
Cite as 283 Neb. 913

These cases are instructive as we consider § 48-148 and
analyze the present case. Similar to the analysis in Edelman
v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing, Inc., 189 Neb. 763, 205
N.W.2d 340 (1973), after Robin’s death, David accepted com-
pensation benefits from Western and its insurer, thereby releas-
ing Western. As in McLaughlin v. Stackpole Fibers Co., 403
Mass. 360, 530 N.e.2d 157 (1982), and Maney v. Louisiana
Pacific Corp., 303 Mont. 398, 15 P.3d 962 (2000), David’s
claim for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress
logically arises from Robin’s death because, as articulated by
the Montana Supreme Court in Maney, had Robin’s injury and
death not occurred, David’s emotional distress claims would not
have arisen. There is a clear, rational nexus between Robin’s
death and David’s claim, and thus David’s claims “aris[e] from
such injury” under § 48-148. based on the foregoing, under
§ 48-148, David’s claim against Western is barred because he
accepted compensation as Robin’s dependent, he settled and
released Western, and his claim arises from Robin’s injury and
death. The district court correctly concluded David’s claim
for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress against
Western was barred by the employer immunity provisions of
the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act.
David’s Claim Against Falkena Is Barred.
Having concluded that employer immunity bars David’s
action against Western, we next consider whether Falkena, the
coemployee of Robin, is also immune from David’s suit. We
conclude that the district court correctly concluded that David’s
claim against Falkena was barred, and we reject David’s assign-
ment of error to the contrary.
In determining whether David’s suit against Falkena is
barred, we look primarily to the language of § 48-111. Section
48-111 provides:
Such agreement or the election provided for in sec-
tion 48-112 shall be a surrender by the parties thereto
of their rights to any other method, form, or amount of
compensation or determination thereof than as provided
in the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act, and an
acceptance of all the provisions of such act, and shall
928 	283 NebRASKA RePORTS

bind the employee himself or herself, and for compen-
sation for his or her death shall bind his or her legal
representatives, his or her surviving spouse and next of
kin, as well as the employer, and the legal representa-
tives of a deceased employer, and those conducting the
business of the employer during bankruptcy or insol-
vency. For the purpose of this section, if the employer
carries a policy of workers’ compensation insurance,
the term employer shall also include the insurer. The
exemption from liability given an employer and insurer
by this section shall also extend to all employees, offi-
cers, or directors of such employer or insurer, but such
exemption given an employee, officer, or director of an
employer or insurer shall not apply in any case when
the injury or death is proximately caused by the willful
and unprovoked physical aggression of such employee,
officer, or director.
[7,8] In construing a statute, our objective is to determine
and give effect to the legislative intent of the enactment.
State v. Hernandez, ante p. 423, 809 N.W.2d 279 (2012).
Components of a series or collection of statutes pertaining
to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and should be
conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent
of the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent,
harmonious, and sensible. Id.
We have previously considered § 48-111. See Pettigrew
v. Home Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 312, 214 N.W.2d 920 (1974). In
Pettigrew, we noted that in 1965, the Nebraska Legislature
amended § 48-111 to include the sentence, “‘For the purpose
of this section, if the employer carries a policy of work-
men’s compensation insurance, the term employer shall also
include the insurer’ . . . .” 191 Neb. at 315, 214 N.W.2d at
922-23. We stated that with this amendment, the Legislature
intended to extend the immunity provided to the employer to
the employer’s workers’ compensation insurer. We observed
that the amendment “place[d] the insurer in the same situation
as the employer.” 191 Neb. at 315, 214 N.W.2d at 923.
In Pettigrew, an injured employee who had already received
workers’ compensation for injuries suffered in the course of
PITTMAN v. WeSTeRN eNGINeeRING CO. 	929
Cite as 283 Neb. 913

his employment brought an additional action in district court
against his employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier
to recover for the same injuries. Looking to the legislative his-
tory of § 48-111, we noted that the principal backer of the 1965
amendment testified before the legislative committee consider-
ing the bill, and stated that the bill was intended to eliminate
the possibility of the injured employee’s receiving an award
in a case under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act and
again from the insurance carrier in a separate action. Once
the employee had elected to receive workers’ compensation
benefits, the insurance carrier, like the employer, was immune
from liability to the employee for the same injuries. Therefore,
based on the language of § 48-111 and its legislative history,
this court determined in Pettigrew that the employee had no
cause of action in district court against the insurer and affirmed
the dismissal of the action.
[9] After 	Pettigrew 	was 	decided, 	§ 	48-111 	was 	again
amended, and the following sentence was added:
The exemption from liability given an employer and
insurer by this section shall also extend to all employees,
officers, or directors of such employer or insurer, but such
exemption given an employee, officer, or director of an
employer or insurer shall not apply in any case when the
injury or death is proximately caused by the willful and
unprovoked physical aggression of such employee, offi-
cer, or director.
See 1975 Neb. Laws, L.b. 227. In determining the meaning
of a statute, the applicable rule is that when the Legislature
enacts a law affecting an area which is already the subject of
other statutes, it is presumed that it did so with full knowl-
edge of the preexisting legislation and the decisions of the
Supreme Court construing and applying that legislation. River
City Life Ctr. v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 265 Neb. 723,
658 N.W.2d 717 (2003). Just as in Pettigrew, supra, where this
court construed the legislative intent of the 1965 amendment to
extend the immunity provided to the employer to the insurer,
we determine that after Pettigrew was decided, § 48-111 was
amended to extend employer immunity to fellow employees in
the absence of willful conduct by the employee.
930 	283 NebRASKA RePORTS

The Introducer’s Statement of Purpose for L.b. 227 states
that where workers’ compensation benefits had been sought,
Pettigrew had “upheld [the] legislative intent” to place the
insurer “in the same situation as the employer” and further
states that the purpose of the current bill was to extend such
immunity to fellow employees. Committee on Labor, 84th Leg.,
1st Sess. (Feb. 4, 1975). The Committee Statement observes
that “[i]t seems inconsistent . . . to permit an employee to sue
people working for the employer when he could not sue the
employer . . . .” Committee Statement, L.b. 227, Committee on
Labor, 84th Leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 5, 1975).
Section 48-111 provides that “[t]he exemption from liability
given an employer . . . shall also extend to all employees . .
. .” The extension of employer immunity to employees under
§ 48-111 means that where the employer is immune from
suit, in the absence of willful conduct, the employee is simi-
larly immune.
As Robin’s dependent, David accepted compensation ben-
efits from Robin’s employer and, as explained above, the
provisions of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act apply
to David. because David accepted these benefits, Robin’s
employer, Western, enjoys employer immunity from third-
party tort actions under § 48-148 and David’s suit against
Western is barred. Under § 48-111, this employer immu-
nity provided to Western extends to Robin’s fellow employee,
Falkena. Accordingly, David’s action against Falkena is barred.
The district court did not err when it determined that David’s
claim against Falkena was barred by the exclusivity provisions
of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act.
CONCLUSION
The district court correctly determined that David’s claims
against the appellees were barred by the exclusivity provisions
of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act, §§ 48-111 and
48-148. The district court sustained the appellees’ motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The district
court did not err in so ruling. Accordingly, we affirm.
aFFirmeD.
PITTMAN v. WeSTeRN eNGINeeRING CO. 	931
Cite as 283 Neb. 913